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Using GOST ciphers in ESP and IKEv2
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Abstract

This document defines a set of encryption transforms for use in Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and Internet Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2) protocols. The transforms are based on Russian cryptographic standard algorithms (GOST) in a Multilinear Galois Mode (MGM).

Status of This Memo

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1. Introduction

This document defines four encryption transforms for the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [RFC4303] and the Internet Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2) [RFC7296]. These transforms are based on two block ciphers from Russian cryptographic standard algorithms (often called "GOST" algorithms) - "Kuznyechik" [RFC7801] and "Magma" [I-D.dolmatov-magma]. These ciphers are used in Multilinear Galois Mode (MGM) [I-D.smyshlyaev-mgm] which provides Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD). In addition these transforms use external re-keying mechanism, described in [I-D.irtf-cfrg-re-keying] to limit a load on a session key.

2. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

3. Overview

Russian cryptographic standard algorithms, often referred as "GOST" algorithms, are a set of cryptographic algorithms of different types - ciphers, hash functions, digital signatures etc. In particular, Russian cryptographic standard [GOST3412-2015] defines two block ciphers - "Kuznyechik" (also defined in [RFC7801]) and "Magma" (also defined in [I-D.dolmatov-magma]). Both these ciphers use 256-bit key. "Kuznyechik" has a block size of 128 bits, while "Magma" has a 64-bit block.

Multilinear Galois Mode (MGM) is an AEAD mode defined in [I-D.smyshlyaev-mgm]. It is claimed to provide defense against some attacks on well-known AEAD modes, like Galois Counter Mode (GCM).

In addition, [I-D.irtf-cfrg-re-keying] defines some mechanisms that can be used to limit the number of times any particular session key is used. One of these mechanisms, called External Re-Keying with Tree-based Construction (defined in Section 5.2.3 of [I-D.irtf-cfrg-re-keying]), is used in the defined transforms. For the purpose of deriving subordinate keys a Key Derivation Function (KDF) KDF_GOSTR3411_2012_256 defined in Section 4.5 of [RFC7836], is used. This KDF is based on an HMAC [RFC2104] in a combination with a Russian GOST hash function defined in Russian cryptographic standard [GOST3411-2012] (also defined in [RFC6986]).

4. Transforms Description

This document defines four transforms for use in ESP and IKEv2. All of them use MGM mode of operation with Tree-based External Re-Keying. The transforms differ in used underlying algorithms and in cryptographic services they provide.

- ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE is an AEAD transform based on "Kuznyechik" algorithm; it provides confidentiality and message authentication and thus can be used both in ESP and IKEv2; the Transform ID is <TBA1 by IANA>;

- ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE is an AEAD transform based on "Magma" algorithm; it provides confidentiality and message authentication and thus can be used both in ESP and IKEv2; the Transform ID is <TBA2 by IANA>

- ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_MAC_KTREE is a MAC-only transform based on "Kuznyechik" algorithm; it provides no confidentiality and thus can only be used in ESP, but not in IKEv2; the Transform ID is <TBA3 by IANA>

- ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_MAC_KTREE is a MAC-only transform based on "Magma" algorithm; it provides no confidentiality and thus can only be used in ESP, but not in IKEv2; the Transform ID is <TBA4 by IANA>

4.1. Tree-based External Re-Keying

All four transforms use the same Tree-based External Re-Keying mechanism. The idea is that the key that is provided for the transform (Child SA key derived from KEYMAT in case of ESP or SK_ei/ SK_er in case of IKEv2) is not directly use to protect messages. Instead a tree of keys is derived using this key as a root. This tree may have several levels. The leaf keys are used for message protection, while intermediate nodes keys are used to derive lower level keys (including leaf keys). See Section 5.2.3 of [I-D.irtf-cfrg-re-keying] for more detail. This construction allows to protect a large amount of data, but at the same time providing a bound on a number of times any particular key in the tree is used, thus defending from some side channel attacks.

