

Internet Draft
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S/MIME Version 3.1 Certificate Profile Addendum

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1. Overview

In light of the expiration of the primary RSA patent, it is proposed that the RSA algorithm replace the DSS and Diffie-Hellman as the MUST implement algorithms in the S/MIME profile. This draft will describe only the proposed changes to the S/MIME Version 3 Certificate Handling RFC [[SMIMEV3CERT](#)], and the rest of that RFC will remain identical.

1.1 Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [[MUSTSHOULD](#)].

1.2 Discussion of This Draft

This draft is being discussed on the "ietf-smime" mailing list. To subscribe, send a message to:
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2. Changes to the S/MIME Version 3 Certificate Handling RFC

The following changes to are proposed to [[SMIMEV3CERT](#)]:

1. [Section 4.3](#) is replaced with the following:

4.3 Certificate and CRL Signing Algorithms

Certificates and Certificate-Revocation Lists (CRLs) are signed by the certificate issuer. A receiving agent MUST be capable of verifying the signatures on certificates and CRLs made with md2WithRSAEncryption, md5WithRSAEncryption and sha-1WithRSAEncryption signature algorithms with key sizes from 512 bits to 2048 bits described in [PKCS#1V2].

A receiving agent MAY be capable of verifying the signatures on certificates and CRLs made with id-dsa-with-sha1 [[DSS](#)].

3. Security Considerations

The security considerations are the same as for [[SMIMEV3CERT](#)].

A. References

[SMIMEV3CERT] "S/MIME Version 3 Certificate Handling", [RFC 2632](#)

[DSS] NIST FIPS PUB 186, "Digital Signature Standard", 18 May 1994.

[MUSTSHOULD] "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", [RFC 2119](#)

[PKCS#1V2], "PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.0", [RFC 2437](#)

B. Acknowledgements

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C. Changes from last draft

Initial revision.

D. Author's address

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