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The Security Evaluated Standardized Password Authenticated Key Exchange  
(SESPAKE) Protocol  
[draft-smyshlyayev-sespaKE-00](#)

## Abstract

This document specifies the Security Evaluated Standardized Password Authenticated Key Exchange (SESPAKE) protocol. The SESPANE protocol provides password authenticated key exchange for usage in the systems for protection of sensitive information. The security proofs of the protocol was made for the case of an active adversary in the channel, including MitM attacks and attacks with trials of impersonation as one of subjects.

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## [1. Introduction](#)

The current document contains the description of the password authenticated key exchange protocol SESPAKE (security evaluated standardized password authenticated key exchange) for usage in the systems for protection of sensitive information. The protocol is intended to use for establishment of keys that are then used for organization of secure channel for protection of sensitive information. The security proofs of the protocol was made for the case of an active adversary in the channel, including MitM attacks and attacks with trials of impersonation as one of subjects.

The protocol is based on the Russian national standards GOST R 34.10-2012 [[GOST3410-2012](#)] and GOST R 34.11-2012 [[GOST3411-2012](#)]. The English versions of these standards can be found in [[RFC7091](#)] and [[RFC6986](#)];

## [2. Conventions used in this document](#)

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [[RFC2119](#)].

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### 3. notations

This document uses the following parameters of elliptic curves in accordance with the GOST R 34.10-2012 [[GOST3410-2012](#)] standard:

- E an elliptic curve defined over a finite prime field GF(p), where  $p > 3$ ;
- p the characteristic of the underlying prime field;
- a, b the coefficients of the equation of the elliptic curve in the canonical form;
- m the elliptic curve group order;
- q the elliptic curve subgroup order;
- P generator of the subgroup of order q;
- X, Y the coordinates of the elliptic curve point in the canonical form;
- 0 zero point of the elliptic curve.

This memo uses the following functions:

H\_256(T) the value of the GOST R 34.11-2012 hash function (see [[RFC6986](#)]) with 256-bit output for a message T;

H\_512(T) the value of the GOST R 34.11-2012 hash function (see [[RFC6986](#)]) with 512-bit output for a message T;

HMAC(K,T) the 256-bit value of the function for calculating a message authentication code, based on a hash function in accordance with [[RFC2104](#)];

F(PW, salt, n) the value of the function PBKDF2(PW,salt,n,len), where PBKDF2(PW,salt,n,len) is calculated according to [[RFC2898](#)] using HMAC\_GOSTR3411\_2012\_512 defined in [[I-D.smyshlyaev-gost-usage](#)] as PRF function. The parameter len is considered equal to 256, if the order of the subgroup q is such that  $2^{254} < q < 2^{256}$ , and equal to 512, if  $2^{508} < q < 2^{512}$ .

This document uses the following terms and definitions for the sets and operations on the elements of these sets



$B_n$  the set of byte strings of size  $n$ ,  $n \geq 0$ , for  $n = 0$  the  $B_n$  set consists of a single empty string of size 0; if  $b$  is an element of  $B_n$ , then  $b = (b_1, \dots, b_n)$ , where  $b_1, \dots, b_n$  are elements of  $\{0, \dots, 255\}$ ;

$\text{int}(w')$  if the byte string  $w' = (w_1, \dots, w_l)$  is in  $B_l$ , then  $\text{int}(w')$  is an integer  $w = 256^{l-1}w_1 + \dots + 256^0w_l$ ;

$\text{INT}(w')$  if the byte string  $w' = (w_1, \dots, w_l)$  is in  $B_l$ , then  $\text{INT}(w')$  is an integer  $w = 256^{l-1}w_1 + \dots + 256^0w_l$ ;

$F(PW, \text{salt}, n)$  the value of the function  $\text{PBKDF2}(PW, \text{salt}, n, \text{len})$ , where  $\text{PBKDF2}(PW, \text{salt}, n, \text{len})$  is calculated according to [RFC2898] using  $\text{HMAC\_GOSTR3411\_2012\_512}$  defined in [I-D.smyshlyaev-gost-usage] as PRF function. The parameter  $\text{len}$  is considered equal to 256, if the order of the subgroup  $q$  is such that  $2^{254} < q < 2^{256}$ , and equal to 512, if  $2^{508} < q < 2^{512}$ .

$\|$  concatenation of byte strings  $A$  and  $C$ , i.e., if  $A$  in  $B_{n1}$ ,  $C$  in  $B_{n2}$ ,  $A = (a_1, a_2, \dots, a_{n1})$  and  $C = (c_1, c_2, \dots, c_{n2})$ , then  $A \| C = (a_1, a_2, \dots, a_{n1}, c_1, c_2, \dots, c_{n2})$  is an element of  $B_{(n1+n2)}$ ;

Byte representation of a point  $\{X, Y\}$  If  $\{X, Y\}$  is an elliptic curve point then the byte representation of  $\{X, Y\}$  is a concatenation of the coordinates of this point  $X \| Y$ ; the length of the bit representations of the coordinates  $X$  and  $Y$  is equal to the minimum possible length of the byte representation of the subgroup generator  $p$ .

## 4. Protocol description

The protocol is used by subjects A and B that are commencing key establishment with password-based authentication.

### 4.1. Protocol parameters

Various elliptic curves can be used in the protocol. For each elliptic curve the following values must be defined:

- o the curve identifier  $ID_{ALG}$ , that is a byte string of arbitrary length;
- o the point  $P$ , that is a generator point of the  $q$ -order group of the curve (the point MUST be generated with a "proven random generation" technique - similar to the technique described in [Section 5](#));

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- o the set of distinct curve points  $\{Q_1, Q_2, \dots, Q_N\}$ , where the total number of points  $N$  is defined for protocol instance. The method of generation of the points  $\{Q_1, Q_2, \dots, Q_N\}$  is described in [Section 5](#)).

The protocol parameters that are used by subject A are the following:

1. The secret password value  $PW$ , which is a byte string that is uniformly randomly chosen from a subset of cardinality  $10^{10}$  or greater of the set  $B_k$ , where  $k \geq 6$  is password length.
2. The list of curve identifiers supported by A.
3. Sets of points  $\{Q_1, Q_2, \dots, Q_N\}$ , corresponding to curves supported by A.
4. The  $C_{1^A}$  counter, that tracks the total number of unsuccessful authentication trials in a row, and a value of  $CLim_1$  that stores the maximum possible number of such events.
5. The  $C_{2^A}$  counter, that tracks the total number of unsuccessful authentication events during the period of usage of the specific  $PW$ , and a value of  $CLim_2$  that stores the maximum possible number of such events.
6. The  $C_{3^A}$  counter, that tracks the total number of authentication events (successful and unsuccessful) during the period of usage of the specific  $PW$ , and a value of  $CLim_3$  that stores the maximum possible number of such events. The identifier  $ID_A$  of subject A (optional), a byte string of an arbitrary length.

The protocol parameters that are used by subject B are the following:

1. The values  $ind$  and  $salt$ , where  $ind$  is in  $\{1, \dots, N\}$ ,  $salt$  is in  $\{1, \dots, 2^{128-1}\}$ .
2. The point  $Q_{PW}$ , satisfying the following equation:

$$Q_{PW} = \text{int}(F(PW, salt, 2000)) * Q_{ind}.$$

It is possible that the point  $Q_{PW}$  is not stored and is calculated using  $PW$  in the beginning of the protocol. In that case B has to store  $PW$  and points  $Q_1, Q_2, \dots, Q_N$ .

3. The  $ID_{ALG}$  identifier of the elliptic curve used in the protocol.



4. The  $C_{1^A}$  counter, that tracks the total number of unsuccessful authentication trials in a row, and a value of  $CLim_1$  that stores the maximum possible number of such events.
5. The  $C_{2^A}$  counter, that tracks the total number of unsuccessful authentication events during the period of usage of the specific PW, and a value of  $CLim_2$  that stores the maximum possible number of such events.
6. The  $C_{3^A}$  counter, that tracks the total number of authentication events (successful and unsuccessful) during the period of usage of the specific PW, and a value of  $CLim_3$  that stores the maximum possible number of such events. The identifier  $ID_A$  of subject A (optional), a byte string of an arbitrary length.

#### **4.2. Initial values of the protocol counters**

After the setup of a new password value PW the values of the counters must be assigned as follows:

- o  $C_{1^A} = C_{1^B} = CLim_1$ , where  $CLim_1$  is in  $\{3, \dots, 5\}$ ;
- o  $C_{2^A} = C_{2^B} = CLim_2$ , where  $CLim_2$  is in  $\{7, \dots, 20\}$ ;
- o  $C_{3^A} = C_{3^B} = CLim_3$ , where  $CLim_3$  is in  $\{10^3, \dots, 10^5\}$ .

#### **4.3. Protocol actions**

The described protocol consists of the following actions:

1. The values  $ind$  and  $salt$ , where  $ind$  is in  $\{1, \dots, N\}$ ,  $salt$  is in  $\{1, \dots, 2^{128-1}\}$ .
2. If any of the counters  $C_{1^A}$ ,  $C_{2^A}$ ,  $C_{3^A}$  is equal to 0, A finishes the protocol with an error that informs of exceeding the number of trials that is controlled by the corresponding counter.
3. A decrements each of the counters  $C_{1^A}$ ,  $C_{2^A}$ ,  $C_{3^A}$  by 1, requests open authentication information from B and sends the  $ID_A$  identifier.
4. If any of the counters  $C_{1^B}$ ,  $C_{2^B}$ ,  $C_{3^B}$  is equal to 0, B finishes the protocol with an error that informs of exceeding the number of trials that is controlled by the corresponding counter.
5. B decrements each of the counters  $C_{1^B}$ ,  $C_{2^B}$ ,  $C_{3^B}$  by 1.

