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The Security Evaluated Standardized Password Authenticated Key Exchange
(SESPAKE) Protocol
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Abstract

This document specifies the Security Evaluated Standardized Password Authenticated Key Exchange (SESPAKE) protocol. The SESPANE protocol provides password authenticated key exchange for usage in the systems for protection of sensitive information. The security proofs of the protocol were made for the case of an active adversary in the channel, including MitM attacks and attacks based on the impersonation of one of the subjects.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction	2
2. Conventions Used in This Document	2
3. Notations	3
4. Protocol Description	4
4.1. Protocol Parameters	5
4.2. Initial Values of the Protocol Counters	6
4.3. Protocol Steps	6
5. Construction of Points Q_1, ..., Q_N	11
6. Acknowledgments	12
7. Security Considerations	12
8. References	13
8.1. Normative References	13
8.2. Informative References	14
Appendix A. Test Examples for GOST-based Protocol Implementation	14
A.1. Examples of Points	14
A.2. Test Examples of SESPAKE	16
Appendix B. Point Verification Script	27
Authors' Addresses	42

1. Introduction

The current document contains the description of the password authenticated key exchange protocol SESPAKE (security evaluated standardized password authenticated key exchange) for usage in the systems for protection of sensitive information. The protocol is intended to use for establishment of keys that are then used for organization of secure channel for protection of sensitive information. The security proofs of the protocol were made for the case of an active adversary in the channel, including MitM attacks and attacks based on the impersonation of one of the subjects.

2. Conventions Used in This Document

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [[RFC2119](#)].

Smyshlyaev, et al.

Expires June 26, 2017

[Page 2]

3. Notations

This document uses the following parameters of elliptic curves in accordance with [[RFC6090](#)]:

- E an elliptic curve defined over a finite prime field GF(p), where $p > 3$;
- p the characteristic of the underlying prime field;
- a, b the coefficients of the equation of the elliptic curve in the canonical form;
- m the elliptic curve group order;
- q the elliptic curve subgroup order;
- P a generator of the subgroup of order q;
- X, Y the coordinates of the elliptic curve point in the canonical form;
- 0 zero point (point of infinity) of the elliptic curve.

This memo uses the following functions:

- HASH the underlying hash function;
- HMAC the function for calculating a message authentication code, based on a HASH function in accordance with [[RFC2104](#)];
- F(PW, salt, n) the value of the function PBKDF2(PW,salt,n,len), where PBKDF2(PW,salt,n,len) is calculated according to [[RFC2898](#)] The parameter len is considered equal to minimal integer that is a multiple of 8 and satisfies the following condition:
 $\text{len} \geq \text{floor}(\log_2(q))$.

This document uses the following terms and definitions for the sets and operations on the elements of these sets

- B_n the set of byte strings of size n, $n \geq 0$, for $n = 0$ the B_n set consists of a single empty string of size 0; if b is an element of B_n, then $b = (b_1, \dots, b_n)$, where b_1, \dots, b_n are elements of $\{0, \dots, 255\}$;
- || concatenation of byte strings A and C, i.e., if A in B_n1, C in B_n2, $A = (a_1, a_2, \dots, a_{n1})$ and $C = (c_1, c_2, \dots, c_{n2})$,

then $A||C = (a_1, a_2, \dots, a_n, c_1, c_2, \dots, c_{n2})$ is an element of $B_{(n1+n2)}$;

$\text{int}(A)$ for the byte string $A = (a_1, \dots, a_n)$ in B_n an integer $\text{int}(A) = 256^{(n-1)}a_n + \dots + 256^0a_1$;

$\text{bytes}_n(X)$ the byte string A in B_n such that $\text{int}(A) = X$, where X is integer, $0 \leq X < 256^n$;

$\text{BYTES}(Q)$ for Q in E , the byte string $\text{bytes}_n(X) || \text{bytes}_n(Y)$, where X, Y are standard Weierstrass coordinates of point Q and $n = \text{ceil}(\log_{256}(p))$.

[4. Protocol Description](#)

The main point of the SESPKE protocol is that parties sharing a weak key (a password) generate a strong common key. The active adversary who has an access to a channel is not able to obtain any information that can be used to find a key in offline mode, i.e. without interaction with legitimate participants.

The protocol is used by the subjects A (client) and B (server) that share some secret parameter that was established in an out-of-band mechanism: a client is a participant who stores a password as a secret parameter and a server is a participant who stores a password-based computed point of the elliptic curve.

The SESPKE protocol consists of two steps: the key agreement step and the key confirmation step. During the first step (the key agreement step) the parties exchange keys using Diffie-Hellman with public components masked by an element that depends on the password - one of the predefined elliptic curve points multiplied by the password-based coefficient. This approach provides an implicit key authentication, which means that after this step one party is assured that no other party aside from a specifically identified second party may gain access to the generated secret key. During the second step (the key confirmation step) the parties exchange strings that strongly depend on the generated key. After this step the parties are assured that a legitimate party and no one else actually has possession of the secret key.

To protect against online guessing attacks the failed connections counters were introduced in the SESPKE protocol. There is also a special way of a small order point processing and a mechanism that provides a reflection attack protection by using different operations for different sides.

Smyshlyaev, et al.

Expires June 26, 2017

[Page 4]

4.1. Protocol Parameters

Various elliptic curves can be used in the protocol. For each elliptic curve supported by clients the following values MUST be defined:

- o the protocol parameters identifier ID_ALG (which can also define a HASH function, PRF used in PBKDF2 function, etc.), that is a byte string of an arbitrary length;
- o the point P, that is a generator point of the subgroup of order q of the curve;
- o the set of distinct curve points {Q_1, Q_2, ..., Q_N} of order q, where the total number of points N is defined for protocol instance.

The method of generation of the points {P, Q_1, Q_2, ..., Q_N} is described in [Section 5](#).

The protocol parameters that are used by subject A are the following:

1. The secret password value PW, which is a byte string that is uniformly randomly chosen from a subset of cardinality 10^{10} or greater of the set B_k, where k ≥ 6 is password length.
2. The list of curve identifiers supported by A.
3. Sets of points {Q_1, Q_2, ..., Q_N}, corresponding to curves supported by A.
4. The C_1^A counter, that tracks the total number of unsuccessful authentication trials in a row, and a value of CLim_1 that stores the maximum possible number of such events.
5. The C_2^A counter, that tracks the total number of unsuccessful authentication events during the period of usage of the specific PW, and a value of CLim_2 that stores the maximum possible number of such events.
6. The C_3^A counter, that tracks the total number of authentication events (successful and unsuccessful) during the period of usage of the specific PW, and a value of CLim_3 that stores the maximum possible number of such events.
7. The unique identifier ID_A of the subject A (OPTIONAL), which is a byte string of an arbitrary length.

Smyshlyaev, et al.

Expires June 26, 2017

[Page 5]

The protocol parameters that are used by subject B are the following:

1. The values `ind` and `salt`, where `ind` is in $\{1, \dots, N\}$, `salt` is in $\{1, \dots, 2^{128}-1\}$.
2. The point `Q_PW`, satisfying the following equation:

$$Q_{PW} = \text{int}(F(PW, salt, 2000)) * Q_{ind}.$$

It is possible that the point `Q_PW` is not stored and is calculated using `PW` in the beginning of the protocol. In that case B has to store `PW` and points `Q_1, Q_2, ..., Q_N`.

3. The `ID_ALG` identifier.
4. The `C_1^B` counter, that tracks the total number of unsuccessful authentication trials in a row, and a value of `CLim_1` that stores the maximum possible number of such events.
5. The `C_2^B` counter, that tracks the total number of unsuccessful authentication events during the period of usage of the specific `PW`, and a value of `CLim_2` that stores the maximum possible number of such events.
6. The `C_3^B` counter, that tracks the total number of authentication events (successful and unsuccessful) during the period of usage of the specific `PW`, and a value of `CLim_3` that stores the maximum possible number of such events.
7. The unique identifier `ID_B` of the subject B (OPTIONAL), which is a byte string of an arbitrary length.

4.2. Initial Values of the Protocol Counters

After the setup of a new password value `PW` the values of the counters MUST be assigned as follows:

- o $C_{1^A} = C_{1^B} = CLim_1$, where `CLim_1` is in $\{3, \dots, 5\}$;
- o $C_{2^A} = C_{2^B} = CLim_2$, where `CLim_2` is in $\{7, \dots, 20\}$;
- o $C_{3^A} = C_{3^B} = CLim_3$, where `CLim_3` is in $\{10^3, 10^{3+1}, \dots, 10^5\}$.

4.3. Protocol Steps

The basic SESPAKE steps are shown in the scheme below:

+-----+-----+-----+

A [A_ID, PW]		B [B_ID, Q_PW , ind, salt]
if C_1^A or C_2^A or C_3^A = 0 ==> quit		
decrement C_1^A, C_2^A, C_3^A by 1	A_ID --->	if C_1^B or C_2^B or C_3^B = 0 ==> quit
z_A = 0	<--- ID_ALG, B_ID (OPTIONAL), ind, salt	decrement C_1^B, C_2^B, C_3^B by 1
Q_PW^A = int(F(PW, salt, 2000)) * Q_ind		
choose alpha randomly from {1,...,q-1}		
u_1 = alpha*P - Q_PW^A	u_1 --->	if u_1 not in E ==> quit
		z_B = 0
		Q_B = u_1 + Q_PW
		choose betta randomly from {1,...,q-1}
		if m/q*Q_B = 0 ==> Q_B = betta*P, z_B = 1
		K_B = HASH(BYTES((m/q*bet ta*(mod q))*Q_B))
if u_2 not in E ==> quit	<--- u_2	u_2 = betta*P + Q_PW
Q_A = u_2 - Q_PW^A		
if m/q*Q_A = 0 ==> Q_A = alpha*P, z_A = 1		
K_A = HASH(BYTES((m/q*a lpha(mod q))*Q_A))		

U_1 = BYTES(u_1), U_2 = BYTES(u_2)		
MAC_A = HMAC(K_A, 0x01 ID_A ind salt U_1 U_2 ID_ALG (OPTIONAL) DATA_A)	DATA_A, MAC_A --->	U_1 = BYTES(u_1), U_2 = BYTES(u_2)
		if MAC_A != HMAC(K_B, 0x01 ID_A ind salt U_1 U_2 ID_ALG (OPTIONAL) DATA_A) ==> quit
		if z_B = 1 ==> quit
		C_1^B = CLim_1, increment C_2^B by 1
if MAC_B != HMAC(K_A, 0x02 ID_B ind salt U_1 U_2 ID_ALG (OPTIONAL) DATA_A DATA_B) ==> quit	<--- DATA_B, MAC_B	MAC_B = HMAC(K_B, 0x02 ID_B ind salt U_1 U_2 ID_ALG (OPTIONAL) DATA_A DATA_B)
if z_A = 1 ==> quit		
C_1^A = CLim_1, increment C_2^A by 1		

Table 1: SESPAKE protocol steps

The full description of the protocol consists of the following steps:

1. If any of the counters C_1^A , C_2^A , C_3^A is equal to 0, A finishes the protocol with an error that informs of exceeding the number of trials that is controlled by the corresponding counter.
2. A decrements each of the counters C_1^A , C_2^A , C_3^A by 1, requests open authentication information from B and sends the ID_A identifier.
3. If any of the counters C_1^B , C_2^B , C_3^B is equal to 0, B finishes the protocol with an error that informs of exceeding

the number of trials that is controlled by the corresponding counter.

