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STIR Out of Band Architecture and Use Cases
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Abstract

The PASSport format defines a token that can be carried by signaling protocols, including SIP, to cryptographically attest the identify of callers. Not all telephone calls use Internet signaling protocols, however, and some calls use them for only part of their signaling path. This document describes use cases that require the delivery of PASSport objects outside of the signaling path, and defines architectures and semantics to provide this functionality.

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[1.](#) Introduction

The STIR problem statement [[RFC7340](#)] describes widespread problems enabled by impersonation in the telephone network, including illegal robocalling, voicemail hacking, and swatting. As telephone services are increasingly migrating onto the Internet, and using Voice over IP (VoIP) protocols such as SIP [[RFC3261](#)], it is necessary for these protocols to support stronger identity mechanisms to prevent impersonation. For example, [[I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis](#)] defines an

Identity header of SIP requests capable of carrying a PASSport [[I-D.ietf-stir-passport](#)] object in SIP as a means to cryptographically attest that the originator of a telephone call is authorized to use the calling party number (or, for native SIP cases, SIP URI) associated with the originator of the call. of the request.

Not all telephone calls use SIP today, however; and even those that do use SIP do not always carry SIP signaling end-to-end. Most calls from telephone numbers still traverse the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) at some point. Broadly, calls fall into one of three categories:

1. One or both of the endpoints is actually a PSTN endpoint.
2. Both of the endpoints are non-PSTN (SIP, Jingle, ...) but the call transits the PSTN at some point.
3. Non-PSTN calls which do not transit the PSTN at all (such as native SIP end-to-end calls).

The first two categories represent the majority of telephone calls associated with problems like illegal robocalling: many robocalls today originate on the Internet but terminate at PSTN endpoints. However, the core network elements that operate the PSTN are legacy devices that are unlikely to be upgradable at this point to support an in-band authentication system. As such, those devices largely cannot be modified to pass signatures originating on the Internet--or indeed any inband signaling data--intact. Even if fields for tunneling arbitrary data can be found in traditional PSTN signaling, in some cases legacy elements would strip the signatures from those fields; in others, they might damage them to the point where they cannot be verified. For those first two categories above, any in-band authentication scheme does not seem practical in the current environment.

But while the core network of the PSTN remains fixed, the endpoints of the telephone network are becoming increasingly programmable and sophisticated. Landline "plain old telephone service" deployments, especially in the developed world, are shrinking, and increasingly being replaced by three classes of intelligent devices: smart phones, IP PBXs, and terminal adapters. All three are general purpose computers, and typically all three have Internet access as well as

access to the PSTN. Additionally, various kinds of gateways increasingly front for legacy equipment. All of this provides a potential avenue for building an authentication system that implements stronger identity while leaving PSTN systems intact.

This capability also provides an ideal transitional technology while in-band STIR adoption is ramping up. It permits early adopters to use the technology even when intervening network elements are not yet STIR-aware, and through various kinds of gateways it may allow providers with a significant PSTN investment to still secure their calls with STIR.


This specification therefore builds on the PASSport [[I-D.ietf-stir-passport](#)] mechanism and the work of [[I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis](#)] to define a way that a PASSport object created in the originating network of a call can reach the terminating network even when it cannot be carried end-to-end in-band in the call signaling. This relies on a new service defined in this document that permits the PASSport object to be stored during call processing and retrieved for verification purposes.

[2.](#) Terminology


The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119](#) [[RFC2119](#)].

[3.](#) Operating Environments

This section describes the environments in which the proposed mechanism is intended to operate. In the simplest setting, Alice is calling Bob through some set of gateways and/or the PSTN. Both Alice and Bob have smart devices which can be modified, but they do not have a clear connection between them: Alice cannot inject any data into signaling which Bob can read, with the exception of the asserted destination and origination E.164 numbers. The calling party number might originate from her own device or from the network. These numbers are effectively the only data that can be used for coordination between the endpoints.



In a more complicated setting, Alice and/or Bob may not have a smart or programmable device, but one or both of them are behind a STIR-aware gateway that can participate in out-of-band coordination, as shown below:



In such a case, Alice might have an analog connection to her gateway/switch which is responsible for her identity. Similarly, the gateway would verify Alice's identity, generate the right calling party number information and provide that number to Bob using ordinary POTS mechanisms.