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6. B sends the values of `ind`, `salt` and the `ID_ALG` identifier to A. All following calculations are done by B in the elliptic curve group defined by the `ID_ALG` identifier.
7. A sets the curve defined by the received `ID_ALG` identifier as the used elliptic curve. All following calculations are done by A in this elliptic curve group.
8. A calculates the point  $Q_{PW^A} = \text{int}(F(PW, \text{salt}, 2000)) * Q_{ind}$ .
9. A chooses randomly (according to the uniform distribution) the value `alpha`, `alpha` is in  $\{1, \dots, q-1\}$ , and assigns  $z_A=0$ .
10. A sends the value  $u_1 = \text{alpha} * P - Q_{PW^A}$  to B.
11. After receiving  $u_1$  B checks that  $u_1$  is in E. If it is not, B finishes with an error, considering the authentication process unsuccessful.
12. B calculates  $Q_B = u_1 + Q_{PW}$ , assigns  $z_B = 0$  and chooses randomly (according to the uniform distribution) the value `betta`, `betta` is in  $\{1, \dots, q-1\}$ .
13. If  $m/q * Q_B = 0$ , B assigns  $Q_B = P$  and  $z_B = 1$ .
14. B calculates  $K_B = H_{256}((m/q * \text{betta} \bmod q) * Q_B)$ , where the input of a hash function is a little-endian representation of the obtained point (x-coordinate first, then y-coordinate).
15. B sends the value  $u_2 = \text{betta} * P + Q_{PW}$  to A.
16. After receiving  $u_2$ , A checks that  $u_2$  is in E. If it is not, A finishes with an error, considering the authentication process unsuccessful.
17. A calculates  $Q_A = u_2 - Q_{PW^A}$ .
18. If  $m/q * Q_A = 0$ , then A assigns  $Q_A = P$  and  $z_A = 1$ .
19. A calculates  $K_A = H_{256}((m/q * \text{alpha} \bmod q) * Q_A)$ , where the input of a hash function is a little-endian representation of the obtained point (x-coordinate first, then y-coordinate).
20. A calculates  $\text{MAC}_A = \text{HMAC}(K_A, 0x01 \parallel ID_A \parallel ind \parallel salt \parallel u_1 \parallel u_2 \parallel DATA_A)$  and sends `DATA_A` || `MAC_A` to B, where `DATA_A` is an optional string that is authenticated with `MAC_A` (if it is not used, then `DATA_A` is considered to be of zero length).



21. B checks that the values MAC\_A and HMAC (K\_B, 0x01 || ID\_A || ind || salt || u\_1 || u\_2 || DATA\_A) are equal. If they are not, it finishes with an error, considering the authentication process unsuccessful.
22. If z\_B = 1, B finishes, considering the authentication process unsuccessful.
23. B sets the value of C\_1^B to CLim\_1 and increases C\_2^B by 1.
24. B calculates MAC\_B = HMAC(K\_B, 0x02 || ID\_B || ind || salt || u\_1 || u\_2 || DATA\_A || DATA\_B) and sends MAC\_B || DATA\_B to A, where DATA\_B is an optional string that is authenticated with MAC\_B (if it is not used, then DATA\_B is considered to be of zero length).
25. A checks that the values MAC\_B and HMAC (K\_A, 0x02 || ID\_B || ind || salt || u\_1 || u\_2 || DATA\_A || DATA\_B) are equal. If they are not, it finishes with an error, considering the authentication process unsuccessful.
26. If z\_A = 1, A finishes, considering the authentication process unsuccessful.
27. A sets the value of C\_1^A to CLim\_1 and increases C\_2^A by 1.

After the successful finish of the procedure the subjects A and B are mutually authenticated and each subject has an explicitly authenticated value of K = K\_A = K\_B.

**N o t e:**

1. Keys K\_A, K\_B in actions 13 and 18 are produced according to VKO\_GOSTR3410\_2012\_256, algorithm defined in [[I-D.smyshlyaev-gost-usage](#)].
2. If an optional parameter ID\_A (or ID\_B) is not defined, it SHOULD be considered equal to a fixed byte string (zero-length string is allowed) defined by a specific implementation.
3. The ID\_ALG parameter can be fixed or agreed in advance.
4. The ind, ID\_A, ID\_B and salt parameters can be agreed in advance. If some parameter is agreed in advance, it is possible not to send it during a corresponding action. Nevertheless, all parameters MUST be used as corresponding inputs to HMAC function HMAC during stages 19, 20, 23 and 24.



5. Continuation of protocol interaction in case of any of the counters  $C_1^A$ ,  $C_1^B$  being equal to zero MAY be done without changing password. In this case these counters can be used for protection against denial-of-service attacks. For example, continuation of interaction can be allowed after a certain delay.
6. Continuation of protocol interaction in case of any of the counters  $C_2^A$ ,  $C_3^A$ ,  $C_2^B$ ,  $C_3^B$  being equal to zero MUST be done only after changing password.

## **5. Construction of points $Q_1, \dots, Q_N$**

For a given elliptic curve  $E$  the algorithm of construction of each point  $Q_i$  in the set  $\{Q_1, \dots, Q_N\}$  that corresponds to this curve is based on choosing points with coordinates with known preimages of a cryptographic hash function:  $H_{256}$ , if the subgroup order  $q$  is such that  $2^{254} < q < 2^{256}$ , and  $H_{512}$ , if  $2^{508} < q < 2^{512}$ . The algorithm consists of the following steps:

1. Choose an arbitrary SEED value with length of 32 bytes or more.
2. Calculate  $X = \text{INT}(H_{\text{len}}(\text{SEED})) \bmod p$ .
3. Check that the value of  $X^3 + aX + b$  is a quadratic residue in the field  $F_p$ . If it is not, return to Step 1.
4. Choose the value of  $Y$  arbitrarily from the set  $\{\pm\sqrt{A}, -\sqrt{A}\}$ , where  $A = X^3 + aX + b$ . Here  $\sqrt{A}$  is an element of  $F_p$ , for which  $(\sqrt{A})^2 = A \bmod p$ .
5. Check that for point  $Q = (X, Y)$  the following relations hold:  $Q \neq 0$  and  $q*Q = 0$ . If they do not, return to Step 1.

With the defined algorithm for any elliptic curve  $E$  point sets  $\{Q_1, \dots, Q_N\}$  are constructed. Constructed points in one set MUST have distinct x-coordinates.

**N o t e:** The knowledge of hash function preimage prevents knowledge of the multiplicity of any point related to generator point  $P$ . It is of primary importance, because such a knowledge could be used to implement an attack against protocol with exhaustive search of password.

## **6. Acknowledgments**

We thank Lolita Sonina, Georgy Borodin, Sergei Agafin and Ekaterina Smyshlyaeva for their careful readings and useful comments.



## **7. Security Considerations**

This entire document is about security considerations.

## **8. Normative References**

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## Appendix A. Examples of points

There are three points ( $Q_1$ ,  $Q_2$ ,  $Q_3$ ) for each of the elliptic curves below. These points were constructed using the method described in [Section 5](#). The same method should be used for constructing, if necessary, additional points. Each of the points is represented by a pair of {X, Y} coordinates in the canonical form and by a pair of {U, V} coordinates in the twisted Edward form in accordance with the document [[I-D.smyshlyayev-gost-usage](#)] for the curves that have the equivalent representation in this form. There is a SEED value for each point, by which it was generated.

### [A.1 Curve id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet](#)

Point  $Q_1$

X= 0xa33ce065b0c23e1d3d026a206f8a1f8747ed1cd92a665bf85198cdb10ac90a5c

Y= 0xb00d0dc0733883f05de9f55fd711f55998f5508cc40bead80c913b4d5b533667

SEED:

```
f8 18 95 b4 13 69 d9 08 9e 3d 3c 56 e8 70 ba 5e
9d 55 5e 20 eb d9 c7 22 66 10 6d 79 c2 83 48 b8
ce 63 70 52 9a 82 9f 18 a4 d3 e3 fd 7b f2 dd 73
b1 1b bc d4 10 9d 27 c9 a3 d4 bd 3a 42 cc 26 ae
43 5b 52 f5 89 a4 c3 b7 61 c0 1b a2 88 b7 e0 8d
f9 4e 22 40 29 f3 aa 96 11 5c 43 f5 eb 87 99 70
```

Point  $Q_2$

X= 0x4ce9c2bcf17212b9efcab65c3c815c0ff96d7461c957634dbfd1fe7c9a324d27

Y= 0xf7500d7adea2c2b4a16d838a8faa02b46639eb881f124d0f2506efca0e24289d

SEED:

```
fd 99 6d bc c7 2e 49 a4 37 e7 49 a8 85 ad de 28
4b 58 64 bd 3b 7e 60 fc b5 2f c8 36 0e 0a bf 98
fd 35 7a 3f 98 c5 f6 20 c8 68 3d b2 ca b9 27 b6
13 f2 91 a1 52 45 c0 65 71 dc 62 b0 4f 2e e5 76
56 a9 fa 51 12 23 5d 0b 80 67 59 af e2 33 b1 09
6a 94 84 91 45 f2 18 50 65 b7 9b 86 ab 68 8a 39
```