4. B decrements each of the counters C_1^B , C_2^B , C_3^B by 1.
5. B sends the values of ind , salt and the ID_{ALG} identifier to A. B also can OPTIONALLY send the ID_B identifier to A. All following calculations are done by B in the elliptic curve group defined by the ID_{ALG} identifier.
6. A sets the curve defined by the received ID_{ALG} identifier as the used elliptic curve. All following calculations are done by A in this elliptic curve group.
7. A calculates the point $Q_{PW^A} = \text{int}(F(PW, \text{salt}, 2000)) * Q_{ind}$.
8. A chooses randomly (according to the uniform distribution) the value alpha, alpha is in $\{1, \dots, q-1\}$, and assigns $z_A = 0$.
9. A sends the value $u_1 = \alpha * P - Q_{PW^A}$ to B.
10. After receiving u_1 , B checks that u_1 is in E. If it is not, B finishes with an error, considering the authentication process unsuccessful.
11. B calculates $Q_B = u_1 + Q_{PW}$, assigns $z_B = 0$ and chooses randomly (according to the uniform distribution) the value betta, betta is in $\{1, \dots, q-1\}$.
12. If $m/q * Q_B = 0$, B assigns $Q_B = \beta * P$ and $z_B = 1$.
13. B calculates $K_B = \text{HASH}(\text{BYTES}((m/q * \beta * (\text{mod } q)) * Q_B))$.
14. B sends the value $u_2 = \beta * P + Q_{PW}$ to A.
15. After receiving u_2 , A checks that u_2 is in E. If it is not, A finishes with an error, considering the authentication process unsuccessful.
16. A calculates $Q_A = u_2 - Q_{PW^A}$.
17. If $m/q * Q_A = 0$, then A assigns $Q_A = \alpha * P$ and $z_A = 1$.
18. A calculates $K_A = \text{HASH}(\text{BYTES}((m/q * \alpha * (\text{mod } q)) * Q_A))$.
19. A calculates $U_1 = \text{BYTES}(u_1)$, $U_2 = \text{BYTES}(u_2)$.

20. A calculates $MAC_A = \text{HMAC}(K_A, 0x01 || ID_A || \text{ind} || \text{salt} || U_1 || U_2 || \text{ID_ALG (OPTIONAL)} || \text{DATA}_A)$, where DATA_A is an OPTIONAL string that is authenticated with MAC_A (if it is not used, then DATA_A is considered to be of zero length).
21. A sends DATA_A , MAC_A to B.
22. B calculates $U_1 = \text{BYTES}(u_1)$, $U_2 = \text{BYTES}(u_2)$.
23. B checks that the values MAC_A and $\text{HMAC}(K_B, 0x01 || ID_A || \text{ind} || \text{salt} || U_1 || U_2 || \text{ID_ALG (OPTIONAL)} || \text{DATA}_A)$ are equal. If they are not, it finishes with an error, considering the authentication process unsuccessful.
24. If $z_B = 1$, B finishes, considering the authentication process unsuccessful.
25. B sets the value of C_{1^B} to CLim_1 and increments C_{2^B} by 1.
26. B calculates $MAC_B = \text{HMAC}(K_B, 0x02 || ID_B || \text{ind} || \text{salt} || U_1 || U_2 || \text{ID_ALG (OPTIONAL)} || \text{DATA}_A || \text{DATA}_B)$, where DATA_B is an OPTIONAL string that is authenticated with MAC_B (if it is not used, then DATA_B is considered to be of zero length).
27. B sends DATA_B , MAC_B to A.
28. A checks that the values MAC_B and $\text{HMAC}(K_A, 0x02 || ID_B || \text{ind} || \text{salt} || U_1 || U_2 || \text{ID_ALG (OPTIONAL)} || \text{DATA}_A || \text{DATA}_B)$ are equal. If they are not, it finishes with an error, considering the authentication process unsuccessful.
29. If $z_A = 1$, A finishes, considering the authentication process unsuccessful.
30. A sets the value of C_{1^A} to CLim_1 and increments C_{2^A} by 1.

After the successful finish of the procedure the subjects A and B are mutually authenticated and each subject has an explicitly authenticated value of $K = K_A = K_B$.

N o t e s :

1. In the case when the interaction process can be initiated by any subject (client or server) the ID_A and ID_B options MUST be used and the receiver MUST check that the identifier he had received is not equal to his own, otherwise, it finishes the protocol. If an OPTIONAL parameter ID_A (or ID_B) is not used in the protocol,

it SHOULD be considered equal to a fixed byte string (zero-length string is allowed) defined by a specific implementation.

2. The ind, ID_A, ID_B and salt parameters can be agreed in advance. If some parameter is agreed in advance, it is possible not to send it during a corresponding step. Nevertheless, all parameters MUST be used as corresponding inputs to HMAC function during stages 20, 23, 26 and 28.
3. The ID_ALG parameter can be fixed or agreed in advance.
4. The ID_ALG parameter is RECOMMENDED to be used in HMAC during stages 20, 23, 26 and 28.
5. Continuation of protocol interaction in case of any of the counters C_1^A, C_1^B being equal to zero MAY be done without changing password. In this case these counters can be used for protection against denial-of-service attacks. For example, continuation of interaction can be allowed after a certain delay.
6. Continuation of protocol interaction in case of any of the counters C_2^A, C_3^A, C_2^B, C_3^B being equal to zero MUST be done only after changing password.
7. It is RECOMMENDED that during the stages 9 and 14 the points u_1 and u_2 are sent in a non-compressed format (BYTES(u_1) and BYTES(u_2)). However, the point compression MAY be used.
8. The use of several Q points can reinforce the independence of the data streams in case of working with several applications, when, for example, two high-level protocols can use two different points. However, the use of more than one point is OPTIONAL.

5. Construction of Points Q_1,...,Q_N

This section provides an example of possible algorithm for generation of each point Q_i in the set {Q_1,...,Q_N} that corresponds to the given elliptic curve E.

The algorithm is based on choosing points with coordinates with known preimages of a cryptographic hash function H, which is the GOST R 34.11-2012 hash function (see [[RFC6986](#)]) with 256-bit output, if $2^{254} < q < 2^{256}$, and the GOST R 34.11-2012 hash function (see [[RFC6986](#)]) with 512-bit output , if $2^{508} < q < 2^{512}$.

The algorithm consists of the following steps:

1. Set i = 1, SEED = 0, s = 4.

2. Calculate $X = \text{int}(\text{HASH}(\text{BYTES}(P) || \text{bytes}_s(\text{SEED}))) \bmod p$.
3. Check that the value of $X^3 + aX + b$ is a quadratic residue in the field F_p . If it is not, set $\text{SEED} = \text{SEED} + 1$ and return to Step 2.
4. Choose the value of $Y = \min\{r_1, r_2\}$, where r_1, r_2 from $\{0, 1, \dots, p-1\}$ are such that $r_1 \neq r_2$ and $r_1^2 = r_2^2 = R \bmod p$ for $R = X^3 + aX + b$.
5. Check that for the point $Q = (X, Y)$ the following relations hold: $Q \neq 0$ and $q*Q = 0$. If they do, go to Step 6; if not, set $\text{SEED} = \text{SEED} + 1$ and return to Step 2.
6. Set $Q_i = Q$. If $i < N$, then set $i = i+1$ and go to Step 2, else finish.

With the defined algorithm for any elliptic curve E point sets $\{Q_1, \dots, Q_N\}$ are constructed. Constructed points in one set MUST have distinct X-coordinates.

N o t e : The knowledge of a hash function preimage prevents knowledge of the multiplicity of any point related to generator point P. It is of primary importance, because such a knowledge could be used to implement an attack against protocol with exhaustive search of password.

6. Acknowledgments

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7. Security Considerations

Any cryptographic algorithms, particularly HASH function and HMAC function, that are used in the SESPKE protocol MUST be carefully designed and MUST be able to withstand all known types of cryptanalytic attack.

It is RECOMMENDED that the HASH function satisfies the following condition:

$\text{hashlen} \leq \log_2(q) + 4$, where hashlen is the lengths of the HASH function output.

The output length of hash functions that are used in the SESPKE protocol is RECOMMENDED to be greater or equal to 256 bits.

The points Q_1, Q_2, \dots, Q_N and P MUST be chosen in such a way that they are provable pseudorandom. As a practical matter, this means that the algorithm for generation of each point Q_i in the set $\{Q_1, \dots, Q_N\}$ (see [Section 5](#)) ensures that multiplicity of any point under any other point is unknown.

For a certain ID_ALG using $N = 1$ is RECOMMENDED.

Note: The exact adversary models, which have been considered during the security evaluation, can be found in the paper [[SESPAKE-SECURITY](#)], containing the security proofs.

8. References

8.1. Normative References

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8.2. Informative References

[SESPAKE-SECURITY]

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Appendix A. Test Examples for GOST-based Protocol Implementation

The following test examples are made for the protocol implementation that is based on the Russian national standards GOST R 34.10-2012 [[GOST3410-2012](#)] and GOST R 34.11-2012 [[GOST3411-2012](#)]. The English versions of these standards can be found in [[RFC7091](#)] and [[RFC6986](#)].

A.1. Examples of Points

There is one point Q_1 for each of the elliptic curves below. These points were constructed using the method described in [Section 5](#), in case when N = 1, where the GOST R 34.11-2012 hash function (see [[RFC6986](#)]) with 256-bit output is used if $2^{254} < q < 2^{256}$, the GOST R 34.11-2012 hash function (see [[RFC6986](#)]) with 512-bit output is used if $2^{508} < q < 2^{512}$.

Each of the points complies with the GOST R 34.10-2012 [[GOST3410-2012](#)] standard and is represented by a pair of (X, Y) coordinates in the canonical form and by a pair of (U, V) coordinates in the twisted Edwards form in accordance with the document [[RFC7836](#)] for the curves that have the equivalent representations in this form. There is a SEED value for each point, by which it was generated.

A.1.1. Curve id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet

Point Q_1

X = 0xa69d51caf1a309fa9e9b66187759b0174c274e080356f23cfcbfe84d396ad7bb
Y = 0x5d26f29ecc2e9ac0404dcf7986fa55fe94986362170f54b9616426a659786dac
SEED = 0x0001

A.1.2. Curve id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet

Point Q_1

X = 0x3d715a874a4b17cb3b517893a9794a2b36c89d2ffc693f01ee4cc27e7f49e399
Y = 0x1c5a641fcf7ce7e87cdf8cea38f3db3096eace2fad158384b53953365f4fe7fe
SEED = 0x0000

A.1.3. Curve id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet

Point Q_1

X = 0x1e36383e43bb6cfa2917167d71b7b5dd3d6d462b43d7c64282ae67dfbec2559d
Y = 0x137478a9f721c73932ea06b45cf72e37eb78a63f29a542e563c614650c8b6399
SEED = 0x0006

A.1.4. Curve id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetA

Point Q_1

X = 0x2a17f8833a32795327478871b5c5e88aefb91126c64b4b8327289bea62559425
d18198f133f400874328b220c74497cd240586cb249e158532cb8090776cd61c
Y = 0x728f0c4a73b48da41ce928358fad26b47a6e094e9362bae82559f83cddc4ec3a
4676bd3707edeaef4cd85e99695c64c241edc622be87dc0cf87f51f4367f723c5
SEED = 0x0001

A.1.5. Curve id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetB

Point Q_1

X = 0x7e1fae8285e035bec244bef2d0e5ebf436633cf50e55231dea9c9cf21d4c8c33
df85d4305de92971f0a4b4c07e00d87bdb720eb66e49079285aaf12e0171149
Y = 0x2cc89998b875d4463805ba0d858a196592db20ab161558ff2f4ef7a85725d209
53967ae621afdeae89bb77c83a2528ef6fce02f68bda4679d7f2704947dbc408
SEED = 0x0000

A.1.6. Curve id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-paramSetA

Point Q_1

X = 0xb51adf93a40ab15792164fad3352f95b66369eb2a4ef5efae32829320363350e
Y = 0x74a358cc08593612f5955d249c96afb7e8b0bb6d8bd2bbe491046650d822be18
U = 0xebe97afffe0d0f88b8b0114b8de430ac2b34564e4420af24728e7305bc48aeea
V = 0x828f2dcf8f06612b4fea4da72ca509c0f76dd37df424ea22bfa6f4f65748c1e4
SEED = 0x0001

A.1.7. Curve id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetC

Point Q_1

X = 0x489c91784e02e98f19a803abca319917f37689e5a18965251ce2ff4e8d8b298f
5ba7470f9e0e713487f96f4a8397b3d09a270c9d367eb5e0e6561adeeb51581d
Y = 0x684ea885aca64eaf1b3fee36c0852a3be3bd8011b0ef18e203ff87028d6eb5db
2c144a0dcc71276542bfd72ca2a43fa4f4939da66d9a60793c704a8c94e16f18
U = 0x3a3496f97e96b3849a4fa7db60fd93858bde89958e4bebd05a6b3214216b37c


```

9d9a560076e7ea59714828b18fbfef996ffc98bf3dc9f2d3cb0ed36a0d6ace88
V = 0x52d884c8bf0ad6c5f7b3973e32a668daa1f1ed092eff138dae6203b2ccdec561
    47464d35fec4b727b2480eb143074712c76550c7a54ff3ea26f70059480dc5b50
SEED = 0x0013

```

A.2. Test Examples of SESPAKE

This protocol implementation uses the GOST R 34.11-2012 hash function (see [[RFC6986](#)]) with 256-bit output as the H function and the HMAC_GOSTR3411_2012_512 function defined in [[RFC7836](#)] as a PRF function for the F function. The parameter len is considered equal to 256, if $2^{254} < q < 2^{256}$, and equal to 512, if $2^{508} < q < 2^{512}$.