The transforms defined in this document use three-level tree. The leaf key that protects a message is computed as follows:

Kmsg = KDF (KDF (KDF (K, L1, I1), L2, I2), L3, I3)

where:

KDF (k, l, s)
: Key Derivation Function KDF_GOSTR3411_2012_256 defined in Section 4.5 of [RFC7836], which accepts three input parameters - a key (k), a label (l) and a seed (s) and provides a new key as an output;

K
: the key for the transform (ESP SA key derived from KEYMAT or SK_ei/SK_er in case of IKEv2);

L1, L2, L3
: labels defined as 6 octet ASCII strings without null termination:

L1 = "level1"

L2 = "level2"

L3 = "level3"

I1, I2, I3
: parameters that determine which keys out of the tree are used on each level, altogether they determine a leaf key that is used for message protection; these parameters are two octet integers in network byte order;

This construction allows to generate up to 2^16 keys on each level, but due to IV construction (see Section 4.2) the number of possible keys on the level 1 is limited to 2^8. So, the total number of possible leaf keys generated from one SA key is 2^40.

This specifications doesn't any requirements on the frequency the external re-keying takes place. It is expected that sending application will follow its own policy dictating how many times the keys on each level must be used.

4.2. Initialization Vector Format

Each message protected by the defined transforms must contain Initialization Vector (IV). The IV has a size of 64 bits and consists of the four fields, three of which are I1, I2 and I3 parameters that determine the particular leaf key this message was protected with (see Section 4.1), and the fourh is a counter, representing the message number for this key.

```
                        1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |      I1       |               I2              |      I3       |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   I3 (cont)   |                       C                       |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
```

Figure 1: IV Format

where:

- I1 (1 octet), I2 (2 octets), I3 (2 octets) - parameters, determining the particular key used to protect this message; 2-octets parameters are integers in network byte order

- C (3 octets) - message counter for the leaf key protecting this message; up to 2^24 messages may be protected using a single leaf key

For any given SA the IV MUST NOT repeat, but there is no requirement that IV is unpredictable.

4.3. Nonce Format for MGM

MGM requires a per-message nonce (called Initial Counter Nonce, ICN, in the [I-D.smyshlyaev-mgm]) that must be unique in the context of any leaf key (that are used to actually protect messages). The size of the ICN is n-1 bits, where n is the size of the block of the

underlying cipher. The two ciphers used in the defined transforms have different block sizes, so the two formats for the ICN are defined.

MGM specification requires that the nonce be n-1 bits in size, where n is a block size of underlying cipher. This document defines MGM nonces that are n bits in size, because that makes them having whole number of bytes. When used inside MGM the most significant bit of the first octet if the nonce (represented as an octet string) is dropped, making an effective size of the nonce equal to n-1 bits. Note, that the dropped bit is a part of zero field (see Figure 2 and Figure 3) which is always set to 0, so no information is lost when it is dropped.

4.3.1. MGM Nonce Format for "Kuznyechik" based Transforms

For transforms based on "Kuznyechik" cipher (ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE and ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_MAC_KTREE) the ICN consists of a zero octet, a 24-bit message counter and a 96-bit secret salt, that is fixed for SA and not transmitted.

```
                       1                   2                   3
   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
  +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
  |     zero      |                      C                        |
  +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
  |                                                               |
  |                             salt                              |
  |                                                               |
  +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
```

Figure 2: Nonce format for "Kuznyechik" based transforms

where:

- zero (1 octet) - set to 0
- C (3 octets) - the counter for the messages protected by the given leaf key; this field MUST be equal to the C field in the IV
- salt (12 octets) - secret salt

4.3.2. MGM Nonce Format for "Magma" based Transforms

For transforms based on "Magma" cipher (ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE and ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_MAC_KTREE) the ICN consists of a zero octet, a 24-bit message counter and a 32-bit secret salt, that is fixed for SA and not transmitted.

```
                          1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |     zero      |                      C                        |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                             salt                              |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
```

Figure 3: Nonce format for "Magma" based transforms

where:

- zero (1 octet) - set to 0

- C (3 octets) - the counter for the messages protected by the given leaf key; this field MUST be equal to the C field in the IV

- salt (4 octets) - secret salt

4.4. Keying Material

The key for ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE and ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_MAC_KTREE transforms consists of 352 bits, of which the first 256 bits is a root key for the tree (denoted as K in Section 4.1) and the remaining 96 bits is a secret salt (see Section 4.3.1).

The key for ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE and ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_MAC_KTREE transforms consists of 288 bits, of which the first 256 bits is a root key for the tree (denoted as K in Section 4.1) and the remaining 32 bits is a secret salt (see Section 4.3.2).

The keys in case ESP are extracted from the KEYMAT, and in case IKEv2 they are SK_ei/SK_er keys. Note, that since these transforms provide authenticated encryption, no additional keys are needed for authentication. It means that in case of IKEv2 the keys SK_ai/SK_ar are not used.

