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OAuth Transient Client Secret Extension for Public Clients
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Abstract

The OAuth 2.0 public client utilizing authorization code grant is susceptible to the code interception attack. This specification describe a mechanism that acts as a control against this threat.

Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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1. Introduction

Public clients in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] is suseptible to the "code" interception attack. The "code" interception attack is an attack that a malicious client intercepts the "code" returned from the authorization endpoint and uses it to obtain the access token. This is possible on a public client as there is no client secret associated for it to be sent to the token endpoint. This is especially true on some smartphone platform in which the "code" is returned to a redirect URI with a custom scheme as there can be multiple apps that can register the same scheme.

To mitigate this attack, this extension utilizes dynamically created client secret called transient client secret whose left hash is sent as a new authorization request parameter. The "code" obtained is then sent to the token endpoint with the transient client secret and the server compairs it with the previously received left hash of it so that it can perfom the proof of posession by the client.

2. Terminology

In addition to the terms defined in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749], this specification defines the following terms.

2.1. transient client secret

a cryptographically random string with big enough entropy that is used to correlate the authorization request to the token request

2.2. transient client secret hash

base64url encoding of the left most 128bit of SHA256 hash of transient client secret

3. Protocol

3.1. Client checks the server support

Before starting the authorization process, the client MUST make sure that the server supports this specification. It may be obtained out-of-band or through some other mechanisms such as the discovery document in OpenID Connect Discovery [OpenID.Discovery]. The exact mechanism on how the client obtains this information is out of scope of this specification.

The client that wishes to use this specification MUST stop proceeding if the server does not support this extension.

3.2. Client creates a transient client secret

The client then creates a transient client secret, "tcs", in the following manner.

tcs = high entropy cryptographic random string

NOTE: transient client secret MUST have high enough entropy to make it inpractical to guess the value.

3.3. Client sends the left hash with the authorization request

Then, the client calculates a transient client secret hash, "tcsh", the left hash of the "tcs" as follows where L is a function that calcualtes the base64url encoded left-most 128 bits of the binary input, and H is a SHA256 function.

tcsh = L (H (tcs))

The client sends the transient client secret hash with the following parameter with the OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] Authorization Request:

tcsh REQUIRED. transient client secret hash

3.4. Server returns the code

When the server issues a "code", it MUST associate the "tcsh" value with the "code" so that it can be used later.

Typically, the "tcsh" value is stored in encrypted form in the "code", but it could as well be just stored in the server in association with the code. The server MUST NOT include the "tcsh" value in the form that any entity but itself can extract it.

3.5. Client sends the code and the secret to the token endpoint

Upon receipt of the "code", the client sends the request to the token endpoint. In addition to the parameters defined in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749], it sends the following parameter:

tcs REQUIRED. transient client secret

3.6. Server verifies tcs before returning the tokens

Upon receipt of the request at the token endpoint, the server verifies it by calculating the transient client secret hash from "tcs" value and comparing it with the previously associated "tcsh". If they are equal, then the successful response SHOULD be returned. If the values are not equal, an error response indicating "invalid_grant" as described in section 5.2 of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] SHOULD be returned.

4. IANA Considerations

This specification makes a registration request as follows:

4.1. OAuth Parameters Registry

This specification registers the following parameters in the IANA OAuth Parameters registry defined in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749].

- Parameter name: tcs
- Parameter usage location: Access Token Request
- Change controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
- Specification document(s): this document
- Related information: None
- Parameter name: tcsh
- Parameter usage location: Authorization Request
- Change controller: OpenID Foundation Artifact Binding Working Group - openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net
- Specification document(s): this document
- Related information: None

5. Security Considerations

The security model relies on the fact that the transient client secret is not being disclosed in the front channel. It is vitally important to adhear to this principle. As such, the transient client secret has to be created in such a manner that it is cryptographically random and has high entropy that it is not practical for the attacker to guess, and if it is to be returned inside "code", it has to be encrypted in such a manner that only the server can decrypt and extract it.

6. Acknowledgements

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7. References

7.1. Normative References

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7.2. Informative References

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