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**GOST Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version
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Abstract

This document specifies a set of cipher suites for the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol Version 1.2 to support the Russian cryptographic standard algorithms.

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Table of Contents

1.	Introduction	3
2.	Conventions Used in This Document	4
3.	Basic Terms and Definitions	4
4.	Cipher Suite Definitions	5
4.1.	Record Payload Protection	5
4.1.1.	CTR_OMAC	6
4.1.2.	CNT_IMIT	7
4.2.	Key Exchange and Authentication	8
4.2.1.	Hello Messages	10
4.2.2.	Server Certificate	11
4.2.3.	CertificateRequest	11
4.2.4.	ClientKeyExchange	12
4.2.4.1.	CTR_OMAC	12
4.2.4.2.	CNT_IMIT	14
4.2.5.	CertificateVerify	16
4.2.6.	Finished	16
4.3.	Cryptographic Algorithms	17
4.3.1.	Block Cipher	17
4.3.2.	MAC algorithm	17
4.3.3.	Encryption algorithm	18
4.3.4.	PRF and HASH algorithms	18
4.3.5.	SNMAX parameter	18
5.	New Values for the SignatureAlgorithm Registry	18
6.	New Values for the Supported Groups Registry	19
7.	New Values for the ClientCertificateType Identifiers Registry	20
8.	Additional Algorithms	21
8.1.	TLSTREE	21
8.1.1.	Key Tree Parameters	21
8.2.	Key export and key import algorithms	22
8.2.1.	KExp15 and KImp15 Algorithms	22
8.2.2.	KExp28147 and KImp28147 Algorithms	23
8.3.	Key Exchange Generation Algorithms	24
8.3.1.	KEG Algorithm	24
8.3.2.	KEG_28147 Algorithm	26
8.4.	gostIMIT28147	27
9.	IANA Considerations	27
10.	Historical considerations	29
11.	Security Considerations	30
12.	References	30
12.1.	Normative References	30
12.2.	Informative References	32
Appendix A.	Test Examples	33
A.1.	Test Examples for CTR_OMAC cipher suites	33

A.1.1.	TLSTREE Examples	33
A.1.1.1.	TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_CTR_OMAC ciphersuite	33
A.1.1.2.	TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_CTR_OMAC ciphersuite	35
A.1.2.	Record Examples	37
A.1.2.1.	TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_CTR_OMAC ciphersuite	37
A.1.2.2.	TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_CTR_OMAC ciphersuite	40
A.1.3.	Handshake Examples	43
A.1.3.1.	TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_CTR_OMAC ciphersuite	43
A.1.3.2.	TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_CTR_OMAC ciphersuite	57
A.2.	Test Examples for CNT_IMIT cipher suites	75
A.2.1.	Record Examples	75
A.2.2.	Handshake Examples	77
Appendix B.	Contributors	90
Appendix C.	Acknowledgments	90
	Authors' Addresses	90

1. Introduction

This document specifies three new cipher suites for the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2 [[RFC5246](#)] to support the set of Russian cryptographic standard algorithms (called GOST algorithms). These cipher suites use the same hash algorithm GOST R 34.11-2012 [[GOST3411-2012](#)] (the English version can be found in [[RFC6986](#)]) and the same signature algorithm GOST R 34.10-2012 [[GOST3410-2012](#)] (the English version can be found in [[RFC7091](#)]) but use different encryption and MAC algorithms, so they are divided into two types: the CTR_OMAC cipher suites and the CNT_IMIT cipher suite.

The CTR_OMAC cipher suites use the GOST R 34.12-2015 [[GOST3412-2015](#)] block ciphers (the English version can be found in [[RFC7801](#)]) and have the following values:

```
TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_CTR_OMAC = {0xC1, 0x00};
TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_CTR_OMAC = {0xC1, 0x01}.
```

The CNT_IMIT cipher suite uses the GOST 28147-89 [[GOST28147-89](#)] block cipher (the English version can be found in [[RFC5830](#)]) and has the following value:

```
TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_28147_CNT_IMIT = {0xC1, 0x02}.
```


2. Conventions Used in This Document

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [\[RFC2119\]](#).

3. Basic Terms and Definitions

This document uses the following terms and definitions for the sets and operations on the elements of these sets:

B_t the set of byte strings of length t , $t \geq 0$, for $t = 0$ the B_t set consists of a single empty string of zero length. If A is an element of B_t , then $A = (a_1, a_2, \dots, a_t)$, where $a_1, a_2, \dots, a_t$ are in $\{0, \dots, 255\}$;

B^* the set of all byte strings of a finite length (hereinafter referred to as strings), including the empty string;

$A[i..j]$ the string $A[i..j] = (a_i, a_{i+1}, \dots, a_j)$ in B_{j-i+1} where $A = (a_1, \dots, a_t)$ in B_t and $1 \leq i \leq j \leq t$;

$|A|$ the byte length of the byte string A ;

$A \mid C$ concatenation of strings A and C both belonging to B^* , i.e., a string in $B_{|A|+|C|}$, where the left substring in $B_{|A|}$ is equal to A , and the right substring in $B_{|C|}$ is equal to C ;

$A \text{ XOR } C$ bitwise exclusive-or of strings A and C both belonging to B_t , i.e., a string in B_t such that if $A = (a_1, a_2, \dots, a_t)$, $C = (c_1, c_2, \dots, c_t)$ then $A \text{ XOR } C = (a_1 \text{ (xor) } c_1, a_2 \text{ (xor) } c_2, \dots, a_t \text{ (xor) } c_t)$ where (xor) is bitwise exclusive-or of bytes;

$i \& j$ bitwise AND of integers i and j ;

STR_t the transformation that maps an integer $i = 256^{t-1} * i_1 + \dots + 256 * i_{t-1} + i_t$ into the byte string $STR_t(i) = (i_1, \dots, i_t)$ in B_t (the interpretation of the integer as a byte string in big-endian format);

str_t the transformation that maps an integer $i = 256^{t-1} * i_t + \dots + 256 * i_2 + i_1$ into the byte string $str_t(i) = (i_1, \dots, i_t)$ in B_t (the interpretation of the integer as a byte string in little-endian format);

INT the transformation that maps a string $a = (a_1, \dots, a_t)$ in B_t into the integer $INT(a) = 256^{t-1} * a_1 + \dots + 256 * a_t$;

$a_{\{t-1\}} + a_t$ (the interpretation of the byte string in big-endian format as an integer);

int the transformation that maps a string $a = (a_1, \dots, a_t)$ in B_t into the integer $\text{int}(a) = 256^{\{t-1\}} * a_t + \dots + 256 * a_2 + a_1$ (the interpretation of the byte string in little-endian format as an integer);

k the byte-length of the block cipher key;

n the byte-length of the block cipher block;

Q_c the public key stored in the client's certificate;

d_c the private key that corresponds to the Q_c key;

Q_s the public key stored in the server's certificate;

d_s the private key that corresponds to the Q_s key;

q_s subgroup order of group of points of the elliptic curve that corresponds to Q_s ;

P_s the point of order q_s that belongs to the same curve as Q_s ;

r_c the random string contained in ClientHello.random field (see [\[RFC5246\]](#));

r_s the random string contained in ServerHello.random field (see [\[RFC5246\]](#)).

4. Cipher Suite Definitions

4.1. Record Payload Protection

All of the cipher suites described in this document MUST use the "null" compression method (see [Section 6.2.2 of \[RFC5246\]](#) and [Section 4.2.1](#)). Note that the CompressionMethod.null operation is an identity operation; no fields are altered.

All of the cipher suites described in this document use the stream cipher (see [Section 4.3.3](#)) to protect records. The TLSCiphertext structure for the CTR_OMAC and CNT_IMIT cipher suites is specified in accordance with the Standard Stream Cipher case (see [Section 6.2.3.1 of \[RFC5246\]](#)):


```
struct {  
    ContentType type;  
    ProtocolVersion version;  
    uint16 length;  
    GenericStreamCipher fragment;  
} TLSCiphertext;
```

where TLSCiphertext.fragment is generated in accordance with [Section 4.1.1](#) or [Section 4.1.2](#).

The connection key material is a key material that consists of the sender_write_key (either the client_write_key or the server_write_key), the sender_write_MAC_key (either the client_write_MAC_key or the server_write_MAC_key) and the sender_write_IV (either the client_write_IV or the server_write_IV) parameters that are generated in accordance with [Section 6.3 of \[RFC5246\]](#).

The record key material is a key material that is generated from the connection key material and is used to protect a record with the certain sequence number. Note that in the cipher suites defined in this document the record key material can be equal to the connection key material.

In this section the TLSCiphertext.fragment generation is described for one particular endpoint (server or client) with the corresponding connection key material and record key material.

[4.1.1](#). CTR_OMAC

In case of the CTR_OMAC cipher suites the record key material differs from the connection key material and for the certain sequence number seqnum consists of:

- o K_ENC_seqnum in B_k;
- o K_MAC_seqnum in B_k;
- o IV_seqnum in B_{n/2}.

The K_ENC_seqnum and K_MAC_seqnum values are calculated using the TLSTREE function defined in [Section 8.1](#) and the connection key material. IV_seqnum is calculated by adding seqnum value to sender_write_IV modulo $2^{\{(n/2)*8\}}$:

- o $K_ENC_seqnum = TLSTREE(sender_write_key, seqnum);$

- o $K_MAC_seqnum = TLSTREE(sender_write_MAC_key, seqnum);$
- o $IV_seqnum = STR_{\{n/2\}}((INT(sender_write_IV) + seqnum) \bmod 2^{\{(n/2)*8\}}).$

The `TLSCiphertext.fragment` that corresponds to the certain sequence number `seqnum` is equal to the `ENCValue_seqnum` value that is calculated as follows:

1. The MAC value (`MACValue_seqnum`) is generated using the MAC algorithm (see [Section 4.3.2](#)) similar to [Section 6.2.3.1 of \[RFC5246\]](#) except the `sender_write_MAC_key` is replaced by the `K_MAC_seqnum` key:

```
MACData_seqnum = STR_8(seqnum) | type_seqnum | version_seqnum |  
length_seqnum | fragment_seqnum;
```

```
MACValue_seqnum = MAC(K_MAC_seqnum, MACData_seqnum),
```

where `type_seqnum`, `version_seqnum`, `length_seqnum`, `fragment_seqnum` are the `TLSCompressed.type`, `TLSCompressed.version`, `TLSCompressed.length` and `TLSCompressed.fragment` values of the record with the `seqnum` sequence number.

2. The entire data with the `MACValue` is encrypted with the ENC stream cipher (see [Section 4.3.3](#)):

```
ENCData_seqnum = fragment_seqnum | MACValue_seqnum;
```

```
ENCValue_seqnum = ENC(K_ENC_seqnum, IV_seqnum, ENCData_seqnum).
```

4.1.2. CNT_IMIT

In case of the `CNT_IMIT` cipher suite the record key material is equal to the connection key material and consists of:

- o `sender_write_key` in `B_k`;
- o `sender_write_MAC_key` in `B_k`;
- o `sender_write_IV` in `B_n`.

The `TLSCiphertext.fragment` that corresponds to the certain sequence number `seqnum` is equal to the `ENCValue_seqnum` value that is calculated as follows:

1. The MAC value (`MACValue_seqnum`) is generated by the MAC algorithm (see [Section 4.3.2](#)) as follows:


```
MACData_i = STR_8(i) | type_i | version_i | length_i | fragment_i,  
i in {0, ... , seqnum};
```

```
MACValue_seqnum = MAC(sender_write_MAC_key, MACData_0 | ... |  
MACData_seqnum),
```

where `type_i`, `version_i`, `length_i`, `fragment_i` are the `TLSCompressed.type`, `TLSCompressed.version`, `TLSCompressed.length` and `TLSCompressed.fragment` values of the record with the `i` sequence number.

Implementation note: Due to the use of the CBC-MAC based mode it is not necessarily to store all previous fragments `MACData_0`, ... , `MACData_{i-1}` to generate the `MACValue_i` fragment for the `i`-th record. It's enough to know only the intermediate internal state of the MAC algorithm.

2. The entire data with the `MACValue` is encrypted with the ENC stream cipher (see [Section 4.3.3](#)):

```
ENCDData_i = fragment_i | MACValue_i, i in {0, ... , seqnum};
```

```
ENCValue_0 | ... | ENCValue_seqnum = ENC(sender_write_key,  
sender_write_IV, ENCDData_0 | ... | ENCDData_seqnum),
```

where `|ENCValue_i| = |ENCDData_i|`, `i in {0, ... , seqnum}`.

Implementation note: Due to the use of the stream cipher it is not necessarily to store all previous fragments `ENCDData_0`, ... , `ENCDData_{i-1}` to generate the `ENCValue_i` fragment for the `i`-th record. It's enough to know only the intermediate internal state of the ENC stream cipher.

[4.2.](#) Key Exchange and Authentication

All of the cipher suites described in this document use ECDHE based schema to share the TLS premaster secret.




Figure 1: Message flow for a full handshake.

* Indicates optional messages that are sent for the client authentication.

Figure 1 shows all messages involved in the TLS key establishment protocol (full handshake). A ServerKeyExchange MUST NOT be sent (the server's certificate contains enough data to allow client to exchange the premaster secret).

The server side of the channel is always authenticated; the client side is optionally authenticated. The server is authenticated by proving that it knows the premaster secret that is encrypted with the public key Q_s from the server's certificate. The client is authenticated via its signature over the handshake transcript.

In general the key exchange process for both CTR_OMAC and CNT_IMIT cipher suites consists of the following steps:

1. The client generates the ephemeral key pair (d_{eph} , Q_{eph}) that corresponds to the server's public key Q_s stored in its certificate.
2. The client generates the premaster secret PS. The PS value is chosen from B_{32} at random.
3. Using d_{eph} and Q_s the client generates the export key material (see [Section 4.2.4.1](#) and [Section 4.2.4.2](#)) for the particular key export algorithm (see [Section 8.2.1](#) and [Section 8.2.2](#)) to generate the export representation PSExp of the PS value.

4. The client sends its ephemeral public key `Q_eph` and `PSExp` value in the `ClientKeyExchange` message.
5. Using its private key `d_s` the server generates the import key material (see [Section 4.2.4.1](#) and [Section 4.2.4.2](#)) for the particular key import algorithm (see [Section 8.2.1](#) and [Section 8.2.2](#)) to extract the premaster secret `PS` from the export representation `PSExp`.

The proposed cipher suites specify the `ClientHello`, `ServerHello`, `ServerCertificate`, `CertificateRequest`, `ClientKeyExchange`, `CertificateVerify` and `Finished` handshake messages, that are described in further detail below.

[4.2.1](#). Hello Messages

The `ClientHello` message is generated in accordance with the following requirements:

- o The `ClientHello.compression_methods` field SHOULD contain exactly one byte, set to zero, which corresponds to the "null" compression method.
- o The `ClientHello.extensions` field SHOULD contain the `signature_algorithms` extension (see [\[RFC5246\]](#)) with the values defined in [Section 5](#).

If the negotiated cipher suite is one of `CTR_OMAC/CTR_IMIT` and the client implementation does not support generating the `signature_algorithms` extension with the appropriate values, the server MUST either abort the connection or ignore this extension and behave as if the client had sent the `signature_algorithms` extension with the values `{0x08, 0x40}` and `{0x08, 0x41}`.

- o The `ClientHello.extensions` field is RECOMMENDED to contain the `extended_master_secret` (see [\[RFC7627\]](#)) and the `renegotiation_info` (see [\[RFC5746\]](#)) extensions.
- o The `ClientHello.extensions` field MAY contain the `supported_groups` extension (see [\[RFC8422\]](#) and [\[RFC7919\]](#)) with the values defined in [Section 6](#).

The `ServerHello` message is generated in accordance with the following requirements:

- o The `ServerHello.compression_method` field MUST contain exactly one byte, set to zero, which corresponds to the "null" compression method.

- o The ServerHello.extensions field is RECOMMENDED to contain the extended_master_secret (see [RFC7627]) and the renegotiation_info (see [RFC5746]) extensions.
- o The ServerHello.extensions field MUST NOT contain the encrypt_then_mac extension (see [RFC7366]).

If the extended_master_secret extension is agreed, then the master secret value MUST be calculated in accordance with [RFC7627].

4.2.2. Server Certificate

This message is used to authentically convey the server's public key Q_s to the client and is generated in accordance with [Section 7.4.2 of \[RFC5246\]](#).

Note: If the client has used supported_groups extension, the public key in the server's certificate MUST respect the client's choice of elliptic curves.

Upon receiving this message the client validates the certificate chain, extracts the server's public key, and checks that the key type is appropriate for the negotiated key exchange algorithm. (A possible reason for a fatal handshake failure is that the client's capabilities for handling elliptic curves and point formats are exceeded)

4.2.3. CertificateRequest

This message is sent when requesting client authentication and is specified in accordance with [RFC5246] as follows.

```
struct {
    ClientCertificateType certificate_types<1..2^8-1>;
    SignatureAndHashAlgorithm
        supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>;
    DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<0..2^16-1>;
} CertificateRequest;
```

If the CTR_OMAC or CNT_IMIT cipher suite is negotiated, the CertificateRequest message MUST meet the following requirements:

- o the CertificateRequest.supported_signature_algorithm field MUST contain only signature/hash algorithm pairs with the values {0x08, 0x40} or {0x08, 0x41} defined in [Section 5](#);

- o the `CertificateRequest.certificate_types` field MUST contain only the `gost_sign256` (0x43) or `gost_sign512` (0x44) values defined in [Section 7](#).

4.2.4. ClientKeyExchange

The ClientKeyExchange message is defined as follows.

```
enum { vko_kdf_gost, vko_gost } KeyExchangeAlgorithm;

struct {
    select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) {
        case vko_kdf_gost: GostKeyTransport;
        case vko_gost: TLSGostKeyTransportBlob;
    } exchange_keys;
} ClientKeyExchange;
```

The body of the ClientKeyExchange message consists of a GostKeyTransport/TLSGostKeyTransportBlob structure that contains an export representation of the premaster secret PS.

The GostKeyTransport structure corresponds to the CTR_OMAC cipher suites and is described in [Section 4.2.4.1](#) and the TLSGostKeyTransportBlob corresponds to CNT_IMIT cipher suite and is described in [Section 4.2.4.2](#).

4.2.4.1. CTR_OMAC

In case of the CTR_OMAC cipher suites the body of the ClientKeyExchange message consists of the GostKeyTransport structure that is defined below.

The client generates the ClientKeyExchange message in accordance with the following steps:

1. Generates the ephemeral key pair (Q_{eph} , d_{eph}), where:

d_{eph} is chosen from $\{1, \dots, q_s - 1\}$ at random;

$Q_{eph} = d_{eph} * P_s$.

2. Generates export keys (K_{EXP_MAC} and K_{EXP_ENC}) using the KEG algorithm defined in [Section 8.3.1](#):

$H = \text{HASH}(r_c \parallel r_s);$

$K_EXP_MAC \parallel K_EXP_ENC = KEG(d_eph, Q_s, H).$

3. Generates an export representation PSExp of the premaster secret PS using the KExp15 algorithm defined in [Section 8.2.1](#):

$IV = H[25..24 + n / 2];$

$PSExp = KExp15(PS, K_EXP_MAC, K_EXP_ENC, IV).$

4. Generates the ClientKeyExchange message using the GostKeyTransport structure that is defined as follows:

```
GostKeyTransport ::= SEQUENCE {
    keyExp          OCTET STRING,
    ephemeralPublicKey SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
    ukm             OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
}

SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
    algorithm        AlgorithmIdentifier,
    subjectPublicKey  BITSTRING
}

AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
    algorithm        OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
    parameters      ANY OPTIONAL
}
```

where the keyExp field contains the PSExp value, the ephemeralPublicKey field contains the Q_eph value and the ukm field MUST be ignored by the server.

Upon receiving the ClientKeyExchange message, the server process it as follows.

1. Checks the following three conditions. If either of these checks fails, then the server MUST abort the handshake with an alert.

- o Q_eph belongs to the same curve as server public key Q_s;
- o Q_eph is not equal to zero point;
- o $q_s * Q_eph$ is equal to zero point.