The test examples for the point of each curve in [Appendix A.1](#) are given below.

[A.2.1 Curve id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet](#)

The input protocol parameters in this example take the following values:

```

N = 1
ind = 1
ID_A:
  00 00 00 00
ID_B:
  00 00 00 00
PW:
  31 32 33 34 35 36 ('123456')
salt:
  29 23 BE 84 E1 6C D6 AE 52 90 49 F1 F1 BB E9 EB
Q_ind:
  X = 0xA69D51CAF1A309FA9E9B66187759B0174C274E080356F23CFCBFE84D396AD7BB
  Y = 0x5D26F29ECC2E9AC0404DCF7986FA55FE94986362170F54B9616426A659786DAC

```

The function F (PW, salt, 2000) takes the following values:

```

F(PW,salt,2000):
  BD 04 67 3F 71 49 B1 8E 98 15 5B D1 E2 72 4E 71
  D0 09 9A A2 51 74 F7 92 D3 32 6C 6F 18 12 70 67

```

The coordinates of the point Q_PW are:

```

  X = 0x59495655D1E7C7424C622485F575CCF121F3122D274101E8AB734CC9C9A9B45E
  Y = 0x48D1C311D33C9B701F3B03618562A4A07A044E3AF31E3999E67B487778B53C62

```

During the calculation of the message u_1 on the subject A the parameter alpha, the point alpha*P and the message u_1 take the following values:
alpha=0x1F2538097D5A031FA68BBB43C84D12B3DE47B7061C0D5E24993E0C873CDBA6B3
alpha*P:

```

  X = 0xBBBC77CF42DC1E62D06227935379B4AA4D14FEA4F565DDF4CB4FA4D31579F9676
  Y = 0x8E16604A4AFDF28246684D4996274781F6CB80ABBBA1414C1513EC988509DABF

```

u_1:

```

  X = 0x204F564383B2A76081B907F3FCA8795E806BE2C2ED228730B5B9E37074229E8D
  Y = 0xE84F9E442C61DDE37B601A7F37E7CA11C56183FA071DFA9320EDE3E7521F9D41

```

During processing a message u_1, calculation the K_B key and the message

u_2 on the subject B the parameters betta, src, $K_B = \text{HASH}(\text{src})$, betta^*P and u_2 take the following values:

betta=0xDC497D9EF6324912FD367840EE509A2032AEDB1C0A890D133B45F596FCCBD45D
src:

```
2E 01 A3 D8 4F DB 7E 94 7B B8 92 9B E9 36 3D F5
F7 25 D6 40 1A A5 59 D4 1A 67 24 F8 D5 F1 8E 2C
A0 DB A9 31 05 CD DA F4 BF AE A3 90 6F DD 71 9D
BE B2 97 B6 A1 7F 4F BD 96 DC C7 23 EA 34 72 A9
```

K_B :

```
1A 62 65 54 92 1D C2 E9 2B 4D D8 D6 7D BE 5A 56
62 E5 62 99 37 3F 06 79 95 35 AD 26 09 4E CA A3
```

betta^*P :

```
X = 0x6097341C1BE388E83E7CA2DF47FAB86E2271FD942E5B7B2EB2409E49F742BC29
Y = 0xC81AA48BDB4CA6FA0EF18B9788AE25FE30857AA681B3942217F9FED151BAB7D0
```

u_2 :

```
X = 0xDC137A2F1D4A35AEBC0ECBF6D3486DEF8480BFDC752A86DD4F207D7D1910E22D
Y = 0x7532F0CE99DCC772A4D77861DAE57C138F07AE304A727907FB0AAFDB624ED572
```

During processing a message u_2 and calculation the key on the subject A the K_A key takes the following value:

K_A :

```
1A 62 65 54 92 1D C2 E9 2B 4D D8 D6 7D BE 5A 56
62 E5 62 99 37 3F 06 79 95 35 AD 26 09 4E CA A3
```

The message $\text{MAC}_A = \text{HMAC}(K_A, 0x01 || ID_A || \text{ind} || \text{salt} || u_1 || u_2)$ from the subject A takes the following value:

MAC_A :

```
23 7A 03 C3 5F 49 17 CE 86 B3 58 94 45 F1 1E 1A
6F 10 8B 2F DD 0A A9 E8 10 66 4B 25 59 60 B5 79
```

The message $\text{MAC}_B = \text{HMAC}(K_B, 0x02 || ID_B || \text{ind} || \text{salt} || u_1 || u_2)$ from the subject B takes the following value:

MAC_B :

```
9E E0 E8 73 3B 06 98 50 80 4D 97 98 73 1D CD 1C
FF E8 7A 3B 15 1F 0A E8 3E A9 6A FB 4F FC 31 E4
```

A.2.2 Curve id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet

The input protocol parameters in this example take the following values:

$N = 1$

$\text{ind} = 1$

ID_A :

```
00 00 00 00
```

ID_B :

```
00 00 00 00
```

PW :

```
31 32 33 34 35 36 ('123456')
```

salt :

```
29 23 BE 84 E1 6C D6 AE 52 90 49 F1 F1 BB E9 EB
```

Q_{ind} :

```
X = 0x3D715A874A4B17CB3B517893A9794A2B36C89D2FFC693F01EE4CC27E7F49E399
```

```
Y = 0x1C5A641FCF7CE7E87CDF8CEA38F3DB3096EACE2FAD158384B53953365F4FE7FE
```


The function F (PW, salt, 2000) takes the following values:

F(PW,salt,2000):

```
BD 04 67 3F 71 49 B1 8E 98 15 5B D1 E2 72 4E 71
D0 09 9A A2 51 74 F7 92 D3 32 6C 6F 18 12 70 67
```

The coordinates of the point Q_PW are:

```
X = 0x6DC2AE26BC691FCA5A73D9C452790D15E34BA5404D92955B914C8D2662ABB985
Y = 0x3B02AAA9DD65AE30C335CED12F3154BBAC059F66B088306747453EDF6E5DB077
```

During the calculation of the message u_1 on the subject A the parameter alpha, the point alpha*P and the message u_1 take the following values:

alpha=0x499D72B90299CAB0DA1F8BE19D9122F622A13B32B730C46BD0664044F2144FAD

alpha*P:

```
X = 0x61D6F916DB717222D74877F179F7EBEF7CD4D24D8C1F523C048E34A1DF30F8DD
Y = 0x3EC48863049CFCFE662904082E78503F4973A4E105E2F1B18C69A5E7FB209000
```

u_1:

```
X = 0x21F5437AF33D2A1171A070226B4AE82D3765CD0EEBFF1ECEFE158EBC50C63AB1
Y = 0x5C9553B5D11AAECE738AD9A9F8CB4C100AD4FA5E089D3CBCCEA8C0172EB7ECC
```

During processing a message u_1, calculation the K_B key and the message u_2 on the subject B the parameters betta, src, K_B = HASH(src), betta*P and u_2 take the following values:

betta=0xF69FF614957EF83668EDC2D7ED614BE76F7B253DB23C5CC9C52BF7DF8F4669D

src:

```
50 14 0A 5D ED 33 43 EF C8 25 7B 79 E6 46 D9 F0
DF 43 82 8C 04 91 9B D4 60 C9 7A D1 4B A3 A8 6B
00 C4 06 B5 74 4D 8E B1 49 DC 8E 7F C8 40 64 D8
53 20 25 3E 57 A9 B6 B1 3D 0D 38 FE A8 EE 5E 0A
```

K_B:

```
A6 26 DE 01 B1 68 0F F7 51 30 09 12 2B CE E1 89
68 83 39 4F 96 03 01 72 45 5C 9A E0 60 CC E4 4A
```

betta*P:

```
X = 0x33BC6F7E9C0BA10CFB2B72546C327171295508EA97F8C8BA9F890F2478AB4D6C
Y = 0x75D57B396C396F492F057E9222CCC686437A2AAD464E452EF426FC8EEED1A4A6
```

u_2:

```
X = 0x089DDEE718EE8A224A7F37E22CFFD731C25FCBF58860364EE322412CDCEF99AC
Y = 0x0ECE03D4E395A6354C571871BEF425A532D5D463B0F8FD427F91A43E20CDA55C
```

During processing a message u_2 and calculation the key on the subject A the K_A key takes the following value:

K_A:

```
A6 26 DE 01 B1 68 0F F7 51 30 09 12 2B CE E1 89
68 83 39 4F 96 03 01 72 45 5C 9A E0 60 CC E4 4A
```

The message MAC_A=HMAC (K_A, 0x01 || ID_A || ind || salt || u_1 || u_2) from the subject A takes the following value:

MAC_A:

```
B9 1F 43 90 2A FA 90 D3 E5 C6 91 CB DC 43 8A 1E
BF 54 7F 4C 2C B4 14 43 CC 38 79 7B E2 47 A7 D0
```

The message MAC_B=HMAC (K_B, 0x02 || ID_B || ind || salt || u_1 || u_2) from the subject B takes the following value:

MAC_B:

```
79 D5 54 83 FD 99 B1 2B CC A5 ED C6 BB E1 D7 B9
```



```
15 CE 04 51 B0 89 1E 77 5D 4A 61 CB 16 E3 3F CC
```

A.2.3 Curve id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet

The input protocol parameters in this example take the following values:

N = 1

ind = 1

ID_A:

```
00 00 00 00
```

ID_B:

```
00 00 00 00
```

PW:

```
31 32 33 34 35 36 ('123456')
```

salt:

```
29 23 BE 84 E1 6C D6 AE 52 90 49 F1 F1 BB E9 EB
```

Q_ind:

```
X = 0x1E36383E43BB6CFA2917167D71B7B5DD3D6D462B43D7C64282AE67DFBEC2559D
```

```
Y = 0x137478A9F721C73932EA06B45CF72E37EB78A63F29A542E563C614650C8B6399
```

The function F (PW, salt, 2000) takes the following values:

F(PW,salt,2000):

```
BD 04 67 3F 71 49 B1 8E 98 15 5B D1 E2 72 4E 71
```

```
D0 09 9A A2 51 74 F7 92 D3 32 6C 6F 18 12 70 67
```

The coordinates of the point Q_PW are:

```
X = 0x945821DAF91E158B839939630655A3B21FF3E146D27041E86C05650EB3B46B59
```

```
Y = 0x3A0C2816AC97421FA0E879605F17F0C9C3EB734CFF196937F6284438D70BDC48
```