Point  $Q_3$

X= 0x31fb8e5070b1e0f52f047f40477c38c6020fd8da9f685791f9237cc47bd89324

Y= 0x8ba1184a4e296dc5c5873639747339ecc71b7fa44d31cc8e35b6615a4f797dd7

SEED:

```
29 0c 12 66 47 91 2e de 11 cc 43 78 0c f8 87 d4
7d a1 63 bc fb 91 1d 92 86 2a ae 4f 53 a6 80 70
08 c1 ec 0c 8f e7 2e 0a a0 81 df a3 32 7c 86 ad
5f 24 da 28 a7 1d 07 f5 fd b7 61 31 a1 fb 04 d5
b2 31 c7 7f ca 26 d3 a6 42 99 9e 3b 10 74 b5 a7
b3 54 2f 03 b0 39 63 2a 6b 44 56 36 fb 52 8d 58
```

### [A.2 Curve id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet](#)

Point  $Q_1$

X= 0x0ad754474a915d9d706c6b8dc879858a1cb85cc8f6c148fc3120825393ecd394

Y= 0x68c33b6d0343cf72cb19666ffd487fa94294dc677b28c8e27ec36068ff85ed83

SEED:



```

78 1d 7d 85 ff 04 12 b9 92 a7 6e 65 37 dd 83 81
9b 81 2f fa bf e8 92 3c d0 12 fe dc 00 c4 96 69
f6 52 44 4d 38 9a f2 b2 6f 57 b5 3e 2d 0f 81 2e
db 2c f3 d6 a7 18 42 52 32 da 47 18 75 1e ec ef
8f 2b c5 03 17 fb 49 6f 02 05 d7 99 bc 3c 34 87
12 f5 1b d3 ef aa 7f f5 ba c2 52 07 80 46 34 77

```

**Point Q\_2**

X= 0x1cd96e72fdf1ce6b544dec12d0d7bcb9f6ba65bba3d9f7af732bcb133c1b6437

Y= 0x34ab5b63c286a2b885ca443ac875a8f9ec0c2f148f1622bc64c83b80e6e3d31f

**SEED:**

```

62 93 40 15 63 0c 9a 09 ce 76 32 6c fd 1c 04 36
ee 08 bc 92 b9 c0 3a d9 63 c6 db 00 18 12 12 fa
e0 1a 46 38 8b b6 81 df ae 4f 64 3e cc 0c 93 8c
e4 10 36 2f d9 6d 5c fd 99 f3 9c 13 fd 30 52 a1
3e 8b 35 8b ed 1c 31 b0 39 9c 03 dc 5a 94 2b 41
f8 ff 9d 62 41 bd eb 9d bf cf 54 b6 c8 cc d1 06

```

**Point Q\_3**

X= 0x18dda7154e5abef001dc9943554439cb44b9e26256def176849da5f09b5f690d

Y= 0x3ef584be59673d1751b2fd6e3fdc619e3d756c0d355595b3a62196de048ece44

**SEED:**

```

33 17 39 c1 38 82 98 88 14 68 83 c6 97 14 86 8c
d0 d2 1a 28 41 51 99 a9 33 40 15 0b 30 88 35 01
4a 41 42 f8 d8 9a a6 bd e1 a6 81 23 94 19 e8 a0
ef 3d 36 02 ef ff 38 e6 10 4b 11 2f 7b b5 50 42
5a 7b 39 a6 00 53 1a 92 fc cc 2b 0d 95 dd ea 95
42 d4 27 6f a8 0f ae 45 b2 d6 f4 38 c1 52 17 5d

```

**A.3 Curve id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet****Point Q\_1**

X= 0x339f791f62938871f241c1c89643619aa8b2c7d7706ce69be01fddff3f840003

Y= 0x31d6d9264cc6f8fe09bf7aa48910b4ad5ddfd74a2ef4699b76de09ffed295f11

**SEED:**

```

0e 29 35 9d 45 dd a3 b4 57 9b 17 e8 87 d9 9e 63
b9 d6 04 e3 ac 74 83 11 91 2a 5b d4 86 7b 5d 9c
5d 07 70 64 cd f1 2d 93 f7 f0 2e f0 0a e1 7b 8b
c1 87 50 b3 8f 39 bb 95 68 21 5c 42 e2 4e 8c fe
59 e9 0f a6 05 0b 76 68 a2 94 da 5f 2c 9a 27 28
1f 3a 7e 4e 14 54 10 21 01 6f 2c a2 97 77 94 12

```

**Point Q\_2**

X= 0x80f4d03b00b1b9b53f6bb4ffa52be65a6d316de846e27f44ccd795bc62d89e23

Y= 0x38dd712518ddec19b46afccccba97338d89d1292427dc12985d4e848066cd1ab

**SEED:**

```

f5 61 4e 92 8f e5 5c 77 26 37 ab ac 1b 1e 3c dd
2a 37 77 be 25 23 cc 58 9a 79 5a 60 28 db 9e 64
f8 62 73 01 98 3e dd 23 0b eb 07 3e 81 9b cb d9
94 bc bf 7f 9e 5f e1 8f a5 8a ce 9e f2 99 0e 9d
fb ee 1c 64 38 22 33 c3 1b e7 05 9e c2 e9 bb 46
b9 dc 15 19 9d e0 9f cb 65 d5 6d 46 2f 01 21 65

```

**Point Q\_3**



X= 0x0c8b64c3f0ec7ece81b6232db2e8054666d051ee28254d4b9a4bcb1460ca546b  
Y= 0x88c98b48b22b90d0d3a018da55ca0d05cedd82b6c838bd62aba2b823ce82b28f  
SEED:

```
8a 1b 29 62 38 f5 c2 e2 9b 4a c0 5b 6d 57 99 88
86 69 a4 1b b9 f6 60 f3 a3 15 26 e5 f4 33 1e ae
80 9a 38 52 f5 44 86 91 71 76 1c ab 77 0a b6 2e
c3 6f d6 4d 3c 31 a3 67 2a 82 25 bf d6 ae c9 95
66 95 b8 87 39 6a 3e bf ef 28 65 16 b9 51 29 1d
65 df 12 7a eb 4c ec f1 6f 08 f5 98 36 0a b9 a0
```

#### [A.4 Curve id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetA](#)

Point Q\_1

X= 0x301aac1a3b3e9c8a65bc095b541ce1d23728b93818e8b61f963e5d5b13eec0fe  
e6b06f8cd481a07bb647b649232e5179b019eef7296a3d9cfa2b66ee8bf0cbf2  
Y= 0x191177dd41ce19cc849c3938abf3adaab366e5eb2d22a972b2dcc69283523e89  
c9907f1d89ab9d96f473f96815da6e0a47297fcdd8b3adac37d4886f7ad055e0

SEED:

```
64 1c 90 19 c5 d7 68 91 de d1 9a 31 28 4e 7c d3
c6 8b 74 e5 e6 a7 20 b5 2c fb 45 17 9f 91 b3 f6
3a 0c b2 5e 3f 91 e3 eb 80 3d 80 4f 79 98 a3 57
f2 e5 dc 5d 84 ab d6 7d 33 a3 2b 89 66 db c6 94
96 8f 96 2d 37 9e 33 c0 fd 14 32 dd 02 70 fb 61
1a 88 4c 6d ae 1b 58 20 24 6e 80 80 5d cd a8 66
```

Point Q\_2

X= 0x7edc38f17f88e3105bafb67c419d58fe6a9094dd4dc1a83bcaccc61f020ac447  
92eba888457c658ee2d82557b7c6ab6efd61ba0c3327741d09a561a8b860a085  
Y= 0x3af1400a7a469058d9ba75e65ea5d3f4d0bdb357fa57eb73fa4900e2dca4da78  
b8e5ff35ca70e522610bb1fc76b102c81cc4729f94b12822584f6b6229a57ea1

SEED:

```
3d ad a1 b4 fb 87 3e 13 1e 51 62 60 1f ee f1 54
b0 77 e0 71 1b cf da 74 a2 20 7e a3 20 01 c3 f5
79 00 5f 10 9f c1 83 83 4e 29 46 b3 29 8a 4c 10
0c 69 f4 c6 40 92 3f ed af b2 68 08 0b 6b 1c 07
48 a1 18 29 6e 64 9b f6 1d eb 26 27 b4 77 9e e8
e0 ff c1 db 48 5d 8b c1 10 8c 58 b1 af 07 5f 7b
```

Point Q\_3

X= 0x387acfba7bbc5815407474a7c1132a1bded12497243d73ef8133d9810eb21716  
95dde2ff15597e159464a1db207b4d1ff98fb989f80c2db13bc8ff5fea16d59  
Y= 0x4c816d1ca3e145ac448478fb79a77e1ad2dfc69576685e2f6867ec93fbad8aa4  
4111acd104036317095bce467e98f295436199c8ead57f243860d1bde8d88b68

SEED:

```
7c 8d a6 91 96 0d 9d 06 65 92 23 08 df cf 51 71
bd 7c 4b f8 50 1b 3f fd 3c b1 58 3a 30 e1 a7 17
4e 09 e2 5f 1d 19 35 6e b0 51 66 1c d0 2a c1 9e
48 22 38 49 76 0d 43 4e 20 ea d1 80 73 84 1c e8
36 a6 8e f3 24 bb 2d 57 45 32 a5 d4 e6 08 73 fa
d3 8c 32 e8 af a1 c5 25 8c ff 3d 52 ca ac 98 d1
```

#### [A.5 Curve id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetB](#)

Point Q\_1



```
X= 0x488cf12b403e539fde9ee32fc36b6ed52aad9ec34ff478c259159a85e99d3dda
    dfd5d73606ecee351e0f780a14c3e9f14e985d9d7ddec93b064fc89b0c843650
Y= 0x7bc73c032edc5f2c74dd7d9da12e1856a061ce344a77253f620592752b1f3a3d
    cbbc87eb27ec4ed5e236dfcb03f3972404747e277671e53a9e412e82aaaf6c3f7
```