2. Generates export keys (K_EXP_MAC and K_EXP_ENC) using the KEG algorithm defined in [Section 8.3.1](#):

$$H = \text{HASH}(r_c \parallel r_s);$$
$$K_EXP_MAC \parallel K_EXP_ENC = \text{KEG}(d_s, Q_eph, H).$$

3. Extracts the premaster secret PS from the export representation PSExp using the KImp15 algorithm defined in [Section 8.2.1](#):

$$IV = H[25..24 + n / 2];$$
$$PS = \text{KImp15}(\text{PSExp}, K_EXP_MAC, K_EXP_ENC, IV).$$

[4.2.4.2](#). CNT_IMIT

In case of the CNT_IMIT cipher suite the body of the ClientKeyExchange message consists of a TLSGostKeyTransportBlob structure that is defined below.

The client generates the ClientKeyExchange message in accordance with the following steps:

1. Generates the ephemeral key pair (Q_eph, d_eph) , where:

d_eph is chosen from $\{1, \dots, q_s - 1\}$ at random;

$$Q_eph = d_eph * P_s.$$

2. Generates export key (K_EXP) using the KEG_28147 algorithm defined in [Section 8.3.2](#):

$$H = \text{HASH}(r_c \parallel r_s);$$
$$K_EXP = \text{KEG}_{28147}(d_eph, Q_s, H).$$

3. Generates an export representation PSExp of the premaster secret PS using the KExp28147 algorithm defined in [Section 8.2.2](#):

$$\text{PSExp} = IV \parallel \text{CEK_ENC} \parallel \text{CEK_MAC} = \text{KExp28147}(PS, K_EXP, H[1..8]).$$

4. Generates the ClientKeyExchange message using the TLSGostKeyTransportBlob structure that is defined as follows:


```
TLSGostKeyTransportBlob ::= SEQUENCE {  
    keyBlob          GostR3410-KeyTransport,  
}  
GostR3410-KeyTransport ::= SEQUENCE {  
    sessionEncryptedKey  Gost28147-89-EncryptedKey,  
    transportParameters [0] IMPLICIT GostR3410-TransportParameters  
}  
Gost28147-89-EncryptedKey ::= SEQUENCE {  
    encryptedKey      Gost28147-89-Key,  
    macKey            Gost28147-89-MAC  
}  
GostR3410-TransportParameters ::= SEQUENCE {  
    encryptionParamSet  OBJECT IDENTIFIER,  
    ephemeralPublicKey  [0] IMPLICIT SubjectPublicKeyInfo,  
    ukm                 OCTET STRING  
}
```

where Gost28147-89-EncryptedKey.encryptedKey field contains the CEK_ENC value, the Gost28147-89-EncryptedKey.macKey field contains the CEK_MAC value, and GostR3410-TransportParameters.ukm field contains the IV value.

The keyBlob.transportParameters.ephemeralPublicKey field contains the client ephemeral public key Q_{eph} . The encryptionParamSet contains value 1.2.643.7.1.2.5.1.1 that corresponds to the id-tc26-gost-28147-param-Z parameters set defined in [\[RFC7836\]](#).

Upon receiving the ClientKeyExchange message, the server process it as follows.

1. Checks the following three conditions. If either of these checks fails, then the server MUST abort the handshake with an alert.

1. Q_{eph} belongs to the same curve as server public key Q_s ;
2. Q_{eph} is not equal to zero point;
3. $q_s * Q_{eph}$ is equal to zero point;

2. Generates export key (K_{EXP}) using the KEG_28147 algorithm defined in [Section 8.3.2](#):

$$H = \text{HASH}(r_c \parallel r_s);$$
$$K_{EXP} = \text{KEG_28147}(d_s, Q_{eph}, H).$$

3. Extracts the premaster secret PS from the export representation PSExp using the KImp28147 algorithm defined in [Section 8.2.2](#):

$$PS = \text{KImp28147}(\text{PSExp}, K_EXP, H[1..8]).$$

[4.2.5](#). CertificateVerify

Client generates the value sgn as follows:

$$\text{sgn} = \text{SIGN}_{\{d_c\}}(\text{handshake_messages}) = \text{str_l}(r) \mid \text{str_l}(s)$$

where $\text{SIGN}_{\{d_c\}}$ is the GOST R 34.10-2012 [[RFC7091](#)] signature algorithm, d_c is a client long-term private key that corresponds to the client long-term public key Q_c from the client's certificate, $l = 32$ for gostr34102012_256 value of the SignatureAndHashAlgorithm field and $l = 64$ for gostr34102012_512 value of the SignatureAndHashAlgorithm field.

Here handshake_messages refers to all handshake messages sent or received, starting at client hello and up to CertificateVerify, but not including, this message, including the type and length fields of the handshake messages.

The TLS CertificateVerify message is specified as follows.

```
struct {  
    SignatureAndHashAlgorithm algorithm;  
    opaque signature<0..2^16-1>;  
} CertificateVerify;
```

where SignatureAndHashAlgorithm structure is specified in [Section 5](#) and CertificateVerify.signature field contains sgn value.

[4.2.6](#). Finished

The TLS Finished message is specified as follows.


```
struct {  
    opaque verify_data[verify_data_length];  
} Finished;  
  
verify_data = PRF(master_secret, finished_label,  
    HASH(handshake_messages))[0..verify_data_length-1];
```

where the `verify_data_length` value is equal to 32 for the CTR_OMAC cipher suites and is equal to 12 for the CNT_IMIT cipher suite. The PRF function is defined in [Section 4.3.4](#).

[4.3.](#) Cryptographic Algorithms

[4.3.1.](#) Block Cipher

The cipher suite TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_CTR_OMAC MUST use Kuznyechik [[RFC7801](#)] as a base block cipher for the encryption and MAC algorithm. The block length `n` is 16 bytes and the key length `k` is 32 bytes.

The cipher suite TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_CTR_OMAC MUST use Magma [[GOST3412-2015](#)] as a base block cipher for the encryption and MAC algorithm. The block length `n` is 8 bytes and the key length `k` is 32 bytes.

The cipher suite TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_28147_CNT_IMIT MUST use GOST 28147-89 as a base block cipher [[RFC5830](#)] with the set of parameters `id-tc26-gost-28147-param-Z` defined in [[RFC7836](#)]. The block length `n` is 8 bytes and the key length `k` is 32 bytes.

[4.3.2.](#) MAC algorithm

The CTR_OMAC cipher suites use the OMAC message authentication code construction defined in [[GOST3413-2015](#)], which can be considered as the CMAC mode defined in [[CMAC](#)] where Kuznyechik or Magma block cipher (see [Section 4.3.1](#)) are used instead of AES block cipher (see [[IK2003](#)] for more detail) as the MAC function. The resulting MAC length is equal to the block length and the MAC key length is 32 bytes.

The CNT_IMIT cipher suite uses the message authentication code function `gostIMIT28147` defined in [Section 8.4](#) with the initialization vector `IV = IV0`, where `IV0` in `B_8` is a string of all zeros, with the CryptoPro Key Meshing algorithm defined in [[RFC4357](#)]. The resulting MAC length is 4 bytes and the MAC key length is 32 bytes.

4.3.3. Encryption algorithm

The CTR_OMAC cipher suites use the block cipher in CTR-ACPKM encryption mode defined in [RFC8645] as the ENC function. The section size N is 4 KB for

TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_CTR_OMAC cipher suite and 1 KB for TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_CTR_OMAC cipher suite. The initial counter nonce is defined as in [Section 4.1](#).

The CNT_IMIT cipher suite uses the block cipher in counter encryption mode (CNT) defined in [Section 6 of \[RFC5830\]](#) with the CryptoPro Key Meshing algorithm defined in [RFC4357] as the ENC function.

4.3.4. PRF and HASH algorithms

The pseudorandom function (PRF) for all the cipher suites defined in this document is the PRF_TLS_GOSTR3411_2012_256 function defined in [RFC7836].

The hash function HASH for all the cipher suites defined in this document is the GOST R 34.11-2012 [RFC6986] hash algorithm with 32-byte (256-bit) hash code.

4.3.5. SNMAX parameter

The SNMAX parameter defines the maximal value of the sequence number seqnum during one TLS 1.2 connection and is defined as follows:

CipherSuites	SNMAX
TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_CTR_OMAC	SNMAX = $2^{64} - 1$
TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_28147_CNT_IMIT	
TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_CTR_OMAC	SNMAX = $2^{32} - 1$

Table 1

5. New Values for the SignatureAlgorithm Registry

The signature/hash algorithm pairs are used to indicate to the server/client which algorithms can be used in digital signatures and are defined by the SignatureAndHashAlgorithm structure (see [Section 7.4.1.4.1 of \[RFC5246\]](#)) as follows:


```
struct {  
    HashAlgorithm hash;  
    SignatureAlgorithm signature;  
} SignatureAndHashAlgorithm;
```

This document defines new values for the "SignatureAlgorithm Registry" that can be used in the SignatureAndHashAlgorithm.signature field for the particular signature/hash algorithm pair:

```
enum {  
    gostr34102012_256(0x40),  
    gostr34102012_512(0x41),  
} SignatureAlgorithm;
```

where the gostr34102012_256 and gostr34102012_512 values correspond to the GOST R 34.10-2012 [[RFC7091](#)] signature algorithm with 32-byte (256-bit) and 64-byte (512-bit) key length respectively.

According to [[RFC7091](#)] the GOST R 34.10-2012 signature algorithm with 32-byte (256-bit) or 64-byte (512-bit) key length use the GOST R 34.11-2012 [[RFC6986](#)] hash algorithm with 32-byte (256-bit) or 64-byte (512-bit) hash code respectively (the hash algorithm is intrinsic to the signature algorithm). Therefore, if the SignatureAndHashAlgorithm.signature field of a particular hash/signature pair listed in the Signature Algorithms Extension is equal to the 0x40 (gostr34102012_256) or 0x41 (gostr34102012_512) value, the SignatureAndHashAlgorithm.hash field of this pair MUST contain the "Intrinsic" value 0x08 (see [[RFC8422](#)]).

6. New Values for the Supported Groups Registry

The Supported Groups Extension indicates the set of elliptic curves supported by the client and is defined in [[RFC8422](#)] and [[RFC7919](#)].

This document defines new values for the "Supported Groups" registry:

```
enum {  
    GC256A(0x22), GC256B(0x23), GC256C(0x24), GC256D(0x25),  
    GC512A(0x26), GC512B(0x27), GC512C(0x28),  
} NamedGroup;
```

Where the values corresponds to the following curves:

Description	Curve Identifier Value	Reference
GC256A	id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-paramSetA	RFC 7836
GC256B	id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet	RFC 4357
GC256C	id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet	RFC 4357
GC256D	id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet	RFC 4357
GC512A	id-tc26-gost-3410-12-512-paramSetA	RFC 7836
GC512B	id-tc26-gost-3410-12-512-paramSetB	RFC 7836
GC512C	id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetC	RFC 7836

Table 2

7. New Values for the ClientCertificateType Identifiers Registry

The ClientCertificateType field of the CertificateRequest message contains a list of the types of certificate types that the client may offer and is defined in [Section 7.4.4 of \[RFC5246\]](#).

This document defines new values for the "ClientCertificateType Identifiers" registry:

```
enum {
    gost_sign256(0x43),
    gost_sign512(0x44),
} ClientCertificateType;
```

To use the gost_sign256 or gost_sign512 authentication mechanism, the client MUST possess a certificate containing a GOST R 34.10-2012-capable public key that corresponds to the 32-byte (256-bit) or 64-byte (512-bit) signature key respectively.

The client proves possession of the private key corresponding to the certified key by including a signature in the CertificateVerify message as described in [Section 4.2.5](#).

8. Additional Algorithms

8.1. TLSTREE

The TLSTREE function is defined as follows:

```
TLSTREE(K_root, i) = KDF_3(KDF_2(KDF_1(K_root, STR_8(i & C_1)),
STR_8(i & C_2)), STR_8(i & C_3)),
```

where

- o K_root in B₃₂;
- o i in {0, 1, ... , 2⁶⁴ - 1};
- o C₁, C₂, C₃ are constants defined by the particular cipher suite (see [Section 8.1.1](#));
- o KDF_j(K, D), j = 1, 2, 3, K in B₃₂, D in B₈, is the key derivation function based on the KDF_GOSTR3411_2012_256 function defined in [\[RFC7836\]](#):

```
KDF_1(K, D) = KDF_GOSTR3411_2012_256(K, "level1", D);
KDF_2(K, D) = KDF_GOSTR3411_2012_256(K, "level2", D);
KDF_3(K, D) = KDF_GOSTR3411_2012_256(K, "level3", D).
```

8.1.1. Key Tree Parameters

The CTR_OMAC cipher suites use the TLSTREE function for the re-keying approach. The constants for it are defined as in the table below.

CipherSuites	C_1, C_2, C_3
TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_CTR_OMAC	C_1=0xFFFFFFFF00000000 C_2=0xFFFFFFFF80000 C_3=0xFFFFFFFFFFFFC0
TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_CTR_OMAC	C_1=0xFFFFF0000000000 C_2=0xFFFFFFFFE000000 C_3=0xFFFFFFFFFFFF000

Table 3

8.2. Key export and key import algorithms

8.2.1. KExp15 and KImp15 Algorithms

Algorithms KExp15 and KImp15 use the block cipher determined by the particular cipher suite.

The KExp15 key export algorithm is defined as follows.

```
+-----+
|  KExp15(S, K_Exp_MAC, K_Exp_ENC, IV)  |
+-----+
|  Input:                                |
|  - secret S to be exported, S in B*,  |
|  - key K_Exp_MAC in B_k,              |
|  - key K_Exp_ENC in B_k,              |
|  - IV in B_{n/2}                      |
|  Output:                              |
|  - export representation SExp in B_{|S|+n} |
+-----+
|  1. CEK_MAC = OMAC(K_Exp_MAC, IV | S), CEK_MAC in B_n |
|  2. SExp = CTR-Encrypt(K_Exp_ENC, IV, S | CEK_MAC)    |
|  3. return SExp                                       |
+-----+
```

where the OMAC function is defined in [MODES], the CTR-Encrypt(K, IV, S) function denotes the encryption of message S on key K and nonce IV in the CTR mode with s = n (see [MODES]).

The KImp15 key import algorithm is defined as follows.


```

+-----+
| KImp15(SEXP, K_Exp_MAC, K_Exp_ENC, IV) |
+-----+
| Input: |
| - export representation SEXP in B* |
| - key K_Exp_MAC in B_k, |
| - key K_Exp_ENC in B_k, |
| - IV in B_{n/2} |
| Output: |
| - secret S in B_{|SEXP|-n} or FAIL |
+-----+
| 1. S | CEK_MAC = CTR-Decrypt(K_Exp_ENC, IV, SEXP), CEK_MAC in B_n |
| 2. If CEK_MAC = OMAC(K_Exp_MAC, IV | S) |
|     then return S; else return FAIL |
+-----+

```

where the OMAC function is defined in [MODES], the CTR-Decrypt(K, IV, S) function denotes the decryption of message S on key K and nonce IV in the CTR mode (see [MODES]).

The keys K_Exp_MAC and K_Exp_ENC MUST be independent. For every pair of keys (K_Exp_ENC, K_Exp_MAC) the IV values MUST be unique. For the import of key K with the KImp15 algorithm every IV value MUST be sent with the export key representation or be a preshared value.

8.2.2. KExp28147 and KImp28147 Algorithms

The KExp28147 key export algorithm is defined as follows.

```

+-----+
| KExp28147(S, K, IV) |
+-----+
| Input: |
| - secret S to be exported, S in B_32, |
| - key K in B_32, |
| - IV in B_8. |
| Output: |
| - export representation SEXP in B_44 |
+-----+
| 1. CEK_MAC = gost28147IMIT(IV, K, S), CEK_MAC in B_4 |
| 2. CEK_ENC = ECB-Encrypt(K, S), CEK_ENC in B_32 |
| 3. return SEXP = IV | CEK_ENC | CEK_MAC |
+-----+

```


where the `gost28147IMIT` function is defined in [Section 8.4](#), the `ECB-Encrypt(K, S)` function denotes the encryption of message `S` on key `K` with the block cipher GOST 28147-89 in the ECB mode (see [[RFC5830](#)]).

The `KImp28147` key import algorithm is defined as follows.

```
+-----+
|  KImp28147(SExp, K, IV)  |
+-----+
|  Input:                  |
|  - export representation SExp in B_44, |
|  - key K in B_32,       |
|  - IV in B_8.           |
|  Output:                 |
|  - imported secret S in B_32 or FAIL    |
+-----+
|  1. extract from SExp    |
|      IV' = SExp[1..8],   |
|      CEK_ENC = SExp[9..40], |
|      CEK_MAC = SExp[41..44] |
|  2. if IV' != IV then return FAIL; else |
|  3. S = ECB-Decrypt(K, CEK_ENC), S in B_32 |
|  4. If CEK_MAC = gost28147IMIT(IV, K, S) |
|      then return S; else return FAIL      |
+-----+
```

where the `gost28147IMIT` function is defined in [Section 8.4](#), the `ECB-Decrypt(CEK_ENC, M)` function denotes the decryption of ciphertext `CEK_ENC` on key `K` with a block cipher GOST 28147-89 in the ECB mode (see [[RFC5830](#)]).

[8.3.](#) Key Exchange Generation Algorithms

[8.3.1.](#) KEG Algorithm

The KEG algorithm is defined as follows:


```
+-----+
| KEG(d, Q, H)                                     |
+-----+
| Input:                                           |
| - private key d,                               |
| - public key Q,                               |
| - H in B_32.                                   |
| Output:                                         |
| - key material K in B_64.                     |
+-----+
| 1. If  $m < 2^{256}$                                |
|     return KEG_256(d, Q, H)                   |
| 2. If  $m < 2^{512}$                                |
|     return KEG_512(d, Q, H)                   |
| 3. return FAIL                                |
+-----+
```

where m is the order of the used elliptic curve points group containing point Q , d in $\{1, \dots, m - 1\}$.

The KEG_256 algorithm is defined as follows:

```
+-----+
| KEG_256(d, Q, H)                               |
+-----+
| Input:                                           |
| - private key d,                               |
| - public key Q,                               |
| - H in B_32.                                   |
| Output:                                         |
| - key material K in B_64.                     |
+-----+
| 1.  $r = \text{INT}(H[1..16])$                        |
| 2. If  $r = 0$                                      |
|     UKM = 1; else UKM =  $r$                      |
| 3.  $K\_EXP = \text{VKO\_256}(d, Q, \text{UKM})$            |
| 4. seed =  $H[17..24]$                            |
| 5. return  $\text{KDFTREE\_256}(K\_EXP, \text{"kdf tree", seed, 1})$  |
+-----+
```

where VKO_256 is the function VKO_GOSTR3410_2012_256 defined in [RFC7836] and KDFTREE_256 is the KDF_TREE_GOSTR3411_2012_256 function defined in [RFC7836] with the parameter L equal to 512.

The KEG_512 algorithm is defined as follows:


```
+-----+
| KEG_512(d, Q, H)                                |
+-----+
| Input:                                           |
| - private key d,                                |
| - public key Q,                                  |
| - H in B_32.                                     |
| Output:                                          |
| - key material K in B_64.                       |
+-----+
| 1. r = INT(H[1..16])                             |
| 2. If r = 0                                       |
|     UKM = 1; else UKM = r                       |
| 3. return VKO_512(d, Q, UKM)                   |
+-----+
```

where VKO_512 is the VKO_GOSTR3410_2012_512 function defined in [\[RFC7836\]](#).

8.3.2. KEG_28147 Algorithm

The KEG_28147 algorithm is defined as follows:

```
+-----+
| KEG_28147(d, Q, H)                                |
+-----+
| Input:                                           |
| - private key d,                                |
| - public key Q,                                  |
| - H in B_32.                                     |
| Output:                                          |
| - key material K in B_32.                       |
+-----+
| 1. UKM = H[1..8]                                 |
| 2. R = VKO_256(d, Q, int(UKM))                  |
| 3. return K = CPDivers(UKM, R)                  |
+-----+
```

where the VKO_256 function is equal to the VKO_GOSTR3410_2012_256 function defined in [\[RFC7836\]](#), the CPDivers function corresponds to the CryptoPro KEK Diversification Algorithm defined in [\[RFC4357\]](#), which takes as input the UKM value and the key value.