During the calculation of the message u_1 on the subject A the parameter alpha, the point alpha*P and the message u_1 take the following values:

alpha=0x3A54AC3F19AD9D0B1EAC8ACDCEA70E581F1DAC33D13FEAFD81E762378639C1A8

alpha*P:

```
X = 0x96B7F09C94D297C257A7DA48364C0076E59E48D221CBA604AE111CA3933B446A
```

```
Y = 0x54E4953D86B77ECCEB578500931E822300F7E091F79592CA202A020D762C34A6
```

u_1:

```
X = 0x81BBD6FCA464D2E2404A66D786CE4A777E739A89AEB68C2DAC99D53273B75387
```

```
Y = 0x6B6DBD922EA7E060998F8B230AB6EF07AD2EC86B2BF66391D82A30612EADD411
```

During processing a message u_1, calculation the K_B key and the message u_2 on the subject B the parameters betta, src, K_B = HASH(src), betta*P and u_2 take the following values:

betta=0x448781782BF7C0E52A1DD9E6758FD3482D90D3CFCCF42232CF357E59A4D49FD4

src:

```
16 A1 2D 88 54 7E 1C 90 06 BA A0 08 E8 CB EC C9
```

```
D1 68 91 ED C8 36 CF B7 5F 8E B9 56 FA 76 11 94
```

```
D2 8E 25 DA D3 81 8D 16 3C 49 4B 05 9A 8C 70 A5
```

```
A1 B8 8A 7F 80 A2 EE 35 49 30 18 46 54 2C 47 0B
```

K_B:

```
BE 7E 7E 47 B4 11 16 F2 C7 7E 3B 8F CE 40 30 72
```

```
CA 82 45 0D 65 DE FC 71 A9 56 49 E4 DE EA EC EE
```

betta*P:

```
X = 0x4B9C0AB55A938121F282F48A2CC4396EB16E7E0068B495B0C1DD4667786A3EB7
```

```
Y = 0x223460AA8E09383E9DF9844C5A0F2766484738E5B30128A171B69A77D9509B96
```


u_2:

```
X = 0x2ED9B903254003A672E89EBEBC9E31503726AD124BB5FC0A726EE0E6FCCE323E
Y = 0x4CF5E1042190120391EC8DB62FE25E9E26EC60FB0B78B242199839C295FCD022
```

During processing a message u_2 and calculation the key on the subject A the K_A key takes the following value:

K_A:

```
BE 7E 7E 47 B4 11 16 F2 C7 7E 3B 8F CE 40 30 72
CA 82 45 0D 65 DE FC 71 A9 56 49 E4 DE EA EC EE
```

The message MAC_A=HMAC (K_A, 0x01 || ID_A || ind || salt || u_1 || u_2) from the subject A takes the following value:

MAC_A:

```
D3 B4 1A E2 C9 43 11 36 06 3E 6D 08 A6 1B E9 63
BD 5E D6 A1 FF F9 37 FA 8B 09 0A 98 E1 62 BF ED
```

The message MAC_B=HMAC (K_B, 0x02 || ID_B || ind || salt || u_1 || u_2) from the subject B takes the following value:

MAC_B:

```
D6 B3 9A 44 99 BE D3 E0 4F AC F9 55 50 2D 16 B2
CB 67 4A 20 5F AC 3C D8 3D 54 EC 2F D5 FC E2 58
```

[A.2.4 Curve id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetA](#)

The input protocol parameters in this example take the following values:

N = 1

ind = 1

ID_A:

```
00 00 00 00
```

ID_B:

```
00 00 00 00
```

PW:

```
31 32 33 34 35 36 ('123456')
```

salt:

```
29 23 BE 84 E1 6C D6 AE 52 90 49 F1 F1 BB E9 EB
```

Q_ind:

```
X = 0xA17F8833A32795327478871B5C5E88AEFB91126C64B4B8327289BEA62559425
D18198F133F400874328B220C74497CD240586CB249E158532CB8090776CD61C
Y = 0x728F0C4A73B48DA41CE928358FAD26B47A6E094E9362BAE82559F83CDDC4EC3A
4676BD3707EDEAF4CD85E99695C64C241EDC622BE87DC0CF87F51F4367F723C5
```

The function F (PW, salt, 2000) takes the following values:

F(PW,salt,2000):

```
BD 04 67 3F 71 49 B1 8E 98 15 5B D1 E2 72 4E 71
D0 09 9A A2 51 74 F7 92 D3 32 6C 6F 18 12 70 67
1C 62 13 E3 93 0E FD DA 26 45 17 92 C6 20 81 22
EE 60 D2 00 52 0D 69 5D FD 9F 5F 0F D5 AB A7 02
```

The coordinates of the point Q_PW are:

```
X = 0x0C0AB53D0E0A9C607CAD758F558915A0A7DC5DC87B45E9A58FDDF30EC3385960
283E030CD322D9E46B070637785FD49D2CD711F46807A24C40AF9A42C8E2D740
Y = 0xDF93A8012B86D3A3D4F8A4D487DA15FC739EB31B20B3B0E8C8C032AAF8072C63
37CF7D5B404719E5B4407C41D9A3216A08CA69C271484E9ED72B8AAA52E28B8B
```

During the calculation of the message u_1 on the subject A the parameter

alpha, the point alpha*P and the message u_1 take the following values:
alpha=0x3CE54325DB52FE798824AEAD11BB16FA766857D04A4AF7D468672F16D90E7396

046A46F815693E85B1CE5464DA9270181F82333B0715057BBE8D61D400505F0E
alpha*P:

X = 0xB93093EB0FCC463239B7DF276E09E592FCFC9B635504EA4531655D76A0A3078E
2B4E51CFE2FA400CC5DE9FBE369DB204B3E8ED7EDD85EE5CCA654C1AED70E396

Y = 0x809770B8D910EA30BD2FA89736E91DC31815D2D9B31128077EEDC371E9F69466
F497DC64DD5B1FADC587F860EE256109138C4A9CD96B628E65A8F590520FC882

u_1:

X = 0xE7510A9EDD37B869566C81052E2515E1563FD79F1D782D6200F33C3CC2764D
40D0070B73AD5A47BAE9A8F2289C1B07DAC26A1A2FF9D3ECB0A8A94A4F179F13

Y = 0xBA333B912570777B626A5337BC7F727952460EEBA2775707FE4537372E902DF5
636080B25399751BF48FB154F3C2319A91857C23F39F89EF54A8F043853F82DE

During processing a message u_1, calculation the K_B key and the message u_2 on the subject B the parameters betta, src, K_B = HASH(src), betta*P and u_2 take the following values:

betta=0xB5C286A79AA8E97EC0E19BC1959A1D15F12F8C97870BA9D68CC12811A56A3BB1
1440610825796A49D468CDC9C2D02D76598A27973D5960C5F50BCE28D8D345F4

src:

84 59 C2 0C B5 C5 32 41 6D B9 28 EB 50 C0 52 0F
B2 1B 9C D3 9A 4E 76 06 B2 21 BE 15 CA 1D 02 DA
08 15 DE C4 49 79 C0 8C 7D 23 07 AF 24 7D DA 1F
89 EC 81 20 69 F5 D9 CD E3 06 AF F0 BC 3F D2 6E
D2 01 B9 53 52 A2 56 06 B6 43 E8 88 30 2E FC 8D
3E 95 1E 3E B4 68 4A DB 5C 05 7B 8F 8C 89 B6 CC
0D EE D1 00 06 5B 51 8A 1C 71 7F 76 82 FF 61 2B
BC 79 8E C7 B2 49 0F B7 00 3F 94 33 87 37 1C 1D

K_B:

53 24 DE F8 48 B6 63 CC 26 42 2F 5E 45 EE C3 4C
51 D2 43 61 B1 65 60 CA 58 A3 D3 28 45 86 CB 7A

betta*P:

X = 0x238B38644E440452A99FA6B93D9FD7DA0CB83C32D3C1E3CFE5DF5C3EB0F9DB91
E588DAEDC849EA2FB867AE855A21B4077353C0794716A6480995113D8C20C7AF

Y = 0xB2273D5734C1897F8D15A7008B862938C8C74CA7E877423D95243EB7EBD02FD2
C456CF9FC956F078A59AA86F19DD1075E5167E4ED35208718EA93161C530ED14

u_2:

X = 0xC33844126216E81B372001E77C1F9C7547F9223CF7BB865C4472EC18BE0C79A
678CC5AE4028E3F3620CCE355514F1E589F8A0C433CEAF CBD2EE87884D953411

Y = 0x8B520D083AAF257E8A54EC90CBADBAF4FEED2C2D868C82FF04FCBB9EF6F38E56
F6BAF9472D477414DA7E36F538ED223D2E2EE02FAE1A20A98C5A9FCF03B6F30D

During processing a message u_2 and calculation the key on the subject A the K_A key takes the following value:

K_A:

53 24 DE F8 48 B6 63 CC 26 42 2F 5E 45 EE C3 4C
51 D2 43 61 B1 65 60 CA 58 A3 D3 28 45 86 CB 7A

The message MAC_A=HMAC (K_A, 0x01 || ID_A || ind || salt || u_1 || u_2)
from the subject A takes the following value:

MAC_A:


```
E8 EF 9E A8 F1 E6 B1 26 68 E5 8C D2 2D D8 EE C6
4A 16 71 00 39 FA A6 B6 03 99 22 20 FA FE 56 14
```

The message MAC_B=HMAC (K_B, 0x02 || ID_B || ind || salt || u_1 || u_2) from the subject B takes the following value:

MAC_B:

```
61 14 34 60 83 6B 23 5C EC D0 B4 9B 58 7E A4 5D
51 3C 3A 38 78 3F 1C 9D 3B 05 97 0A 95 6A 55 BA
```

A.2.5 Curve id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetB

The input protocol parameters in this example take the following values:

N = 1

ind = 1

ID_A:

```
00 00 00 00
```

ID_B:

```
00 00 00 00
```

PW:

```
31 32 33 34 35 36 ('123456')
```

salt:

```
29 23 BE 84 E1 6C D6 AE 52 90 49 F1 F1 BB E9 EB
```

Q_ind:

```
X = 0x7E1FAE8285E035BEC244BEF2D0E5EBF436633CF50E55231DEA9C9CF21D4C8C33
DF85D4305DE92971F0A4B4C07E00D87BDBC720EB66E49079285AAF12E0171149
```

```
Y = 0x2CC89998B875D4463805BA0D858A196592DB20AB161558FF2F4EF7A85725D209
53967AE621AFDEAE89BB77C83A2528EF6FCE02F68BDA4679D7F2704947DBC408
```

The function F (PW, salt, 2000) takes the following values:

F(PW,salt,2000):

```
BD 04 67 3F 71 49 B1 8E 98 15 5B D1 E2 72 4E 71
D0 09 9A A2 51 74 F7 92 D3 32 6C 6F 18 12 70 67
1C 62 13 E3 93 0E FD DA 26 45 17 92 C6 20 81 22
EE 60 D2 00 52 0D 69 5D FD 9F 5F 0F D5 AB A7 02
```

The coordinates of the point Q_PW are:

```
X = 0x7D03E65B8050D1E12CBB601A17B9273B0E728F5021CD47C8A4DD822E4627BA5F
9C696286A2CDDA9A065509866B4DEDEDCA118409604AD549F87A60AFA621161
```

```
Y = 0x16037DAD45421EC50B00D50BDC6AC3B85348BC1D3A2F85DB27C3373580FEF87C
2C743B7ED30F22BE22958044E716F93A61CA3213A361A2797A16A3AE62957377
```

