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ASPA Verification in the Presence of Regionalized AS-Relationships

Abstract

This document proposes a method for ASPA verification in the Presence of Regionalized AS-Relationships.

Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

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1. Introduction

[RFC6811] defines a method for verifying the origin of BGP prefixes,
which can resolve the most common source AS hijacking. Autonomous
System Provider Authorization (ASPA) [I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-
verification] is a methodology to validate the entire AS path. ASPA
verification procedures use a shared signed database of customer-to-
provider relationships using a new RPKI object - Autonomous System
Provider Authorization (ASPA). This method relies heavily on the
accuracy of the shared signed database of customer-to-provider
relationships.

Currently, two ASes may have different relationships at different
interconnection points. For example:

```
                    Europe
          +----------------+
         /Customer Provider \
        /                    \
   AS1--+                      +--AS2
        \                    /
         \ Peer        Peer/
          +----------------+
                  Asia
```

Figure 1: Hybrid Relationship Case 1

Case 1) AS1 is AS2's customer in Europe, but AS1 and AS2 establish
P2P relationships in Asia;

```
                         Europe
                +----------------+
                /Customer Provider \
              /                      \
        AS3--+                        +--AS4
              \                      /
                \ Provider Customer/
                +----------------+
                        Asia
```

               Figure 2: Hybrid Relationship Case 2

Case 2) AS3 is AS4's customer in Europe, on the contrary, AS4 is
AS3's customer in Asia;

There are some other examples, not fully listed in this draft.

For case 1, AS1 signs one record ASPA (AS1, AFI, [AS2, ...]) per [I-
D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification].

```
                         Europe
                +----------------+
                /Customer Provider \
 Route P1             /                      \
Origin AS11 .. AS1--+                        +--AS2-- ... Check Point
          --->      \                      /   ---->
                      \ Peer       Peer/
                      +---------------+
                            Asia
                            ---->
```

    Figure 3: Problematic Use Case


As shown in Figure 3, the main processing steps per [I-D.ietf-
sidrops-aspa-verification] are as follows:

1) Check Point receives the Route P1, AS-Path: AS2 (via Asia Link)
AS1 ... AS11;

2) Check Point uses ASPA (AS1, AFI, [AS2, ...]) to validate AS-Pair
(AS1 AS2) Per the AS_PATH verification procedure defined in [I-
D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification], it will return the result
"Valid".

Actually here should return the result "Invalid", not the result "Valid", because the AS-Relationship between AS1 and AS2 in Asia is P2P, not C2P.

This problem arises because of the existence of regionalized AS-Relationships. This document proposes a method for ASPA verification in the Presence of Regionalized AS-Relationships.

2. **Definitions and Acronyms**

   *ASPA: Autonomous System Provider Authorization

   *C2P: Customer to Provider

   *OV: Origin Validation

   *P2C: Provider to Customer

   *P2P: Peer to Peer

   *RP: Relying Party

   *RPKI: Resource Public Key Infrastructure

3. **Regionalized AS-Relationships**

   This section discusses how to obtain regionalized AS-Relationships on routers.

   Option 1: Add a Region ID field to ASPA Object

   Each organization holds an AS number reports its C2P business relationship information to the RIR where it is located. The key information reported: the customer's AS number, the customer's provider AS number list (one or more), the region identifier, the region identifier is newly added by the present draft, and identifies the customer's business relationship with the one or more of its Providers in the same region is C2P. Each RIR maintains C2P business relationship information like maintaining ROA related information, when the region identifier is empty, it indicates that the business relationship between the Customer and the one or more of its Providers in all regions is C2P.

   RP (Relying Party) obtains all the C2P business relationship information from each RIR, and generates the ASPA Validation Database entries.

   RFC8210[RFC8210] RPKI-Router Protocol extension supports the ability to carry region identifier when delivering the ASPA Validation

Database to routers, and delivers the enhanced ASPA Validation
Database from RP to routers.

Option 2: Local Management of the enhanced C2P business
relationships

Locally, by analyzing the global Internet routing table and various
Internet public data, a regionalized C2P business relational
database is sorted out.

Option 3: TBD

By processing as above, AS1 signs one record ASPA (AS1, AFI, [AS2,
...], Europe).

4. Operations

Once we get the Regionalized AS-Relationships, the main processing
steps in section 1 (Figure 3) will be changed as follows:

1) Check Point receives the Route P1, AS-Path: AS2 (via Asia Link)
AS1 ... AS11;

2) Check Point uses ASPA (AS1, AFI, [AS2, ...], Europe) to validate
AS-Pair (AS1 AS2) Per the AS_PATH verification procedure [I-D.ietf-
sidrops-aspa-verification], because the ASPA record contains region
identifier information, further confirm which region the [AS1 AS2]
connection is in (we can use various tools such as TraceRoute etc.
This needs to be described in detail in next revision.), if we get
the region identifier information of the latter is different from
the ASPA records (In current case, what we get is Asia, not Europe),
then the ASPA verification will return the result "Invalid".

From the above processing results, we can see that the solution
proposed in this draft has worked and solved the problem described
in the second section.

5. IANA Considerations

No IANA actions are required for this document.

6. Security Considerations

This document does not change the security properties of RPKI and
ASPA.

7. Contributors

The following people made significant contributions to this
document:

TBD

8. Acknowledgements

TBD.

9. References

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