8.4. gostIMIT28147

gost28147IMIT(IV, K, M) is a MAC algorithm with 4 bytes output and is defined as follows:

```
+-----+
| gost28147IMIT(IV, K, M) |
+-----+
| Input: |
| - initial value IV in B_8, |
| - key K in B_32, |
| - message M in B*. |
| Output: |
| - MAC value T in B_4. |
+-----+
| 1. M' = PAD(M) |
| 2. M' = M'_0 | ... | M'_r, |M'_i| = 8, i in {0, ... , r} |
| 3. M'' = (M'_0 XOR IV) | M'_1 | ... | M'_r |
| 4. return K = MAC28147(K, M'') |
+-----+
```

where the PAD function is the padding function that adds m zero bytes to the end of the message, where m is the smallest, non-negative solution to the equation $(|M| + m) \bmod 8 = 0$, the MAC28147 function corresponds to Message Authentication Code Generation Mode defined in [\[RFC5830\]](#) with 4 byte length output.

9. IANA Considerations

IANA has added numbers {0xC1, 0x00}, {0xC1, 0x01} and {0xC1, 0x02} with the names TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_CTR_OMAC, TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_CTR_OMAC, TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_28147_CNT_IMIT to the "TLS Cipher Suite" registry with this document as reference, as shown below.

Value	Description	DTLS-OK	Reference
0xC1, 0x00	TLS_GOSTR341112_256_ _WITH_KUZNYECHIK_CTR_OMAC	N	this RFC
0xC1, 0x01	TLS_GOSTR341112_256_ _WITH_MAGMA_CTR_OMAC	N	this RFC
0xC1, 0x02	TLS_GOSTR341112_256_ _WITH_28147_CNT_IMIT	N	this RFC

Table 4

IANA has added numbers 0x40, 0x41 with the names gostr34102012_256, gostr34102012_512, to the "TLS SignatureAlgorithm" registry, as shown below.

Value	Description	DTLS-OK	Reference
0x40	gostr34102012_256	Y	this RFC
0x41	gostr34102012_512	Y	this RFC

Table 5

IANA has added numbers 0x22, 0x23, 0x24, 0x25, 0x26, 0x27, 0x28 with the names GC256A, GC256B, GC256C, GC256D, GC512A, GC512B, GC512C to the "TLS Supported Groups" registry, as shown below.

Value	Description	DTLS-OK	Recomended	Reference
0x22	GC256A	Y	N	this RFC
0x23	GC256B	Y	N	this RFC
0x24	GC256C	Y	N	this RFC
0x25	GC256D	Y	N	this RFC
0x26	GC512A	Y	N	this RFC
0x27	GC512B	Y	N	this RFC
0x28	GC512C	Y	N	this RFC

Table 6

IANA has added numbers 0x43, 0x44 with the names `gost_sign256`, `gost_sign512` to the "ClientCertificateType Identifiers" registry, as shown below.

Value	Description	DTLS-OK	Reference
0x43	<code>gost_sign256</code>	Y	this RFC
0x44	<code>gost_sign512</code>	Y	this RFC

Table 7

10. Historical considerations

Note that prior to the existence of this document implementations could use only the values from the Private Use space in order to use the GOST-based algorithms. So some old implementations can still use the old value {0x00, 0x81} instead of the {0xC1, 0x02} value to indicate the `TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_28147_CNT_IMIT` cipher suite; one old value 0xEE instead of the values 0x40, 0x08 and 0x43 (to indicate the `gostr34102012_256` signature algorithm, the Intrinsic hash algorithm and the `gost_sign256` certificate type respectively); one old value 0xEF instead of the values 0x41, 0x08 and 0x44 (to indicate the `gostr34102012_512` signature algorithm, the Intrinsic hash algorithm and the `gost_sign512` certificate type respectively).

Due to historical reasons in addition to the curve identifier values listed in Table 2 there exist some extra identifier values that correspond to the curves GC256B, GC256C and GC256D as follows.

+-----+-----+	
Description Curve Identifier Values	
+-----+-----+	
GC256B	id-GostR3410_2001-CryptoPro-XchA-ParamSet
	id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-paramSetB
+-----+-----+	
GC256C	id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-paramSetC
+-----+-----+	
GC256D	id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchB-ParamSet
	id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-paramSetD
+-----+-----+	

Table 8

Client should be prepared to handle any of them correctly if corresponding group is included in the supported_groups extension.

11. Security Considerations

This entire document is about security considerations.

12. References

12.1. Normative References

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12.2. Informative References

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[Appendix A](#). Test Examples

[A.1](#). Test Examples for CTR_OMAC cipher suites

[A.1.1](#). TLSTREE Examples

[A.1.1.1](#). TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_CTR_OMAC ciphersuite

```
TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_CTR_OMAC
*****
Root Key K_root:
00 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 AA BB CC EE FF 0A
11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 AA BB CC EE FF 0A 00

seqnum = 0
First level key from Divers_1:
F3 55 89 F0 9B F8 01 B1 CA 11 42 73 B9 5F D6 C1
39 2E 78 F9 FB 81 4D A0 5A 7C CA 08 9E C8 65 42

Second level key from Divers_2:
51 37 D5 C4 A6 E6 BE 42 C4 40 D1 0A 95 EE A0 7F
08 9E 74 0D 38 90 EB 52 65 2C 0C B9 3F 20 7B B4

The resulting key from Divers 3:
19 A7 6E D3 0F 4D 6D 1F 5B 72 63 EC 49 1A D8 38
17 C0 B5 7D 8A 03 56 12 71 40 FB 4F 74 25 49 4D

seqnum = 4095
First level key from Divers_1:
F3 55 89 F0 9B F8 01 B1 CA 11 42 73 B9 5F D6 C1
39 2E 78 F9 FB 81 4D A0 5A 7C CA 08 9E C8 65 42

Second level key from Divers_2:
51 37 D5 C4 A6 E6 BE 42 C4 40 D1 0A 95 EE A0 7F
08 9E 74 0D 38 90 EB 52 65 2C 0C B9 3F 20 7B B4

The resulting key from Divers 3:
19 A7 6E D3 0F 4D 6D 1F 5B 72 63 EC 49 1A D8 38
17 C0 B5 7D 8A 03 56 12 71 40 FB 4F 74 25 49 4D

seqnum = 4096
First level key from Divers_1:
F3 55 89 F0 9B F8 01 B1 CA 11 42 73 B9 5F D6 C1
```


39 2E 78 F9 FB 81 4D A0 5A 7C CA 08 9E C8 65 42

Second level key from Divers_2:

51 37 D5 C4 A6 E6 BE 42 C4 40 D1 0A 95 EE A0 7F
08 9E 74 0D 38 90 EB 52 65 2C 0C B9 3F 20 7B B4

The resulting key from Divers 3:

FB 30 EE 53 CF CF 89 D7 48 FC 0C 72 EF 16 0B 8B
53 CB BB FD 03 12 82 B0 26 21 4A B2 E0 77 58 FF

seqnum = 33554431

First level key from Divers_1:

F3 55 89 F0 9B F8 01 B1 CA 11 42 73 B9 5F D6 C1
39 2E 78 F9 FB 81 4D A0 5A 7C CA 08 9E C8 65 42

Second level key from Divers_2:

51 37 D5 C4 A6 E6 BE 42 C4 40 D1 0A 95 EE A0 7F
08 9E 74 0D 38 90 EB 52 65 2C 0C B9 3F 20 7B B4

The resulting key from Divers 3:

B8 5B 36 DC 22 82 32 6B C0 35 C5 72 DC 93 F1 8D
83 AA 01 74 F3 94 20 9A 51 3B B3 74 DC 09 35 AE

seqnum = 33554432

First level key from Divers_1:

F3 55 89 F0 9B F8 01 B1 CA 11 42 73 B9 5F D6 C1
39 2E 78 F9 FB 81 4D A0 5A 7C CA 08 9E C8 65 42

Second level key from Divers_2:

3F EA 59 38 DA 2B F8 DD C4 7E C1 DC 55 61 89 66
79 02 BE 42 0D F4 C3 7D AF 21 75 3B CB 1D C7 F3

The resulting key from Divers 3:

0F D7 C0 9E FD F8 E8 15 73 EE CC F8 6E 4B 95 E3
AF 7F 34 DA B1 17 7C FD 7D B9 7B 6D A9 06 40 8A

seqnum = 274877906943

First level key from Divers_1:

F3 55 89 F0 9B F8 01 B1 CA 11 42 73 B9 5F D6 C1
39 2E 78 F9 FB 81 4D A0 5A 7C CA 08 9E C8 65 42

Second level key from Divers_2:

AB F3 A5 37 98 3A 1B 98 40 06 6D E6 8A 49 BF 25
97 7E E5 C3 F5 2D 33 3E 3C 22 0F 1D 15 C5 08 93

The resulting key from Divers 3:

48 0F 99 72 BA F2 5D 4C 36 9A 96 AF 91 BC A4 55
3F 79 D8 F0 C5 61 8B 19 FD 44 CF DC 57 FA 37 33

seqnum = 274877906944

First level key from Divers_1:

15 60 0D 9E 8F A6 85 54 CF 15 2D C7 4F BC 42 51
17 B0 3E 09 76 BB 28 EA 98 24 C3 B7 0F 28 CB D8

Second level key from Divers_2:

6C C2 8E B0 93 24 72 12 5C 7A D3 F8 09 73 B3 C8
C4 13 7D A5 73 BC 17 1A 24 ED D4 A3 71 F1 F8 73

The resulting key from Divers 3:

25 28 C1 C6 A8 F0 92 7B F2 BE 27 BB 78 D2 7F 21
46 D6 55 93 B0 C7 17 3A 06 CB 9D 88 DF 92 32 65

[A.1.1.2.](#) TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_CTR_OMAC ciphersuite

TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_CTR_OMAC

Root Key K_root:

00 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 AA BB CC EE FF 0A
11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 AA BB CC EE FF 0A 00

seqnum = 0

First level key from Divers_1:

F3 55 89 F0 9B F8 01 B1 CA 11 42 73 B9 5F D6 C1
39 2E 78 F9 FB 81 4D A0 5A 7C CA 08 9E C8 65 42

Second level key from Divers_2:

51 37 D5 C4 A6 E6 BE 42 C4 40 D1 0A 95 EE A0 7F
08 9E 74 0D 38 90 EB 52 65 2C 0C B9 3F 20 7B B4

The resulting key from Divers 3:

19 A7 6E D3 0F 4D 6D 1F 5B 72 63 EC 49 1A D8 38
17 C0 B5 7D 8A 03 56 12 71 40 FB 4F 74 25 49 4D

seqnum = 63

First level key from Divers_1:

F3 55 89 F0 9B F8 01 B1 CA 11 42 73 B9 5F D6 C1
39 2E 78 F9 FB 81 4D A0 5A 7C CA 08 9E C8 65 42

Second level key from Divers_2:

51 37 D5 C4 A6 E6 BE 42 C4 40 D1 0A 95 EE A0 7F
08 9E 74 0D 38 90 EB 52 65 2C 0C B9 3F 20 7B B4

The resulting key from Divers 3:

19 A7 6E D3 0F 4D 6D 1F 5B 72 63 EC 49 1A D8 38

17 C0 B5 7D 8A 03 56 12 71 40 FB 4F 74 25 49 4D

seqnum = 64

First level key from Divers_1:

F3 55 89 F0 9B F8 01 B1 CA 11 42 73 B9 5F D6 C1
39 2E 78 F9 FB 81 4D A0 5A 7C CA 08 9E C8 65 42

Second level key from Divers_2:

51 37 D5 C4 A6 E6 BE 42 C4 40 D1 0A 95 EE A0 7F
08 9E 74 0D 38 90 EB 52 65 2C 0C B9 3F 20 7B B4

The resulting key from Divers 3:

AE BE 1E F4 18 71 3B F0 44 B9 FC D9 E5 72 D4 37
FB 38 B5 D8 29 56 7A 6F 79 18 39 6D 9F 4E 09 6B

seqnum = 524287

First level key from Divers_1:

F3 55 89 F0 9B F8 01 B1 CA 11 42 73 B9 5F D6 C1
39 2E 78 F9 FB 81 4D A0 5A 7C CA 08 9E C8 65 42

Second level key from Divers_2:

51 37 D5 C4 A6 E6 BE 42 C4 40 D1 0A 95 EE A0 7F
08 9E 74 0D 38 90 EB 52 65 2C 0C B9 3F 20 7B B4

The resulting key from Divers 3:

6F 18 D4 00 3E A2 CB 30 F5 FE C1 93 A2 34 F0 7D
7C 43 94 98 7F 50 75 8D E2 2B 22 0D 8A 10 51 06

seqnum = 524288

First level key from Divers_1:

F3 55 89 F0 9B F8 01 B1 CA 11 42 73 B9 5F D6 C1
39 2E 78 F9 FB 81 4D A0 5A 7C CA 08 9E C8 65 42

Second level key from Divers_2:

F6 59 EB 85 EE BD 2A 8D CC 1B B3 F7 C6 00 57 FF
6D 33 B6 0F 74 65 DD 42 B5 11 2C F3 A6 B1 AB 66

The resulting key from Divers 3:

E5 4B 16 41 5B 3B 66 3E 78 0B 06 2D 24 F7 36 C4
49 54 63 C3 A8 91 E1 FA 46 F7 AE 99 FF F9 F3 78

seqnum = 4294967295

First level key from Divers_1:

F3 55 89 F0 9B F8 01 B1 CA 11 42 73 B9 5F D6 C1
39 2E 78 F9 FB 81 4D A0 5A 7C CA 08 9E C8 65 42

Second level key from Divers_2:

F4 BC 10 1A BB 68 86 2A 8C E3 1E A0 0D DF A7 FE

B8 29 10 F1 24 F4 B1 E2 9E A8 3B E0 06 C2 26 8D

The resulting key from Divers 3:

CF 60 09 04 C7 1E 7B 88 A4 9A C8 E2 45 77 4B 3D
BE ED FB 81 DE 9A 0E 2F 4E 46 C3 56 07 BC 2F 04

seqnum = 4294967296

First level key from Divers_1:

55 CC 95 E0 D1 FB 54 85 AF 8E F6 9A CD 72 B2 32
79 7C D2 E8 5D 86 CD FD 1D E5 5B D1 FA 14 37 78

Second level key from Divers_2:

72 16 91 E1 01 C4 28 96 A6 40 AE 18 3F BB 44 5B
76 37 9C 57 E1 FD 8A 7D 49 A6 23 E4 23 8C 0E 1D

The resulting key from Divers 3:

16 18 0B 24 64 54 00 B8 36 14 38 37 D8 6A AC 93
95 2A E3 EB 82 44 D5 EC 2A B0 2C FF 30 78 11 38

[A.1.2.](#) Record Examples

[A.1.2.1.](#) TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_CTR_OMAC ciphersuite

TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_CTR_OMAC

It is assumed that during Handshake following keys were established:

- MAC key:

00000: 00 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 AA BB CC EE FF 0A
00010: 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 AA BB CC EE FF 0A 00

- Encryption key:

00000: 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 AA BB CC EE FF 0A 00 11
00010: 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 AA BB CC EE FF 0A 00 11 22

- IV:

00000: 00 00 00 00

seqnum = 0

Application data:

00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

TLSPplaintext:

00000: 17 03 03 00 07 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

K_MAC_0:


```
00000:  19 A7 6E D3 0F 4D 6D 1F 5B 72 63 EC 49 1A D8 38
00010:  17 C0 B5 7D 8A 03 56 12 71 40 FB 4F 74 25 49 4D
```

MAC value:

```
00000:  F3 3E B6 89 6F EC E2 86
```

K_ENC_0:

```
00000:  58 AF BE 9A 4C 31 98 AA AB AA 26 92 C4 19 F1 79
00010:  7C 9B 92 DE B3 CC 74 46 B3 63 57 71 13 F0 FB 56
```

IV_0:

```
00000:  00 00 00 00
```

TLSCiphertext:

```
00000:  17 03 03 00 0F 9B 42 0D A8 6F AF 36 7F 05 14 43
00010:  CE 9C 10 72
```

seqnum = 4095

Application data:

```
00000:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00010:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00020:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
. . .
003D0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
003E0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
003F0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
```

TLSPlaintext:

```
00000:  17 03 03 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00010:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00020:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
. . .
003D0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
003E0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
003F0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00400:  00 00 00 00 00
```

K_MAC_4095:

```
00000:  19 A7 6E D3 0F 4D 6D 1F 5B 72 63 EC 49 1A D8 38
00010:  17 C0 B5 7D 8A 03 56 12 71 40 FB 4F 74 25 49 4D
```

MAC value:

```
00000:  58 D3 BB 60 8F BC 98 B8
```

K_ENC_4095:

```
00000:  58 AF BE 9A 4C 31 98 AA AB AA 26 92 C4 19 F1 79
00010:  7C 9B 92 DE B3 CC 74 46 B3 63 57 71 13 F0 FB 56
```


IV_4095:

```
00000:  00 00 0F FF
```

TLSCiphertext:

```
00000:  17 03 03 04 08 B7 11 43 8B 16 20 1F 3C 49 33 95
00010:  21 C9 C8 CA 75 66 D4 C2 0F D3 3E 58 1F 80 07 DC
00020:  76 04 3E 2B 35 C8 E8 4B B2 55 08 27 66 13 59 6F
. . .
003D0:  E7 77 70 BF 45 17 E1 F8 DD 1B 2C 05 64 AD 68 FC
003E0:  4A 88 9A 48 B8 B1 FF 0E A4 E1 BB 70 4D 56 A4 75
003F0:  2F 51 A5 82 CC 54 1A 80 8F 8C 8B 62 97 68 88 C8
00400:  10 59 DE 41 27 63 A3 E0 99 9A CD DA 77
```

seqnum = 4096

Application data:

```
00000:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00010:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00020:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
. . .
007D0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
007E0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
007F0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
```

TLSPlaintext:

```
00000:  17 03 03 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00010:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00020:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
. . .
007D0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
007E0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
007F0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00800:  00 00 00 00 00
```

K_MAC_4096:

```
00000:  FB 30 EE 53 CF CF 89 D7 48 FC 0C 72 EF 16 0B 8B
00010:  53 CB BB FD 03 12 82 B0 26 21 4A B2 E0 77 58 FF
```

MAC value:

```
00000:  50 55 A2 6A BE 19 63 81
```

K_ENC_4096:

```
00000:  ED F2 FD 02 47 71 60 23 83 09 00 2D 1D 57 DF 9F
00010:  D2 ED 18 D6 45 66 C7 6F 4B F0 3D 3A BF 7B BB 1E
```

IV_4096:

```
00000:  00 00 10 00
```


TLSCiphertext:

```

00000:  17 03 03 08 08 99 95 26 07 03 47 1D ED A2 E6 55
00010:  B6 B3 93 83 5E 33 8B 1E D0 0E DD 22 47 A2 FB 88
00020:  FB B7 A8 94 80 62 08 8A F3 2C AE B6 AA 2C 4F 2A
. . .
007D0:  7F 0B 24 61 E7 5F E1 06 34 B8 4D C5 70 35 72 5A
007E0:  CA 4F 0C BC A9 B0 6C B9 F7 6F BD 2F 80 46 2B 8D
007F0:  77 5E BD 41 6F 63 41 39 AC 89 C2 ED 3D F1 9F E2
00800:  4E F8 C0 5A A8 90 93 1B 01 86 FD 7D DF

```

[A.1.2.2.](#) TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_CTR_OMAC ciphersuite

TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_CTR_OMAC

```
*****
```

It is assumed that during Handshake following keys were established:

- MAC key:

```

00000:  00 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 AA BB CC EE FF 0A
00010:  11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 AA BB CC EE FF 0A 00

```

- Encryption key:

```

00000:  22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 AA BB CC EE FF 0A 00 11
00010:  33 44 55 66 77 88 99 AA BB CC EE FF 0A 00 11 22

```

- IV:

```

00000:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

```

```
-----
seqnum = 0
```

Application data:

```

00000:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

```

TLSPlaintext:

```

00000:  17 03 03 00 0F 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00010:  00 00 00 00

```

K_MAC_0:

```

00000:  19 A7 6E D3 0F 4D 6D 1F 5B 72 63 EC 49 1A D8 38
00010:  17 C0 B5 7D 8A 03 56 12 71 40 FB 4F 74 25 49 4D

```

MAC value:

```

00000:  FD 17 19 DD 95 08 37 EB 7C 7B B8 F5 00 37 99 81

```

K_ENC_0:

```

00000:  58 AF BE 9A 4C 31 98 AA AB AA 26 92 C4 19 F1 79
00010:  7C 9B 92 DE B3 CC 74 46 B3 63 57 71 13 F0 FB 56

```


IV_0:

00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

TLSCiphertext:

00000: 17 03 03 00 1F 4D 1A 30 52 36 57 3B FF C1 4E 46

00010: DC BE 74 6D B6 C9 9A 17 5A 81 C4 71 1E 2F 84 C3

00020: 92 C5 40 7C

seqnum = 63

Application data:

00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

00010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

00020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

. . .