4. Dataflows

Because in these operating environments endpoints cannot pass cryptographic information to one another directly through signaling,

any solution must involve some rendezvous mechanism to allow endpoints to communicate. We call this rendezvous service a "call placement service" (CPS), a service where a record of call placement, in this case a PASSport, can be stored for future retrieval. In principle this service could communicate any information, but minimally we expect it to include a full-form PASSport that attests the caller, callee, and the time of the call. The callee can use the existence of a PASSport for a given incoming call as rough validation of the asserted origin of that call. (See [Section 9.1](#) for limitations of this design.)

There are roughly two plausible dataflow architectures for the CPS:

The callee registers with the CPS. When the caller wishes to place a call to the callee, it sends the PASSport to the CPS, which immediately forwards it to the callee.

The caller stores the PASSport with the CPS at the time of call placement. When the callee receives the call, it contacts the CPS and retrieves the PASSport.

While the first architecture is roughly isomorphic to current VoIP protocols, it shares their drawbacks. Specifically, the callee must maintain a full-time connection to the CPS to serve as a notification channel. This comes with the usual networking costs to the callee and is especially problematic for mobile endpoints. Indeed, if the

endpoints had the capabilities to implement such an architecture, they could surely just use SIP or some other protocol to set up a secure session; even if the media were going through the traditional PSTN, a "shadow" SIP session could convey the PASSport. Thus, we focus on the second architecture in which the PSTN incoming call serves as the notification channel and the callee can then contact the CPS to retrieve the PASSport.

[5.](#) Use Cases

The following are the motivating use cases for this mechanism. Bear in mind that just as in [[I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis](#)] there may be multiple Identity headers in a single SIP INVITE, so there may be multiple PASSports in this out-of-band mechanism associated with a single call. For example, a SIP user agent might create a PASSport

for a call with an end user credential, and as the call exits the originating administrative domain the network authentication service might create its own PASSporT for the same call. As such, these use cases may overlap in the processing of a single call.

5.1. Case 1: VoIP to PSTN Call

A call originates in the SIP world in a STIR-aware administrative domain. The local authentication service for that administrative domain creates a PASSporT which is carried in band in the call per [[I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis](#)]. The call is routed out of the originating administrative domain and reaches a gateway to the PSTN. Eventually, the call will terminate on a mobile smartphone that supports this out-of-band mechanism.

In this use case, the originating authentication service can store the PASSporT with the appropriate CPS for the target telephone number as a fallback in case SIP signaling will not reach end-to-end. When the destination mobile smartphone receives the call over the PSTN, it consults the CPS and discovers a PASSporT from the originating telephone number waiting for it. It uses this PASSporT to verify the calling party number.

5.2. Case 2: Two Smart PSTN endpoints

A call originates with an enterprise PBX that has both Internet access and a built-in gateway to the PSTN. It will immediately drop its call to the PSTN, but before it does, it provisions a PASSporT on the CPS associated with the target telephone number.

After normal PSTN routing, the call lands on a smart mobile handset that supports the STIR out-of-band mechanism. It queries the appropriate CPS over the Internet to determine if a call has been

placed to it by a STIR-aware device. It finds the PASSporT provisioned by the enterprise PBX and uses it to verify the calling party number.

5.3. Case 3: PSTN to VoIP Call

A call originates with an enterprise PBX that has both Internet access and a built-in gateway to the PSTN. It will immediate drop

the call to the PSTN, but before it does, it provisions a PASSport with the CPS associated with the target telephone number. However, it turns out that the call will eventually route through the PSTN to an Internet gateway, which will translate this into a SIP call and deliver it to an administrative domain with a STIR verification service.

In this case, there are two subcases for how the PASSport might be retrieved. In subcase 1, the Internet gateway that receives the call from the PSTN could query the appropriate CPS to determine if the original caller created and provisioned a PASSport for this call. If so, it can retrieve the PASSport and, when it creates a SIP INVITE for this call, add a corresponding Identity header per [\[I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis\]](#). When the SIP INVITE reaches the destination administrative domain, it will be able to verify the PASSport normally. Note that to avoid discrepancies with the Date header field value, only full-form PASSport should be used for this purpose. In subcase 2, the gateway does not retrieve the PASSport itself, but instead the verification service at the destination administrative domain does so. Subcase 1 would perhaps be valuable for deployments where the destination administrative domain supports in-band STIR but not out-of-band STIR.