**SEED:**

```
40 57 8b 1a c0 bd 53 8d 75 97 2d 49 9b 1c c6 73
94 c8 f7 d4 76 cd fe 15 59 02 fa 0f 28 b8 06 e1
81 4c fb d0 4d 62 86 0c 4a ce c1 0e 88 13 da 2a
d4 fd 7a 13 4d ba 75 0d 2c 80 f2 68 ba c1 b4 34
98 ea fe 10 51 86 60 b7 70 30 f8 64 6f 21 d9 40
aa da 62 3e ad 44 3f 93 73 a5 6b c3 15 55 3c bd
```

**Point Q\_2**

```
X= 0x175166b97248bda12ec035df2e312a2771d0b16977c9cbc79461ff05e01f719c
    92ae8b53f3b7e3edcacffcc5063b5e9c8de18d0cb87da358350992132173df69
Y= 0x10e2943dc1a18a841ab76ac756fa974948d5a18d071d458a4769c2494fe2a6c5
    966e3c8931e624d87259156aea9317157502698e4a4a489c327b89277cf59b4c
```

**SEED:**

```
26 01 07 1b 3d 3e 6d e7 0e d0 22 ae be 81 be 47
51 77 49 b6 5d 29 d1 07 5c df cb f4 56 a8 77 54
2b e9 91 50 34 06 b3 aa 71 c5 ce 16 b6 5f e9 93
e7 48 99 58 b1 26 81 10 9f 9b e4 30 38 73 77 13
f0 6a 4f 30 05 b2 66 76 9f b8 1b 5f 39 55 52 97
ab 46 6b 5d 2e 19 2d 12 f3 2a b3 18 72 71 52 62
```

**Point Q\_3**

```
X= 0x01f4583db894cdebd7c591af848783ee011a20567751ca1561f398a6118ace08
    a4efe1501bda67f39d060270ba660526dc53063c6b40fa5548c9a9e7688f2239
Y= 0x7bc640641d70c8296bd9257c9eebb5b1bd3196a169bac04f7579bf27b5847d4e
    7b4f63748ad81b5469070ed35ad93e5a5258652306f84094eae04a91954536ee
```

**SEED:**

```
bb 9a 63 a5 67 7d 40 7c f3 4d 06 df 96 7d d9 e9
ca 4d 42 eb d6 7d a5 69 a4 9b d8 b1 04 64 2e 20
fb a9 9d 84 2f cb 54 76 61 dc 7a a4 de 72 6f 67
4a 09 85 46 20 04 7c c1 75 2c ab 67 99 8b 5c 8e
6a 88 6d 0a 06 e6 a3 fa e8 19 34 21 1a ec 81 8d
89 03 9e 45 dc a1 85 03 7e c3 49 37 33 ee 3c 2e
```

**A.6 Curve id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-paramSetA****Point Q\_1**

```
X= 0x5161b08a973d521bdde0cbd45b68aa0470e1058dd936e5bd618fd3373770eed9
Y= 0xc1633db551677c62b9c2b69d47e503c0f8ca83b6b3109dece0a5f985d77a83a7
U= 0x9c5ad63ddc3314ac009d879780d6219720bf4573f4fe6b4bf7a0a88860677f9d
V= 0x8ee071a767f3d6f0435eb6100d1a936f984e43d9af0bc91c864a9e65cee025fb
```

**SEED:**

```
c4 7e 5e 42 31 4e dd 8e e9 ac 39 fb c8 da ea c8
e6 5b fd 26 58 27 4e 1f 99 e9 33 e1 1e 5d f2 62
4a e3 97 f1 7e db f9 83 60 f3 ec 2e 8f 6f 2e ff
d4 aa 80 5c 71 d6 ed 5b a1 5b c9 d0 ad d6 38 23
84 c1 55 20 a5 b8 bb bd 7b 23 1f c8 fb 8c 77 71
```



57 b9 77 25 91 55 3f 17 46 8c 4b b3 64 6f 9f 53

**Point Q\_2**

X= 0xd47abd59dccad35849dec9dc721ffa1e44419ca8686406a9f441e61294b210ed

Y= 0xa78b64220bf3375d08de0ea5e2920cf8f204da6757bf1878ac870fb7e5ca0e8

U= 0xf0195efb6b249eb8018c19376907c787511bf30516a5c27d045fc7ba2af58ed0

V= 0xacae88466127df000b663863bc7bd394eafa6996fcedad11d7834f502a6a2686

**SEED:**

30 5f d0 bb ce c7 16 49 ac e4 1b 4d ca 07 6c a6  
 96 a8 8c c6 fd 06 91 a8 79 13 5d e1 90 96 e3 c8  
 03 c5 b4 ad 41 68 36 9b e7 b9 ed 81 d6 e2 bd 0c  
 a2 8e b0 e9 6f 74 2d 50 e2 df b6 a1 86 ae 15 60  
 96 a3 5a 97 a2 20 fa 6d 0f cf 88 db 6d 86 cd db  
 19 7c 3a 21 5f 10 cc ea 42 95 ef aa b2 63 95 d5

**Point Q\_3**

X= 0xe0d610ff42ce21eb308980964ca368963fbe5cb08c277187d22d0c94f4bf0762

Y= 0x82619b88da25b666e07b617ff487be8af8b092568b493ecef44ee0c04b5f

U= 0x723df0719311d095b814ee05ca086e18c410c375a48789dc03c3fe844ed3b7c9

V= 0x160e1b5338337ee0620745206dbe5556a7ff5d19735418a3cc03bf7f2735ce25

**SEED:**

22 16 91 c7 21 8d 93 d4 a8 ad 15 e4 72 33 84 90  
 ca 5c 5e 3b 84 84 57 4e bc df 83 26 68 84 5e f4  
 09 53 71 79 7a f8 e2 a6 e3 99 93 de 2a 7c 65 f0  
 37 26 2e cc fa 95 58 9a c6 e8 b1 2d e6 09 af be  
 f9 2f 12 d0 a3 08 56 9a b3 c0 fa d8 ec 5d 7b 9c  
 f4 27 1f aa 54 bc bb da 31 61 b7 cd f5 40 d6 b8

**A.7 Curve id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetC****Point Q\_1**

X= 0x5b065ead2e94de0ee2e462de204c93c6b2bf3498ad920393cb60259e1a8ffc7c  
 7e7d4defa20ff4282abf70207e4611d532f40db6800e29d2b53f6ac0713e5b38

Y= 0xa39a28c59ff7f796b85223b8834384907c626086415487288ed1182ca4487dc1  
 ae5f37af90fd267b7c0dc8542ea52cd984af54731bc84271d6186d973c91359b

U= 0x3c80e89805380f52fce86ff990501801d70e5b4636e8478674d2d5706a56a666  
 63eb03abdc332584f7ea8c3255b1be3ca75e4685a060e0ea88e569612d9e7227

V= 0xd8f2cf17c484f4bb6a0208b3796a2609971c55d56bfffadf155c0fb76f7afe99  
 7d6b6e8fde9e2cefd0ab3e31a1862953425a70334e4e2404c9cd9079856c7259

**SEED:**

03 8a 01 b5 ea a2 28 3b bb 29 7b 81 ad 94 92 01  
 e4 32 11 df 76 a3 70 ec c0 09 ec 49 1f 9f 8d 33  
 f2 ee 24 08 c7 88 27 cd 0c 51 17 a7 e3 8d 58 5b  
 3d 15 50 30 a3 29 1b ad 6a 21 ab 48 38 1d 66 bc  
 1b d6 b9 ba 6e d8 6a 21 65 c5 99 84 dc 5d 51 81  
 f3 f1 97 fe 4a 86 81 c2 e5 0a 22 a0 61 2c 55 7e

**Point Q\_2**

X= 0xb3e6c475f173af4494dd02ad7c9df3bd6a5ca82c3d65ad86fbb330dfb1c40e34  
 c4cd04d93f609cff2daea5907d0e08192a29be3ff2752223b868e8bcc6a7b74

Y= 0x53ffcf818281bcf383d9b6542b3b1fce5bd20cd1c805ed1dacb83ba161167a5  
 eb96df52c1d290496043ea514c465ecb37970fcfd7ffbb6ca35a767cd0227fe8c

U= 0x8dd3f6f455fffaea85c3935750792b65fa1ba990c7ac8bc449a77bb86aeb87eb6



```

ecb6bf387924885b0ea1e30fc4d742919504cd7baf4926b777ed40b898be41f8
V= 0x2d7edc1ca6078878d2d8ecafabc2abc83fc269c049baa11951ff2523b69b1d1
    4ee6c0fa7cbd5a566cb32246d14568eb9fa04e3b53ee6175bb32887796870ba9
SEED:
63 ce db 44 3d f8 df 68 8d 5d fd d0 ea 54 41 62
f5 6d 78 92 73 0c 86 88 53 e2 24 4d dd 87 1e 4a
0e 3f b7 32 40 c8 7a bc e8 fd b3 16 dd 0e 9b 23
ec 1f c7 40 86 29 8c fc f2 a1 d9 18 31 af a3 cf
1e 98 b8 0d 42 0c f6 73 8d 57 44 77 8e 1a d3 e4
42 d7 26 39 6c 91 b7 f5 e8 84 09 8d be 02 aa 80

Point Q_3
X= 0xbe963ad90f84ff9ff6ff7ddd39d91cea649e849bf20b8cc1e72040cf689a974f
    40f24e10c737bfa558b514c605b7c156e24251b859202b12ef311b0f363171eb
Y= 0x007cfa56f5ae239694e74f7996e1f44fc4f62205a555fdb627e4212576b4591
    7f88667bcd924a3271f40dc4bbd2f2e216b4fcf59c25fdd8154241d40f42e2ad
U= 0xff6697883ce5c6cc165fa78ff158c03b31add23dc01b24902b18c5487f1835ff
    eaf4af5ede44f8b254748704e504810597d0e4418daf50e0253f33915de97b7b
V= 0x54e1ba656234479c5845c06af70bbefa741a863d5186ca720ee2f43bdd4d5b74
    71594871d532ce263928aa30ae3c25efc6a2f82d4163c45869339426888be3bc
SEED:
06 ce 08 fa 5d 11 50 45 e2 d2 a8 03 01 d2 9e 2a
39 c3 ea e7 f1 61 37 f9 3e 51 d1 46 f3 21 b1 89
fb 5c 17 70 26 5b 30 8b 6d f2 87 7c d9 d3 6f 8a
3c b4 e7 1d f0 99 a4 73 69 1d d5 46 8d 43 50 f9
87 df e5 e5 de ff 3c 7b b8 f4 62 ed 19 9b f3 33
7a 6f f9 0e c5 f0 bc bb 1a 59 1e cd c2 9b 52 64

```

## [Appendix B. Test examples](#)

The test examples for one of the three points of each curve in [Appendix A](#) of this document are given below.