00FD0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

00FE0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

00FF0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

TLSPlaintext:

00000: 17 03 03 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

00010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

00020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

. . .

00FD0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

00FE0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

00FF0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

01000: 00 00 00 00 00

K_MAC_63:

00000: 19 A7 6E D3 0F 4D 6D 1F 5B 72 63 EC 49 1A D8 38

00010: 17 C0 B5 7D 8A 03 56 12 71 40 FB 4F 74 25 49 4D

Mac value:

00000: 98 46 27 61 D0 26 24 4A 2C 0B 7D 1B CC CB E7 B0

K_ENC_63:

00000: 58 AF BE 9A 4C 31 98 AA AB AA 26 92 C4 19 F1 79

00010: 7C 9B 92 DE B3 CC 74 46 B3 63 57 71 13 F0 FB 56

IV_63:

00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 3F

TLSCiphertext:

00000: 17 03 03 10 10 12 93 51 D2 6E 14 07 13 A2 1B 37

00010: 68 24 A2 23 17 CD C0 D8 8E 01 CF A3 FE 21 41 5F

00020: 5C 5E 05 86 9C CF 38 A5 1B C2 E0 ED 68 94 46 A8


```
. . .
00FE0:  19 AD 99 8C 06 25 21 E6 7B 63 59 A4 F5 C8 16 F9
00FF0:  47 6B A7 13 26 82 BB A8 CE 0B ED AD 65 E4 20 A2
01000:  97 B6 E2 C6 1F A4 06 D9 B8 CA 36 FD 9F CD 3A EE
01010:  24 78 F4 D1 96
```

```
-----
seqnum = 64
```

Application data:

```
00000:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00010:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00020:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
. . .
01FD0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
01FE0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
01FF0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
```

TLSPplaintext:

```
00000:  17 03 03 20 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00010:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00020:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
. . .
01FD0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
01FE0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
01FF0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
02000:  00 00 00 00 00
```

K_MAC_64:

```
00000:  AE BE 1E F4 18 71 3B F0 44 B9 FC D9 E5 72 D4 37
00010:  FB 38 B5 D8 29 56 7A 6F 79 18 39 6D 9F 4E 09 6B
```

Mac value:

```
00000:  EA C3 97 87 84 2B 1D BD 60 80 CC 3F BF AE 5C 2F
```

K_ENC_64:

```
00000:  64 F5 5A FC 37 A1 74 D9 53 3E 70 8B CD 14 FA 4A
00010:  EE C3 7B C0 E3 2B A4 99 01 B4 66 9E 96 A6 3D 96
```

IV_64:

```
00000:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40
```

TLSCiphertext:

```
00000:  17 03 03 20 10 E6 66 BB 98 AC 5B 0F 39 31 D8 55
00010:  1B 93 36 85 96 EE F0 EB A8 26 9C B8 BD AA E7 EB
00020:  80 C8 30 D7 5A B7 D4 6C 25 06 DC 8B 83 E1 F2 D3
. . .
01FE0:  B3 02 67 2C CB 02 86 CD 40 48 FB D5 38 1A 65 55
```



```

01FF0:  26 11 25 51 01 4F A8 ED F5 C2 1B 7D 1D B3 9D 6B
02000:  AD EC 0D 7C 07 05 34 8B 5C 55 6C 4D 50 81 69 1A
02010:  A9 EC 36 F8 B5

```

[A.1.3.](#) Handshake Examples

[A.1.3.1.](#) TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_CTR_OMAC ciphersuite

Server certificate curve OID:

id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet, "1.2.643.2.2.35.1"

Server public key Q_s:

```

x = 0x6531D4A72E655BFC9DFB94293B260702
    82FABF10D5C49B7366148C60E0BF8167

```

```

y = 0x37F8CC71DC5D917FC4A66F7826E72750
    8270B4FFC266C26CD4363E77B553A5B8

```

Server private key d_s:

```

0x5F308355DFD6A8ACAE0837B100A3B1F
    6D63FB29B78EF27D3967757F0527144C

```

-----Client-----

ClientHello message:

```

msg_type:      01
length:        000040
body:
  client_version:
    major:      03
    minor:      03
  random:       933EA21EC3802A561550EC78D6ED51AC
                2439D7E749C31BC3A3456165889684CA
  session_id:
    length:     00
    vector:     --
  cipher_suites:
    length:     0004
    vector:
      CipherSuite: C100
      CipherSuite: C101
  compression_methods:
    length:     01

```



```
vector:
  CompressionMethod: 00
extensions:
  length: 0013
vector:
  Extension: /* signature_algorithms */
    extension_type: 000D
    extension_data:
      length: 0006
      vector:
        supported_signature_algorithms:
          length: 0004
          vector:
            /* 1 pair of algorithms */
            hash: 08
            signature:
              40
            /* 2 pair of algorithms */
            hash: 08
            signature:
              41
  Extension: /* renegotiation_info */
    extension_type: FF01
    extension_data:
      length: 0001
      vector:
        renegotiated_connection:
          length: 00
          vector: --
  Extension: /* extended_master_secret */
    extension_type: 0017
    extension_data:
      length: 0000
      vector: --
```

```
00000: 01 00 00 40 03 03 93 3E A2 1E C3 80 2A 56 15 50
00010: EC 78 D6 ED 51 AC 24 39 D7 E7 49 C3 1B C3 A3 45
00020: 61 65 88 96 84 CA 00 00 04 C1 00 C1 01 01 00 00
00030: 13 00 0D 00 06 00 04 08 40 08 41 FF 01 00 01 00
00040: 00 17 00 00
```

Record layer message:

```
type: 16
version:
  major: 03
  minor: 03
length: 0044
fragment: 010000400303933EA21EC3802A561550
```



```
EC78D6ED51AC2439D7E749C31BC3A345
6165889684CA000004C100C101010000
13000D0006000408400841FF01000100
00170000
```

```
00000:  16 03 03 00 44 01 00 00 40 03 03 93 3E A2 1E C3
00010:  80 2A 56 15 50 EC 78 D6 ED 51 AC 24 39 D7 E7 49
00020:  C3 1B C3 A3 45 61 65 88 96 84 CA 00 00 04 C1 00
00030:  C1 01 01 00 00 13 00 0D 00 06 00 04 08 40 08 41
00040:  FF 01 00 01 00 00 17 00 00
```

-----Server-----

ServerHello message:

```
msg_type:      02
length:        000041
body:
  server_version:
    major:      03
    minor:      03
    random:      933EA21E49C31BC3A3456165889684CA
                  A5576CE7924A24F58113808DBD9EF856
  session_id:
    length:      10
    vector:      C3802A561550EC78D6ED51AC2439D7E7
  cipher_suite:
    CipherSuite: C101
  compression_method:
    CompressionMethod: 00
  extensions:
    length:      0009
    vector:
      Extension: /* renegotiation_info */
        extension_type: FF01
        extension_data:
          length: 0001
          vector:
            renegotiated_connection:
              length: 00
              vector: --
      Extension: /* extended_master_secret */
        extension_type: 0017
        extension_data:
          length: 0000
          vector: --
```

```
00000:  02 00 00 41 03 03 93 3E A2 1E 49 C3 1B C3 A3 45
```



```
00010:  61 65 88 96 84 CA A5 57 6C E7 92 4A 24 F5 81 13
00020:  80 8D BD 9E F8 56 10 C3 80 2A 56 15 50 EC 78 D6
00030:  ED 51 AC 24 39 D7 E7 C1 01 00 00 09 FF 01 00 01
00040:  00 00 17 00 00
```

Record layer message:

```
type:          16
version:
  major:       03
  minor:       03
length:        0045
fragment:      020000410303933EA21E49C31BC3A345
               6165889684CAA5576CE7924A24F58113
               808DBD9EF85610C3802A561550EC78D6
               ED51AC2439D7E7C101000009FF010001
               0000170000
```

```
00000:  16 03 03 00 45 02 00 00 41 03 03 93 3E A2 1E 49
00010:  C3 1B C3 A3 45 61 65 88 96 84 CA A5 57 6C E7 92
00020:  4A 24 F5 81 13 80 8D BD 9E F8 56 10 C3 80 2A 56
00030:  15 50 EC 78 D6 ED 51 AC 24 39 D7 E7 C1 01 00 00
00040:  09 FF 01 00 01 00 00 17 00 00
```

-----Server-----

Certificate message:

```
msg_type:      0B
length:        0001DB
body:
  certificate_list:
    length:     0001D8
    vector:
      ASN.1Cert:
        length: 0001D5
        vector: 308201D13082017EA003020102020833
                FBB2C0E9575A46300A06082A85030701
                010302301F311D301B06035504030C14
                . . .
                797990E4B5452CF82FE1F19EE237B754
                CBCD5078D752A28013DFFC8224AD114B
                BD7C1BB71E480AD6EEF9857A8C99C595
                9053EEDFE9
```

```
00000:  0B 00 01 DB 00 01 D8 00 01 D5 30 82 01 D1 30 82
00010:  01 7E A0 03 02 01 02 02 08 33 FB B2 C0 E9 57 5A
00020:  46 30 0A 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 03 02 30 1F 31
00030:  1D 30 1B 06 03 55 04 03 0C 14 74 65 73 74 5F 73
```



```
00040: 65 6C 66 73 69 67 6E 65 64 5F 63 65 72 74 30 1E
00050: 17 0D 31 39 30 36 32 37 31 35 32 34 30 38 5A 17
00060: 0D 32 30 31 32 31 38 31 35 33 34 30 38 5A 30 1F
00070: 31 1D 30 1B 06 03 55 04 03 0C 14 74 65 73 74 5F
00080: 73 65 6C 66 73 69 67 6E 65 64 5F 63 65 72 74 30
00090: 66 30 1F 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 01 01 30 13 06
000A0: 07 2A 85 03 02 02 23 01 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01
000B0: 02 02 03 43 00 04 40 67 81 BF E0 60 8C 14 66 73
000C0: 9B C4 D5 10 BF FA 82 02 07 26 3B 29 94 FB 9D FC
000D0: 5B 65 2E A7 D4 31 65 B8 A5 53 B5 77 3E 36 D4 6C
000E0: C2 66 C2 FF B4 70 82 50 27 E7 26 78 6F A6 C4 7F
000F0: 91 5D DC 71 CC F8 37 A3 81 96 30 81 93 30 1D 06
00100: 03 55 1D 0E 04 16 04 14 E7 D0 0B B8 4D 8D 24 18
00110: 29 3E 05 C1 7C E7 77 98 D4 8D 30 16 30 0E 06 03
00120: 55 1D 0F 01 01 FF 04 04 03 02 01 C6 30 12 06 03
00130: 55 1D 13 01 01 FF 04 08 30 06 01 01 FF 02 01 01
00140: 30 4E 06 03 55 1D 23 04 47 30 45 80 14 E7 D0 0B
00150: B8 4D 8D 24 18 29 3E 05 C1 7C E7 77 98 D4 8D 30
00160: 16 A1 23 A4 21 30 1F 31 1D 30 1B 06 03 55 04 03
00170: 0C 14 74 65 73 74 5F 73 65 6C 66 73 69 67 6E 65
00180: 64 5F 63 65 72 74 82 08 33 FB B2 C0 E9 57 5A 46
00190: 30 0A 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 03 02 03 41 00 E2
001A0: 88 44 F9 F1 C8 55 E2 DB 5B 19 79 79 90 E4 B5 45
001B0: 2C F8 2F E1 F1 9E E2 37 B7 54 CB CD 50 78 D7 52
001C0: A2 80 13 DF FC 82 24 AD 11 4B BD 7C 1B B7 1E 48
001D0: 0A D6 EE F9 85 7A 8C 99 C5 95 90 53 EE DF E9
```

Record layer message:

```
type: 16
version:
  major: 03
  minor: 03
length: 01DF
fragment: 0B0001DB0001D80001D5308201D13082
          017EA003020102020833FBB2C0E9575A
          46300A06082A85030701010302301F31
          . . .
          8844F9F1C855E2DB5B19797990E4B545
          2CF82FE1F19EE237B754CBCD5078D752
          A28013DFFC8224AD114BBD7C1BB71E48
          0AD6EEF9857A8C99C5959053EEDFE9
```

```
00000: 16 03 03 01 DF 0B 00 01 DB 00 01 D8 00 01 D5 30
00010: 82 01 D1 30 82 01 7E A0 03 02 01 02 02 08 33 FB
00020: B2 C0 E9 57 5A 46 30 0A 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01
00030: 03 02 30 1F 31 1D 30 1B 06 03 55 04 03 0C 14 74
00040: 65 73 74 5F 73 65 6C 66 73 69 67 6E 65 64 5F 63
00050: 65 72 74 30 1E 17 0D 31 39 30 36 32 37 31 35 32
```



```
00060:  34 30 38 5A 17 0D 32 30 31 32 31 38 31 35 33 34
00070:  30 38 5A 30 1F 31 1D 30 1B 06 03 55 04 03 0C 14
00080:  74 65 73 74 5F 73 65 6C 66 73 69 67 6E 65 64 5F
00090:  63 65 72 74 30 66 30 1F 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01
000A0:  01 01 30 13 06 07 2A 85 03 02 02 23 01 06 08 2A
000B0:  85 03 07 01 01 02 02 03 43 00 04 40 67 81 BF E0
000C0:  60 8C 14 66 73 9B C4 D5 10 BF FA 82 02 07 26 3B
000D0:  29 94 FB 9D FC 5B 65 2E A7 D4 31 65 B8 A5 53 B5
000E0:  77 3E 36 D4 6C C2 66 C2 FF B4 70 82 50 27 E7 26
000F0:  78 6F A6 C4 7F 91 5D DC 71 CC F8 37 A3 81 96 30
00100:  81 93 30 1D 06 03 55 1D 0E 04 16 04 14 E7 D0 0B
00110:  B8 4D 8D 24 18 29 3E 05 C1 7C E7 77 98 D4 8D 30
00120:  16 30 0E 06 03 55 1D 0F 01 01 FF 04 04 03 02 01
00130:  C6 30 12 06 03 55 1D 13 01 01 FF 04 08 30 06 01
00140:  01 FF 02 01 01 30 4E 06 03 55 1D 23 04 47 30 45
00150:  80 14 E7 D0 0B B8 4D 8D 24 18 29 3E 05 C1 7C E7
00160:  77 98 D4 8D 30 16 A1 23 A4 21 30 1F 31 1D 30 1B
00170:  06 03 55 04 03 0C 14 74 65 73 74 5F 73 65 6C 66
00180:  73 69 67 6E 65 64 5F 63 65 72 74 82 08 33 FB B2
00190:  C0 E9 57 5A 46 30 0A 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 03
001A0:  02 03 41 00 E2 88 44 F9 F1 C8 55 E2 DB 5B 19 79
001B0:  79 90 E4 B5 45 2C F8 2F E1 F1 9E E2 37 B7 54 CB
001C0:  CD 50 78 D7 52 A2 80 13 DF FC 82 24 AD 11 4B BD
001D0:  7C 1B B7 1E 48 0A D6 EE F9 85 7A 8C 99 C5 95 90
001E0:  53 EE DF E9
```

-----Server-----

ServerHelloDone message:

```
msg_type:      0E
length:        000000
body:          --
```

```
00000:  0E 00 00 00
```

Record layer message::

```
type:          16
version:
  major:       03
  minor:       03
length:        0004
fragment:      0E000000
```

```
00000:  16 03 03 00 04 0E 00 00 00
```

-----Client-----

PMS:

```
00000:  A5 57 6C E7 92 4A 24 F5 81 13 80 8D BD 9E F8 56
00010:  F5 BD C3 B1 83 CE 5D AD CA 36 A5 3A A0 77 65 1D
```

Random d_eph value:

```
0xA5C77C7482373DE16CE4A6F73CCE7F78
471493FF2C0709B8B706C9E8A25E6C1E
```

Q_eph ephemeral key:

```
x = 0xA8F36D63D262A203978F1B3B6795CDBB
F1AE7FB8EF7F47F1F18871C198E00793
```

```
y = 0x34CA5D6B4485640EA195435993BEB1F8
B016ED610496B5CC175AC2EA1F14F887
```

HASH (r_c | r_s):

```
00000:  C3 EF 04 28 D4 B7 A1 F4 C5 02 5F 2E 65 DD 2B 2E
00010:  A5 83 AE EF DB 67 C7 F4 21 4A 6A 29 8E 99 E3 25
```

Export key generation. r value:

```
0xC3EF0428D4B7A1F4C5025F2E65DD2B2E
```

Export key generation. UKM value:

```
0xC3EF0428D4B7A1F4C5025F2E65DD2B2E
```

seed:

```
00000:  A5 83 AE EF DB 67 C7 F4
```

K_EXP:

```
00000:  1E 58 54 90 E8 65 FF D1 8F 18 D7 C0 A0 4D 0E E8
00010:  4F 1A 5D 79 7C EF AD A0 1B 1E 3B 7F DB 90 E0 29
```

Export keys K_Exp_MAC | K_Exp_ENC used in KExp15 algorithm:

```
00000:  2D 8B A8 C8 4C B2 32 FF 41 F1 0C 3A D9 24 13 42
00010:  23 25 4F 71 E5 69 6D 3D 29 C3 E4 C9 DA A6 B2 93
00020:  84 9E B6 34 0B FF AE 69 28 A3 C3 E4 FF 92 EC CB
00030:  1E 8F 0C F7 A1 88 36 8E 6B 74 8E 52 EA 37 8B 0C
```

IV:

```
00000:  21 4A 6A 29
```

PMSEXP:

```
00000:  D7 F0 F0 42 23 67 86 7B 25 FA 42 33 A9 54 F5 8B
00010:  DE 92 E9 C9 BB FB 88 16 C9 9F 15 E6 39 87 22 A0
00020:  B2 B7 BF E8 49 3E 9A 5C
```

-----Client-----

ClientKeyExchange message:

```
msg_type:      10
length:        000095
body:
  exchange_keys: 3081920428D7F0F0422367867B25FA42
                  33A954F58BDE92E9C9BBFB8816C99F15
                  E6398722A0B2B7BFE8493E9A5C306630
                  . . .
                  EFB87FAEF1BB8D95673B1B8F9703A262
                  D2636DF3A887F8141FEAC25A17CCB596
                  0461ED16B0F8B1BE93594395A10E6485
                  446B5DCA34
```

```
00000:  10 00 00 95 30 81 92 04 28 D7 F0 F0 42 23 67 86
00010:  7B 25 FA 42 33 A9 54 F5 8B DE 92 E9 C9 BB FB 88
00020:  16 C9 9F 15 E6 39 87 22 A0 B2 B7 BF E8 49 3E 9A
00030:  5C 30 66 30 1F 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 01 01 30
00040:  13 06 07 2A 85 03 02 02 23 01 06 08 2A 85 03 07
00050:  01 01 02 02 03 43 00 04 40 93 07 E0 98 C1 71 88
00060:  F1 F1 47 7F EF B8 7F AE F1 BB CD 95 67 3B 1B 8F
00070:  97 03 A2 62 D2 63 6D F3 A8 87 F8 14 1F EA C2 5A
00080:  17 CC B5 96 04 61 ED 16 B0 F8 B1 BE 93 59 43 95
00090:  A1 0E 64 85 44 6B 5D CA 34
```

