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**Multiple Repository Publication Points support in the Resource Public  
Key Infrastructure (RPKI)  
draft-rogaglia-sidr-multiple-publication-points-00**

**Abstract**

The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) depends on Relying Parties (RP) ability to access its Trust Anchors' certificate specified in the different "Trust Anchor Locator (TAL)" files and the Repository Objects located at the Certificate Authorities (CA) repositories hosted in its respective publication point. This document updates [[RFC6490](#)] by allowing multiple URI associated to a single public key in a TAL file and introduces the concept of multiple repository publication point operators for every CA in the RPKI. This document provides also recommendation for the RP behavior when analyzing signed objects that include multiple publications points.

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## Table of Contents

<a href="#">1.</a>	Requirements notation . . . . .	<a href="#">3</a>
<a href="#">2.</a>	Introduction . . . . .	<a href="#">4</a>
<a href="#">3.</a>	Multiple Operators support in TAL files . . . . .	<a href="#">5</a>
<a href="#">3.1.</a>	Update to <a href="#">RFC 6490 Section 2.1</a> . . . . .	<a href="#">5</a>
<a href="#">3.2.</a>	Rules for Relying Parties (RP) . . . . .	<a href="#">5</a>
<a href="#">4.</a>	Multiple Operators support in Certificates . . . . .	<a href="#">7</a>
<a href="#">4.1.</a>	Rules for Relying Parties (RP) . . . . .	<a href="#">7</a>
<a href="#">5.</a>	IANA Considerations . . . . .	<a href="#">8</a>
<a href="#">6.</a>	Security Considerations . . . . .	<a href="#">9</a>
<a href="#">7.</a>	Acknowledgements . . . . .	<a href="#">10</a>
<a href="#">8.</a>	Normative References . . . . .	<a href="#">11</a>
	Authors' Addresses . . . . .	<a href="#">12</a>



## **1. Requirements notation**

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [[RFC2119](#)].

## 2. Introduction

When thinking on how to scale the RPKI repository system described in [\[RFC6481\]](#) CA operators have a number of options such as:

- o Give the content to a Content Delivery Network (CDN) to have the content distributed (as long as the CDN supports the access method for the CA, which at this time is rsync).
- o Copy the content to different Repository Publication Points around the globe (i.e. using [\[I-D.ietf-sidr-publication\]](#)) and load balance the content using different Domain Name System (DNS) techniques.

When using any of these scaling technique to a unique CA Repository Publication Point URI, there is a dependency in the resolution of a single Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN). Also, when a single operator manages a RPKI Repository Publication Point, it is possible to introduce circular dependencies when the Route Origin Authorization (ROA) signed objects for the Repository Publication Point IP addresses are hosted in servers that uses those same addresses. The idea of having multiple Repository Publication Points operators for a RPKI CA mitigates these risks and is complementary to any other scaling solution (as the ones described above).

The first thing that is needed is to add multiple URIs support for each Trust Anchor. [\[RFC6490\]](#) requires that each TAL file includes a unique URI. This document remove this requirement by allowing one or more URI for each public key in a TAL file.

A CA can add support for multiple Repository Publication Points operators by adding more than one respective object for the Authority Information Access (AIA), the Subject Information Access (SIA) and the CRL Distribution Points (CRLDP) and which is supported by [\[RFC5280\]](#) and [\[RFC6487\]](#) .

The addition of multiple Repository Publication Points operators for CAs in the RPKI introduces complexity for the RP. This documents provide some recommendations for RP implementors.



### 3. Multiple Operators support in TAL files

The idea of multiples operators support for a Trust Anchor certificate expressed on its TAL file is similar to the support for several Root Server operators in a DNS hints file.

An example of such a TAL file with 3 operators would be:

```
rsync://rpki.operator1.org/rpki/hedgehog/root.cer
rsync://rpki.operator2.net/rpki/hedgehog/root.cer
rsync://rpki.operator3.biz/rpki/hedgehog/root.cer
MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAovWQL2lh6knDx
GUG5hbtCXvvh4A0zjhDkSHlj22gn/1oiM9IeDATIwP44vhQ6L/xvuk7W6
Kfa5ygmqQ+xOZOWTWpCrUbqaQyPNxokuivzyvqVZVDec0Eqs78q58mSp9
nbtxmLRW7B67SJCBSzfa5XpVyXYEgYAJkk3fpmefU+AcxtxvvHB50VPIa
BfPcs80ICMgHQX+fphvute9XLxjfJKJWkhZqZ0v7pZm2uhkcPx1PMGcrG
ee0WSDC3fr3erLueagpiLsFjwwpX6F+Ms8vqz45H+DKmYKvPSstZjCCq9
aJ0qANT90tnfSDOS+aLRPjZryCnyvvBHxZXqj5YCGKtwIDAQAB
```

As we can see in this example, a RP would have different URI where to fetch the self-signed certificate for the trust anchor. In each location, the same result should be expected as all the URI share the same public key.

In order to increase in diversity, It is RECOMMENDED that different FQDN could be resolved to IP addresses included in ROA objects from different CAs and hosted in diverse Repository Publication Points.

#### 3.1. Update to [RFC 6490 Section 2.1](#)

The following text will replace the last paragraph on [Section 2.1 of RFC 6490](#):

The TAL is an ordered sequence of:

- 1) One or more rsync URI [[RFC5781](#)],
- 2) A <CRLF> or <LF> line break after each URI, and
- 3) A subjectPublicKeyInfo [[RFC5280](#)] in DER format [X.509], encoded in Base64 (see [Section 4 of \[RFC4648\]](#)).A

#### 3.2. Rules for Relying Parties (RP)

A RP can use different rules to select the URI from where fetch the Trust Anchor certificate. Some examples are:





- o Using the order provided in the TAL file
- o Selecting the URI randomly from the available list
- o Creating a prioritized list of URIs based on RP specific parameters such as connection establishment delay

If the connection to the preferred URI fails or the fetched certificate public key does not match the TAL public key, the RP SHOULD fetch the TA certificate from the next URI of preference.

#### **4. Multiple Operators support in Certificates**

The support for multiple operators in the RPKI Certificate Authority (CA) and End Entity (EE) certificates is supported as the [RFC 5082](#) allows multiple repository publication point operators as the SIA, AIA and CRLDP are implemented as sequences. Consequently, no changes are needed on the existing RPKI standard and this section could be considered informative.

In the case of the SIA extension, for each operator, the accessMethods for both the CA repository publication point and for the correspondent manifest needs to be added.

##### **4.1. Rules for Relying Parties (RP)**

A RP can use different rules to select the URI to fetch the different repository objects and when performing the validation.

When a RP needs to fetch one or more object from a list of possible URIs, it can chose the URI by adopting a locally defined rule that could be:

- o Using the order provided in the correspondent certificate
- o Selecting the URI randomly from the available list
- o Creating a prioritized list of URIs based on RP specific parameters such as connection establishment delay

If the connection to the preferred URI fails , the RP SHOULD fetch the repository objects from the next URI of preference.



## **5. IANA Considerations**

No IANA requirements

## **6. Security Considerations**

TBA

## **7. Acknowledgements**

TBA.

## 8. Normative References

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