### **B.1 Curveid-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet**

The input protocol parameters in this example take the following values:

```

N= 3
ind= 1
ID_A:
 00 00 00 00
ID_B:
 00 00 00 00
PW:
 31 32 33 34 35 36 ('123456')
salt:
 29 23 be 84 e1 6c d6 ae 52 90 49 f1 f1 bb e9 eb
Q_ind:
X= 0xa33ce065b0c23e1d3d026a206f8a1f8747ed1cd92a665bf85198cdb10ac90a5c
Y= 0xb00d0dc0733883f05de9f55fd711f55998f5508cc40bead80c913b4d5b533667

```



The function F (PW, salt, 2000) takes the following values:

F(PW,salt,2000):

```
bd 04 67 3f 71 49 b1 8e 98 15 5b d1 e2 72 4e 71
d0 09 9a a2 51 74 f7 92 d3 32 6c 6f 18 12 70 67
```

The coordinates of the point Q\_PW are:

X= 0x9d339b3396ae4a816388a14c79ab3a8dd495fa4c53f0d4076579022ef2aaeb68

Y= 0xdad91482e208590fd316bf959480f5ec2c17463ec8fc8f63030649b452cd5da8

During the calculation of the message u\_1 on the side A the parameter

alpha, the point alpha\*P and the message u\_1 take the following values:

alpha=0xfcdb45d1f2538097d5a031fa68bbb43c84d12b3de47b7061c0d5e24993e0c87

alphaP:

```
X= 0x24538e096781b9d53316c342ae5bbd49ccfb2db627c3659175bc4fa9d95b4618
```

```
Y= 0xf6e39a7490ae0ac449f5abe7e2135697c582daf3a038c40a05e6e8be3e466a2b
```

u\_1:

```
X= 0xcf73b30dd577369fb98e2a93d6d98d7450f9ceef2bada1e3dc8bb1016dff1e1
```

```
Y= 0x1cf05014caedb1635120b30e0a445060b8f1cca52965cf83c4838d554ca4e2
```

During processing a message u\_1, calculation the K\_B key and the message u\_2 on the side B the parameters betta, src, K\_B = H\_256 (src), betta\*P and u\_2 take the following values:

betta=0xf2144faddc497d9ef6324912fd367840ee509a2032aedb1c0a890d133b45f596

src:

```
39 c0 e8 83 59 91 cd 6d 56 88 fc ad 55 29 1f 79
```

```
e5 0f 87 9d 94 b5 0a b2 db d6 bd f7 e8 39 b7 1a
```

```
10 b5 a7 8d c0 36 b8 73 f7 e4 b1 6b 12 48 6f eb
```

```
69 d7 39 d4 01 4d ae e2 cc 5c 2f c7 4a 2c c8 06
```

K\_B:

```
e0 4e e0 14 7f 9f 19 8d e2 5a af 33 a2 84 99 e0
```

```
ce 7d 31 6e 47 39 76 2f d5 19 f8 e9 91 d7 fc 00
```

betta\*P:

```
X= 0xb11f1a8fb043bc6d4068667b897e4ff637b8410f5eb19e11b0a7028f34d6936a
```

```
Y= 0x266d952955e2ab3f3ba75d14a919795d6b8ac04dbcff1cfaac6ba32291c099fd
```

u\_2:

```
X= 0x6e1bfb24b6131a3ad0b60e477a38715c6f96f21bb0b2f9ebd67680e804a77199
```

```
Y= 0x873ee3c546c41e8f707298f11b955fe64f7577d52d7dad1beccb9925178ca80
```

During processing a message u\_2 and calculation the key on the side A the the K\_A key takes the following value:

K\_A:

```
e0 4e e0 14 7f 9f 19 8d e2 5a af 33 a2 84 99 e0
```

```
ce 7d 31 6e 47 39 76 2f d5 19 f8 e9 91 d7 fc 00
```

The message MAC\_A=HMAC (K\_A, 0x01 || ID\_A || ind || salt || u\_1 || u\_2) from the side A takes the following value:

MAC\_A:

```
bd 35 c5 0e 90 60 e6 4f 04 2e 7b e6 cc 02 99 84
```

```
0c 8e 27 82 b8 e5 9c 3d d4 47 50 11 16 73 c5 ea
```

The message MAC\_B=HMAC (K\_B, 0x02 || ID\_B || ind || salt || u\_1 || u\_2) from the side B takes the following value:

MAC\_B:

```
c8 c8 2c 0f ed 8e 4d 1e 41 42 d7 a9 f0 55 b4 5f
```



```
f6 71 2d 2f 41 bf 26 ef 2f bc 37 c5 56 4b 86 d3
```

### **B.2 Curveid-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet**

The input protocol parameters in this example take the following values:

N= 3

ind= 1

ID\_A:

```
00 00 00 00
```

ID\_B:

```
00 00 00 00
```

PW:

```
31 32 33 34 35 36 ('123456')
```

salt:

```
29 23 be 84 e1 6c d6 ae 52 90 49 f1 f1 bb e9 eb
```

Q\_ind:

```
X= 0x0ad754474a915d9d706c6b8dc879858a1cb85cc8f6c148fc3120825393ecd394
```

```
Y= 0x68c33b6d0343cf72cb19666ffd487fa94294dc677b28c8e27ec36068ff85ed83
```

The function F (PW, salt, 2000) takes the following values:

F(PW,salt,2000):

```
bd 04 67 3f 71 49 b1 8e 98 15 5b d1 e2 72 4e 71
```

```
d0 09 9a a2 51 74 f7 92 d3 32 6c 6f 18 12 70 67
```

The coordinates of the point Q\_PW are:

```
X= 0x7a7211a430fd4e31b815e6d2454eea9574f034c5c442dce1723d69555d3ee4c9
```

```
Y= 0x2995e857187808e80d3e40a00fb87128e203f2d91c1f15d8193a5aad95964734
```

During the calculation of the message u\_1 on the side A the parameter alpha, the point alpha\*P and the message u\_1 take the following values:

alpha=0x499d72b90299cab0da1f8be19d9122f622a13b32b730c46bd0664044f2144fad

alphaP:

```
X= 0x61d6f916db717222d74877f179f7ebef7cd4d24d8c1f523c048e34a1df30f8dd
```

```
Y= 0x3ec48863049cfcf662904082e78503f4973a4e105e2f1b18c69a5e7fb209000
```

u\_1:

```
X= 0x35e78fcbc24998eb3039445a9de7032aadf291e7768196ef618e45bed80edf88
```

```
Y= 0x1970a4697295f6d361d2c3edd3885794c1254bac3f4adb4a3346ad01a911d13c
```

During processing a message u\_1, calculation the K\_B key and the message u\_2 on the side B the parameters betta, src, K\_B = H\_256 (src), betta\*P and u\_2 take the following values:

betta=0x0f69ff614957ef83668edc2d7ed614be76f7b253db23c5cc9c52bf7df8f4669d

src:

```
50 14 0a 5d ed 33 43 ef c8 25 7b 79 e6 46 d9 f0
```

```
df 43 82 8c 04 91 9b d4 60 c9 7a d1 4b a3 a8 6b
```

```
00 c4 06 b5 74 4d 8e b1 49 dc 8e 7f c8 40 64 d8
```

```
53 20 25 3e 57 a9 b6 b1 3d 0d 38 fe a8 ee 5e 0a
```

K\_B:

```
a6 26 de 01 b1 68 0f f7 51 30 09 12 2b ce e1 89
```

```
68 83 39 4f 96 03 01 72 45 5c 9a e0 60 cc e4 4a
```

betta\*P:

```
X= 0x33bc6f7e9c0ba10cfb2b72546c327171295508ea97f8c8ba9f890f2478ab4d6c
```

```
Y= 0x75d57b396c396f492f057e9222ccc686437a2aad464e452ef426fc8eed1a4a6
```

u\_2:



X= 0x20d7a92b238143e3f137be904d52fa35c45a29f02a7226a7ac83a1172c2a55cd  
Y= 0x5fc4cd6ffb0e76ea8603ce9e6dab5164285617969ab3bfab09fbe8595d1f47b  
During processing a message u\_2 and calculation the key on the side A  
the K\_A key takes the following value:

K\_A:

```
a6 26 de 01 b1 68 0f f7 51 30 09 12 2b ce e1 89  

68 83 39 4f 96 03 01 72 45 5c 9a e0 60 cc e4 4a
```

The message MAC\_A=HMAC (K\_A, 0x01 || ID\_A || ind || salt || u\_1 || u\_2)  
from the side A takes the following value:

MAC\_A:

```
55 7a 59 61 42 60 39 a1 52 c8 23 a7 65 04 59 b0  

62 be 3d 47 56 53 03 09 95 57 1c e7 53 40 26 47
```

The message MAC\_B=HMAC (K\_B, 0x02 || ID\_B || ind || salt || u\_1 || u\_2)  
from the side B takes the following value:

MAC\_B:

```
3b c5 5e 27 07 84 19 94 c4 b9 ca ba 43 e6 ce 6a  

09 2d e9 08 83 76 5f b6 c3 44 c6 1d 76 02 96 e9
```

### **B.3 Curveid-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet**

The input protocol parameters in this example take the following values:

N= 3

ind= 1

ID\_A:

```
00 00 00 00
```

ID\_B:

```
00 00 00 00
```

PW:

```
31 32 33 34 35 36 ('123456')
```

salt:

```
29 23 be 84 e1 6c d6 ae 52 90 49 f1 f1 bb e9 eb
```

Q\_ind:

```
X= 0x339f791f62938871f241c1c89643619aa8b2c7d7706ce69be01fddff3f840003  

Y= 0x31d6d9264cc6f8fe09bf7aa48910b4ad5ddfd74a2ef4699b76de09ffed295f11
```

The function F (PW, salt, 2000) takes the following values:

F(PW,salt,2000):

```
bd 04 67 3f 71 49 b1 8e 98 15 5b d1 e2 72 4e 71  

d0 09 9a a2 51 74 f7 92 d3 32 6c 6f 18 12 70 67
```

The coordinates of the point Q\_PW are:

X= 0x8b666917d42c455331358c50c3c12c85b898a2e454b50dd773541da02e1c3068

Y= 0x8a9b6c4703934b7f0dc903f52c16275e1d38b568117c7cff3bd322a99a311fe9

During the calculation of the message u\_1 on the side A the parameter

alpha, the point alpha\*P and the message u\_1 take the following values:

alpha=0x3a54ac3f19ad9d0b1eac8acdcea70e581f1dac33d13feaf81e762378639c1a8

alphap:

```
X= 0x96b7f09c94d297c257a7da48364c0076e59e48d221cba604ae111ca3933b446a  

Y= 0x54e4953d86b77ecceb578500931e822300f7e091f79592ca202a020d762c34a6
```

u\_1:

```
X= 0x2124a22e00b1be2114f5ca42d58d55a0a9f2b08f8cb10275edd8243402abb7a  

Y= 0x62497815861d15877b7ad2e86768a2deb0f755a8b1a8897fc5235da783914a59
```



During processing a message  $u_1$ , calculation the  $K_B$  key and the message  $u_2$  on the side B the parameters betta, src,  $K_B = H_{256}(\text{src})$ ,  $\text{betta} * P$  and  $u_2$  take the following values:

$\text{betta}=0x448781782bf7c0e52a1dd9e6758fd3482d90d3cfccf42232cf357e59a4d49fd4$

$\text{src}:$

```
16 a1 2d 88 54 7e 1c 90 06 ba a0 08 e8 cb ec c9
d1 68 91 ed c8 36 cf b7 5f 8e b9 56 fa 76 11 94
d2 8e 25 da d3 81 8d 16 3c 49 4b 05 9a 8c 70 a5
a1 b8 8a 7f 80 a2 ee 35 49 30 18 46 54 2c 47 0b
```

$K_B:$

```
be 7e 47 b4 11 16 f2 c7 7e 3b 8f ce 40 30 72
ca 82 45 0d 65 de fc 71 a9 56 49 e4 de ea ec ee
```

$\text{betta} * P:$

```
X= 0x4b9c0ab55a938121f282f48a2cc4396eb16e7e0068b495b0c1dd4667786a3eb7
Y= 0x223460aa8e09383e9df9844c5a0f2766484738e5b30128a171b69a77d9509b96
```

$u_2:$

```
X= 0x47ad0110d1620fe38832e90b58971d2e0b9183dd52de23422b6fc47bec64541a
Y= 0x8296af496b3c52640e738a195d63ab7bfb457aba7c71b5649cc3e300829cbf0a
```

During processing a message  $u_2$  and calculation the key on the side A the  $K_A$  key takes the following value:

$K_A:$

```
be 7e 47 b4 11 16 f2 c7 7e 3b 8f ce 40 30 72
ca 82 45 0d 65 de fc 71 a9 56 49 e4 de ea ec ee
```

The message  $\text{MAC}_A=\text{HMAC}(K_A, 0x01 || \text{ID}_A || \text{ind} || \text{salt} || u_1 || u_2)$  from the side A takes the following value:

$\text{MAC}_A:$

```
47 58 fa 64 9f 2e 31 3b f2 70 8b 76 a7 f7 a7 5a
37 ce 9e 7f 55 c3 fc 5a 55 77 e8 77 a7 a2 c1 ea
```

The message  $\text{MAC}_B=\text{HMAC}(K_B, 0x02 || \text{ID}_B || \text{ind} || \text{salt} || u_1 || u_2)$  from the side B takes the following value:

$\text{MAC}_B:$

```
2f 33 b9 bf f0 7d cd e3 44 67 bd b0 7f 62 fc a8
b3 52 3a 64 39 ef f1 c9 93 ba 0b 4c e6 c2 ed e4
```

#### **B.4 Curveid-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetA**

The input protocol parameters in this example take the following values:

$N= 3$

$\text{ind}= 1$

$\text{ID}_A:$

```
00 00 00 00
```

$\text{ID}_B:$

```
00 00 00 00
```

$\text{PW}:$

```
31 32 33 34 35 36 ('123456')
```

$\text{salt}:$

```
29 23 be 84 e1 6c d6 ae 52 90 49 f1 f1 bb e9 eb
```

$\text{Q\_ind}:$

```
X= 0x301aac1a3b3e9c8a65bc095b541ce1d23728b93818e8b61f963e5d5b13eec0fe
e6b06f8cd481a07bb647b649232e5179b019eef7296a3d9cfa2b66ee8bf0cbf2
```



```
Y= 0x191177dd41ce19cc849c3938abf3adaab366e5eb2d22a972b2dcc69283523e89
    c9907f1d89ab9d96f473f96815da6e0a47297fcdd8b3adac37d4886f7ad055e0
```

The function F (PW, salt, 2000) takes the following values:

F(PW,salt,2000):

```
bd 04 67 3f 71 49 b1 8e 98 15 5b d1 e2 72 4e 71
d0 09 9a a2 51 74 f7 92 d3 32 6c 6f 18 12 70 67
```

The coordinates of the point Q\_PW are:

```
X= 0xa8b54a6339b296f5c5227670fb1482010b4b07e3642974b40c58a5f1da33370e
    fed546eb17c6a707f3fc69671deba10a6de03a55f859473e9074a89b4a7b5488
```

```
Y= 0xfebf437ecf21536328b32f4c8e0430d5c0c096001c08a378ac30b8634412f44c
    5ba9b7096642f51cc3a018cd1599c849cd62917a370eca3bbc6bed5eedabdd77
```

During the calculation of the message u\_1 on the side A the parameter alpha, the point alpha\*P and the message u\_1 take the following values:  
alpha=0x3ce54325db52fe798824aead11bb16fa766857d04a4af7d468672f16d90e7396

```
046a46f815693e85b1ce5464da9270181f82333b0715057bbe8d61d400505f0e
```

alphaP:

```
X= 0xb93093eb0fcc463239b7df276e09e592fcfc9b635504ea4531655d76a0a3078e
    2b4e51cfe2fa400cc5de9fbe369db204b3e8ed7edd85ee5cca654c1aed70e396
```

```
Y= 0x809770b8d910ea30bd2fa89736e91dc31815d2d9b31128077eedc371e9f69466
    f497dc64dd5b1fadcc587ff860ee256109138c4a9cd96b628e65a8f590520fc882
```

u\_1:

```
X= 0xe8732d5471901b3eb9a31aaebeac7a6155c2c8fc1c960cb475e14074987dd2c8
    4eccafac0835735a5c2df3d1c8dacf4a1d2e38e1e4419f5df4e25b7f8dd90b50
```

```
Y= 0xd680a41eaec979d49f4752008e9e92eb0efc1950d74b85e852be47f3958d5500
    0442d859e5b459de5dc7acaa0c36383cd1f98f271333c6083dcecaf07ac825b8
```

During processing a message u\_1, calculation the K\_B key and the message u\_2 on the side B the parameters betta, src, K\_B = H\_256 (src), betta\*P and u\_2 take the following values:

```
betta=0xb5c286a79aa8e97ec0e19bc1959a1d15f12f8c97870ba9d68cc12811a56a3bb1
    1440610825796a49d468cdc9c2d02d76598a27973d5960c5f50bce28d8d345f4
```

src:

```
84 59 c2 0c b5 c5 32 41 6d b9 28 eb 50 c0 52 0f
b2 1b 9c d3 9a 4e 76 06 b2 21 be 15 ca 1d 02 da
08 15 de c4 49 79 c0 8c 7d 23 07 af 24 7d da 1f
89 ec 81 20 69 f5 d9 cd e3 06 af f0 bc 3f d2 6e
d2 01 b9 53 52 a2 56 06 b6 43 e8 88 30 2e fc 8d
3e 95 1e 3e b4 68 4a db 5c 05 7b 8f 8c 89 b6 cc
0d ee d1 00 06 5b 51 8a 1c 71 7f 76 82 ff 61 2b
bc 79 8e c7 b2 49 0f b7 00 3f 94 33 87 37 1c 1d
```