Record layer message:

```
type:          16
version:
  major:       03
  minor:       03
length:        0099
fragment:      100000953081920428D7F0F042236786
                7B25FA4233A954F58BDE92E9C9BBFB88
                16C99F15E6398722A0B2B7BFE8493E9A
                . . .
                F1F1477FEFB87FAEF1BB8D95673B1B8F
                9703A262D2636DF3A887F8141FEAC25A
                17CCB5960461ED16B0F8B1BE93594395
                A10E6485446B5DCA34
```

```
00000:  16 03 03 00 99 10 00 00 95 30 81 92 04 28 D7 F0
00010:  F0 42 23 67 86 7B 25 FA 42 33 A9 54 F5 8B DE 92
00020:  E9 C9 BB FB 88 16 C9 9F 15 E6 39 87 22 A0 B2 B7
00030:  BF E8 49 3E 9A 5C 30 66 30 1F 06 08 2A 85 03 07
00040:  01 01 01 01 30 13 06 07 2A 85 03 02 02 23 01 06
00050:  08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 02 02 03 43 00 04 40 93 07
00060:  E0 98 C1 71 88 F1 F1 47 7F EF B8 7F AE F1 BB CD
00070:  95 67 3B 1B 8F 97 03 A2 62 D2 63 6D F3 A8 87 F8
00080:  14 1F EA C2 5A 17 CC B5 96 04 61 ED 16 B0 F8 B1
```


00090: BE 93 59 43 95 A1 0E 64 85 44 6B 5D CA 34

-----Server-----

PMSEXP extracted:

00000: D7 F0 F0 42 23 67 86 7B 25 FA 42 33 A9 54 F5 8B

00010: DE 92 E9 C9 BB FB 88 16 C9 9F 15 E6 39 87 22 A0

00020: B2 B7 BF E8 49 3E 9A 5C

HASH(r_c | r_s):

00000: C3 EF 04 28 D4 B7 A1 F4 C5 02 5F 2E 65 DD 2B 2E

00010: A5 83 AE EF DB 67 C7 F4 21 4A 6A 29 8E 99 E3 25

Export key generation. r value:

0xC3EF0428D4B7A1F4C5025F2E65DD2B2E

Export key generation. UKM value:

0xC3EF0428D4B7A1F4C5025F2E65DD2B2E

seed:

00000: A5 83 AE EF DB 67 C7 F4

K_EXP:

00000: 1E 58 54 90 E8 65 FF D1 8F 18 D7 C0 A0 4D 0E E8

00010: 4F 1A 5D 79 7C EF AD A0 1B 1E 3B 7F DB 90 E0 29

Import keys K_Imp_MAC | K_Imp_ENC used in KImp15 algorithm:

00000: 2D 8B A8 C8 4C B2 32 FF 41 F1 0C 3A D9 24 13 42

00010: 23 25 4F 71 E5 69 6D 3D 29 C3 E4 C9 DA A6 B2 93

00020: 84 9E B6 34 0B FF AE 69 28 A3 C3 E4 FF 92 EC CB

00030: 1E 8F 0C F7 A1 88 36 8E 6B 74 8E 52 EA 37 8B 0C

IV:

00000: 21 4A 6A 29

PMS:

00000: A5 57 6C E7 92 4A 24 F5 81 13 80 8D BD 9E F8 56

00010: F5 BD C3 B1 83 CE 5D AD CA 36 A5 3A A0 77 65 1D

-----Client-----

HASH(HM):

00000: 7E 1F 59 D3 64 9D B6 09 00 EA 4F 8A 58 5A 65 7A

00010: 92 77 B3 04 50 58 4C F5 43 51 19 8C DE A3 0C 49

MS:


```
00000:  FD D2 7C B4 04 AD 4E 44 49 68 4F 7C 55 90 E9 E7
00010:  02 EF 41 01 93 3B 52 77 A4 A9 6D F5 00 B0 7C C3
00020:  32 4F D8 A6 D9 07 CB B0 3D F3 FB 33 1F 1C 4D 0C
```

Client connection key material

K_write_MAC|K_read_MAC|K_write_ENC|K_read_ENC|IV_write|IV_read:

```
00000:  DD 4E 10 17 E3 09 1F FD 86 75 65 8A 78 00 90 09
00010:  3B BE 69 EC A6 93 31 5C A8 5B E0 A6 14 3D C9 F8
00020:  1D 64 D0 23 46 5F 8B EA 17 F8 12 F8 C2 D8 BF C0
00030:  D9 BB AB A7 B4 DF D3 A1 7C E0 E1 3B 2D 63 65 F3
00040:  FC 8B 34 59 CF 54 FE 44 9A 04 07 64 53 73 08 00
00050:  75 10 32 55 9D 07 B6 C4 EA C6 75 48 71 BC 97 8A
00060:  B9 0E 2A EE 98 77 14 BB D8 F7 57 AE F7 84 FF 24
00070:  47 B3 94 2E B4 3E 26 35 73 1C 4C 28 22 D0 2D 79
00080:  2B 6A 81 3F 93 ED A6 FA
```

-----Server-----

HASH(HM):

```
00000:  7E 1F 59 D3 64 9D B6 09 00 EA 4F 8A 58 5A 65 7A
00010:  92 77 B3 04 50 58 4C F5 43 51 19 8C DE A3 0C 49
```

MS:

```
00000:  FD D2 7C B4 04 AD 4E 44 49 68 4F 7C 55 90 E9 E7
00010:  02 EF 41 01 93 3B 52 77 A4 A9 6D F5 00 B0 7C C3
00020:  32 4F D8 A6 D9 07 CB B0 3D F3 FB 33 1F 1C 4D 0C
```

Server connection key material

K_read_MAC|K_write_MAC|K_read_ENC|K_write_ENC|IV_read|IV_write:

```
00000:  DD 4E 10 17 E3 09 1F FD 86 75 65 8A 78 00 90 09
00010:  3B BE 69 EC A6 93 31 5C A8 5B E0 A6 14 3D C9 F8
00020:  1D 64 D0 23 46 5F 8B EA 17 F8 12 F8 C2 D8 BF C0
00030:  D9 BB AB A7 B4 DF D3 A1 7C E0 E1 3B 2D 63 65 F3
00040:  FC 8B 34 59 CF 54 FE 44 9A 04 07 64 53 73 08 00
00050:  75 10 32 55 9D 07 B6 C4 EA C6 75 48 71 BC 97 8A
00060:  B9 0E 2A EE 98 77 14 BB D8 F7 57 AE F7 84 FF 24
00070:  47 B3 94 2E B4 3E 26 35 73 1C 4C 28 22 D0 2D 79
00080:  2B 6A 81 3F 93 ED A6 FA
```

-----Client-----

ChangeCipherSpec message:

type: 01

00000: 01

Record layer message:

type: 14
version:
 major: 03
 minor: 03
length: 0001
fragment: 01

00000: 14 03 03 00 01 01

-----Client-----

HASH(HM):

00000: 7E 1F 59 D3 64 9D B6 09 00 EA 4F 8A 58 5A 65 7A
00010: 92 77 B3 04 50 58 4C F5 43 51 19 8C DE A3 0C 49

client_verify_data:

00000: B4 61 C5 AD 25 EA 1E 62 B3 70 BD 1F 1B CB 16 91
00010: FC CC BA 37 8B BC 13 43 BE 54 B3 8D F5 53 B7 A5

-----Client-----

Finished message:

msg_type: 14
length: 000020
body:
 verify_data: B461C5AD25EA1E62B370BD1F1BCB1691
 FCCCB3A378BBC1343BE54B38DF553B7A5

00000: 14 00 00 20 B4 61 C5 AD 25 EA 1E 62 B3 70 BD 1F
00010: 1B CB 16 91 FC CC BA 37 8B BC 13 43 BE 54 B3 8D
00020: F5 53 B7 A5

Record layer message:

type: 16
version:
 major: 03
 minor: 03
length: 002C
fragment: 0C630271D4DA39DD8D6BD040302D9B8F
 33D5F7B967EED155F7D65592892C03C7
 885C249B1225B184AB4D5DBF

00000: 16 03 03 00 2C 0C 63 02 71 D4 DA 39 DD 8D 6B D0
00010: 40 30 2D 9B 8F 33 D5 F7 B9 67 EE D1 55 F7 D6 55
00020: 92 89 2C 03 C7 88 5C 24 9B 12 25 B1 84 AB 4D 5D

00030: BF

-----Server-----

ChangeCipherSpec message:

type: 01

00000: 01

Record layer message:

type: 14

version:

major: 03

minor: 03

length: 0001

fragment: 01

00000: 14 03 03 00 01 01

-----Server-----

HASH(HM):

00000: DB D7 D8 93 82 4A ED FD D5 FB 7B 75 4B 47 E1 E6

00010: AF E0 77 DA E6 D1 13 63 42 07 C7 EE 0F C6 F3 B1

server_verify_data:

00000: 45 39 EC 8D 0A F7 B1 A6 20 41 AB 43 4A 43 77 71

00010: D3 4C 47 19 D8 6E BB FD 0F 28 C3 E9 53 55 0C D0

-----Server-----

Finished message:

msg_type: 14

length: 000020

body:

verify_data: 4539EC8D0AF7B1A62041AB434A437771

D34C4719D86EBBFD0F28C3E953550CD0

00000: 14 00 00 20 45 39 EC 8D 0A F7 B1 A6 20 41 AB 43

00010: 4A 43 77 71 D3 4C 47 19 D8 6E BB FD 0F 28 C3 E9

00020: 53 55 0C D0

Record layer message:

type: 16

version:

major: 03
minor: 03
length: 002C
fragment: E6A94A4BF70886566A2316811E57B483
BB1E47950A1FF820A80DCA77A4DF9954
2DAB6953F3ED03D95CCA4748

00000: 16 03 03 00 2C E6 A9 4A 4B F7 08 86 56 6A 23 16
00010: 81 1E 57 B4 83 BB 1E 47 95 0A 1F F8 20 A8 0D CA
00020: 77 A4 DF 99 54 2D AB 69 53 F3 ED 03 D9 5C CA 47
00030: 48

-----Client-----

Application data:

00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

Record layer message:

type: 17
version:
major: 03
minor: 03
length: 0028
fragment: 38807B6E5E0C3F4F7E0DBF7758031BF0
7F100C4B63ADBC75F49BCBF428572D37
7CAED097336DB203

00000: 17 03 03 00 28 38 80 7B 6E 5E 0C 3F 4F 7E 0D BF
00010: 77 58 03 1B F0 7F 10 0C 4B 63 AD BC 75 F4 9B CB
00020: F4 28 57 2D 37 7C AE D0 97 33 6D B2 03

-----Server-----

Application data:

00000: FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
00010: FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF

Record layer message:

type: 17
version:
major: 03
minor: 03
length: 0028
fragment: 05B869E5C979C3B9D4837B8E39D9BBEE
1BBD0052D3D48340D0CDE082B33BC07F

4E742D1113249AD8

00000: 17 03 03 00 28 05 B8 69 E5 C9 79 C3 B9 D4 83 7B
00010: 8E 39 D9 BB EE 1B BD 00 52 D3 D4 83 40 D0 CD E0
00020: 82 B3 3B C0 7F 4E 74 2D 11 13 24 9A D8

-----Client-----

close_notify alert:

Alert:

level: 01
description: 00

00000: 01 00

Record layer message:

type: 15
version:
major: 03
minor: 03
length: 000A
fragment: 4F2A0807A0374E28C632

00000: 15 03 03 00 0A 4F 2A 08 07 A0 37 4E 28 C6 32

-----Server-----

close_notify alert:

Alert:

level: 01
description: 00

00000: 01 00

Record layer message:

type: 15
version:
major: 03
minor: 03
length: 000A
fragment: 999468B49AC5B0DE512C

00000: 15 03 03 00 0A 99 94 68 B4 9A C5 B0 DE 51 2C

A.1.3.2. TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZYNECHIK_CTR_OMAC ciphersuite

Server certificate curve OID:

id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetC, "1.2.643.7.1.2.1.2.3"

Server public key Q_s:

x = 0xF14589DA479AD972C66563669B3FF580
92E6A30A288BF447CD9FF6C3133E9724
7A9706B267703C9B4E239F0D7C7E3310
C22D2752B35BD2E4FD39B8F11DEB833A

y = 0xF305E95B36502D4E60A1059FB20AB30B
FC7C95727F3A2C04B1DFDDB53B0413F2
99F2DFE66A5E1CCB4101A7A01D612BE6
BD78E1E3B3D567EBB16ABE587A11F4EA

Server private key d_s:

0x12FD7A70067479A0F66C59F9A25534AD
FBC7ABFD3CC72D79806F8B402601644B
3005ED365A2D8989A8CCAE640D5FC08D
D27DFBBFE137CF528E1AC6D445192E01

Client certificate curve OID:

id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-paramSetA, "1.2.643.7.1.2.1.1.1"

Client public key Q_c:

x = 0x0F5DB18A9E15F324B778676025BFD7B5
DF066566EABAA1C51CD879F87B0B4975

y = 0x9EE5BBF18361F842D3F087DEC2943939
E0FA2BFB4EDEC25A8D10ABB22C48F386

Client private key d_c:

0x0918AD3F7D209ABF89F1E8505DA894CE
E10DA09D32E72E815D9C0ADA30B5A103

-----Client-----

ClientHello message:

msg_type:	01
length:	000040
body:	
client_version:	
major:	03
minor:	03


```
random:                933EA21EC3802A561550EC78D6ED51AC
                        2439D7E749C31BC3A3456165889684CA
session_id:
  length:              00
  vector:              --
cipher_suites:
  length:              0004
  vector:
    CipherSuite:       C100
    CipherSuite:       C101
compression_methods:
  length:              01
  vector:
    CompressionMethod: 00
extensions:
  length:              0013
  vector:
    Extension: /* signature_algorithms */
    extension_type:    000D
    extension_data:
      length:          0006
      vector:
        supported_signature_algorithms:
          length:      0004
          vector:
            /* 1 pair of algorithms */
            hash:      08
            signature:
              40
            /* 2 pair of algorithms */
            hash:      08
            signature:
              41
    Extension: /* renegotiation_info */
    extension_type:    FF01
    extension_data:
      length:          0001
      vector:
        renegotiated_connection:
          length:      00
          vector:      --
    Extension: /* extended_master_secret */
    extension_type:    0017
    extension_data:
      length:          0000
      vector:          --
```

```
00000:  01 00 00 40 03 03 93 3E A2 1E C3 80 2A 56 15 50
```



```
00010:  EC 78 D6 ED 51 AC 24 39 D7 E7 49 C3 1B C3 A3 45
00020:  61 65 88 96 84 CA 00 00 04 C1 00 C1 01 01 00 00
00030:  13 00 0D 00 06 00 04 08 40 08 41 FF 01 00 01 00
00040:  00 17 00 00
```

Record layer message:

```
type:          16
version:
  major:       03
  minor:       03
length:        0044
fragment:      010000400303933EA21EC3802A561550
               EC78D6ED51AC2439D7E749C31BC3A345
               6165889684CA000004C100C101010000
               13000D0006000408400841FF01000100
               00170000
```

```
00000:  16 03 03 00 44 01 00 00 40 03 03 93 3E A2 1E C3
00010:  80 2A 56 15 50 EC 78 D6 ED 51 AC 24 39 D7 E7 49
00020:  C3 1B C3 A3 45 61 65 88 96 84 CA 00 00 04 C1 00
00030:  C1 01 01 00 00 13 00 0D 00 06 00 04 08 40 08 41
00040:  FF 01 00 01 00 00 17 00 00
```

-----Server-----

```
msg_type:      02
length:        000041
body:
  server_version:
    major:      03
    minor:      03
  random:       933EA21E49C31BC3A3456165889684CA
               A5576CE7924A24F58113808DBD9EF856
  session_id:
    length:     10
    vector:     C3802A561550EC78D6ED51AC2439D7E7
  cipher_suite:
    CipherSuite: C100
  compression_method:
    CompressionMethod: 00
  extensions:
    length:     0009
    vector:
      Extension: /* renegotiation_info */
      extension_type: FF01
      extension_data:
        length: 0001
```



```
vector:
  renegotiated_connection:
    length: 00
    vector: --
Extension: /* extended_master_secret */
extension_type: 0017
extension_data:
  length: 0000
  vector: --

00000: 02 00 00 41 03 03 93 3E A2 1E 49 C3 1B C3 A3 45
00010: 61 65 88 96 84 CA A5 57 6C E7 92 4A 24 F5 81 13
00020: 80 8D BD 9E F8 56 10 C3 80 2A 56 15 50 EC 78 D6
00030: ED 51 AC 24 39 D7 E7 C1 00 00 00 09 FF 01 00 01
00040: 00 00 17 00 00

Record layer message:
type: 16
version:
  major: 03
  minor: 03
length: 0045
fragment: 020000410303933EA21E49C31BC3A345
          6165889684CAA5576CE7924A24F58113
          808DBD9EF85610C3802A561550EC78D6
          ED51AC2439D7E7C1000000009FF010001
          0000170000

00000: 16 03 03 00 45 02 00 00 41 03 03 93 3E A2 1E 49
00010: C3 1B C3 A3 45 61 65 88 96 84 CA A5 57 6C E7 92
00020: 4A 24 F5 81 13 80 8D BD 9E F8 56 10 C3 80 2A 56
00030: 15 50 EC 78 D6 ED 51 AC 24 39 D7 E7 C1 00 00 00
00040: 09 FF 01 00 01 00 00 17 00 00
```

-----Server-----

```
Certificate message:
msg_type: 0B
length: 00024C
body:
  certificate_list:
    length: 000249
    vector:
      ASN.1Cert:
        length: 000246
        vector: 30820242308201AEA003020102020101
                300A06082A850307010103033042312C
```


302A06092A864886F70D010901161D74

. . .

