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Recursive to Authoritative DNS with Opportunistic Encryption
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Abstract

This document describes a use case and a method for a DNS recursive resolver to use opportunistic encryption (that is, encryption with optional authentication) when communicating with authoritative servers. The motivating use case for this method is that more encryption on the Internet is better, and opportunistic encryption is better than no encryption at all. The method here is optional for both the recursive resolver and the authoritative server. Nothing in this method prevents use cases and methods that can use, or require, authenticated encryption.

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[1.](#) Introduction

A recursive resolver using traditional DNS over port 53 may wish instead to use encrypted communication with authoritative servers in order to prevent passive snooping of its DNS traffic. The recursive resolver can use opportunistic encryption (defined in [[RFC7435](#)]) to achieve this goal.

This document describes a use case and a method for recursive resolvers to use opportunistic encryption. The use case is described in [Section 1.1](#). The method uses DNS-over-TLS [[RFC7858](#)] (DoT) with authoritative servers in an efficient manner; it is called "ADoT", as described in [[I-D.ietf-dnsop-rfc8499bis](#)]. ((A later version of this document will probably also describe the use of DNS-over-QUIC [[I-D.ietf-dprive-dnsquic](#)] (DoQ).))

Because opportunistic encryption means encryption with optional authentication, a resolver using the mechanism described here could achieve authenticated encryption with some authoritative servers,

depending on how authentication for ADoT is defined. To date, there have been no definition of how a resolver can take advantage of DNS features that require authentication of authoritative servers. If those advantages are defined in the future, this document would need to define the types of authentication for ADoT that would be allowed.

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[1.1.](#) Use Case

The use case in this document is recursive resolver operators who are happy to use TLS [[RFC8446](#)] encryption with authoritative servers if doing so doesn't significantly slow down getting answers, and authoritative server operators that are happy to use encryption with recursive resolvers if it doesn't cost much.

Both parties understand that using encryption costs something, but are willing to absorb the costs for the benefit of more Internet traffic being encrypted. The extra costs (compared to using traditional DNS on port 53) include:

- * Extra round trips to establish TCP for every session
- * Extra round trips for TLS establishment
- * Greater CPU use for TLS establishment
- * Greater CPU use for encryption after TLS establishment
- * Greater memory use for holding TLS state

[1.2.](#) Summary of Protocol

This protocol has four main parts. This summary gives an overview of how the work together.

- * A resolver that uses this protocol has a cache that it uses to know whether to attempt using ADoT with a particular authoritative server, as described in [Section 4](#).
- * A resolver fills its transport cache by discovering whether any authoritative server of interest uses encrypted DNS, as described in [Section 3](#).

- * If there is no entry for that server in the cache, or the cache says that the authoritative server doesn't support encrypted transport, the resolver uses classic DNS; otherwise, the resolver attempts to connect to the authoritative server with ADoT, as described in [Section 2](#).
- * If the TLS session is authenticated and the resolver has use for this authentication, the resolver can mark responses it gets as authenticated, as described in [Section 5](#). If the TLS session is not authenticated, the resolver treats the answers it receives as if they were received over classic DNS.

[1.3](#). Definitions

The terms "recursive resolver", "authoritative server", "ADoT", and "classic DNS" are defined in [[I-D.ietf-dnsop-rfc8499bis](#)].

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [BCP 14](#) [[RFC2119](#)] [[RFC8174](#)] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

[2](#). Method for Opportunistic Encryption

[RFC7435] defines opportunistic encryption. In this document, the only difference between normal TLS session establishment and opportunistic encryption is that the the TLS client (the recursive resolver) optionally authenticates the server. See [Section 5](#) for a fuller description of the use of authentication.

[2.1](#). Resolvers

A resolver following this protocol uses its transport cache (described in [Section 4](#)) to decide whether to use classic DNS or this protocol to contact authoritative servers. If the transport cache indicates that the authoritative server is known to support encrypted DNS, the resolver attempts to connect to it with ADoT on port 853.

The resolver is configured with a set of timeouts that it uses when it is setting up ADoT. This document does has suggested values for

those timeouts; they are marked here with ((timeout_)). Resolver software might use these suggested values for defaults, or might choose their own default values.

((The proposed default values here are based on research that I have done but not published. The research is expected to be published before IETF 110.))

The resolver MUST fall back to using classic DNS with a server if any of the following happens when using ADoT:

- * The resolver receives a TCP RST response
- * The resolver does not receive a reply to the TCP SYN message within timeout "timeout_syn"; the suggested default is .6 seconds
- * The resolver does not receive a reply to its first TLS message within timeout "timeout_tls_start"; the suggested default (which includes the TCP startup time) is 2.3 seconds

- * The TLS handshake gets a definitive failure
- * The TLS session is set up, but the resolver does not receive a response to its first DNS query in the TLS session within timeout "timeout_dns_answ"; the suggested default is 5 seconds (which includes the TCP and TLS startup times)
- * The TLS session fails for reasons other than for authentication, such as incorrect algorithm choices or TLS record failures

In any of those cases, the resolver needs to update its transport cache to indicate that the server is not currently available over DoT. The time-to-live value for that entry, "timeout_ttl", could be as long as the TTL on the NS RRset.