K\_B:

```
53 24 de f8 48 b6 63 cc 26 42 2f 5e 45 ee c3 4c
51 d2 43 61 b1 65 60 ca 58 a3 d3 28 45 86 cb 7a
```

betta\*P:

```
X= 0x238b38644e440452a99fa6b93d9fd7da0cb83c32d3c1e3cfe5df5c3eb0f9db91
    e588daedc849ea2fb867ae855a21b4077353c0794716a6480995113d8c20c7af
```

```
Y= 0xb2273d5734c1897f8d15a7008b862938c8c74ca7e877423d95243eb7ebd02fd2
    c456cf9fc956f078a59aa86f19dd1075e5167e4ed35208718ea93161c530ed14
```

u\_2:



```
X= 0x1830804bf1fb07ebd43f27d03ff71ad9c7c31becaf1d3585dfb9e356c36638dc
    d82aba559dec06d46c862566653dfe0b116eb1a68439b0283f4d79ce48408eee
Y= 0x23b33ae97fba92e06095c41525aedf7b5d96fe9ca8e0244ed6c8a565d542d05e
    d3044caf1a8ac9a570c5133ba846d61da77f54da2daf13b0def7d90a0796f06
```

During processing a message u\_2 and calculation the key on the side A the K\_A key takes the following value:

K\_A:

```
53 24 de f8 48 b6 63 cc 26 42 2f 5e 45 ee c3 4c
51 d2 43 61 b1 65 60 ca 58 a3 d3 28 45 86 cb 7a
```

The message MAC\_A=HMAC (K\_A, 0x01 || ID\_A || ind || salt || u\_1 || u\_2) from the side A takes the following value:

MAC\_A:

```
37 e6 1a 43 2d 85 75 9b 30 13 a2 9d d6 82 f1 4d
33 ca 86 89 37 db 4b f2 02 91 ed cf 6b e2 4b 4e
```

The message MAC\_B=HMAC (K\_B, 0x02 || ID\_B || ind || salt || u\_1 || u\_2) from the side B takes the following value:

MAC\_B:

```
72 dc de 19 5f 26 4b b8 a8 1d 2a fe 2f d9 da 2d
60 12 81 9c 15 f7 11 db 2b c4 c5 74 85 9e 05 3e
```

### **B.5 Curveid-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetB**

The input protocol parameters in this example take the following values:

N= 3

ind= 1

ID\_A:

```
00 00 00 00
```

ID\_B:

```
00 00 00 00
```

PW:

```
31 32 33 34 35 36 ('123456')
```

salt:

```
29 23 be 84 e1 6c d6 ae 52 90 49 f1 f1 bb e9 eb
```

Q\_ind:

```
X= 0x488cf12b403e539fde9ee32fc36b6ed52aad9ec34ff478c259159a85e99d3dda
    dfd5d73606ecee351e0f780a14c3e9f14e985d9d7ddec93b064fc89b0c843650
```

```
Y= 0x7bc73c032edc5f2c74dd7d9da12e1856a061ce344a77253f620592752b1f3a3d
    cbbc87eb27ec4ed5e236dfcb03f3972404747e277671e53a9e412e82aaaf6c3f7
```

The function F (PW, salt, 2000) takes the following values:

F(PW,salt,2000):

```
bd 04 67 3f 71 49 b1 8e 98 15 5b d1 e2 72 4e 71
d0 09 9a a2 51 74 f7 92 d3 32 6c 6f 18 12 70 67
```

The coordinates of the point Q\_PW are:

```
X= 0x2383039092052ed0e8ca3f751c11ebb891b8f32f7c66a437dec86345c63efc4b
    a1ecd04dfc11826dd581cbc1d744754e284c00b04eef9cd6eff22c12432c46fd
```

```
Y= 0x374202580afbaf2f68da8a5c03ab82e71eb4c1f1fdd881aa2911d0206d470039
    275d298d5477901565ab826ec4492f67eebcf3194442f272fd2cad9a5f04234f
```

During the calculation of the message u\_1 on the side A the parameter alpha, the point alpha\*P and the message u\_1 take the following values:  
alpha=0x715e893fa639bf341296e0623e6d29dadf26b163c278767a7982a989462a3863



fe12aef8bd403d59c4dc4720570d4163db0805c7c10c4e818f9cb785b04b9997

alphap:

```
X= 0x10c479ea1c04d3c2c02b0576a9c42d96226ff033c1191436777f66916030d87d
    02fb93738ed7669d07619ffce7c1f3c4db5e5df49e2186d6fa1e2eb5767602b9
Y= 0x039f6044191404e707f26d59d979136a831cce43e1c5f0600d1ddf8f39d0ca3d
    52fdb943bf04ddced1aa2ce8f5ebd7487acdef239c07d015084d796784f35436
```

u\_1:

```
X= 0x0ab9e56fc0d48e4982ee0a0b09507a63dc530181611d9f00d0464724415757b9
    de1c647178783a0fb4648dfd8e3da1efeb4db29de4711c8599191054ca7de6c4
Y= 0x4decae941f8d19c44daae9eb132019e116478124e76430b8bee16ce6910a06c8
    a2fed68f4907e4ba17c4f4e3356dc3b3b8647165b9c1aae54b1c13239bfa8213
```

During processing a message u\_1, calculation the K\_B key and the message u\_2 on the side B the parameters betta, src, K\_B = H\_256 (src), betta\*P and u\_2 take the following values:

betta=0x30fa8c2b4146c2dbbe82bed04d7378877e8c06753bd0a0ff71ebf2bef8da8f3
 dc0836468e2ce7c5c961281b6505140f8407413f03c2cb1d201ea1286ce30e6d

src:

```
3f 04 02 e4 0a 9d 59 63 20 5b cd f4 fd 89 77 91
9b ba f4 80 f8 e4 fb d1 25 5a ec e6 ed 57 26 4b
d0 a2 87 98 4f 59 d1 02 04 b5 f4 5e 4d 77 f3 cf
8a 63 b3 1b eb 2d f5 9f 8a f7 3c 20 9c ca 8b 50
b4 18 d8 01 e4 90 ae 13 3f 04 f4 f3 f4 d8 fe 8e
19 64 6a 1b af 44 d2 36 fc c2 1b 7f 4d 8f c6 a1
e2 9d 6b 69 ac ce ed 4e 62 ab b2 0d ad 78 ac f4
fe b0 ed 83 8e d9 1e 92 12 ab a3 89 71 4e 56 0c
```

K\_B:

```
d5 90 e0 5e f5 ae ce 8b 7c fb fc 71 be 45 5f 29
a5 cc 66 6f 85 cd b1 7e 7c c7 16 c5 9f f1 70 e9
```

betta\*P:

```
X= 0x34c0149e7bb91ae377b02573fcc48af7bfb7b16deb8f9ce870f384688e3241a3
    a868588cc0ef4364cca67d17e3260cd82485c202adc76f895d5df673b1788e67
Y= 0x608e944929bd643569ed5189db871453f13333a1eaf82b2fe1be8100e775f13d
    d9925bd317b63bfaf05024d4a738852332b64501195c1b2ef789e34f23ddafc5
```

u\_2:

```
X= 0x66defd2a42f0efe38ed3d4a4dfbed6b86d40f4adf156c86fee1605dbf6b057b1
    2fe82a0be4823f7f215b5110673e02e3bf44f0ae26630005fcfd9f01473127eb
Y= 0x36168c6d20c9514556ab442bf63ded0115346916ef45af7e5517f59205d1cc52
    ae2e72c3036f13cab7de12932e4a3acd0789f5e2474ff722b81334676c8a3371
```

During processing a message u\_2 and calculation the key on the side A the K\_A key takes the following value:

K\_A:

```
d5 90 e0 5e f5 ae ce 8b 7c fb fc 71 be 45 5f 29
a5 cc 66 6f 85 cd b1 7e 7c c7 16 c5 9f f1 70 e9
```

The message MAC\_A=HMAC (K\_A, 0x01 || ID\_A || ind || salt || u\_1 || u\_2) from the side A takes the following value:

MAC\_A:

```
9e c1 a8 74 93 b2 87 c9 ca c3 da c2 a2 d7 1b 82
8d c5 97 7c b0 03 93 42 c1 5a cd fb 66 c8 cf 89
```



The message MAC\_B=HMAC (K\_B, 0x02 || ID\_B || ind || salt || u\_1 || u\_2) from the side B takes the following value:

MAC\_B:

```
a9 b2 f1 9b d9 c1 fd 0f 0c ab fd 09 52 94 c6 e6
3c d5 9f 12 cf 8e fd 01 12 46 0d b7 aa 20 bb 6e
```

#### **B.6 Curveid-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-paramSetA**

The input protocol parameters in this example take the following values:

N= 3

ind= 1

ID\_A:

```
00 00 00 00
```

ID\_B:

```
00 00 00 00
```

PW:

```
31 32 33 34 35 36 ('123456')
```

salt:

```
29 23 be 84 e1 6c d6 ae 52 90 49 f1 f1 bb e9 eb
```

Q\_ind:

```
X= 0x5161b08a973d521bdde0cbd45b68aa0470e1058dd936e5bd618fd3373770eed9
```

```
Y= 0xc1633db551677c62b9c2b69d47e503c0f8ca83b6b3109dece0a5f985d77a83a7
```

The function F (PW, salt, 2000) takes the following values:

F(PW,salt,2000):

```
bd 04 67 3f 71 49 b1 8e 98 15 5b d1 e2 72 4e 71
d0 09 9a a2 51 74 f7 92 d3 32 6c 6f 18 12 70 67
```

The coordinates of the point Q\_PW are:

```
X= 0xa0fd0bcfaa07f640c802aa95f42e80b28bb758fbcb7ee2aca2cc0a615b567207
```

```
Y= 0x52cf0c960f362894bd097d198999e965bd940c7828e0d2ad38a0097f68135047
```