371AF83C5BC58B366DFEFA7345D50317

867C177AC84AC07EE8612164629AB7BD

C48AA0F64A741FE7298E82C5BFCE8672

029F875391F7

```
00000: 0B 00 02 4C 00 02 49 00 02 46 30 82 02 42 30 82
00010: 01 AE A0 03 02 01 02 02 01 01 30 0A 06 08 2A 85
00020: 03 07 01 01 03 03 30 42 31 2C 30 2A 06 09 2A 86
00030: 48 86 F7 0D 01 09 01 16 1D 74 6C 73 31 32 5F 73
00040: 65 72 76 65 72 35 31 32 43 40 63 72 79 70 74 6F
00050: 70 72 6F 2E 72 75 31 12 30 10 06 03 55 04 03 13
00060: 09 53 65 72 76 65 72 35 31 32 30 1E 17 0D 31 37
00070: 30 35 32 35 30 39 32 35 31 38 5A 17 0D 33 30 30
00080: 35 30 31 30 39 32 35 31 38 5A 30 42 31 2C 30 2A
00090: 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 09 01 16 1D 74 6C 73
000A0: 31 32 5F 73 65 72 76 65 72 35 31 32 43 40 63 72
000B0: 79 70 74 6F 70 72 6F 2E 72 75 31 12 30 10 06 03
000C0: 55 04 03 13 09 53 65 72 76 65 72 35 31 32 30 81
000D0: AA 30 21 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 01 02 30 15 06
000E0: 09 2A 85 03 07 01 02 01 02 03 06 08 2A 85 03 07
000F0: 01 01 02 03 03 81 84 00 04 81 80 3A 83 EB 1D F1
00100: B8 39 FD E4 D2 5B B3 52 27 2D C2 10 33 7E 7C 0D
00110: 9F 23 4E 9B 3C 70 67 B2 06 97 7A 24 97 3E 13 C3
00120: F6 9F CD 47 F4 8B 28 0A A3 E6 92 80 F5 3F 9B 66
00130: 63 65 C6 72 D9 9A 47 DA 89 45 F1 EA F4 11 7A 58
00140: BE 6A B1 EB 67 D5 B3 E3 E1 78 BD E6 2B 61 1D A0
00150: A7 01 41 CB 1C 5E 6A E6 DF F2 99 F2 13 04 3B B5
00160: DD DF B1 04 2C 3A 7F 72 95 7C FC 0B B3 0A B2 9F
00170: 05 A1 60 4E 2D 50 36 5B E9 05 F3 A3 43 30 41 30
00180: 1D 06 03 55 1D 0E 04 16 04 14 87 9C C6 5A 0F 4A
00190: 89 CB 4A 58 49 DF 05 61 56 9B AA DC 11 69 30 0B
001A0: 06 03 55 1D 0F 04 04 03 02 03 28 30 13 06 03 55
001B0: 1D 25 04 0C 30 0A 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 03 01
001C0: 30 0A 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 03 03 03 81 81 00
001D0: 35 BE 38 51 EC B6 E9 2D 32 40 01 81 0F 8C 89 03
001E0: 52 42 F4 05 46 9F 4C 4E CB 05 02 7C 57 E2 71 52
001F0: 12 AF D7 CD BB 0C ED 7A 8B 4D 33 42 CC 50 1A BD
00200: 99 99 75 A5 8A DE 0E 58 4F CA 35 F5 2E 45 58 B7
00210: 31 1D 49 D0 A0 51 32 79 F7 39 37 1A F8 3C 5B C5
00220: 8B 36 6D FE FA 73 45 D5 03 17 86 7C 17 7A C8 4A
00230: C0 7E E8 61 21 64 62 9A B7 BD C4 8A A0 F6 4A 74
00240: 1F E7 29 8E 82 C5 BF CE 86 72 02 9F 87 53 91 F7
```

Record layer message:

type: 16

version:

major: 03
minor: 03
length: 0250
fragment: 0B00024C000249000246308202423082
01AEA003020102020101300A06082A85
0307010103033042312C302A06092A86
.
.
.
8B366DFEFA7345D50317867C177AC84A
C07EE8612164629AB7BDC48AA0F64A74
1FE7298E82C5BFCE8672029F875391F7

00000: 16 03 03 02 50 0B 00 02 4C 00 02 49 00 02 46 30
00010: 82 02 42 30 82 01 AE A0 03 02 01 02 02 01 01 30
00020: 0A 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 03 03 30 42 31 2C 30
00030: 2A 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 09 01 16 1D 74 6C
00040: 73 31 32 5F 73 65 72 76 65 72 35 31 32 43 40 63
00050: 72 79 70 74 6F 70 72 6F 2E 72 75 31 12 30 10 06
00060: 03 55 04 03 13 09 53 65 72 76 65 72 35 31 32 30
00070: 1E 17 0D 31 37 30 35 32 35 30 39 32 35 31 38 5A
00080: 17 0D 33 30 30 35 30 31 30 39 32 35 31 38 5A 30
00090: 42 31 2C 30 2A 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 09 01
000A0: 16 1D 74 6C 73 31 32 5F 73 65 72 76 65 72 35 31
000B0: 32 43 40 63 72 79 70 74 6F 70 72 6F 2E 72 75 31
000C0: 12 30 10 06 03 55 04 03 13 09 53 65 72 76 65 72
000D0: 35 31 32 30 81 AA 30 21 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01
000E0: 01 02 30 15 06 09 2A 85 03 07 01 02 01 02 03 06
000F0: 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 02 03 03 81 84 00 04 81 80
00100: 3A 83 EB 1D F1 B8 39 FD E4 D2 5B B3 52 27 2D C2
00110: 10 33 7E 7C 0D 9F 23 4E 9B 3C 70 67 B2 06 97 7A
00120: 24 97 3E 13 C3 F6 9F CD 47 F4 8B 28 0A A3 E6 92
00130: 80 F5 3F 9B 66 63 65 C6 72 D9 9A 47 DA 89 45 F1
00140: EA F4 11 7A 58 BE 6A B1 EB 67 D5 B3 E3 E1 78 BD
00150: E6 2B 61 1D A0 A7 01 41 CB 1C 5E 6A E6 DF F2 99
00160: F2 13 04 3B B5 DD DF B1 04 2C 3A 7F 72 95 7C FC
00170: 0B B3 0A B2 9F 05 A1 60 4E 2D 50 36 5B E9 05 F3
00180: A3 43 30 41 30 1D 06 03 55 1D 0E 04 16 04 14 87
00190: 9C C6 5A 0F 4A 89 CB 4A 58 49 DF 05 61 56 9B AA
001A0: DC 11 69 30 0B 06 03 55 1D 0F 04 04 03 02 03 28
001B0: 30 13 06 03 55 1D 25 04 0C 30 0A 06 08 2B 06 01
001C0: 05 05 07 03 01 30 0A 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 03
001D0: 03 03 81 81 00 35 BE 38 51 EC B6 E9 2D 32 40 01
001E0: 81 0F 8C 89 03 52 42 F4 05 46 9F 4C 4E CB 05 02
001F0: 7C 57 E2 71 52 12 AF D7 CD BB 0C ED 7A 8B 4D 33
00200: 42 CC 50 1A BD 99 99 75 A5 8A DE 0E 58 4F CA 35
00210: F5 2E 45 58 B7 31 1D 49 D0 A0 51 32 79 F7 39 37
00220: 1A F8 3C 5B C5 8B 36 6D FE FA 73 45 D5 03 17 86
00230: 7C 17 7A C8 4A C0 7E E8 61 21 64 62 9A B7 BD C4
00240: 8A A0 F6 4A 74 1F E7 29 8E 82 C5 BF CE 86 72 02

00250: 9F 87 53 91 F7

-----Server-----

CertificateRequest message:

msg_type: 0D
length: 00000B
body:
 certificate_types:
 length: 02
 vector:
 /* gost_sign256 */
 43
 /* gost_sign512 */
 44
 supported_signature_algorithms:
 length: 0004
 vector:
 /* 1 pair of algorithms */
 hash: 08
 signature: 40
 /* 2 pair of algorithms */
 hash: 08
 signature: 41
 certificate_authorities:
 length: 0000
 vector: --

00000: 0D 00 00 0B 02 43 44 00 04 08 40 08 41 00 00

Record layer message:

type: 16
version:
 major: 03
 minor: 03
length: 000F
fragment: 0D00000B0243440004084008410000

00000: 16 03 03 00 0F 0D 00 00 0B 02 43 44 00 04 08 40
00010: 08 41 00 00

-----Server-----

ServerHelloDone message:

msg_type: 0E
length: 000000

body: --

00000: 0E 00 00 00

Record layer message:

type: 16

version:

major: 03

minor: 03

length: 0004

fragment: 0E000000

00000: 16 03 03 00 04 0E 00 00 00

-----Client-----

Certificate message:

msg_type: 0B

length: 0001EA

body:

certificate_list:

length: 0001E7

vector:

ASN.1Cert:

length: 0001E4

vector: 308201E03082018DA003020102020101

300A06082A850307010103023053312E

302C06092A864886F70D010901161F74

. . .

C1CAB43AC01AFB0F3451BDC2DB188BBC

B77884251CDF6037BA830F4B31D5E96F

DC9BC1C95ABE658266C48402E070DE1F

292724E8

00000: 0B 00 01 EA 00 01 E7 00 01 E4 30 82 01 E0 30 82

00010: 01 8D A0 03 02 01 02 02 01 01 30 0A 06 08 2A 85

00020: 03 07 01 01 03 02 30 53 31 2E 30 2C 06 09 2A 86

00030: 48 86 F7 0D 01 09 01 16 1F 74 6C 73 31 32 5F 63

00040: 6C 69 65 6E 74 32 35 36 41 5F 45 40 63 72 79 70

00050: 74 6F 70 72 6F 2E 72 75 31 21 30 1F 06 03 55 04

00060: 03 1E 18 00 43 00 6C 00 69 00 65 00 6E 00 74 00

00070: 32 00 35 00 36 00 41 00 5F 00 45 30 1E 17 0D 31

00080: 37 30 35 32 35 30 39 33 31 31 38 5A 17 0D 33 30

00090: 30 35 30 31 30 39 33 31 31 38 5A 30 53 31 2E 30

000A0: 2C 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 09 01 16 1F 74 6C

000B0: 73 31 32 5F 63 6C 69 65 6E 74 32 35 36 41 5F 45

000C0: 40 63 72 79 70 74 6F 70 72 6F 2E 72 75 31 21 30


```
000D0:  1F 06 03 55 04 03 1E 18 00 43 00 6C 00 69 00 65
000E0:  00 6E 00 74 00 32 00 35 00 36 00 41 00 5F 00 45
000F0:  30 68 30 21 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 01 01 30 15
00100:  06 09 2A 85 03 07 01 02 01 01 01 06 08 2A 85 03
00110:  07 01 01 02 02 03 43 00 04 40 75 49 0B 7B F8 79
00120:  D8 1C C5 A1 BA EA 66 65 06 DF B5 D7 BF 25 60 67
00130:  78 B7 24 F3 15 9E 8A B1 5D 0F 86 F3 48 2C B2 AB
00140:  10 8D 5A C2 DE 4E FB 2B FA E0 39 39 94 C2 DE 87
00150:  F0 D3 42 F8 61 83 F1 BB E5 9E A3 43 30 41 30 1D
00160:  06 03 55 1D 0E 04 16 04 14 74 49 1E 77 30 D3 42
00170:  A6 28 0E 72 A1 13 9D D9 90 8B FA F1 03 30 0B 06
00180:  03 55 1D 0F 04 04 03 02 07 80 30 13 06 03 55 1D
00190:  25 04 0C 30 0A 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 03 02 30
001A0:  0A 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 03 02 03 41 00 1C 2D
001B0:  35 22 B4 11 02 D6 20 1F 23 50 C1 CA B4 3A C0 1A
001C0:  FB 0F 34 51 BD C2 DB 18 8B BC B7 78 84 25 1C DF
001D0:  60 37 BA 83 0F 4B 31 D5 E9 6F DC 9B C1 C9 5A BE
001E0:  65 82 66 C4 84 02 E0 70 DE 1F 29 27 24 E8
```

Record layer message:

```
type:          16
version:
  major:       03
  minor:       03
length:        01EE
fragment:      0B0001EA0001E70001E4308201E03082
               018DA003020102020101300A06082A85
               0307010103023053312E302C06092A86
               . . .
               3522B41102D6201F2350C1CAB43AC01A
               FB0F3451BDC2DB188BBCB77884251CDF
               6037BA830F4B31D5E96FDC9BC1C95ABE
               658266C48402E070DE1F292724E8
```

```
00000:  16 03 03 01 EE 0B 00 01 EA 00 01 E7 00 01 E4 30
00010:  82 01 E0 30 82 01 8D A0 03 02 01 02 02 01 01 30
00020:  0A 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 03 02 30 53 31 2E 30
00030:  2C 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 09 01 16 1F 74 6C
00040:  73 31 32 5F 63 6C 69 65 6E 74 32 35 36 41 5F 45
00050:  40 63 72 79 70 74 6F 70 72 6F 2E 72 75 31 21 30
00060:  1F 06 03 55 04 03 1E 18 00 43 00 6C 00 69 00 65
00070:  00 6E 00 74 00 32 00 35 00 36 00 41 00 5F 00 45
00080:  30 1E 17 0D 31 37 30 35 32 35 30 39 33 31 31 38
00090:  5A 17 0D 33 30 30 35 30 31 30 39 33 31 31 38 5A
000A0:  30 53 31 2E 30 2C 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 09
000B0:  01 16 1F 74 6C 73 31 32 5F 63 6C 69 65 6E 74 32
000C0:  35 36 41 5F 45 40 63 72 79 70 74 6F 70 72 6F 2E
000D0:  72 75 31 21 30 1F 06 03 55 04 03 1E 18 00 43 00
```



```
000E0:  6C 00 69 00 65 00 6E 00 74 00 32 00 35 00 36 00
000F0:  41 00 5F 00 45 30 68 30 21 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01
00100:  01 01 01 30 15 06 09 2A 85 03 07 01 02 01 01 01
00110:  06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 02 02 03 43 00 04 40 75
00120:  49 0B 7B F8 79 D8 1C C5 A1 BA EA 66 65 06 DF B5
00130:  D7 BF 25 60 67 78 B7 24 F3 15 9E 8A B1 5D 0F 86
00140:  F3 48 2C B2 AB 10 8D 5A C2 DE 4E FB 2B FA E0 39
00150:  39 94 C2 DE 87 F0 D3 42 F8 61 83 F1 BB E5 9E A3
00160:  43 30 41 30 1D 06 03 55 1D 0E 04 16 04 14 74 49
00170:  1E 77 30 D3 42 A6 28 0E 72 A1 13 9D D9 90 8B FA
00180:  F1 03 30 0B 06 03 55 1D 0F 04 04 03 02 07 80 30
00190:  13 06 03 55 1D 25 04 0C 30 0A 06 08 2B 06 01 05
001A0:  05 07 03 02 30 0A 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 03 02
001B0:  03 41 00 1C 2D 35 22 B4 11 02 D6 20 1F 23 50 C1
001C0:  CA B4 3A C0 1A FB 0F 34 51 BD C2 DB 18 8B BC B7
001D0:  78 84 25 1C DF 60 37 BA 83 0F 4B 31 D5 E9 6F DC
001E0:  9B C1 C9 5A BE 65 82 66 C4 84 02 E0 70 DE 1F 29
001F0:  27 24 E8
```

-----Client-----

PMS value:

```
00000:  A5 57 6C E7 92 4A 24 F5 81 13 80 8D BD 9E F8 56
00010:  F5 BD C3 B1 83 CE 5D AD CA 36 A5 3A A0 77 65 1D
```

Random d_eph value:

```
0x150ACD11B66DD695AD18418FA7A2DC63
  6B7E29DCA24536AABC826EE3175BB1FA
  DC3AA0D01D3092E120B0FCF7EB872F4B
  7E26EA17849D689222A48CF95A6E4831
```

Q_eph ephemeral key:

```
x = 0xC941BE5193189B476D5A0334114A3E04
  BBE5B37C738AE40F150B334135288664
  FEBFC5622818894A07B1F7AD60E28480
  B4B637B90EA7D4BA980186B605D75BC6
```

```
y = 0xA154F7B93E8148652011F4FD52C9A06A
  6471ADB28D0A949AE26BC786DE874153
  ABC00B35164F3214A8A83C00ECE27831
  B093528456234EFE766224FC2A7E9ABE
```

HASH (r_c | r_s):

```
00000:  C3 EF 04 28 D4 B7 A1 F4 C5 02 5F 2E 65 DD 2B 2E
00010:  A5 83 AE EF DB 67 C7 F4 21 4A 6A 29 8E 99 E3 25
```

Export key generation. r value:

0xC3EF0428D4B7A1F4C5025F2E65DD2B2E

Export key generation. UKM value:

0xC3EF0428D4B7A1F4C5025F2E65DD2B2E

Export keys K_Exp_MAC | K_Exp_ENC used in KExp15 algorithm:

00000: 7D AC 56 E4 8A 4D C1 70 FA A8 FC BA E2 0D B8 45
00010: 45 0C CC C4 C6 32 8B DC 8D 01 15 7C EF A2 A5 F1
00020: 1F 1C BA D8 86 61 66 F0 1F FA AB 01 52 E2 4B F4
00030: 60 9D 5F 46 A5 C8 99 C7 87 90 0D 08 B9 FC AD 24

IV:

00000: 21 4A 6A 29 8E 99 E3 25

PMSEXP:

00000: 25 0D 1B 67 A2 70 AB 04 D3 F6 54 18 E1 D3 80 B4
00010: CB 94 5F 0A 3D CA 51 50 0C F3 A1 BE F3 7F 76 C0
00020: 73 41 A9 83 9C CF 6C BA 71 89 DA 61 EB 67 17 6C

-----Client-----

ClientKeyExchange message:

msg_type: 10

length: 0000E2

body:

exchange_keys: 3081DF0430250D1B67A270AB04D3F654
18E1D380B4CB945F0A3DCA51500CF3A1
BEF37F76C07341A9839CCF6CBA7189DA
. . .
93B03178E2EC003CA8A814324F16350B
C0AB534187DE86C76BE29A940A8DB2AD
71646AA0C952FDF411206548813EB9F7
54A1

00000: 10 00 00 E2 30 81 DF 04 30 25 0D 1B 67 A2 70 AB
00010: 04 D3 F6 54 18 E1 D3 80 B4 CB 94 5F 0A 3D CA 51
00020: 50 0C F3 A1 BE F3 7F 76 C0 73 41 A9 83 9C CF 6C
00030: BA 71 89 DA 61 EB 67 17 6C 30 81 AA 30 21 06 08
00040: 2A 85 03 07 01 01 01 02 30 15 06 09 2A 85 03 07
00050: 01 02 01 02 03 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 02 03 03
00060: 81 84 00 04 81 80 C6 5B D7 05 B6 86 01 98 BA D4
00070: A7 0E B9 37 B6 B4 80 84 E2 60 AD F7 B1 07 4A 89
00080: 18 28 62 C5 BF FE 64 86 28 35 41 33 0B 15 0F E4
00090: 8A 73 7C B3 E5 BB 04 3E 4A 11 34 03 5A 6D 47 9B
000A0: 18 93 51 BE 41 C9 BE 9A 7E 2A FC 24 62 76 FE 4E
000B0: 23 56 84 52 93 B0 31 78 E2 EC 00 3C A8 A8 14 32
000C0: 4F 16 35 0B C0 AB 53 41 87 DE 86 C7 6B E2 9A 94


```
000D0:  0A 8D B2 AD 71 64 6A A0 C9 52 FD F4 11 20 65 48
000E0:  81 3E B9 F7 54 A1
```

Record layer message:

```
type:          16
version:
  major:       03
  minor:       03
length:        00E6
fragment:      100000E23081DF0430250D1B67A270AB
                04D3F65418E1D380B4CB945F0A3DCA51
                500CF3A1BEF37F76C07341A9839CCF6C
                . . .
                2356845293B03178E2EC003CA8A81432
                4F16350BC0AB534187DE86C76BE29A94
                0A8DB2AD71646AA0C952FDF411206548
                813EB9F754A1
```

```
00000:  16 03 03 00 E6 10 00 00 E2 30 81 DF 04 30 25 0D
00010:  1B 67 A2 70 AB 04 D3 F6 54 18 E1 D3 80 B4 CB 94
00020:  5F 0A 3D CA 51 50 0C F3 A1 BE F3 7F 76 C0 73 41
00030:  A9 83 9C CF 6C BA 71 89 DA 61 EB 67 17 6C 30 81
00040:  AA 30 21 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 01 02 30 15 06
00050:  09 2A 85 03 07 01 02 01 02 03 06 08 2A 85 03 07
00060:  01 01 02 03 03 81 84 00 04 81 80 C6 5B D7 05 B6
00070:  86 01 98 BA D4 A7 0E B9 37 B6 B4 80 84 E2 60 AD
00080:  F7 B1 07 4A 89 18 28 62 C5 BF FE 64 86 28 35 41
00090:  33 0B 15 0F E4 8A 73 7C B3 E5 BB 04 3E 4A 11 34
000A0:  03 5A 6D 47 9B 18 93 51 BE 41 C9 BE 9A 7E 2A FC
000B0:  24 62 76 FE 4E 23 56 84 52 93 B0 31 78 E2 EC 00
000C0:  3C A8 A8 14 32 4F 16 35 0B C0 AB 53 41 87 DE 86
000D0:  C7 6B E2 9A 94 0A 8D B2 AD 71 64 6A A0 C9 52 FD
000E0:  F4 11 20 65 48 81 3E B9 F7 54 A1
```

-----Server-----

PMSEXP extracted:

```
00000:  25 0D 1B 67 A2 70 AB 04 D3 F6 54 18 E1 D3 80 B4
00010:  CB 94 5F 0A 3D CA 51 50 0C F3 A1 BE F3 7F 76 C0
00020:  73 41 A9 83 9C CF 6C BA 71 89 DA 61 EB 67 17 6C
```

HASH(r_c | r_s):

```
00000:  C3 EF 04 28 D4 B7 A1 F4 C5 02 5F 2E 65 DD 2B 2E
00010:  A5 83 AE EF DB 67 C7 F4 21 4A 6A 29 8E 99 E3 25
```

Export key generation. r value:

0xC3EF0428D4B7A1F4C5025F2E65DD2B2E

Export key generation. UKM value:

0xC3EF0428D4B7A1F4C5025F2E65DD2B2E

Export keys K_Exp_MAC | K_Exp_ENC used in KImp15 algorithm:

00000: 7D AC 56 E4 8A 4D C1 70 FA A8 FC BA E2 0D B8 45
00010: 45 0C CC C4 C6 32 8B DC 8D 01 15 7C EF A2 A5 F1
00020: 1F 1C BA D8 86 61 66 F0 1F FA AB 01 52 E2 4B F4
00030: 60 9D 5F 46 A5 C8 99 C7 87 90 0D 08 B9 FC AD 24

IV:

00000: 21 4A 6A 29 8E 99 E3 25

PMS:

00000: A5 57 6C E7 92 4A 24 F5 81 13 80 8D BD 9E F8 56
00010: F5 BD C3 B1 83 CE 5D AD CA 36 A5 3A A0 77 65 1D

-----Client-----

Random value k used in signature generation:

0x163962EEA268203E7C6B3F70BF8D4A36
34CE6E2CFC424687951D70ACE0B4292A

Signature value sgn_c = SIGN_d_c(HM):

00000: F7 1F 43 62 45 5B C5 5B A8 9A 8F AF 01 82 88 EC
00010: 00 B3 27 17 48 2E 76 24 B2 57 D9 79 7C 8F F6 02
00020: E3 15 FD BD 8D E5 6D 08 54 18 04 0E 1B 61 BB F6
00030: B3 01 AC 26 3D 50 03 8B 30 31 13 DB 36 17 50 3A

-----Client-----

CertificateVerify message:

msg_type: 0F
length: 000044
body:
 algorithm:
 hash: 08
 signature: 40
 signature:
 length: 0040
 vector: F71F4362455BC55BA89A8FAF018288EC
 00B32717482E7624B257D9797C8FF602
 E315FDBD8DE56D085418040E1B61BBF6
 B301AC263D50038B303113DB3617503A


```
00000:  0F 00 00 44 08 40 00 40 F7 1F 43 62 45 5B C5 5B
00010:  A8 9A 8F AF 01 82 88 EC 00 B3 27 17 48 2E 76 24
00020:  B2 57 D9 79 7C 8F F6 02 E3 15 FD BD 8D E5 6D 08
00030:  54 18 04 0E 1B 61 BB F6 B3 01 AC 26 3D 50 03 8B
00040:  30 31 13 DB 36 17 50 3A
```

Record layer message:

```
type:          16
version:
  major:       03
  minor:       03
length:        0048
fragment:      0F00004408400040F71F4362455BC55B
               A89A8FAF018288EC00B32717482E7624
               B257D9797C8FF602E315FDBD8DE56D08
               5418040E1B61BBF6B301AC263D50038B
               303113DB3617503A
```

```
00000:  16 03 03 00 48 0F 00 00 44 08 40 00 40 F7 1F 43
00010:  62 45 5B C5 5B A8 9A 8F AF 01 82 88 EC 00 B3 27
00020:  17 48 2E 76 24 B2 57 D9 79 7C 8F F6 02 E3 15 FD
00030:  BD 8D E5 6D 08 54 18 04 0E 1B 61 BB F6 B3 01 AC
00040:  26 3D 50 03 8B 30 31 13 DB 36 17 50 3A
```

-----Client-----

HASH(HM):

```
00000:  9D 64 0D D8 B2 54 6B 87 05 CC 3E 67 F3 BB 83 2F
00010:  89 2A 5B D5 D4 5C A0 44 85 01 14 C2 E6 56 02 69
```

MS:

```
00000:  E3 18 17 B0 EC 7F 3B C9 4A 8B C4 5F 89 12 DE C5
00010:  71 2A 7A 34 78 56 31 C0 4B AE 81 43 EE 17 90 B4
00020:  C9 D3 68 0F 6C 9D E1 70 74 58 C8 75 62 4D B6 ED
```

Client connection key material

K_write_MAC|K_read_MAC|K_write_ENC|K_read_ENC|IV_write|IV_read:

```
00000:  50 52 5D 33 4E F7 00 6C 1D ED B8 B8 08 EA 03 CC
00010:  CF 1F CB 3D 33 65 F9 72 E1 7C 7C 31 4E DD 97 90
00020:  6C 74 35 22 0A A1 B0 C6 DE 6A 1B 0F AC 29 B6 17
00030:  9E B3 23 86 62 25 E0 7F 30 4C A1 D1 27 75 86 29
00040:  7B 97 20 5D 7A 08 C2 CD 7F 60 3C 09 46 75 E6 C4
00050:  CC 15 F2 84 0D 9A EC 63 F0 2A FF 51 DB D5 74 D2
00060:  76 6C 77 2B 83 2F CE 58 CB 4D E5 49 88 77 A6 7A
00070:  A4 51 40 B2 ED 52 6E 61 65 0A 28 1B 32 56 35 BC
00080:  CB 8E F9 4C 5B DF 5B 9F 47 48 B9 5B F1 B0 E0 BF
```


-----Server-----

HASH(HM):

00000: 9D 64 0D D8 B2 54 6B 87 05 CC 3E 67 F3 BB 83 2F
00010: 89 2A 5B D5 D4 5C A0 44 85 01 14 C2 E6 56 02 69

MS:

00000: E3 18 17 B0 EC 7F 3B C9 4A 8B C4 5F 89 12 DE C5
00010: 71 2A 7A 34 78 56 31 C0 4B AE 81 43 EE 17 90 B4
00020: C9 D3 68 0F 6C 9D E1 70 74 58 C8 75 62 4D B6 ED

Server connection key material

K_read_MAC|K_write_MAC|K_read_ENC|K_write_ENC|IV_read|IV_write:

00000: 50 52 5D 33 4E F7 00 6C 1D ED B8 B8 08 EA 03 CC
00010: CF 1F CB 3D 33 65 F9 72 E1 7C 7C 31 4E DD 97 90
00020: 6C 74 35 22 0A A1 B0 C6 DE 6A 1B 0F AC 29 B6 17
00030: 9E B3 23 86 62 25 E0 7F 30 4C A1 D1 27 75 86 29
00040: 7B 97 20 5D 7A 08 C2 CD 7F 60 3C 09 46 75 E6 C4
00050: CC 15 F2 84 0D 9A EC 63 F0 2A FF 51 DB D5 74 D2
00060: 76 6C 77 2B 83 2F CE 58 CB 4D E5 49 88 77 A6 7A
00070: A4 51 40 B2 ED 52 6E 61 65 0A 28 1B 32 56 35 BC
00080: CB 8E F9 4C 5B DF 5B 9F 47 48 B9 5B F1 B0 E0 BF

-----Client-----

ChangeCipherSpec message:

type: 01

00000: 01

Record layer message:

type: 14

version:

major: 03

minor: 03

length: 0001

fragment: 01

00000: 14 03 03 00 01 01

-----Client-----

HASH(HM):

00000: 9D 64 0D D8 B2 54 6B 87 05 CC 3E 67 F3 BB 83 2F
00010: 89 2A 5B D5 D4 5C A0 44 85 01 14 C2 E6 56 02 69

client_verify_data:

00000: 62 DA B6 48 52 0C 44 96 2D 1E 60 29 70 57 FA E1
00010: F3 01 E0 8A 68 A2 36 CA F0 EE 2A 2C 81 1B 14 EC

-----Client-----

Finished message:

msg_type: 14
length: 000020
body:
verify_data: 62DAB648520C44962D1E60297057FAE1
F301E08A68A236CAF0EE2A2C811B14EC

00000: 14 00 00 20 62 DA B6 48 52 0C 44 96 2D 1E 60 29
00010: 70 57 FA E1 F3 01 E0 8A 68 A2 36 CA F0 EE 2A 2C
00020: 81 1B 14 EC

Record layer message:

type: 16
version:
major: 03
minor: 03
length: 0034
fragment: 4DC53D65A479742A92EC2D98E3287F22
4C0382DCCE405A32BF671EB5AEB09611
CA72AE8AE792116CEB1B77A9E135783D
A0709535

00000: 16 03 03 00 34 4D C5 3D 65 A4 79 74 2A 92 EC 2D
00010: 98 E3 28 7F 22 4C 03 82 DC CE 40 5A 32 BF 67 1E
00020: B5 AE B0 96 11 CA 72 AE 8A E7 92 11 6C EB 1B 77
00030: A9 E1 35 78 3D A0 70 95 35

-----Server-----

ChangeCipherSpec message:

type: 01

00000: 01

Record layer message:

type: 14
version:
major: 03
minor: 03
length: 0001

fragment: 01

00000: 14 03 03 00 01 01

-----Server-----

HASH(HM):

00000: C1 62 4B ED F2 83 75 1A 28 9B 90 9E 3E C5 00 14

00010: 2B 7E 7B 76 46 CD 37 68 15 3B 87 D9 C5 F6 AA 07

server_verify_data:

00000: B3 38 7A B1 8B 9E F0 74 8A B7 14 B0 10 DC B5 27

00010: 75 02 EF AF 7D 70 A6 1D 70 11 4E 9C 06 C5 D7 52

-----Server-----

Finished message:

msg_type: 14

length: 000020

body:

verify_data: B3387AB18B9EF0748AB714B010DCB527
7502EFAF7D70A61D70114E9C06C5D752

00000: 14 00 00 20 B3 38 7A B1 8B 9E F0 74 8A B7 14 B0

00010: 10 DC B5 27 75 02 EF AF 7D 70 A6 1D 70 11 4E 9C

00020: 06 C5 D7 52

Record layer message:

type: 16

version:

major: 03

minor: 03

length: 0034

fragment: F9887C36F91DCBD3520D944F249AA466
F9D55CA04EB61DB418529BB58889FB82
74F05644ABA588B8F248C31C511E4C1E
229F9EA6

00000: 16 03 03 00 34 F9 88 7C 36 F9 1D CB D3 52 0D 94

00010: 4F 24 9A A4 66 F9 D5 5C A0 4E B6 1D B4 18 52 9B

00020: B5 88 89 FB 82 74 F0 56 44 AB A5 88 B8 F2 48 C3

00030: 1C 51 1E 4C 1E 22 9F 9E A6

-----Client-----

Application data:

```
00000:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00010:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
```

Record layer message:

```
type:          17
version:
  major:       03
  minor:       03
length:        0030
fragment:      F14F06FB8557408846080690E7A5525D
                1C6E9C901D24025486AB79728BF63D06
                5C09C27233006D65CFF0B5BA87504969
```

```
00000:  17 03 03 00 30 F1 4F 06 FB 85 57 40 88 46 08 06
00010:  90 E7 A5 52 5D 1C 6E 9C 90 1D 24 02 54 86 AB 79
00020:  72 8B F6 3D 06 5C 09 C2 72 33 00 6D 65 CF F0 B5
00030:  BA 87 50 49 69
```

-----Server-----

Application data:

```
00000:  FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
00010:  FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
```

Record layer message:

```
type:          17
version:
  major:       03
  minor:       03
length:        0030
fragment:      1561E52A8B6DB258746FFE18F3CDCB11
                1D0173AF2E5C13741C99BFF13B47CD32
                B3CED856A9506E706A2340D5841AB114
```

```
00000:  17 03 03 00 30 15 61 E5 2A 8B 6D B2 58 74 6F FE
00010:  18 F3 CD CB 11 1D 01 73 AF 2E 5C 13 74 1C 99 BF
00020:  F1 3B 47 CD 32 B3 CE D8 56 A9 50 6E 70 6A 23 40
00030:  D5 84 1A B1 14
```

-----Client-----

close_notify alert:

```
Alert:
  level:        01
  description:   00
```


00000: 01 00

Record layer message:

type: 15
version:
 major: 03
 minor: 03
length: 0012
fragment: E530C164642A078CEF528CB465E9DA7E
 AD4D

00000: 15 03 03 00 12 E5 30 C1 64 64 2A 07 8C EF 52 8C

00010: B4 65 E9 DA 7E AD 4D

-----Server-----

close_notify alert:

Alert:
 level: 01
 description: 00

00000: 01 00

Record layer message:

type: 15
version:
 major: 03
 minor: 03
length: 0012
fragment: EB62E5AB78BF2A4B678920A11027EC43
 0C3F

00000: 15 03 03 00 12 EB 62 E5 AB 78 BF 2A 4B 67 89 20

00010: A1 10 27 EC 43 0C 3F

[A.2.](#) Test Examples for CNT_IMIT cipher suites

[A.2.1.](#) Record Examples

It is assumed that during Handshake following keys were established:

- MAC key:

00000: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff

00010: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff

- Encryption key:


```
00000:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00010:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
- IV:
00000:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
```

seqnum = 0

Application data:

```
00000:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
```

Plaintext:

```
00000:  17 03 03 00 07 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
```

MAC:

```
00000:  30 01 34 a1
```

Ciphertext:

```
00000:  17 03 03 00 0b 86 71 cd bf 3c 1a ae 0f 62 4b 04
```

seqnum = 1

Application data:

```
00000:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00010:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
....
007f0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
```

Plaintext:

```
00000:  17 03 03 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00010:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
....
007f0:  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00804:  00 00 00 00 00
```

MAC:

```
00000:  f7 c3 8b 8a
```

Ciphertext:

```
00000:  17 03 03 08 04 cf aa 0c b4 2f a5 a4 7a 13 3d 73
00010:  b9 f2 c0 b0 4f 8c a2 55 52 f8 56 bc be 6a 58 fa
....
007f0:  3e e2 c7 6f a2 30 a0 44 be 21 dc 8e 1a 96 f9 a8
00804:  88 1f ad 83 45 96 96 84 47
```


[A.2.2.](#) Handshake Examples

Server certificate curve OID:

id-tc26-gost-3410-12-512-paramSetA, "1.2.643.7.1.2.1.2.1"

Server public key Q_s:

x = 0x16DB0566C0278AC8204143994824236D
97F36A13D5433E990B2EAC859D2E9B7A
E054794655389158B8242923E3841B14
24FD89F221701C89D9A3BF6A9F946795

y = 0xD01E80DEC5BD23C8BC6B85F12BBB1635
A5AE7AD50DE24FB8FD02CB285A4AE65A
7D6FBB99AAFFDA80629826F2F7F73282
220444761615A06D082077C4A00FD4CF

Server private key d_s:

0x5F1E83AFA2C4CB2C5633C51380E84E37
4B013EE7C238330709080CE914B442D4
34EB016D23FB63FEDC18B62D9DA93D26
B3B9CE6F663B383303BD5930ED41608B

-----Client-----

ClientHello message:

msg_type: 01
length: 00003a
body:
 client_version:
 major: 03
 minor: 03
 random: 6A523D6880DCC2DC75CCC43CFD04B616
 F5C3757B8077B76A9B504949FD3BFDB8
 session_id:
 length: 00
 vector: --
 cipher_suites:
 length: 0002
 vector:
 CipherSuite: C102
 compression_methods:
 length: 01
 vector:
 CompressionMethod: 00
 extensions:
 length: 000F


```

Extension: /* signature_algorithms */
extension_type: 000D
extension_data:
  length: 0006
  vector:
    supported_signature_algorithms:
      length: 0004
      vector:
        /* 1 pair of algorithms */
        hash: 08
        signature:
          41
        /* 2 pair of algorithms */
        hash: 08
        signature:
          40
Extension: /* renegotiation_info */
extension_type: FF01
extension_data:
  length: 0001
  vector:
    renegotiated_connection:
      length: 00
      vector: --

```

```

00000: 01 00 00 3A 03 03 6A 52 3D 68 80 DC C2 DC 75 CC
00010: C4 3C FD 04 B6 16 F5 C3 75 7B 80 77 B7 6A 9B 50
00020: 49 49 FD 3B FD B8 00 00 02 C1 02 01 00 00 0F 00
00030: 0D 00 06 00 04 08 41 08 40 FF 01 00 01 00

```

Record layer message:

```

type: 16
version:
  major: 03
  minor: 03
length: 003e
fragment: 0100003A03036A523D6880DCC2DC75CC
          C43CFD04B616F5C3757B8077B76A9B50
          4949FD3BFDB8000002C1020100000F00
          0D0006000408410840FF01000100

```

```

00000: 16 03 03 00 3E 01 00 00 3A 03 03 6A 52 3D 68 80
00010: DC C2 DC 75 CC C4 3C FD 04 B6 16 F5 C3 75 7B 80
00020: 77 B7 6A 9B 50 49 49 FD 3B FD B8 00 00 02 C1 02
00030: 01 00 00 0F 00 0D 00 06 00 04 08 41 08 40 FF 01
00040: 00 01 00

```


-----Server-----

ServerHello message:

msg_type: 02
length: 00004D
body:
 client_version:
 major: 03
 minor: 03
 random: FE92C9516D0E1A67A04C33CD7F2C90B1
 5E76DCC30815C19F92A6D100915AF2DB
 session_id:
 length: 20
 vector: 12AAA5E5779014711CCD6D265BDEE519
 1026431C83768EE5EB5A157F940BE9FB
 cipher_suite:
 CipherSuite: C102
 compression_method:
 CompressionMethod: 00
 extensions:
 length: 0005
 Extension: /* renegotiation_info */
 extension_type: FF01
 extension_data:
 length: 0001
 vector:
 renegotiated_connection:
 length: 00
 vector: --

00000: 02 00 00 4D 03 03 FE 92 C9 51 6D 0E 1A 67 A0 4C
00010: 33 CD 7F 2C 90 B1 5E 76 DC C3 08 15 C1 9F 92 A6
00020: D1 00 91 5A F2 DB 20 12 AA A5 E5 77 90 14 71 1C
00030: CD 6D 26 5B DE E5 19 10 26 43 1C 83 76 8E E5 EB
00040: 5A 15 7F 94 0B E9 FB C1 02 00 00 05 FF 01 00 01
00050: 00

Record layer message:

type: 16
version:
 major: 03
 minor: 03
length: 0051
fragment: 02000004D0303FE92C9516D0E1A67A04C
 33CD7F2C90B15E76DCC30815C19F92A6
 D100915AF2DB2012AAA5E5779014711C
 CD6D265BDEE5191026431C83768EE5EB
 5A157F940BE9FBC102000005FF010001

00

```
00000:  16 03 03 00 51 02 00 00 4D 03 03 FE 92 C9 51 6D
00010:  0E 1A 67 A0 4C 33 CD 7F 2C 90 B1 5E 76 DC C3 08
00020:  15 C1 9F 92 A6 D1 00 91 5A F2 DB 20 12 AA A5 E5
00030:  77 90 14 71 1C CD 6D 26 5B DE E5 19 10 26 43 1C
00040:  83 76 8E E5 EB 5A 15 7F 94 0B E9 FB C1 02 00 00
00050:  05 FF 01 00 01 00
```

-----Server-----

Certificate message:

```
msg_type:      0B
length:        000266
body:
  certificate_list:
    length:      000263
    vector:
      ASN.1Cert:
        length:   000260
        vector:   3082025C308201C8A003020102021478
                  94DC9D920977809191642F1DAEDC26BA
                  3B5104300A06082A8503070101030330
                  . . .
                  6C12D51F99C98A4A9904F0EA5486FED7
                  FF66AB8EB2425E1ACEAE8A758BDF843B
                  E1A8F6FEBF673015FED7AB86533DBF20
```

```
00000:  0B 00 02 66 00 02 63 00 02 60 30 82 02 5C 30 82
00010:  01 C8 A0 03 02 01 02 02 14 78 94 DC 9D 92 09 77
00020:  80 91 91 64 2F 1D AE DC 26 BA 3B 51 04 30 0A 06
00030:  08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 03 03 30 19 31 17 30 15 06
00040:  03 55 04 03 13 0E 43 41 20 43 65 72 74 69 66 69
00050:  63 61 74 65 30 1E 17 0D 31 38 30 31 30 32 30 30
00060:  30 30 31 31 5A 17 0D 32 32 30 31 30 32 30 30 30
00070:  30 32 31 5A 30 21 31 1F 30 1D 06 03 55 04 03 13
00080:  16 53 65 72 76 65 72 20 35 31 32 20 43 65 72 74
00090:  69 66 69 63 61 74 65 30 81 AA 30 21 06 08 2A 85
000a0:  03 07 01 01 01 02 30 15 06 09 2A 85 03 07 01 02
000b0:  01 02 01 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 02 03 03 81 84
000c0:  00 04 81 80 95 67 94 9F 6A BF A3 D9 89 1C 70 21
000d0:  F2 89 FD 24 14 1B 84 E3 23 29 24 B8 58 91 38 55
000e0:  46 79 54 E0 7A 9B 2E 9D 85 AC 2E 0B 99 3E 43 D5
000f0:  13 6A F3 97 6D 23 24 48 99 43 41 20 C8 8A 27 C0
00100:  66 05 DB 16 CF D4 0F A0 C4 77 20 08 6D A0 15 16
00110:  76 44 04 22 82 32 F7 F7 F2 26 98 62 80 DA FF AA
00120:  99 BB 6F 7D 5A E6 4A 5A 28 CB 02 FD B8 4F E2 0D
```



```
00130:  D5 7A AE A5 35 16 BB 2B F1 85 6B BC C8 23 BD C5
00140:  DE 80 1E D0 A3 81 93 30 81 90 30 0C 06 03 55 1D
00150:  13 01 01 FF 04 02 30 00 30 1A 06 03 55 1D 11 04
00160:  13 30 11 82 09 6C 6F 63 61 6C 68 6F 73 74 87 04
00170:  7F 00 00 01 30 13 06 03 55 1D 25 04 0C 30 0A 06
00180:  08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 03 01 30 0F 06 03 55 1D 0F
00190:  01 01 FF 04 05 03 03 07 B0 00 30 1D 06 03 55 1D
001a0:  0E 04 16 04 14 AE 46 41 1B FD B3 08 C3 39 03 47
001b0:  57 57 2B 0F BF A3 6F 9A 99 30 1F 06 03 55 1D 23
001c0:  04 18 30 16 80 14 7F 7B 7A 15 61 A6 F2 18 A2 E3
001d0:  48 3B C6 39 D9 7F 42 DB 6D AF 30 0A 06 08 2A 85
001e0:  03 07 01 01 03 03 03 81 81 00 9C 49 78 F7 1B AB
001f0:  54 8A 25 6D 2A 18 7C A8 4D 72 4F E1 EF A7 E5 36
00200:  67 2E 79 1F 8A 0C B6 74 1E B1 63 E2 96 37 8C 5B
00210:  82 83 EE DA B4 1B A4 22 1E BC E2 05 F6 F8 79 CF
00220:  EB F0 AD E9 36 07 0F B2 40 E5 0D 04 37 03 7F 2A
00230:  EC 99 C7 CD 23 9F 6F 20 25 A8 6C 12 D5 1F 99 C9
00240:  8A 4A 99 04 F0 EA 54 86 FE D7 FF 66 AB 8E B2 42
00250:  5E 1A CE AE 8A 75 8B DF 84 3B E1 A8 F6 FE BF 67
00260:  30 15 FE D7 AB 86 53 3D BF 20
```