During the calculation of the message u_1 on the subject A the parameter alpha, the point alpha*P and the message u_1 take the following values:

alpha=0x715E893FA639BF341296E0623E6D29DADF26B163C278767A7982A989462A3863
FE12AEF8BD403D59C4DC4720570D4163DB0805C7C10C4E818F9CB785B04B9997

alpha*P:

```
X = 0x10C479EA1C04D3C2C02B0576A9C42D96226FF033C1191436777F66916030D87D
02FB93738ED7669D07619FFCE7C1F3C4DB5E5DF49E2186D6FA1E2EB5767602B9
```

```
Y = 0x039F6044191404E707F26D59D979136A831CCE43E1C5F0600D1DDF8F39D0CA3D
52FBD943BF04DDCED1AA2CE8F5EBD7487ACDEF239C07D015084D796784F35436
```

u_1:

```
X = 0x45C05CCE8290762F2470B719B4306D62B2911CEB144F7F72EF11D10498C7E921
FF163FE72044B4E7332AD8CBEC3C12117820F53A60762315BCEB5BC6DA5CF1E0
```


$Y = 0x5BE483E382D0F5F0748C4F6A5045D99E62755B5ACC9554EC4A5B2093E121A2DD$
 $5C6066BC9EDE39373BA19899208BB419E38B39BBDEDEB0B09A5CAAEEA984D02E$

During processing a message u_1 , calculation the K_B key and the message u_2 on the subject B the parameters betta, src, $K_B = \text{HASH}(\text{src})$, betta^*P and u_2 take the following values:

$\text{betta}=0x30FA8C2B4146C2DBBE82BED04D7378877E8C06753BD0A0FF71EBF2BEFE8DA8F3$
 $DC0836468E2CE7C5C961281B6505140F8407413F03C2CB1D201EA1286CE30E6D$

src:

```
3F 04 02 E4 0A 9D 59 63 20 5B CD F4 FD 89 77 91
9B BA F4 80 F8 E4 FB D1 25 5A EC E6 ED 57 26 4B
D0 A2 87 98 4F 59 D1 02 04 B5 F4 5E 4D 77 F3 CF
8A 63 B3 1B EB 2D F5 9F 8A F7 3C 20 9C CA 8B 50
B4 18 D8 01 E4 90 AE 13 3F 04 F4 F3 F4 D8 FE 8E
19 64 6A 1B AF 44 D2 36 FC C2 1B 7F 4D 8F C6 A1
E2 9D 6B 69 AC CE ED 4E 62 AB B2 0D AD 78 AC F4
FE B0 ED 83 8E D9 1E 92 12 AB A3 89 71 4E 56 0C
```

K_B :

```
D5 90 E0 5E F5 AE CE 8B 7C FB FC 71 BE 45 5F 29
A5 CC 66 6F 85 CD B1 7E 7C C7 16 C5 9F F1 70 E9
```

betta^*P :

$X = 0x34C0149E7BB91AE377B02573FCC48AF7BFB7B16DEB8F9CE870F384688E3241A3$
 $A868588CC0EF4364CCA67D17E3260CD82485C202ADC76F895D5DF673B1788E67$
 $Y = 0x608E944929BD643569ED5189DB871453F13333A1EAF82B2FE1BE8100E775F13D$
 $D9925BD317B63BFAF05024D4A738852332B64501195C1B2EF789E34F23DDAFC5$

u_2 :

```
X = 0x0535F95463444C4594B5A2E14B35760491C670925060B4BEBC97DE3A3076D1A5
81F89026E04282B040925D9250201024ACA4B2713569B6C3916A6F3344B840AD
Y = 0x40E6C2E55AEC31E7BCB6EA0242857FC6DFB5409803EDF4CA20141F72CC3C7988
706E076765F4F004340E5294A7F8E53BA59CB67502F0044558C854A7D63FE900
```

During processing a message u_2 and calculation the key on the subject A the K_A key takes the following value:

K_A :

```
D5 90 E0 5E F5 AE CE 8B 7C FB FC 71 BE 45 5F 29
A5 CC 66 6F 85 CD B1 7E 7C C7 16 C5 9F F1 70 E9
```

The message $\text{MAC}_A=\text{HMAC}(K_A, 0x01 || \text{ID}_A || \text{ind} || \text{salt} || u_1 || u_2)$ from the subject A takes the following value:

MAC_A :

```
DE 46 BB 4C 8C E0 8A 6E F3 B8 DF AC CC 1A 39 B0
8D 8C 27 B6 CB 0F CF 59 23 86 A6 48 F4 E5 BD 8C
```

The message $\text{MAC}_B=\text{HMAC}(K_B, 0x02 || \text{ID}_B || \text{ind} || \text{salt} || u_1 || u_2)$ from the subject B takes the following value:

MAC_B :

```
EC B1 1D E2 06 1C 55 F1 D1 14 59 CB 51 CE 31 40
99 99 99 2F CA A1 22 2F B1 4F CE AB 96 EE 7A AC
```

[A.2.6 Curve id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-paramSetA](#)

The input protocol parameters in this example take the following values:

$N = 1$


```

ind = 1
ID_A:
  00 00 00 00
ID_B:
  00 00 00 00
PW:
  31 32 33 34 35 36 ('123456')
salt:
  29 23 BE 84 E1 6C D6 AE 52 90 49 F1 F1 BB E9 EB
Q_ind:
  X = 0xB51ADF93A40AB15792164FAD3352F95B66369EB2A4EF5EFAE32829320363350E
  Y = 0x74A358CC08593612F5955D249C96AFB7E8B0BB6D8BD2BBE491046650D822BE18
The function F (PW, salt, 2000) takes the following values:
F(PW,salt,2000):
  BD 04 67 3F 71 49 B1 8E 98 15 5B D1 E2 72 4E 71
  D0 09 9A A2 51 74 F7 92 D3 32 6C 6F 18 12 70 67
The coordinates of the point Q_PW are:
  X = 0xDBF99827078956812FA48C6E695DF589DEF1D18A2D4D35A96D75BF6854237629
  Y = 0x9FDDD48BFBC57BEE1DA0cff282884F284D471B388893C48F5ECB02FC18D67589
During the calculation of the message u_1 on the subject A the parameter
alpha, the point alpha*P and the message u_1 take the following values:
alpha=0x147B72F6684FB8FD1B418A899F7DBECAF5FCE60B13685BAA95328654A7F0707F
alpha*P:
  X = 0x33FBAC14EAE538275A769417829C431BD9FA622B6F02427EF55BD60EE6BC2888
  Y = 0x22F2EBCF960A82E6CDB4042D3DDA511B2FBA925383C2273D952EA2D406EAE46
u_1:
  X = 0xE569AB544E3A13C41077DE97D659A1B7A13F61DDD808B633A5621FE2583A2C43
  Y = 0xA21A743A08F4D715661297ECD6F86553A808925BF34802BF7EC34C548A40B2C0
During processing a message u_1, calculation the K_B key and the message
u_2 on the subject B the parameters betta, src, K_B = HASH(src), betta*P
and u_2 take the following values:
betta=0x30D5CFADAA0E31B405E6734C03EC4C5DF0F02F4BA25C9A3B320EE6453567B4CB
src:
  A3 39 A0 B8 9C EF 1A 6F FD 4C A1 28 04 9E 06 84
  DF 4A 97 75 B6 89 A3 37 84 1B F7 D7 91 20 7F 35
  11 86 28 F7 28 8E AA 0F 7E C8 1D A2 0A 24 FF 1E
  69 93 C6 3D 9D D2 6A 90 B7 4D D1 A2 66 28 06 63
K_B:
  7D F7 1A C3 27 ED 51 7D 0D E4 03 E8 17 C6 20 4B
  C1 91 65 B9 D1 00 2B 9F 10 88 A6 CD A6 EA CF 27
betta*P:
  X = 0x2B2D89FAB735433970564F2F28CFA1B57D640CB902BC6334A538F44155022CB2
  Y = 0x10EF6A82EEF1E70F942AA81D6B4CE5DEC0DDB9447512962874870E6F2849A96F
u_2:
  X = 0x190D2F283F7E861065DB53227D7FBDF429CEBF93791262CB29569BDF63C86CA4
  Y = 0xB3F1715721E9221897CCDE046C9B843A8386DBF7818A112F15A02BC820AC8F6D
During processing a message u_2 and calculation the key on the subject A
the K_A key takes the following value:

```


K_A:

```
7D F7 1A C3 27 ED 51 7D 0D E4 03 E8 17 C6 20 4B
C1 91 65 B9 D1 00 2B 9F 10 88 A6 CD A6 EA CF 27
```

The message MAC_A=HMAC (K_A, 0x01 || ID_A || ind || salt || u_1 || u_2) from the subject A takes the following value:

MAC_A:

```
F9 29 B6 1A 3C 83 39 85 B8 29 F2 68 55 7F A8 11
00 9F 82 0A B1 A7 30 B5 AA 33 4C 3E 6B A3 17 7F
```

The message MAC_B=HMAC (K_B, 0x02 || ID_B || ind || salt || u_1 || u_2) from the subject B takes the following value:

MAC_B:

```
A2 92 8A 5C F6 20 BB C4 90 0D E4 03 F7 FC 59 A5
E9 80 B6 8B E0 46 D0 B5 D9 B4 AE 6A BF A8 0B D6
```

[A.2.7 Curve id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetC](#)

The input protocol parameters in this example take the following values:

N = 1

ind = 1

ID_A:

```
00 00 00 00
```

ID_B:

```
00 00 00 00
```

PW:

```
31 32 33 34 35 36 ('123456')
```

salt:

```
29 23 BE 84 E1 6C D6 AE 52 90 49 F1 F1 BB E9 EB
```

Q_ind:

```
X = 0x489C91784E02E98F19A803ABC A319917F37689E5A18965251CE2FF4E8D8B298F
      5BA7470F9E0E713487F96F4A8397B3D09A270C9D367EB5E0E6561ADEEB51581D
```

```
Y = 0x684EA885ACA64EAF1B3FEE36C0852A3BE3BD8011B0EF18E203FF87028D6EB5DB
      2C144A0DCC71276542BFD72CA2A43FA4F4939DA66D9A60793C704A8C94E16F18
```

The function F (PW, salt, 2000) takes the following values:

F(PW,salt,2000):

```
BD 04 67 3F 71 49 B1 8E 98 15 5B D1 E2 72 4E 71
D0 09 9A A2 51 74 F7 92 D3 32 6C 6F 18 12 70 67
1C 62 13 E3 93 0E FD DA 26 45 17 92 C6 20 81 22
EE 60 D2 00 52 0D 69 5D FD 9F 5F 0F D5 AB A7 02
```

The coordinates of the point Q_Pw are:

```
X = 0x0185AE6271A81BB7F236A955F7CAA26FB63849813C0287D96C83A15AE6B6A864
      67AB13B6D88CE8CD7DC2E5B97FF5F28FAC2C108F2A3CF3DB5515C9E6D7D210E8
```

```
Y = 0xED0220F92EF771A71C64ECC77986DB7C03D37B3E2AB3E83F32CE5E074A762EC0
      8253C9E2102B87532661275C4B1D16D2789CDABC58ACFDF7318DE70AB64F09B8
```

During the calculation of the message u_1 on the subject A the parameter alpha, the point alpha*P and the message u_1 take the following values:

alpha=0x332F930421D14CFE260042159F18E49FD5A54167E94108AD80B1DE60B13DE799
 9A34D611E63F3F870E5110247DF8EC7466E648ACF385E52CCB889ABF491EDFF0

alpha*P:

```
X = 0x561655966D52952E805574F4281F1ED3A2D498932B00CBA9DECB42837F09835B
```


FFBFE2D84D6B6B242FE7B57F92E1A6F2413E12DDD6383E4437E13D72693469AD

Y = 0xF6B18328B2715BD7F4178615273A36135BC0BF62F7D8BB9F080164AD36470AD0
3660F51806C64C6691BADEF30F793720F8E3FEAED631D6A54A4C372DCBF80E82

u_1:

X = 0x40645B4B9A908D74DEF98886A336F98BAE6ADA4C1AC9B7594A33D5E4A16486C5
533C7F3C5DD84797AB5B4340BFC70CAF1011B69A01A715E5B9B5432D5151CBD7