5.4. Case 4: Gateway Out-of-band

A call originates in the SIP world in a STIR-aware administrative domain. The local authentication service for that administrative domain creates a PASSport which is carried in band in the call per [\[I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis\]](#). The call is routed out of the originating administrative domain and eventually reaches a gateway to the PSTN.

In this case, the originating authentication service does not support the out-of-band mechanism, so instead the gateway to the PSTN extracts the PASSport from the SIP request and provisions it to the CPS. (When the call reaches the gateway to the PSTN, the gateway might first check the CPS to see if a PASSport object had already been provisioned for this call, and only provision a PASSport if none is present).

Ultimately, the call may terminate on the PSTN, or be routed back to

the IP world. In the former case, perhaps the destination endpoints queries the CPS to retrieve the PASSporT provisioned by the first gateway. Or if the call ultimately returns to the IP world, it might be the gateway from the PSTN back to the Internet that retrieves the PASSporT from the CPS and attaches it to the new SIP INVITE it creates, or it might be the terminating administrative domain's verification service that checks the CPS when an INVITE arrives with no Identity header field. Either way the PASSporT can survive the gap in SIP coverage caused by the PSTN leg of the call.

6. Authorization for Storing and Retrieving PASSporTs

The use cases show a variety of entities accessing the CPS to store and retrieve PASSporTs. The question of how the CPS authorizes the storage and retrieval of PASSporT is thus a key design decision in the architecture.

The STIR architecture assumes that service providers and in some cases end user devices will have credentials suitable for attesting authority over telephone numbers per [[I-D.ietf-stir-certificates](#)]. These credentials provide the most obvious way that a CPS can authorize the storage and retrieval of PASSporTs. However, as use cases 3 and 4 in [Section 5](#) show, it may sometimes make sense for the entity storing or retrieving PASSporTs to be an intermediary rather than a device associated with either the originating or terminating side of a call, and those intermediaries often would not have access to STIR credentials covering the telephone numbers in question.

It is an explicit design goal of this mechanism to minimize the potential privacy exposure of using a CPS. Ideally, the out-of-band mechanism should not result in a worse privacy situation than in-band [[I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis](#)] STIR: for in-band, we might say that a SIP entity is authorized to receive a PASSporT if it is an intermediate or final target of the routing of a SIP request. As the originator of a call cannot necessarily predict the routing path a call will follow, an out-of-band mechanism could conceivably even improve on the privacy story. As a first step, transport-level security can provide confidentiality from eavesdroppers for both the storage and retrieval of PASSporTs.

6.1. Storage

For authorizing the storage of PASSporTs, the architecture can permit some flexibility. A CPS could adopt a policy where it will store any valid PASSporT - that is, the CPS could act as a limited verification service and validate the PASSporT, only storing it if the timestamp and signature are valid. In that case, it would not matter whether

the CPS received a PASSporT from the authentication service that created it or from an intermediary gateway downstream in the routing path as in case 4: so long as the PASSporT is valid, it would be stored.

[6.2.](#) Retrieval

For retrieval of PASSporTs, the story is a bit more complicated. Beyond using transport-level security when storing and retrieving PASSporTs, the architecture must include some way to constrain access to the PASSporTs stored at a CPS. How those constraints should operate depends on the semantics of the request used to retrieve PASSporTs. A retrieval request could have one of the following three semantics:

- a) Are there any current PASSporTs for calls originating from 1.111.111.1111?
- b) Are there any current PASSporTs for calls destined to 2.222.222.2222?
- c) Are there any current PASSporTs for calls originating from 1.111.111.1111 and destined to 2.222.222.2222?

Each of these three semantics results in very different properties for the architecture. If a CPS permitted just anyone to ask for all PASSporTs that happen to exist for current calls to or from a given telephone number, that would be an unacceptable privacy situation. Although on the surface semantic (c) may seem sufficiently strict, a particular adversary might only be interested in learning when one specific party calls another, and there are certainly cases in which that could pose a significant security risk. While a CPS could eventually refuse to answer repeated requests from a single device that is obviously polling to collect the state of calls in progress, more sophisticated adversaries could outwit any attempt to do source filtering on requests at the CPS.