During the calculation of the message u\_1 on the side A the parameter alpha, the point alpha\*P and the message u\_1 take the following values:

alpha=0x147b72f6684fb8fd1b418a899f7dbeaf5fce60b13685baa95328654a7f0707f

alphaP:

```
X= 0x33fbac14eae538275a769417829c431bd9fa622b6f02427ef55bd60ee6bc2888
```

```
Y= 0x22f2ebcf960a82e6cdb4042d3ddda511b2fba925383c2273d952ea2d406eae46
```

u\_1:

```
X= 0x8e8929226c7f679ea8c2dfb833d1f8062d62a9672493df02ad7462014c0edbc6
```

```
Y= 0x20f2382c2425aaa638f61e8b70fcf70dae6bcb2f9f341b33ae577c62395aa816
```

During processing a message u\_1, calculation the K\_B key and the message u\_2 on the side B the parameters betta, src, K\_B = H\_256 (src), betta\*P and u\_2 take the following values:

betta=0x30d5cfadada0e31b405e6734c03ec4c5df0f02f4ba25c9a3b320ee6453567b4cb

src:

```
a3 39 a0 b8 9c ef 1a 6f fd 4c a1 28 04 9e 06 84
df 4a 97 75 b6 89 a3 37 84 1b f7 d7 91 20 7f 35
11 86 28 f7 28 8e aa 0f 7e c8 1d a2 0a 24 ff 1e
69 93 c6 3d 9d d2 6a 90 b7 4d d1 a2 66 28 06 63
```

K\_B:

```
7d f7 1a c3 27 ed 51 7d 0d e4 03 e8 17 c6 20 4b
c1 91 65 b9 d1 00 2b 9f 10 88 a6 cd a6 ea cf 27
```



**beta\*P:**

```
X= 0x2b2d89fab735433970564f2f28cfa1b57d640cb902bc6334a538f44155022cb2
Y= 0x10ef6a82eef1e70f942aa81d6b4ce5dec0ddb9447512962874870e6f2849a96f
u_2:
```

```
X= 0x47182ed8f018fa93a5d837e52724af6051c168ef15e4a40fe926473bc3f1032a
Y= 0x97f3e1e674da53b0ec3ebb1a62a25c7424f4334950daec4d33045f78d9faeeb4
```

During processing a message u\_2 and calculation the key on the side A the K\_A key takes the following value:

K\_A:

```
7d f7 1a c3 27 ed 51 7d 0d e4 03 e8 17 c6 20 4b
c1 91 65 b9 d1 00 2b 9f 10 88 a6 cd a6 ea cf 27
```

The message MAC\_A=HMAC (K\_A, 0x01 || ID\_A || ind || salt || u\_1 || u\_2) from the side A takes the following value:

MAC\_A:

```
f5 69 f6 e7 68 9e f0 ba 08 46 98 cc 0e bc ac 59
67 8c 93 26 af 21 f5 4d 3e 90 05 29 32 6b 41 ee
```

The message MAC\_B=HMAC (K\_B, 0x02 || ID\_B || ind || salt || u\_1 || u\_2) from the side B takes the following value:

MAC\_B:

```
80 d5 f0 3b 48 22 37 76 43 b4 ff 92 05 dd ed b1
9f 22 80 1f b4 de 0b fb e0 74 55 c2 54 32 45 1e
```

### **B.7 Curveid-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetC**

The input protocol parameters in this example take the following values:

N= 3

ind= 1

ID\_A:

```
00 00 00 00
```

ID\_B:

```
00 00 00 00
```

PW:

```
31 32 33 34 35 36 ('123456')
```

salt:

```
29 23 be 84 e1 6c d6 ae 52 90 49 f1 f1 bb e9 eb
```

Q\_ind:

```
X= 0x5b065ead2e94de0ee2e462de204c93c6b2bf3498ad920393cb60259e1a8ffc7c
    7e7d4defa20ff4282abf70207e4611d532f40db6800e29d2b53f6ac0713e5b38
Y= 0xa39a28c59ff7f796b85223b8834384907c626086415487288ed1182ca4487dc1
    ae5f37af90fd267b7c0dc8542ea52cd984af54731bc84271d6186d973c91359b
```

The function F (PW, salt, 2000) takes the following values:

F(PW,salt,2000):

```
bd 04 67 3f 71 49 b1 8e 98 15 5b d1 e2 72 4e 71
d0 09 9a a2 51 74 f7 92 d3 32 6c 6f 18 12 70 67
```

The coordinates of the point Q\_PW are:

```
X= 0x463e9d38239ddac18e7cc7f6caa7244ae5c49d58dcfd6a56510d7779496744d
    75e3e0d5795d4e603f7baea8d24ada989d4179e1db33d1912602fc59470192df
```

```
Y= 0x088874b12c160930aa840f046ee75fa86206f19ca5f431d81e2381d6d947b7b0
    30577e40f09b1c16f8e6ef84daddba028f8b6e397a27ece0e13197662659af4d
```

During the calculation of the message u\_1 on the side A the parameter



alpha, the point alpha\*P and the message u\_1 take the following values:  
alpha=0x0b3fe942126aefc0287f82c6290505aeb117aa8dc033cee56222dd1b9f9e1e5

377583ba300211ec2c399546b4f54578ee925c238d52530c159c7034ccfa0ddd

alphaP:

X= 0x61427a12468974b5829de1263d91fdfd8e26ea337c6c223595e05b4da4f8fe93

2b532f33c0f4631729422c04f7018a7bf619c026ef0edc4ba2a96b79397eba92

Y= 0x6833806e26791ef1dd01e60c10cc247173b97d7d8d7fea53de4a8a6a444bacc7

042bf35394aef4cfde0f236788f2e9fca9e10f7d7fee54fff951ae17996808c1

u\_1:

X= 0x03664ef83e51beaec1f11711f8742b180001c7734a715e4a693758acd9851b38

c6d7e0a316d809b75694ae1b356951a93c91a9b85aa3e3a561742211fd238852

Y= 0x2b92fa93fab060fa86c3039eb2904bc18fbe45032dc3c93ce1c6ba1542a29e0d

790a5f7b63928ed9e50d1fef06bd00ade4eb021bc62a560567a3419e74dfc08a

During processing a message u\_1, calculation the K\_B key and the message u\_2 on the side B the parameters betta, src, K\_B = H\_256 (src), betta\*P and u\_2 take the following values:

betta=0xd494d54fb777781d1324ed6088bb0d9d86b8b0a252aa6a3ee70af8ef44b87a6

4cea3a432b61a699bad2d9760d700c2891b6285be0b0bb90f16a40a9b2e0e36a

src:

c2 a3 1a 15 08 52 8a fb 70 be d5 7a 3a 97 9a 3a

8c ed 00 2f 1b 05 8f 99 cb ee 64 56 5c cb ae 42

c5 80 b1 39 18 04 b3 e3 34 d0 2f 70 55 18 ef 16

b7 cf 0e 79 91 76 6f 7e 22 81 f2 87 b1 df cd 34

5c 56 04 ef 1d 9a 8e b8 27 3f 2e 7a 3b fb a4 13

ad 7f 19 59 99 41 f8 f6 73 63 2b e1 43 b1 65 7f

d3 3a 3a de 7d 9f 71 6c e4 0c b5 9e 9d dd a5 0d

db 87 66 57 e7 37 8f f1 55 94 fc 7a 9e 4b 03 48

K\_B:

84 14 e1 12 6c 56 a1 1e 1f 5e a0 b7 c3 bd ab e9

8b 26 8b 59 d4 08 f9 7c d0 ea d7 c2 7e e4 9c 15

betta\*P:

X= 0xe247677c90ac3c74952c70da0d43f25ece4ac22eda732f7ddd772de7c3e69b22

f7679cc01cae009e442c630c7aa9403a9f11e0fb62cf7af84e77b95210a17edd

Y= 0x63be6dc920e57cb1c5b63fd8b623db6c934b87e0b14468de32c9387515cf3d35

618e945a986424708ef0515ccaa30061ac6870ab56c29c43340736a6c6179c2e

u\_2:

X= 0x32260df3ddeabaa9c5c1f55248e8e9a3552cef81a19f0ac1e10f3b7280a844c

5362b527da1c6ec7eeace2a77aa1167f5e18a4bb6bc6445b4f479ca239245002

Y= 0x04e0612a0c8cd4323535899d0698dd09bb9fc4302016f1b236c86692358ffd98

1cd082c0129763bd4749ee5bb014255d1de0fd7775deccb564213ebc7100001d

During processing a message u\_2 and calculation the key on the side A the K\_A key takes the following value:

K\_A:

84 14 e1 12 6c 56 a1 1e 1f 5e a0 b7 c3 bd ab e9

8b 26 8b 59 d4 08 f9 7c d0 ea d7 c2 7e e4 9c 15

The message MAC\_A=HMAC (K\_A, 0x01 || ID\_A || ind || salt || u\_1 || u\_2) from the side A takes the following value:

MAC\_A:



```
53 0b 77 63 c5 9e 7c 98 52 59 ad eb af a4 16 41  
c6 f4 35 47 85 01 bd c9 7e a9 cf 88 a6 9a 12 8c
```

The message MAC\_B=HMAC (K\_B, 0x02 || ID\_B || ind || salt || u\_1 || u\_2)  
from the side B takes the following value:

MAC\_B:

```
3f 48 65 b8 8c 81 e5 ac 56 1e 31 c1 b3 d1 d9 0c  
57 e1 e7 4b ac 77 b1 63 ac 60 74 82 4e 99 d3 cc
```

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