Y = 0x267FBB18D0B79559D1875909F2A15F7B49ECD8ED166CF7F4FCD1F44891550483
5E80D52BE8D34ADA5B5E159CF52979B1BCFE8F5048DC443A0983AA19192B8407

During processing a message u_1, calculation the K_B key and the message u_2 on the subject B the parameters betta, src, K_B = HASH(src), betta*P and u_2 take the following values:

betta=0x38481771E7D054F96212686B613881880BD8A6C89DDBC656178F014D2C093432
A033EE10415F13A160D44C2AD61E6E2E05A7F7EC286BCEA3EA4D4D53F8634FA2

src:

```
4F 4D 64 B5 D0 70 08 E9 E6 85 87 4F 88 2C 3E 1E
60 A6 67 5E ED 42 1F C2 34 16 3F DE B4 4C 69 18
B7 BC CE AB 88 A0 F3 FB 78 8D A8 DB 10 18 51 FF
1A 41 68 22 BA 37 C3 53 CE C4 C5 A5 23 95 B7 72
AC 93 C0 54 E3 F4 05 5C ED 6F F0 BE E4 A6 A2 4E
D6 8B 86 FE FA 70 DE 4A 2B 16 08 51 42 A4 DF F0
5D 32 EC 7D DF E3 04 F5 C7 04 FD FA 06 0F 64 E9
E8 32 14 00 25 F3 92 E5 03 50 77 0E 3F B6 2C AC
```

K_B:

```
A0 83 84 A6 2F 4B E1 AE 48 98 FC A3 6D AA 3F AA
45 1B 3E C5 B5 9C E3 75 F8 9E 92 9F 4B 13 25 8C
```

betta*P:

X = 0xB7C5818687083433BC1AFF61CB5CA79E38232025E0C1F123B8651E62173CE687
3F3E6FFE7281C2E45F4F524F66B0C263616ED08FD210AC4355CA3292B51D71C3

Y = 0x497F14205DBDC89BDDAF50520ED3B1429AD30777310186BE5E68070F016A44E0
C766DB08E8AC23FBDFDE6D675AA4DF591EB18BA0D348DF7AA40973A2F1DCFA55

u_2:

```
X = 0xB772FD97D6FDEC1DA0771BC059B3E5ADF9858311031EAE5AEC6A6EC8104B4105
C45A6C65689A8EE636C687DB62CC0AFC9A48CA66E381286CC73F374C1DD8F445
Y = 0xC64F69425FFEB2995130E85A08EDC3A686EC28EE6E8469F7F09BD3BCBDD843AC
573578DA6BA1CB3F5F069F205233853F06255C4B28586C9A1643537497B1018C
```

During processing a message u_2 and calculation the key on the subject A the K_A key takes the following value:

K_A:

```
A0 83 84 A6 2F 4B E1 AE 48 98 FC A3 6D AA 3F AA
45 1B 3E C5 B5 9C E3 75 F8 9E 92 9F 4B 13 25 8C
```

The message MAC_A=HMAC (K_A, 0x01 || ID_A || ind || salt || u_1 || u_2) from the subject A takes the following value:

MAC_A:

```
12 63 F2 89 0E 90 EE 42 6B 9B A0 8A B9 EA 7F 1F
FF 26 E1 60 5C C6 5D E2 96 96 91 15 E5 31 76 87
```

The message MAC_B=HMAC (K_B, 0x02 || ID_B || ind || salt || u_1 || u_2) from the subject B takes the following value:

MAC_B:

6D	FD	06	04	5D	6D	97	A0	E4	19	B0	0E	00	35	B9	D2
E3	AB	09	8B	7C	A4	AD	52	54	60	FA	B6	21	85	AA	57

Appendix B. Point Verification Script

The points from the [Appendix A.1](#) were generated with the following point verification script in Python:


```
"x":0x91E38443A5E82C0D880923425712B2BB658B9196932E02C78B2582FE742DAA28,
"y":0x32879423AB1A0375895786C4BB46E9565FDE0B5344766740AF268ADB32322E5C,
"n":32
},
{
'OID':"id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetC",
"p":(0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF0xFFFFFFFFL<<296)+\
      (0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFL<<80)+\
      0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF0xFFFFFFFFDC7L,
"a":(0xDC9203E514A721875485A529D2C722FB187BC8980EB866644DE41CL<<296)+\
      (0x68E143064546E861C0E2C9EDD92ADE71F46FCF50FF2AD97F951FDAL<<80)+\
      0x9F2A2EB6546F39689BD3L,
"b":(0xB4C4EE28CEBC6C2C8AC12952CF37F16AC7EFB6A9F69F4B57FFDA2EL<<296)+\
      (0x4F0DE5ADE038CBC2FFF719D2C18DE0284B8BFEF3B52B8CC7A5F5BFL<<80)+\
      0x0A3C8D2319A5312557E1L,
"m":(0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFL<<296)+\
      (0xFFFFFFFF26336E91941AAC0130CEA7FD451D40B323B6A79E9DA6L<<80)+\
      0x849A5188F3BD1FC08FB4L,
"q":(0x3FFFFFFFFFFFFF0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFL<<296)+\
      (0xFFFFFFFFFC98CDBA46506AB004C33A9FF5147502CC8EDA9E7A769L<<80)+\
      0xA12694623CEF47F023EDL,
"x":(0xE2E31EDFC23DE7BDEBE241CE593EF5DE2295B7A9CBAEFO21D385F7L<<296)+\
      (0x074CEA043AA27272A7AE602BF2A7B9033DB9ED3610C6FB85487EAEL<<80)+\
      0x97AAC5BC7928C1950148L,
"y":(0xF5CE40D95B5EB899ABBCCFF5911CB8577939804D6527378B8C108CL<<296)+\
      (0x3D2090FF9BE18E2D33E3021ED2EF32D85822423B6304F726AA854BL<<80)+\
      0xAE07D0396E9A9ADDC40FL,
"n":64
}
]

def str2list( s ):
    res = []
    for c in s:
        res += [ ord( c ) ]
    return res

def list2str( l ):
    r = ""
    for k in l:
        r += chr( k )
    return r

def hprint( data ):
    r = ""
    for i in range( len( data ) ):
        r += "%02X " % data[ i ]
        if i % 16 == 15:
```



```

    r += "\n"
print( r )

class Stribog:

    __A = [
        0x8e20faa72ba0b470, 0x47107ddd9b505a38, 0xad08b0e0c3282d1c,
        0xd8045870ef14980e, 0x6c022c38f90a4c07, 0x3601161cf205268d,
        0x1b8e0b0e798c13c8, 0x83478b07b2468764, 0xa011d380818e8f40,
        0x5086e740ce47c920, 0x2843fd2067adea10, 0x14aff010bdd87508,
        0x0ad97808d06cb404, 0x05e23c0468365a02, 0x8c711e02341b2d01,
        0x46b60f011a83988e, 0x90dab52a387ae76f, 0x486dd4151c3dfdb9,
        0x24b86a840e90f0d2, 0x125c354207487869, 0x092e94218d243cba,
        0x8a174a9ec8121e5d, 0x4585254f64090fa0, 0xaccc9ca9328a8950,
        0x9d4df05d5f661451, 0xc0a878a0a1330aa6, 0x60543c50de970553,
        0x302a1e286fc58ca7, 0x18150f14b9ec46dd, 0x0c84890ad27623e0,
        0x0642ca05693b9f70, 0x0321658cba93c138, 0x86275df09ce8aaa8,
        0x439da0784e745554, 0xafc0503c273aa42a, 0xd960281e9d1d5215,
        0xe230140fc0802984, 0x71180a8960409a42, 0xb60c05ca30204d21,
        0x5b068c651810a89e, 0x456c34887a3805b9, 0xac361a443d1c8cd2,
        0x561b0d22900e4669, 0x2b838811480723ba, 0x9bcf4486248d9f5d,
        0xc3e9224312c8c1a0, 0xefffa11af0964ee50, 0xf97d86d98a327728,
        0xe4fa2054a80b329c, 0x727d102a548b194e, 0x39b008152acb8227,
        0x9258048415eb419d, 0x492c024284fbaec0, 0xaa16012142f35760,
        0x550b8e9e21f7a530, 0xa48b474f9ef5dc18, 0x70a6a56e2440598e,
        0x3853dc371220a247, 0x1ca76e95091051ad, 0x0edd37c48a08a6d8,
        0x07e095624504536c, 0x8d70c431ac02a736, 0xc83862965601dd1b,
        0x641c314b2b8ee083
    ]

    __Sbox = [
        0xFC, 0xEE, 0xDD, 0x11, 0xCF, 0x6E, 0x31, 0x16, 0xFB, 0xC4, 0xFA,
        0xDA, 0x23, 0xC5, 0x04, 0x4D, 0xE9, 0x77, 0xF0, 0xDB, 0x93, 0x2E,
        0x99, 0xBA, 0x17, 0x36, 0xF1, 0xBB, 0x14, 0xCD, 0x5F, 0xC1, 0xF9,
        0x18, 0x65, 0x5A, 0xE2, 0x5C, 0xEF, 0x21, 0x81, 0x1C, 0x3C, 0x42,
        0x8B, 0x01, 0x8E, 0x4F, 0x05, 0x84, 0x02, 0xAE, 0xE3, 0x6A, 0x8F,
        0xA0, 0x06, 0x0B, 0xED, 0x98, 0x7F, 0xD4, 0xD3, 0x1F, 0xEB, 0x34,
        0x2C, 0x51, 0xEA, 0xC8, 0x48, 0xAB, 0xF2, 0x2A, 0x68, 0xA2, 0xFD,
        0x3A, 0xCE, 0xCC, 0xB5, 0x70, 0x0E, 0x56, 0x08, 0x0C, 0x76, 0x12,
        0xBF, 0x72, 0x13, 0x47, 0x9C, 0xB7, 0x5D, 0x87, 0x15, 0xA1, 0x96,
        0x29, 0x10, 0x7B, 0x9A, 0xC7, 0xF3, 0x91, 0x78, 0x6F, 0x9D, 0x9E,
        0xB2, 0xB1, 0x32, 0x75, 0x19, 0x3D, 0xFF, 0x35, 0x8A, 0x7E, 0x6D,
        0x54, 0xC6, 0x80, 0xC3, 0xBD, 0x0D, 0x57, 0xDF, 0xF5, 0x24, 0xA9,
        0x3E, 0xA8, 0x43, 0xC9, 0xD7, 0x79, 0xD6, 0xF6, 0x7C, 0x22, 0xB9,
        0x03, 0xE0, 0x0F, 0xEC, 0xDE, 0x7A, 0x94, 0xB0, 0xBC, 0xDC, 0xE8,
        0x28, 0x50, 0x4E, 0x33, 0x0A, 0x4A, 0xA7, 0x97, 0x60, 0x73, 0x1E,
        0x00, 0x62, 0x44, 0x1A, 0xB8, 0x38, 0x82, 0x64, 0x9F, 0x26, 0x41,
        0xAD, 0x45, 0x46, 0x92, 0x27, 0x5E, 0x55, 0x2F, 0x8C, 0xA3, 0xA5,
    ]