The semantics of (a) or (b) vs. (c) could be very significant when the originating and destination numbers are for call centers or similar organizations that send or receive a vast amount of calls for a single number. In a case where many thousands of people are trying to call a number where tickets have just gone on sale, for example, it might be difficult using semantics (b) to sift through all of the call setup attempts in progress to find a PASSporT matching any particular call. A more narrow semantic like (c) would make it far easier.

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Sometimes the more narrow semantics of (c) can pose an obstacle to acquiring the right PASSporT, for example in call forwarding cases where retargeting of the request has occurred. Even using semantic (b) would be problematic if the PASSporT stored by the originating authentication service had a different original "dest". Mechanisms have been proposed for STIR to patch this by creating PASSporTs that record the diversion (see [[I-D.peterson-passport-divert](#)]), and potentially a CPS could store these additional PASSporT objects and supply them through the retrieval interface.

If we assume that the party retrieving PASSporTs from the CPS has a STIR credential attesting authority over the terminating number, then two more attractive mechanisms become possible: using authentication and encryption. Note however that in some use cases, like case 3 subcase 1 above, the retrieving party is an intermediary who would not have access to the necessary credentials. However, this might argue that subcase 1 should be disallowed for security reasons, and only subcase 2 should be permitted.

[6.2.1](#). Authentication

For any of the three proposed retrieval semantics, a CPS could authenticate a request to retrieve PASSporTs and only release PASSporTs that have a destination that matches the credential provided by the requestor. Per semantic (b), if a smart endpoint has a credential for 2.222.222.2222, it could send a request to the CPS signed with that credential to retrieve any PASSporTs for calls in progress to 2.222.222.2222. In this case, (a) and (c) have very similar semantics: when the requestor asks for (a), effectively they would receive only those PASSporTs coming from 1.111.111.1111 that are destined to 2.222.222.2222 - though perhaps in cases where the call had been forwarded, a CPS aware of the situation could understand that the new destination should be authorized to see the original PASSporT.

On balance, an approach along the lines of requiring authenticating requests with semantic (a) appears attractive as a direction for out-of-band.

[6.2.2.](#) Encryption

Some of the privacy risks on the retrieval side could potentially be mitigated with encryption. If all PASSporTs stored at a CPS were encrypted with a key belonging to the intended destination, then potentially the CPS could allow almost anyone to download PASSporTs using semantics (a) or (b) without much fear of compromising private information about calls in progress – provided that the CPS always provided at least one encrypted blob in response to a request, even

if there was no call in progress. It would also prevent the CPS itself from learning the contents of PASSporTs, and thus metadata about calls in progress, which would make the CPS a less attractive target for pervasive monitoring (see [\[RFC7258\]](#)). However, encrypting PASSporTs faces some substantial difficulties.

First, this requires the entity that stores the PASSporT to have access to a public key associated with the intended called party to be used to encrypt the PASSporT. Discovering this key would require some new service that does not exist today; depending on how the CPS is architected, however, some kind of key store or repository could be implemented adjacent to it, and perhaps even incorporated into its operation. This key discovery problem is compounded by the fact that there can potentially be multiple entities that have authority over a telephone number: a carrier, a reseller, an enterprise, and an end user might all have credentials permitting them to attest that they are allowed to originate calls from a number, say. PASSporTs might need to be encrypted with multiple keys in the hopes that one will be decipherable by the relying party.

Second, in call forwarding cases, the difficulties in managing the relationship between PASSporTs with the diversion extension [\[I-D.peterson-passport-divert\]](#) become more serious. The originating authentication service would encrypt the PASSporT with the public key of the intended destination, but when a call is forwarded, it may go to a destination that does not possess the corresponding private key. It would require special behavior on the part of the retargeting entity, and probably the CPS as well, to accommodate encrypted PASSporTs that show a secure chain of diversion.