Record layer message:

```
type:          16
version:
  major:       03
  minor:       03
length:        026A
fragment:      0B0002660002630002603082025C3082
               01C8A00302010202147894DC9D920977
               809191642F1DAEDC26BA3B5104300A06
               . . .
               EC99C7CD239F6F2025A86C12D51F99C9
               8A4A9904F0EA5486FED7FF66AB8EB242
               5E1ACEAE8A758BDF843BE1A8F6FEBF67
               3015FED7AB86533DBF20
```

```
00000:  16 03 03 02 6A 0B 00 02 66 00 02 63 00 02 60 30
00010:  82 02 5C 30 82 01 C8 A0 03 02 01 02 02 14 78 94
00020:  DC 9D 92 09 77 80 91 91 64 2F 1D AE DC 26 BA 3B
00030:  51 04 30 0A 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 03 03 30 19
00040:  31 17 30 15 06 03 55 04 03 13 0E 43 41 20 43 65
00050:  72 74 69 66 69 63 61 74 65 30 1E 17 0D 31 38 30
00060:  31 30 32 30 30 30 30 31 31 5A 17 0D 32 32 30 31
00070:  30 32 30 30 30 30 32 31 5A 30 21 31 1F 30 1D 06
00080:  03 55 04 03 13 16 53 65 72 76 65 72 20 35 31 32
00090:  20 43 65 72 74 69 66 69 63 61 74 65 30 81 AA 30
000a0:  21 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 01 02 30 15 06 09 2A
000b0:  85 03 07 01 02 01 02 01 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01
```



```
000c0: 02 03 03 81 84 00 04 81 80 95 67 94 9F 6A BF A3
000d0: D9 89 1C 70 21 F2 89 FD 24 14 1B 84 E3 23 29 24
000e0: B8 58 91 38 55 46 79 54 E0 7A 9B 2E 9D 85 AC 2E
000f0: 0B 99 3E 43 D5 13 6A F3 97 6D 23 24 48 99 43 41
00100: 20 C8 8A 27 C0 66 05 DB 16 CF D4 0F A0 C4 77 20
00110: 08 6D A0 15 16 76 44 04 22 82 32 F7 F7 F2 26 98
00120: 62 80 DA FF AA 99 BB 6F 7D 5A E6 4A 5A 28 CB 02
00130: FD B8 4F E2 0D D5 7A AE A5 35 16 BB 2B F1 85 6B
00140: BC C8 23 BD C5 DE 80 1E D0 A3 81 93 30 81 90 30
00150: 0C 06 03 55 1D 13 01 01 FF 04 02 30 00 30 1A 06
00160: 03 55 1D 11 04 13 30 11 82 09 6C 6F 63 61 6C 68
00170: 6F 73 74 87 04 7F 00 00 01 30 13 06 03 55 1D 25
00180: 04 0C 30 0A 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 03 01 30 0F
00190: 06 03 55 1D 0F 01 01 FF 04 05 03 03 07 B0 00 30
001a0: 1D 06 03 55 1D 0E 04 16 04 14 AE 46 41 1B FD B3
001b0: 08 C3 39 03 47 57 57 2B 0F BF A3 6F 9A 99 30 1F
001c0: 06 03 55 1D 23 04 18 30 16 80 14 7F 7B 7A 15 61
001d0: A6 F2 18 A2 E3 48 3B C6 39 D9 7F 42 DB 6D AF 30
001e0: 0A 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 03 03 03 81 81 00 9C
001f0: 49 78 F7 1B AB 54 8A 25 6D 2A 18 7C A8 4D 72 4F
00200: E1 EF A7 E5 36 67 2E 79 1F 8A 0C B6 74 1E B1 63
00210: E2 96 37 8C 5B 82 83 EE DA B4 1B A4 22 1E BC E2
00220: 05 F6 F8 79 CF EB F0 AD E9 36 07 0F B2 40 E5 0D
00230: 04 37 03 7F 2A EC 99 C7 CD 23 9F 6F 20 25 A8 6C
00240: 12 D5 1F 99 C9 8A 4A 99 04 F0 EA 54 86 FE D7 FF
00250: 66 AB 8E B2 42 5E 1A CE AE 8A 75 8B DF 84 3B E1
00260: A8 F6 FE BF 67 30 15 FE D7 AB 86 53 3D BF 20
```

-----Server-----

ServerHelloDone message:

```
msg_type:      0E
length:        000000
body:          --
```

```
00000:  0E 00 00 00
```

Record layer message::

```
type:          16
version:
  major:        03
  minor:        03
length:        0004
fragment:      0E000000
```

```
00000:  16 03 03 00 04 0E 00 00 00
```


-----Client-----

PMS:

00000: CE 0D D6 B6 70 42 12 15 2B E4 69 5A 7E 89 F6 4C
00010: 89 29 A4 0D BF 0A 5A 55 C2 CE 00 2B 06 BA B6 2F

Random d_eph value:

0xC96486B1A3732389A162F5AD0145D537
43C9AC27D42ACF1091CE7EF67E6C3CCA
0F6C879B2DA3C1607648BAEB96471BD2
078DF5CAAA4FA83ECC0FFD6D3C8E5D56

Q_eph ephemeral key:

x = 0x4B9CB381BCC737E493E43B2D7FD95BFE
2AEF6BE8F6224882E5E559ADA08170DC
49A815B3A1B3B323D2B50195153CFC60
DD6139C3770C5762A6A7719FABF84BFB

y = 0x95CEF28392C846A5EEFCB51C84E4960A
77B77D0D85EBD22061BFDA0013C5AB6C
42DDD04973F65D2AEB8A5427A53D6872
CF2D68F5F722C4640D7AAF2E0194FBD0

HASH(r_c | r_s):

00000: FB F3 9D 10 E8 00 AF 70 E7 AA 22 C1 10 DA 94 A9
00010: 9A 58 98 D8 45 27 C7 CB DE C1 1E 53 39 90 6A 1A

K_EXP:

00000: 3F D9 99 D1 68 4A 15 CC 9B DD 5A 35 06 7A F6 98
00010: 17 15 00 22 E0 95 54 AC 79 1A 60 F1 61 F5 53 49

IV:

00000: FB F3 9D 10 E8 00 AF 70

CEK_ENC:

00000: D6 22 D1 67 A5 64 2E 29 52 5A 29 5C B9 F2 8F 96
00010: F2 8B 0E FA A7 D3 A2 BE E1 49 B0 11 78 C2 DF D5

CEK_MAC:

00000: 4C 93 36 57

PMSEXP:

00000: FB F3 9D 10 E8 00 AF 70 D6 22 D1 67 A5 64 2E 29
00010: 52 5A 29 5C B9 F2 8F 96 F2 8B 0E FA A7 D3 A2 BE
00020: E1 49 B0 11 78 C2 DF D5 4C 93 36 57

-----Client-----

ClientKeyExchange message:

msg_type: 10
length: 0000F5
body:
 exchange_keys: 3081F23081EF30280420D622D167A564
 2E29525A295CB9F28F96F28B0EFAA7D3
 A2BEE149B01178C2DFD504044C933657
 .
 .
 .
 DABF6120D2EB850D7DB7770A96E4841C
 B5FCEEA546C89283F2CE950408FBF39D
 10E800AF70

00000: 10 00 00 F5 30 81 F2 30 81 EF 30 28 04 20 D6 22
00010: D1 67 A5 64 2E 29 52 5A 29 5C B9 F2 8F 96 F2 8B
00020: 0E FA A7 D3 A2 BE E1 49 B0 11 78 C2 DF D5 04 04
00030: 4C 93 36 57 A0 81 C2 06 09 2A 85 03 07 01 02 05
00040: 01 01 A0 81 AA 30 21 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 01
00050: 02 30 15 06 09 2A 85 03 07 01 02 01 02 01 06 08
00060: 2A 85 03 07 01 01 02 03 03 81 84 00 04 81 80 FB
00070: 4B F8 AB 9F 71 A7 A6 62 57 0C 77 C3 39 61 DD 60
00080: FC 3C 15 95 01 B5 D2 23 B3 B3 A1 B3 15 A8 49 DC
00090: 70 81 A0 AD 59 E5 E5 82 48 22 F6 E8 6B EF 2A FE
000A0: 5B D9 7F 2D 3B E4 93 E4 37 C7 BC 81 B3 9C 4B D0
000B0: FB 94 01 2E AF 7A 0D 64 C4 22 F7 F5 68 2D CF 72
000C0: 68 3D A5 27 54 8A EB 2A 5D F6 73 49 D0 DD 42 6C
000D0: AB C5 13 00 DA BF 61 20 D2 EB 85 0D 7D B7 77 0A
000E0: 96 E4 84 1C B5 FC EE A5 46 C8 92 83 F2 CE 95 04
000F0: 08 FB F3 9D 10 E8 00 AF 70

Record layer message:

type: 16
version:
 major: 03
 minor: 03
length: 00F9
fragment: 100000F53081F23081EF30280420D622
 D167A5642E29525A295CB9F28F96F28B
 0EFAA7D3A2BEE149B01178C2DFD50404
 .
 .
 .
 ABC51300DABF6120D2EB850D7DB7770A
 96E4841CB5FCEEA546C89283F2CE9504
 08FBF39D10E800AF70

00000: 16 03 03 00 F9 10 00 00 F5 30 81 F2 30 81 EF 30
00010: 28 04 20 D6 22 D1 67 A5 64 2E 29 52 5A 29 5C B9
00020: F2 8F 96 F2 8B 0E FA A7 D3 A2 BE E1 49 B0 11 78
00030: C2 DF D5 04 04 4C 93 36 57 A0 81 C2 06 09 2A 85
00040: 03 07 01 02 05 01 01 A0 81 AA 30 21 06 08 2A 85


```
00050:  03 07 01 01 01 02 30 15 06 09 2A 85 03 07 01 02
00060:  01 02 01 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 02 03 03 81 84
00070:  00 04 81 80 FB 4B F8 AB 9F 71 A7 A6 62 57 0C 77
00080:  C3 39 61 DD 60 FC 3C 15 95 01 B5 D2 23 B3 B3 A1
00090:  B3 15 A8 49 DC 70 81 A0 AD 59 E5 E5 82 48 22 F6
000A0:  E8 6B EF 2A FE 5B D9 7F 2D 3B E4 93 E4 37 C7 BC
000B0:  81 B3 9C 4B D0 FB 94 01 2E AF 7A 0D 64 C4 22 F7
000C0:  F5 68 2D CF 72 68 3D A5 27 54 8A EB 2A 5D F6 73
000D0:  49 D0 DD 42 6C AB C5 13 00 DA BF 61 20 D2 EB 85
000E0:  0D 7D B7 77 0A 96 E4 84 1C B5 FC EE A5 46 C8 92
000F0:  83 F2 CE 95 04 08 FB F3 9D 10 E8 00 AF 70
```

-----Client-----

HASH(HM):

```
00000:  F8 D6 FE EB 17 64 4D 17 B0 38 36 A6 51 EB 87 69
00010:  BD EA A2 D3 EB 18 47 F6 91 91 42 7C 30 D0 17 8E
```

MS:

```
00000:  BE 57 46 C8 BB B7 84 7E 97 8F D4 C9 4F 52 34 52
00010:  44 2C 8E B1 72 FD E6 28 1C 18 C5 44 63 B1 F9 4C
00020:  2B D9 81 40 05 41 6D BB 0F 90 A5 7E A4 E0 6B 50
```

Client connection key material

K_write_MAC|K_read_MAC|K_write_ENC|K_read_ENC|IV_write|IV_read:

```
00000:  F3 37 F6 A8 6F F3 1F CA 52 EA 64 7C DE E3 B7 83
00010:  34 AB 77 B5 7F E0 DB 2F C0 C8 71 EC DC AC A5 A8
00020:  FB A0 4C 21 32 82 3A 24 96 EF 93 6F 0E BC F3 0E
00030:  A0 CB 7E AF 6C A7 94 75 4F 1F 45 B1 77 22 DE B4
00040:  4E 5B C3 2D 44 30 AF 58 93 11 6A CF 81 A3 BE 0C
00050:  90 D2 EA 8E 76 E0 84 07 28 BA F5 E2 B2 F9 40 C0
00060:  AE 18 26 7B B6 34 C1 6A 1D 1A C1 24 73 50 95 4B
00070:  2F EE 9B 77 F3 0D 18 D5 54 01 2B 43 78 60 87 0A
00080:  D9 21 A8 4B 07 FF 98 AF 8C 82 38 6B 91 FB BA 64
```

-----Server-----

PMSEXP extracted:

```
00000:  FB F3 9D 10 E8 00 AF 70 D6 22 D1 67 A5 64 2E 29
00010:  52 5A 29 5C B9 F2 8F 96 F2 8B 0E FA A7 D3 A2 BE
00020:  E1 49 B0 11 78 C2 DF D5 4C 93 36 57
```

HASH(r_c | r_s):

```
00000:  FB F3 9D 10 E8 00 AF 70 E7 AA 22 C1 10 DA 94 A9
00010:  9A 58 98 D8 45 27 C7 CB DE C1 1E 53 39 90 6A 1A
```


K_EXP:

00000: 3F D9 99 D1 68 4A 15 CC 9B DD 5A 35 06 7A F6 98
00010: 17 15 00 22 E0 95 54 AC 79 1A 60 F1 61 F5 53 49

PMS:

00000: CE 0D D6 B6 70 42 12 15 2B E4 69 5A 7E 89 F6 4C
00010: 89 29 A4 0D BF 0A 5A 55 C2 CE 00 2B 06 BA B6 2F

-----Server-----

HASH(HM):

00000: F8 D6 FE EB 17 64 4D 17 B0 38 36 A6 51 EB 87 69
00010: BD EA A2 D3 EB 18 47 F6 91 91 42 7C 30 D0 17 8E

MS:

00000: BE 57 46 C8 BB B7 84 7E 97 8F D4 C9 4F 52 34 52
00010: 44 2C 8E B1 72 FD E6 28 1C 18 C5 44 63 B1 F9 4C
00020: 2B D9 81 40 05 41 6D BB 0F 90 A5 7E A4 E0 6B 50

Client connection key material

K_read_MAC|K_write_MAC|K_read_ENC|K_write_ENC|IV_read|IV_write:

00000: F3 37 F6 A8 6F F3 1F CA 52 EA 64 7C DE E3 B7 83
00010: 34 AB 77 B5 7F E0 DB 2F C0 C8 71 EC DC AC A5 A8
00020: FB A0 4C 21 32 82 3A 24 96 EF 93 6F 0E BC F3 0E
00030: A0 CB 7E AF 6C A7 94 75 4F 1F 45 B1 77 22 DE B4
00040: 4E 5B C3 2D 44 30 AF 58 93 11 6A CF 81 A3 BE 0C
00050: 90 D2 EA 8E 76 E0 84 07 28 BA F5 E2 B2 F9 40 C0
00060: AE 18 26 7B B6 34 C1 6A 1D 1A C1 24 73 50 95 4B
00070: 2F EE 9B 77 F3 0D 18 D5 54 01 2B 43 78 60 87 0A
00080: D9 21 A8 4B 07 FF 98 AF 8C 82 38 6B 91 FB BA 64

-----Client-----

ChangeCipherSpec message:

type: 01

00000: 01

Record layer message:

type: 14

version:

major: 03

minor: 03

length: 0001

fragment: 01

00000: 14 03 03 00 01 01

-----Client-----

HASH(HM):

00000: F8 D6 FE EB 17 64 4D 17 B0 38 36 A6 51 EB 87 69

00010: BD EA A2 D3 EB 18 47 F6 91 91 42 7C 30 D0 17 8E

Finished message:

msg_type: 14

length: 00000C

body:

verify_data: D3EE1DEA725CD7080C744311

00000: 14 00 00 0C D3 EE 1D EA 72 5C D7 08 0C 74 43 11

Record layer message:

type: 16

version:

major: 03

minor: 03

length: 0014

fragment: 8854A0ED0CCBDAE076FA7D22D763A8D1

AF701BBB

00000: 16 03 03 00 14 88 54 A0 ED 0C CB DA E0 76 FA 7D

00010: 22 D7 63 A8 D1 AF 70 1B BB

-----Server-----

ChangeCipherSpec message:

type: 01

00000: 01

Record layer message:

type: 14

version:

major: 03

minor: 03

length: 0001

fragment: 01

00000: 14 03 03 00 01 01

-----Server-----

HASH(HM):


```
00000:  9C 9F C4 E3 32 5B 5F B3 70 B9 94 2A 71 D2 6E F0
00010:  10 71 D8 A5 A1 8F 69 E8 C2 0B 70 CC 90 E9 A9 46
```

Finished message:

```
msg_type:      14
length:        00000C
body:
  verify_data:  D6A2A697E9F23DB0F9017A79
```

```
00000:  14 00 00 0C D6 A2 A6 97 E9 F2 3D B0 F9 01 7A 79
```

Record layer message:

```
type:          16
version:
  major:        03
  minor:        03
length:        0014
fragment:      7BDDBB3C0A6A4A9E302B468CCD5CF786
               665FFEBC
```

```
00000:  16 03 03 00 14 7B DD BB 3C 0A 6A 4A 9E 30 2B 46
00010:  8C CD 5C F7 86 66 5F FE BC
```

-----Client-----

Application data:

```
00000:  48 45 4C 4F 0A
```

Record layer message:

```
type:          17
version:
  major:        03
  minor:        03
length:        0009
fragment:      A8951D9389D1AEFE3B
```

```
00000:  17 03 03 00 09 A8 95 1D 93 89 D1 AE FE 3B
```

-----Server-----

Application data:

```
00000:  48 45 4C 4F 0A
```

Record layer message:

```
type:          17
```


version:
 major: 03
 minor: 03
length: 0009
fragment: 0F368E5CEC86B4F8D7

00000: 17 03 03 00 09 0F 36 8E 5C EC 86 B4 F8 D7

-----Client-----

close_notify alert:
Alert:
 level: 01
 description: 00

00000: 01 00

Record layer message:
type: 15
version:
 major: 03
 minor: 03
length: 0006
fragment: F91FCD98F309

00000: 15 03 03 00 06 F9 1F CD 98 F3 09

-----Server-----

close_notify alert:
Alert:
 level: 01
 description: 00

00000: 01 00

Record layer message:
type: 15
version:
 major: 03
 minor: 03
length: 0006
fragment: 117B57AD5FED

00000: 15 03 03 00 06 11 7B 57 AD 5F ED

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