```



```

0x7D, 0x69, 0xD5, 0x95, 0x3B, 0x07, 0x58, 0xB3, 0x40, 0x86, 0xAC,
0x1D, 0xF7, 0x30, 0x37, 0x6B, 0xE4, 0x88, 0xD9, 0xE7, 0x89, 0xE1,
0x1B, 0x83, 0x49, 0x4C, 0x3F, 0xF8, 0xFE, 0x8D, 0x53, 0xAA, 0x90,
0xCA, 0xD8, 0x85, 0x61, 0x20, 0x71, 0x67, 0xA4, 0x2D, 0x2B, 0x09,
0x5B, 0xCB, 0x9B, 0x25, 0xD0, 0xBE, 0xE5, 0x6C, 0x52, 0x59, 0xA6,
0x74, 0xD2, 0xE6, 0xF4, 0xB4, 0xC0, 0xD1, 0x66, 0xAF, 0xC2, 0x39,
0x4B, 0x63, 0xB6
]

__Tau = [
    0, 8, 16, 24, 32, 40, 48, 56,
    1, 9, 17, 25, 33, 41, 49, 57,
    2, 10, 18, 26, 34, 42, 50, 58,
    3, 11, 19, 27, 35, 43, 51, 59,
    4, 12, 20, 28, 36, 44, 52, 60,
    5, 13, 21, 29, 37, 45, 53, 61,
    6, 14, 22, 30, 38, 46, 54, 62,
    7, 15, 23, 31, 39, 47, 55, 63
]

__C = [
    [
        0xb1, 0x08, 0x5b, 0xda, 0x1e, 0xca, 0xda, 0xe9,
        0xeb, 0xcb, 0x2f, 0x81, 0xc0, 0x65, 0x7c, 0x1f,
        0x2f, 0x6a, 0x76, 0x43, 0x2e, 0x45, 0xd0, 0x16,
        0x71, 0x4e, 0xb8, 0x8d, 0x75, 0x85, 0xc4, 0xfc,
        0x4b, 0x7c, 0xe0, 0x91, 0x92, 0x67, 0x69, 0x01,
        0xa2, 0x42, 0x2a, 0x08, 0xa4, 0x60, 0xd3, 0x15,
        0x05, 0x76, 0x74, 0x36, 0xcc, 0x74, 0x4d, 0x23,
        0xdd, 0x80, 0x65, 0x59, 0xf2, 0xa6, 0x45, 0x07
    ],
    [
        0x6f, 0xa3, 0xb5, 0x8a, 0xa9, 0x9d, 0x2f, 0x1a,
        0x4f, 0xe3, 0x9d, 0x46, 0x0f, 0x70, 0xb5, 0xd7,
        0xf3, 0xfe, 0xea, 0x72, 0x0a, 0x23, 0x2b, 0x98,
        0x61, 0xd5, 0x5e, 0x0f, 0x16, 0xb5, 0x01, 0x31,
        0x9a, 0xb5, 0x17, 0x6b, 0x12, 0xd6, 0x99, 0x58,
        0x5c, 0xb5, 0x61, 0xc2, 0xdb, 0x0a, 0xa7, 0xca,
        0x55, 0xdd, 0xa2, 0x1b, 0xd7, 0xcb, 0xcd, 0x56,
        0xe6, 0x79, 0x04, 0x70, 0x21, 0xb1, 0x9b, 0xb7
    ],
    [
        0xf5, 0x74, 0xdc, 0xac, 0x2b, 0xce, 0x2f, 0xc7,
        0x0a, 0x39, 0xfc, 0x28, 0x6a, 0x3d, 0x84, 0x35,
        0x06, 0xf1, 0x5e, 0x5f, 0x52, 0x9c, 0x1f, 0x8b,
        0xf2, 0xea, 0x75, 0x14, 0xb1, 0x29, 0x7b, 0x7b,
        0xd3, 0xe2, 0x0f, 0xe4, 0x90, 0x35, 0x9e, 0xb1,
        0xc1, 0xc9, 0x3a, 0x37, 0x60, 0x62, 0xdb, 0x09,
    ]
]
```



```
0xc2, 0xb6, 0xf4, 0x43, 0x86, 0x7a, 0xdb, 0x31,
0x99, 0x1e, 0x96, 0xf5, 0x0a, 0xba, 0xa, 0xb2
],
[
    0xef, 0x1f, 0xdf, 0xb3, 0xe8, 0x15, 0x66, 0xd2,
    0xf9, 0x48, 0xe1, 0xa0, 0x5d, 0x71, 0xe4, 0xdd,
    0x48, 0x8e, 0x85, 0x7e, 0x33, 0x5c, 0x3c, 0x7d,
    0x9d, 0x72, 0x1c, 0xad, 0x68, 0x5e, 0x35, 0x3f,
    0xa9, 0xd7, 0x2c, 0x82, 0xed, 0x03, 0xd6, 0x75,
    0xd8, 0xb7, 0x13, 0x33, 0x93, 0x52, 0x03, 0xbe,
    0x34, 0x53, 0xea, 0xa1, 0x93, 0xe8, 0x37, 0xf1,
    0x22, 0x0c, 0xbe, 0xbc, 0x84, 0xe3, 0xd1, 0x2e
],
[
    0x4b, 0xea, 0x6b, 0xac, 0xad, 0x47, 0x47, 0x99,
    0x9a, 0x3f, 0x41, 0x0c, 0x6c, 0xa9, 0x23, 0x63,
    0x7f, 0x15, 0x1c, 0x1f, 0x16, 0x86, 0x10, 0x4a,
    0x35, 0x9e, 0x35, 0xd7, 0x80, 0x0f, 0xff, 0xbd,
    0xbf, 0xcd, 0x17, 0x47, 0x25, 0x3a, 0xf5, 0xa3,
    0xdf, 0xff, 0x00, 0xb7, 0x23, 0x27, 0x1a, 0x16,
    0x7a, 0x56, 0xa2, 0x7e, 0xa9, 0xea, 0x63, 0xf5,
    0x60, 0x17, 0x58, 0xfd, 0x7c, 0x6c, 0xfe, 0x57
],
[
    0xae, 0x4f, 0xae, 0xae, 0x1d, 0x3a, 0xd3, 0xd9,
    0x6f, 0xa4, 0xc3, 0x3b, 0x7a, 0x30, 0x39, 0xc0,
    0x2d, 0x66, 0xc4, 0xf9, 0x51, 0x42, 0xa4, 0x6c,
    0x18, 0x7f, 0x9a, 0xb4, 0x9a, 0xf0, 0x8e, 0xc6,
    0xcf, 0xfa, 0xa6, 0xb7, 0x1c, 0x9a, 0xb7, 0xb4,
    0x0a, 0xf2, 0x1f, 0x66, 0xc2, 0xbe, 0xc6, 0xb6,
    0xbf, 0x71, 0xc5, 0x72, 0x36, 0x90, 0x4f, 0x35,
    0xfa, 0x68, 0x40, 0x7a, 0x46, 0x64, 0x7d, 0x6e
],
[
    0xf4, 0xc7, 0x0e, 0x16, 0xee, 0xaa, 0xc5, 0xec,
    0x51, 0xac, 0x86, 0xfe, 0xbf, 0x24, 0x09, 0x54,
    0x39, 0x9e, 0xc6, 0xc7, 0xe6, 0xbf, 0x87, 0xc9,
    0xd3, 0x47, 0x3e, 0x33, 0x19, 0x7a, 0x93, 0xc9,
    0x09, 0x92, 0xab, 0xc5, 0x2d, 0x82, 0x2c, 0x37,
    0x06, 0x47, 0x69, 0x83, 0x28, 0x4a, 0x05, 0x04,
    0x35, 0x17, 0x45, 0x4c, 0xa2, 0x3c, 0x4a, 0xf3,
    0x88, 0x86, 0x56, 0x4d, 0x3a, 0x14, 0xd4, 0x93
],
[
    0x9b, 0x1f, 0x5b, 0x42, 0x4d, 0x93, 0xc9, 0xa7,
    0x03, 0xe7, 0xaa, 0x02, 0x0c, 0x6e, 0x41, 0x41,
    0x4e, 0xb7, 0xf8, 0x71, 0x9c, 0x36, 0xde, 0x1e,
    0x89, 0xb4, 0x44, 0x3b, 0x4d, 0xdb, 0xc4, 0x9a,
```



```
0xf4, 0x89, 0x2b, 0xcb, 0x92, 0x9b, 0x06, 0x90,
0x69, 0xd1, 0x8d, 0x2b, 0xd1, 0xa5, 0xc4, 0x2f,
0x36, 0xac, 0xc2, 0x35, 0x59, 0x51, 0xa8, 0xd9,
0xa4, 0x7f, 0x0d, 0xd4, 0xbf, 0x02, 0xe7, 0x1e
],
[
 0x37, 0x8f, 0x5a, 0x54, 0x16, 0x31, 0x22, 0x9b,
 0x94, 0x4c, 0x9a, 0xd8, 0xec, 0x16, 0x5f, 0xde,
 0x3a, 0x7d, 0x3a, 0x1b, 0x25, 0x89, 0x42, 0x24,
 0x3c, 0xd9, 0x55, 0xb7, 0xe0, 0x0d, 0x09, 0x84,
 0x80, 0x0a, 0x44, 0x0b, 0xdb, 0xb2, 0xce, 0xb1,
 0x7b, 0x2b, 0x8a, 0x9a, 0xa6, 0x07, 0x9c, 0x54,
 0x0e, 0x38, 0xdc, 0x92, 0xcb, 0x1f, 0x2a, 0x60,
 0x72, 0x61, 0x44, 0x51, 0x83, 0x23, 0x5a, 0xdb
],
[
 0xab, 0xbe, 0xde, 0xa6, 0x80, 0x05, 0x6f, 0x52,
 0x38, 0x2a, 0xe5, 0x48, 0xb2, 0xe4, 0xf3, 0xf3,
 0x89, 0x41, 0xe7, 0x1c, 0xff, 0x8a, 0x78, 0xdb,
 0x1f, 0xff, 0xe1, 0x8a, 0x1b, 0x33, 0x61, 0x03,
 0x9f, 0xe7, 0x67, 0x02, 0xaf, 0x69, 0x33, 0x4b,
 0x7a, 0x1e, 0x6c, 0x30, 0x3b, 0x76, 0x52, 0xf4,
 0x36, 0x98, 0xfa, 0xd1, 0x15, 0x3b, 0xb6, 0xc3,
 0x74, 0xb4, 0xc7, 0xfb, 0x98, 0x45, 0x9c, 0xed
],
[
 0x7b, 0xcd, 0x9e, 0xd0, 0xef, 0xc8, 0x89, 0xfb,
 0x30, 0x02, 0xc6, 0xcd, 0x63, 0x5a, 0xfe, 0x94,
 0xd8, 0xfa, 0x6b, 0xbb, 0xeb, 0xab, 0x07, 0x61,
 0x20, 0x01, 0x80, 0x21, 0x14, 0x84, 0x66, 0x79,
 0x8a, 0x1d, 0x71, 0xef, 0xea, 0x48, 0xb9, 0xca,
 0xef, 0xba, 0xcd, 0x1d, 0x7d, 0x47, 0x6e, 0x98,
 0xde, 0xa2, 0x59, 0x4a, 0xc0, 0x6f, 0xd8, 0x5d,
 0x6b, 0xca, 0xa4, 0xcd, 0x81, 0xf3, 0x2d, 0x1b
],
[
 0x37, 0x8e, 0xe7, 0x67, 0xf1, 0x16, 0x31, 0xba,
 0xd2, 0x13, 0x80, 0xb0, 0x04, 0x49, 0xb1, 0x7a,
 0xcd, 0xa4, 0x3c, 0x32, 0xbc, 0xdf, 0x1d, 0x77,
 0xf8, 0x20, 0x12, 0xd4, 0x30, 0x21, 0x9f, 0x9b,
 0x5d, 0x80, 0xef, 0x9d, 0x18, 0x91, 0xcc, 0x86,
 0xe7, 0x1d, 0xa4, 0xaa, 0x88, 0xe1, 0x28, 0x52,
 0xfa, 0xf4, 0x17, 0xd5, 0xd9, 0xb2, 0x1b, 0x99,
 0x48, 0xbc, 0x92, 0x4a, 0xf1, 0x1b, 0xd7, 0x20
]
]

def __AddModulo(self, A, B):
```



```
result = [0] * 64
t = 0
for i in reversed(range(0, 64)):
    t = A[i] + B[i] + (t >> 8)
    result[i] = t & 0xFF
return result

def __AddXor(self, A, B):
    result = [0] * 64
    for i in range(0, 64):
        result[i] = A[i] ^ B[i]
    return result

def __S(self, state):
    result = [0] * 64
    for i in range(0, 64):
        result[i] = self.__Sbox[state[i]]
    return result

def __P(self, state):
    result = [0] * 64
    for i in range(0, 64):
        result[i] = state[self.__Tau[i]]
    return result

def __L(self, state):
    result = [0] * 64
    for i in range(0, 8):
        t = 0
        for k in range(0, 8):
            for j in range(0, 8):
                if ((state[i * 8 + k] & (1 << (7 - j))) != 0):
                    t ^= self.__A[k * 8 + j]
        for k in range(0, 8):
            result[i * 8 + k] = (t & (0xFF << (7 - k) * 8)) >> (7 - k) * 8

    return result

def __KeySchedule(self, K, i):
    K = self.__AddXor(K, self.__C[i])
    K = self.__S(K)
    K = self.__P(K)
    K = self.__L(K)
    return K

# E(K, m)
def __E(self, K, m):
    state = self.__AddXor(K, m)
```



```
for i in range(0, 12):
    state = self.__S(state)
    state = self.__P(state)
    state = self.__L(state)
    K = self.__KeySchedule(K, i)
    state = self.__AddXor(state, K)
return state

def __G_n(self, N, h, m):
    K = self.__AddXor(h, N)
    K = self.__S(K)
    K = self.__P(K)
    K = self.__L(K)
    t = self.__E(K, m)
    t = self.__AddXor(t, h)
    return self.__AddXor(t, m)

def __Padding(self, last, N, h, Sigma):
    if (len(last) < 64):
        padding = [0] * (64 - len(last))
        padding[-1] = 1
        padded_message = padding + last
    h = self.__G_n(N, h, padded_message)
    N_len = [0] * 64
    N_len[63] = (len(last) * 8) & 0xff
    N_len[62] = (len(last) * 8) >> 8
    N = self.__AddModulo(N, N_len)
    Sigma = self.__AddModulo(Sigma, padded_message)
    return (h, N, Sigma)

def digest( self, message, out=512 ):
    return list2str( self.GetHash( str2list( message ), out ) )

def GetHash(self, message, out=512, no_pad=False):
    N = [0] * 64
    Sigma = [0] * 64
    if out == 512:
        h = [0] * 64
    elif out == 256:
        h = [0x01] * 64
    else:
        print("Wrong hash out length!")
    N_512 = [0] * 64
    N_512[62] = 0x02      # 512 = 0x200

    length_bits = len(message) * 8
```



```

length = len(message)

i = 0
asd = message[::-1]
while (length_bits >= 512):
    tmp = (message[i * 64: (i + 1) * 64])[::-1]
    h = self.__G_n(N, h, tmp)
    N = self.__AddModulo(N, N_512)
    Sigma = self.__AddModulo(Sigma, tmp)
    length_bits -= 512
    i += 1

last = (message[i * 64: length])[::-1]

if (len(last) == 0 and no_pad):
    pass
else:
    h, N, Sigma = self.__Padding(last, N, h, Sigma)

N_0 = [0] * 64
h = self.__G_n(N_0, h, N)
h = self.__G_n(N_0, h, Sigma)

if out == 512:
    return h[::-1]
elif out == 256:
    return (h[0:32])[::-1]

def hash(self, str_message, out=512, no_pad=False):
    return list2str(self.GetHash(str2list(str_message), out, no_pad))

def H256(msg):
    S = Stribog()
    return S.hash(msg, out=256)

def H512(msg):
    S = Stribog()
    return S.hash(msg)

def num2le( s, n ):
    res = ""
    for i in range(n):
        res += chr(s & 0xFF)
        s >>= 8
    return res

def le2num( s ):