Another side effect of encrypting PASSporTs before storing them is that the CPS can no longer validate the PASSporTs since it cannot in

fact read them. However, a CPS needs to know enough about PASSporTs so that it can respond to requests to retrieve them, whichever semantics are used - which means the CPS will always process some amount of metadata (even if some sort of hash function is used to index PASSporTs). Unless the storer of PASSporTs is authenticated, it may be possible for attackers to inject bogus PASSporTs into the system. Note however that merely injecting a bogus PASSporT into a CPS will not allow attackers to impersonate parties. That is because verification services trust a PASSporT based its own internal signature, not based on where the verification service found it. This is orthogonal to the current question of how the CPS authorizes an endpoint to acquire a PASSporT; though of course spamming a CPS with large numbers of bogus PASSporTs could cause a denial of service or similar problems with retrieval of PASSporTs.

[7.](#) Solution Architecture

In this section, we discuss a strawman architecture for providing the service described in the previous sections. This discussion is deliberately sketchy, focusing on broad concepts and skipping over details. The intent here is merely to provide a rough concept, not a complete solution.


[7.1.](#) Credentials and Phone Numbers

We start from the premise of the STIR problem statement [[RFC7340](#)] that phone numbers can be associated with credentials which can be used to attest ownership of numbers. For purposes of exposition, we will assume that ownership is associated with the endpoint (e.g., a smartphone) but it might well be associated with a provider or gateway acting for the endpoint instead. It might be the case that multiple entities are able to act for a given number, provided that they have the appropriate authority. [[I-D.ietf-stir-certificates](#)] describes a credentials system suitable for this purpose; the question of how an entity is determined to have control of a given number is out of scope for the current document.

[7.2.](#) Solution Architecture

An overview of the basic calling and verification process is shown

below. In this diagram, we assume that Alice has the number +1.111.111.1111 and Bob has the number +2.222.222.2222.



When Alice wishes to make a call to Bob, she contacts the CPS and stores a PASSport on the CPS. The CPS validates the PASSport before

indexing it so that it can be acquired with a request from Bob's number

Once Alice has stored the PASSporT, she then places the call to Bob as usual. At this point, Bob's phone would usually ring and display Alice's number (+1.111.111.1111), which is informed by the existing PSTN mechanisms for relaying a calling party number (i.e., the CIN field of the IAM). Instead, Bob's phone transparently contacts the CPS, authenticates itself, and requests any current PASSporTs for calls from Alice. The CPS responds with any such PASSporTs (assuming they exist). If such a PASSporT exists, and the verification service in Bob's phone validates it, then Bob's phone can then present the calling party number information as valid. Otherwise, the call is unverifiable. Note that this does not necessarily mean that the call is bogus; because we expect incremental deployment many legitimate calls will be unverifiable.

[7.3. Security Analysis](#)

The primary attack we seek to prevent is an attacker convincing the callee that a given call is from some other caller C. There are two scenarios to be concerned with:

The attacker wishes to impersonate a target when no call from that target is in progress.

The attacker wishes to substitute himself for an existing call setup as described in [Section 7.4](#).


If an attacker can inject fake PASSporT into the CPS or in the communication from the CPS to the callee, he can mount either attack. As PASSporTs should be digitally signed by an appropriate authority for the number and verified by the callee (see [Section 7.1](#)), this should not arise in ordinary operations. For privacy and robustness reasons, using TLS on the originating side when storing the PASSporT at the CPS is recommended.

The entire system depends on the security of the credential infrastructure. If the authentication credentials for a given number are compromised, then an attacker can impersonate calls from that number. However, that is no different from in-band [\[I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis\]](#) STIR.

[7.4](#). Substitution Attacks

All that receipt of the PASSporT from the CPS proves to the called party is that Alice is trying to call Bob (or at least was as of very recently) - it does not prove that any particular incoming call is

from Alice. Consider the scenario in which we have a service which provides an automatic callback to a user-provided number. In that case, the attacker can try to arrange for a false caller-id value, as shown below:



```

Call from CS (forged caller-id info) ----->
                                     Call from CS -----> X
                                     <----- Retrieve PASSporT
                                               for CS:Bob
                                     PASSporT for CS:Bob ----->
                                     [Ring phone with callerid = CS]

```

In order to mount this attack, the attacker contacts the Callback Service (CS) and provides it with Bob's number. This causes the CS to initiate a call to Bob. As before, the CS contacts the CPS to insert an appropriate PASSporT and then initiates a call to Bob. Because it is a valid CS injecting the PASSporT, none of the security checks mentioned above help. However, the attacker simultaneously initiates a call to Bob using forged caller-id information corresponding to the CS. If he wins the race with the CS, then Bob's phone will attempt to verify the attacker's call (and succeed since they are indistinguishable) and the CS's call will go to busy/voice mail/call waiting. Note: in a SIP environment, the callee might notice that there were multiple INVITEs and thus detect this attack.