A resolver SHOULD keep a TLS session to a particular server open if it expects to send additional queries to that server in a short period of time, "timeout_hold_open". If the server closes the TLS session, the resolver can re-establish a TLS session if the version of TLS in use allows for session resumption.

[2.2.](#) Authoritative Servers

An authoritative server following this protocol SHOULD support an ADoT service at port 853 for each IP address on which it offers service for classic DNS on port 53.

A server MAY close a TLS connection at any time. For example, it can close the TLS session if it has not received a DNS query in a defined length of time, "timeout_dns_query". It can also close the TLS session after it sends a DNS response; however, it might also want to keep the TLS session open waiting for another DNS query from the resolver.

[3.](#) Discovering Whether an Authoritative Server Uses Encryption

A recursive resolver can discover whether an authoritative server supports ADoT by attempting to open a TLS session to port 853 of an IP address for the server. If the server completes the TLS handshake, the resolver can be fairly confident that the server supports ADoT.

((Note that there are likely better ways to do discovery. The DPRIVE WG requested that this version of this draft only specify port-probing. Future drafts might describe other methods, and how to use multiple methods at the same time for discovery, depending on what the WG chooses for discovery.))

The following are indications of failure for the ability to use ADoT with the server:

- * The resolver receives a TCP RST response
- * The resolver does not receive a reply to the TCP SYN message within timeout "timeout_syn"
- * The resolver does not receive a reply to its first TLS message within timeout "timeout_tls_start"
- * The TLS handshake gets a definitive failure

[4.](#) The Transport Cache

A recursive resolver that attempted to use encrypted transport every time it connected to any authoritative server would inherently be slower than one that did not. Similarly, a recursive resolver that made an external lookup of what secure transports every authoritative server supports each time it connected would also inherently be slower than one that did not. Recursive resolver operators desire to give answers to stub resolvers as quickly as possible, so neither of these two strategies would make sense.

Instead, recursive resolvers following the method described in this document MUST keep a cache of relevant information about how DNS-over-TLS is supported by authoritative servers. This is called a "transport cache" in this document. The relevant information could include things such as support for encryption, expected round-trip times, authentication mechanisms, and so on. The transport cache is likely to store both positive and negative information about a server's ability to support encrypted DNS.

The recursive resolver MUST look in its transport cache before sending DNS queries to an authoritative server. If there is no entry for an authoritative server in its transport cache, the recursive resolver MUST use classic DNS over port 53. It MAY then probe for encrypted transports, and cache that information for later connections.

This document explicitly does not mandate the contents of the transport cache. Different recursive resolver implementers are likely to have different cache structures based on many factors, such as research results, active measurements, secure protocols supported, and customer feedback. There will likely be different strategies for the time-to-live for parts of the transport cache, such as how often to refresh the data in the cache, how often to refresh negative data, whether to prioritize refreshing certain zones or types of zones, and

so on.

This document also explicitly doesn't mandate the strategy for filling transport caches. Some strategies might include one or more of "test NS entries from the main cache", "try to send a refresh query over ADoT", "use external data", "trust a third-party service for filling the transport cache", and so on.

There are no interoperability issues with different implementors making different choices for the contents and fill strategies of their transport caches, and having many different options available will likely cause the cache designs to get better over time.

5. Authentication

In the opportunistic encryption described here, there is no requirement, and no advantage, for the recursive resolver to authenticate the authoritative server because any certificate authentication failure does not prevent the TLS session from being set up. If it is easier programmatically for the recursive resolver to authenticate the authoritative server and then ignore the negative result for certificate authentication, than to just not authenticate, the recursive resolver MAY do that.

This document does not describe what to do with successful authentication of a ADoT TLS session. Some suggestions have been floated in the DPRIVE WG, but none have been written into drafts. If there later are reasons to note authentication of the server, resolvers following this protocol MAY use that authenticated data. ((Change this paragraph if the WG later defines DNS-related reasons to authenticate.))

Later protocols for encrypted resolver-to-authoritative communication might to require normal TLS authentication. Because of this, authoritative servers SHOULD use TLS certificates that can be used in authenticated TLS authentication, such as those issued by trusted third parties or self-issued certificates that can be authenticated with DANE [[RFC6698](#)] records. However, if an authoritative server does not care about the use cases for such future protocols, it MAY use self-issued certificates that cannot be authenticated.

6. Security Considerations

The method described in this document explicitly allows a stub to perform DNS communications over traditional unencrypted, unauthenticated DNS on port 53.

The method described in this document explicitly allows a stub to choose to allow unauthenticated TLS. In this case, the resulting communication will be susceptible to obvious and well-understood attacks from an attacker in the path of the communications.

7. Acknowledgements

Puneet Sood and Peter van Dijk contributed many ideas to early drafts of this document.

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8.1. Normative References

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