```



```
res = 0
for i in range(len(s) - 1, -1, -1):
    res = (res << 8) + ord(s[i])
return res

def XGCD(a,b):
    """XGCD(a,b) returns a list of form [g,x,y], where g is GCD(a,b) and
    x,y satisfy the equation g = ax + by."""
    a1=1; b1=0; a2=0; b2=1; aneg=1; bneg=1; swap = False
    if(a < 0):
        a = -a; aneg=-1
    if(b < 0):
        b = -b; bneg=-1
    if(b > a):
        swap = True
        [a,b] = [b,a]
    while (1):
        quot = -(a / b)
        a = a % b
        a1 = a1 + quot*a2; b1 = b1 + quot*b2
        if(a == 0):
            if(swap):
                return [b, b2*bneg, a2*aneg]
            else:
                return [b, a2*aneg, b2*bneg]
        quot = -(b / a)
        b = b % a
        a2 = a2 + quot*a1; b2 = b2 + quot*b1
        if(b == 0):
            if(swap):
                return [a, b1*bneg, a1*aneg]
            else:
                return [a, a1*aneg, b1*bneg]

def getMultByMask( elems, mask ):
    n = len( elems )
    r = 1
    for i in range( n ):
        if mask & 1:
            r *= elems[ n - 1 - i ]
        mask = mask >> 1
    return r

def subF(P, other, p):
    return (P - other) % p
```



```
def divF(P, other, p):
    return mulF(P, invF(other, p), p)
```

```
def addF(P, other, p):
    return (P + other) % p
```

```
def mulF(P, other, p):
    return (P * other) % p
```

```
def invF(R, p):
    assert (R != 0)
    return XGCD(R, p)[1] % p
```

```
def negF(R, p):
    return (-R) % p
```

```
def powF(R, m, p):
    assert R != None
    assert type(m) in (int, long)
```

```
if m == 0:
    assert R != 0
    return 1
elif m < 0:
    t = invF(R, p)
    return powF(t, (-m), p)
else:
    i = m.bit_length() - 1
    r = 1
    while i > 0:
        if (m >> i) & 1:
            r = (r * R) % p
        r = (r * r) % p
        i -= 1
    if m & 1:
        r = (r * R) % p
return r
```

```
def add(Px, Py, Qx, Qy, p, a, b):
    if Qx == Qy == None:
        return [Px, Py]
```

```
if Px == Py == None:
    return [Qx, Qy]
```



```
if (Px == Qx) and (Py == negF(Qy, p)):
    return [None, None]

if (Px == Qx) and (Py == Qy):
    assert Py != 0
    return duplicate(Px, Py, p, a)
else:
    l = divF( subF( Qy, Py, p ), subF( Qx, Px, p ), p )
    resX = subF( subF( powF( l, 2, p ), Px, p ), Qx, p )
    resY = subF( mulF( l, subF( Px, resX, p ), p ), Py, p )
    return [resX, resY]

def duplicate(Px, Py, p, a):
    if (Px == None) and (Py == None):
        return [None, None]

    if Py == 0:
        return [None, None]

    l = divF(addF(mulF(powF(Px, 2, p), 3, p), a, p), mulF(Py, 2, p), p)
    resX = subF(powF(l, 2, p), mulF(Px, 2, p), p)
    resY = subF(mulF(l, subF(Px, resX, p), p), Py, p)
    return [resX, resY]

def mul(Px, Py, s, p, a, b):
    assert type(s) in (int, long)
    assert Px != None and Py != None

    X = Px
    Y = Py

    i = s.bit_length() - 1
    resX = None
    resY = None
    while i > 0:
        if (s >> i) & 1:
            resX, resY = add(resX, resY, X, Y, p, a, b)
            resX, resY = duplicate(resX, resY, p, a)
        i -= 1
    if s & 1:
        resX, resY = add(resX, resY, X, Y, p, a, b)
    return [resX, resY]

def Ord(Px, Py, m, q, p, a, b):
    assert Px != None and Py != None
    assert (m != None) and (q != None)
    assert mul(Px, Py, m, p, a, b) == [None, None]
```



```
X = Px
Y = Py
r = m
for mask in range(1 << len(q)):
    t = getMultByMask(q, mask)
    Rx, Ry = mul(X, Y, t, p, a, b)
    if (Rx == None) and (Ry == None):
        r = min(r, t)
return r

def isQuadraticResidue( R, p ):
    if R == 0:
        assert False
    temp = powF(R, ((p - 1) / 2), p)
    if temp == (p - 1):
        return False
    else:
        assert temp == 1
    return True

def getRandomQuadraticNonresidue(p):
    from random import randint
    r = (randint(2, p - 1)) % p
    while isQuadraticResidue(r, p):
        r = (randint(2, p - 1)) % p
    return r

def ModSqrt( R, p ):
    assert R != None
    assert isQuadraticResidue(R, p)

    if p % 4 == 3:
        res = powF(R, (p + 1) / 4, p)
        if powF(res, 2, p) != R:
            res = None
        return [res, negF(res, p)]
    else:
        ainvF = invF(R, p)

        s = p - 1
        alpha = 0
        while (s % 2) == 0:
            alpha += 1
            s = s / 2

        b = powF(getRandomQuadraticNonresidue(p), s, p)
        r = powF(R, (s + 1) / 2, p)
```



```
bj = 1
for k in range(0, alpha - 1): # alpha >= 2 because p % 4 = 1
    d = 2 ** (alpha - k - 2)
    x = powF(mulF(powF(mulF(bj, r, p), 2, p), ainvF, p), d, p)
    if x != 1:
        bj = mulF(bj, powF(b, (2 ** k), p), p)
    res = mulF(bj, r, p)
return [res, negF(res, p)]


def generateQs( p, pByteSize, a, b, m, q, orderDivisors, Px, Py, N ):
    assert pByteSize in ( 256 / 8, 512 / 8 )
    PxBytes = num2le( Px, pByteSize )
    PyBytes = num2le( Py, pByteSize )
    Qs = []
    S = []
    Hash_src = []
    Hash_res = []
    co_factor = m / q

    seed = 0
    while len( Qs ) != N:
        hashSrc = PxBytes + PyBytes + num2le( seed, 4 )
        if pByteSize == ( 256 / 8 ):
            QxBytes = H256( hashSrc )
        else:
            QxBytes = H512( hashSrc )

        Qx = le2num( QxBytes ) % p

        R = addF( addF( powF(Qx, 3, p ), mulF(Qx, a, p), p ), b, p )
        if ( R == 0 ) or ( not isQuadraticResidue( R, p ) ):
            seed += 1
            continue

        Qy_sqrt = ModSqrt( R, p )
        Qy = min(Qy_sqrt)
        if co_factor * Ord(Qx, Qy, m, orderDivisors, p, a, b) != m:
            seed += 1
            continue

        Qs += [(Qx, Qy)]
        S += [seed]
        Hash_src += [hashSrc]
        Hash_res += [QxBytes]
        seed += 1

    return Qs, S, Hash_src, Hash_res
```



```
if __name__ == "__main__":
    for i, curve in enumerate(curvesParams):
        print "A.1." + str(i+1) + ". Curve " + curve["OID"]
        if "3410-2012-256-paramSetA" in curve["OID"] or \
           "3410-2012-512-paramSetC" in curve["OID"]:
            Q, S, Hash_src, Hash_res = generateQs(curve["p"], \
                curve["n"], \
                curve["a"], \
                curve["b"], \
                curve["m"], \
                curve["q"], \
                [ 2, 2, curve["q"]], \
                curve["x"], \
                curve["y"], \
                1)
        else:
            Q, S, Hash_src, Hash_res = generateQs(curve["p"], \
                curve["n"], \
                curve["a"], \
                curve["b"], \
                curve["m"], \
                curve["q"], \
                [curve["q"]], \
                curve["x"], \
                curve["y"], \
                1)

        j = 1
        for q, s, hash_src, hash_res in zip(Q, S, Hash_src, Hash_res):
            print "Point Q_" + str(j)
            j += 1

            print "X=", hex(q[0])[:-1]
            print "Y=", hex(q[1])[:-1]

            print "SEED=", "{0:#0{1}x}".format(s,6)
            print
```

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