8. Call Placement Service Discovery

In order for the two ends of the out-of-band dataflow to coordinate, they must agree on a way to discover a CPS and retrieve PASSporT objects from it based solely on the rendezvous information available: the calling party number and the called number. There are a number of potential service discovery mechanisms that could be used for this purpose. The means of service discovery may vary by use case.

Although the discussion above is written in terms of a single CPS, having a significant fraction of all telephone calls result in

storing and retrieving PASSporTs at a single monolithic CPS has obvious scaling problems, and would as well allow the CPS to gather metadata about a very wide set of callers and callees. These issues can be alleviated by operational models with a federated CPS; any

service discovery mechanism for out-of-band STIR should enable federation of the CPS function.

Some service discovery possibilities under consideration include the following:

If a credential lookup service is already available, the CPS location can also be recorded in the callee's credentials; an extension to [[I-D.ietf-stir-certificates](#)] could for example provide a link to the location of the CPS where PASSporTs should be stored for a destination.

There exist a number of common directory systems that might be used to translate telephone numbers into the URIs of a CPS. ENUM [[RFC6116](#)] is commonly implemented, though no "golden root" central ENUM administration exists that could be easily reused today to help the endpoints discover a common CPS. Other protocols associated with queries for telephone numbers, such as the TeRI [[I-D.peterson-modern-teri](#)] protocol, could also serve for this application.

Another possibility is to use a single distributed service for this function. VIPR [[I-D.rosenberg-dispatch-vipr-overview](#)] proposed a RELOAD [[RFC6940](#)] usage for telephone numbers to help direct calls to enterprises on the Internet. It would be possible to describe a similar RELOAD usage to identify the CPS where calls for a particular telephone number should be stored. One advantage that the STIR architecture has over VIPR is that it assumes a credential system that proves authority over telephone numbers; those credentials could be used to determine whether or not a CPS could legitimately claim to be the proper store for a given telephone number.

Future versions of this specification will identify suitable service discovery mechanisms for out-of-band STIR.

9. To Do

[Section 4](#) provides a broad sketch of an approach. In this section, we consider some areas for additional work. Readers can feel free to skip this section, as it is not necessary to get the flavor of the document.

9.1. Credential Lookup

In order to encrypt a PASSport (see [Section 6.2.2](#)), the caller needs access to the callee's credentials (specifically their public key). This requires some sort of directory/lookup system. This document does not specify any particular scheme, but a list of requirements would be something like:

Obviously, if there is a single central database and the caller and callee each contact it in real time to determine the other's credentials, then this represents a real privacy risk, as the central database learns about each call. A number of mechanisms are potentially available to mitigate this:

- Have endpoints pre-fetch credentials for potential counterparties (e.g., their address book or the entire database).

- Have caching servers in the user's network that proxy their fetches and thus conceal the relationship between the user and the credentials they are fetching.

Clearly, there is a privacy/timeliness tradeoff in that getting really up-to-date knowledge about credential validity requires contacting the credential directory in real-time (e.g., via OCSP). This is somewhat mitigated for the caller's credentials in that he can get short-term credentials right before placing a call which only reveals his calling rate, but not who he is calling. Alternately, the CPS can verify the caller's credentials via OCSP, though of course this requires the callee to trust the CPS's verification. This approach does not work as well for the callee's credentials, but the risk there is more modest since an attacker would need to both have the callee's credentials and regularly poll the database for every potential caller.

We consider the exact best point in the tradeoff space to be an open issue.

10. Acknowledgments

The ideas in this document come out of discussions with Richard Barnes and Cullen Jennings.

11. IANA Considerations

This memo includes no request to IANA.

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[12.](#) Security Considerations

This entire document is about security, but the detailed security properties depend on having a single concrete scheme to analyze.

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