4.5. Integrity Check Value

The MGM computes authentication tag equal to the size of the block of the underlying cipher. For "Kuznyechik" based transforms (ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE and ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_MAC_KTREE) the resulting Integrity Check Value (ICV) is truncated to 96 bits by dropping the last 4 octets of the produced authentication tag. For "Magma" based transforms the full 64-bit authentication tag is used as ICV.

4.6. Plaintext Padding

All transforms defined in this document doesn't require any special plaintext padding, as specified in [I-D.smyshlyaev-mgm]. It means, that only those padding requirements that are imposed by the protocol are applied (4 bytes for ESP, no special padding for IKEv2).

4.7. AAD Construction

4.7.1. ESP AAD

Additional Authenticated Data (AAD) in ESP are constructed differently depending on the transform being used and whether Extended Sequence Number (ESN) is in use or not. The ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE and ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE provide confidentiality, so the content of the ESP body is encrypted and AAD consists of the ESP SPI and (E)SN. The AAD is constructed similar to the one in [RFC4106].

On the other hand the ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_MAC_KTREE and ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_MAC_KTREE don't provide confidentiality, they provide only message authentication. For this purpose the part of ESP packet that is normally encrypted is included in the AAD instead. For these transforms encryption capability provided by MGM is not used. The AAD is constructed similar to the one in [RFC4543].

```
                       1                   2                   3
   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
  +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
  |                               SPI                             |
  +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
  |                     32-bit Sequence Number                    |
  +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
```

Figure 4: AAD for AEAD transforms with 32-bit SN

```
                       1                   2                   3
   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
  +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
  |                               SPI                             |
  +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
  |                 64-bit Extended Sequence Number               |
  |                                                               |
  +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
```

Figure 5: AAD for AEAD transforms with 64-bit ESN

```
                          1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                               SPI                             |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                     32-bit Sequence Number                    |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                                                               |
     ~                    Payload Data (variable)                    ~
     |                                                               |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                    Padding (0-255 bytes)                      |
     +                               +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                               |  Pad Length   | Next Header   |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
```

Figure 6: AAD for authentication only transforms with 32-bit SN

```
                          1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                               SPI                             |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                 64-bit Extended Sequence Number               |
     |                                                               |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                                                               |
     ~                    Payload Data (variable)                    ~
     |                                                               |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                    Padding (0-255 bytes)                      |
     +                               +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                               |  Pad Length   | Next Header   |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
```

Figure 7: AAD for authentication only transforms with 64-bit ESN

4.7.2. IKEv2 AAD

For IKEv2 the AAD consists of the IKEv2 Header, the unencrypted payload followed it and an Encrypted (or Encrypted Fragment) payload header. The AAD is constructed similar to one in [RFC5282].

```
                        1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   ~                         IKEv2 Header                          ~
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   ~                   Unencrypted IKE Payloads                    ~
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | Next Payload  |C|  RESERVED   |         Payload Length        |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
```

Figure 8: AAD for IKEv2

4.8. Using Transforms

When SA is established the I1, I2 and I3 parameters are set to 0 by the sender and a leaf key is calculated. The C parameter starts from 0 and is incremented with each message protected by the same leaf key. When sender decides that the leaf should be changed, it increments I3 parameter and generates a new leaf key. The C parameter for the new leaf key is reset to 0 and the process continues. If the sender decides, that 3-rd level key corresponding to I3 is used enough times, it increments I2, resets I3 to 0 and calculates a new leaf key. The C is reset to 0 (as with every new leaf key) and the process continues.

The receiver always use I1, I2 and I3 from the incoming message. If they differ from the values in previous packets, a new leaf key is calculated . The C parameter is always used from the incoming packet. To improve performance implementations may cache recently used leaf key. When new leaf key is calculated (based on the values from incoming message) the old key may be cacheed for some time to improve performance in case of possible packet reordering (when packets protected by the old leaf key may be delayed and arrive later).

5. Security Considerations

TBD

6. IANA Considerations

IANA has assigned four Transform IDs in the "Transform Type 1 - Encryption Algorithm Transform IDs" registry (where RFCXXXX is this document):

Number	Name	ESP Reference	IKEv2 Reference
TBA1	ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE	[RFCXXXX]	[RFCXXXX]
TBA2	ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE	[RFCXXXX]	[RFCXXXX]
TBA3	ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_MAC_KTREE	[RFCXXXX]	Not allowed
TBA4	ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_MAC_KTREE	[RFCXXXX]	Not allowed

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