

Using GOST ciphers in ESP and IKEv2
draft-smyslov-esp-gost-10

Abstract

This document defines a set of encryption transforms for use in the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and in the Internet Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2) protocols which are parts of the IP Security (IPsec) protocols suite. The transforms are based on Russian cryptographic standard algorithms (GOST) in a Multilinear Galois Mode (MGM).

This specification is developed to facilitate implementations that wish to support the GOST algorithms. This document does not imply IETF endorsement of the cryptographic algorithms used in this document.

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Table of Contents

1.	Introduction	2
2.	Requirements Language	3
3.	Overview	3
4.	Transforms Description	4
4.1.	Tree-based External Re-Keying	4
4.2.	Initialization Vector Format	5
4.3.	Nonce Format for MGM	6
4.3.1.	MGM Nonce Format for "Kuznyechik" based Transforms	6
4.3.2.	MGM Nonce Format for "Magma" based Transforms	7
4.4.	Keying Material	8
4.5.	Integrity Check Value	8
4.6.	Plaintext Padding	8
4.7.	AAD Construction	8
4.7.1.	ESP AAD	8
4.7.2.	IKEv2 AAD	10
4.8.	Using Transforms	11
5.	Security Considerations	12
6.	IANA Considerations	12
7.	Acknowledgments	13
8.	References	13
8.1.	Normative References	13
8.2.	Informative References	14
Appendix A.	Test Vectors	15
Author's Address		23

[1.](#) Introduction

The IP Security (IPsec) protocols suite consists of several protocols, of which the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [[RFC4303](#)] and the Internet Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2) [[RFC7296](#)] are most widely used. This document defines four transforms for ESP and IKEv2 based on Russian cryptographic standard algorithms (GOST). This definition is based on Russian Standard [[GOST-ESP](#)], which describes how Russian cryptographic standard algorithms are used in ESP and IKEv2. Transforms defined in this document are based on two block ciphers from Russian cryptographic standard algorithms (often called "GOST" algorithms) - "Kuznyechik" [[GOST3412-2015](#)][[RFC7801](#)] and "Magma" [[GOST3412-2015](#)][[RFC8891](#)] in Multilinear Galois Mode (MGM) [[GOST-MGM](#)][[RFC9058](#)]. These transforms provide Authenticated

Smyslov

Expires June 9, 2022

[Page 2]

Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD). An external re-keying mechanism, described in [\[RFC8645\]](#) is also used in these transforms to limit load on session keys.

Because the GOST specification includes the definition of both 128 ("Kuznyechik") and 64 ("Magma") bit block ciphers, both are included in this document. Implementers should make themselves aware of the relative security and other cost-benefit implications of the two ciphers. See [Section 5](#) for more details.

This specification is developed to facilitate implementations that wish to support the GOST algorithms. This document does not imply IETF endorsement of the cryptographic algorithms used in this document.

2. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [BCP 14](#) [\[RFC2119\]](#) [\[RFC8174\]](#) when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

3. Overview

Russian cryptographic standard algorithms, often referred as "GOST" algorithms, constitute a set of cryptographic algorithms of different types - ciphers, hash functions, digital signatures, etc. In particular, Russian cryptographic standard [\[GOST3412-2015\]](#) defines two block ciphers - "Kuznyechik" (also defined in [\[RFC7801\]](#)) and "Magma" (also defined in [\[RFC8891\]](#)). Both ciphers use 256-bit key. "Kuznyechik" has a block size of 128 bits, while "Magma" has a 64-bit block.

Multilinear Galois Mode (MGM) is an AEAD mode defined in [\[GOST-MGM\]](#) [\[RFC9058\]](#). It is claimed to provide defense against some attacks on well-known AEAD modes, like Galois Counter Mode (GCM).

[\[RFC8645\]](#) defines mechanisms that can be used to limit the number of times any particular session key is used. One of these mechanisms, called external re-keying with tree-based construction (defined in [Section 5.2.3 of \[RFC8645\]](#)), is used in the defined transforms. For the purpose of deriving subordinate keys a Key Derivation Function (KDF) KDF_GOSTR3411_2012_256 defined in [Section 4.5 of \[RFC7836\]](#), is used. This KDF is based on an HMAC [\[RFC2104\]](#) in a combination with a Russian GOST hash function defined in Russian cryptographic standard [\[GOST3411-2012\]](#) (also defined in [\[RFC6986\]](#)).

Smyslov

Expires June 9, 2022

[Page 3]

4. Transforms Description

This document defines four transforms for use in ESP and IKEv2. All of them use MGM mode of operation with tree-based external re-keying. The transforms differ in underlying ciphers and in cryptographic services they provide.

- o ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE (Transform ID 32) is an AEAD transform based on "Kuznyechik" algorithm; it provides confidentiality and message authentication and thus can be used both in ESP and IKEv2
- o ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE (Transform ID 33) is an AEAD transform based on "Magma" algorithm; it provides confidentiality and message authentication and thus can be used both in ESP and IKEv2
- o ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_MAC_KTREE (Transform ID 34) is a MAC-only transform based on "Kuznyechik" algorithm; it provides no confidentiality and thus can only be used in ESP, but not in IKEv2
- o ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_MAC_KTREE (Transform ID 35) is a MAC-only transform based on "Magma" algorithm; it provides no confidentiality and thus can only be used in ESP, but not in IKEv2

4.1. Tree-based External Re-Keying

All four transforms use the same tree-based external re-keying mechanism. The idea is that the key that is provided for the transform is not directly used to protect messages. Instead a tree of keys is derived using this key as a root. This tree may have several levels. The leaf keys are used for message protection, while intermediate nodes keys are used to derive lower level keys, including leaf keys. See [Section 5.2.3 of \[RFC8645\]](#) for more details. This construction allows to protect a large amount of data, at the same time providing a bound on a number of times any particular key in the tree is used, thus defending from some side channel attacks.

The transforms defined in this document use three-level tree. The leaf key that protects a message is computed as follows:

$$K_{\text{msg}} = \text{KDF} (\text{KDF} (\text{KDF} (K, l_1, i_1), l_2, i_2), l_3, i_3)$$

where:

KDF (k, l, s) Key Derivation Function KDF_GOSTR3411_2012_256 defined in [Section 4.5 of \[RFC7836\]](#), which accepts three input parameters - a key (k), a label (l) and a seed (s) and provides a new key as an output;

Smyslov

Expires June 9, 2022

[Page 4]

K the root key for the tree (see [Section 4.4](#));

l1, l2, l3 labels defined as 6 octet ASCII strings without null termination:

```

l1 = "level1"
l2 = "level2"
l3 = "level3"

```

i1, i2, i3 parameters that determine which keys out of the tree are used on each level, altogether they determine a leaf key that is used for message protection; these parameters are two octet integers in network byte order;

This construction allows to generate up to 2^{16} keys on each level, but due to IV construction (see [Section 4.2](#)) the number of possible keys on the level 1 is limited to 2^8 . So, the total number of possible leaf keys generated from one SA key is 2^{40} .

This specification doesn't impose any requirements on the frequency the external re-keying takes place. It is expected that sending application will follow its own policy dictating how many times the keys on each level must be used.

4.2. Initialization Vector Format

Each message protected by the defined transforms MUST contain Initialization Vector (IV). The IV has a size of 64 bits and consists of the four fields, three of which are i1, i2 and i3 parameters that determine the particular leaf key this message was protected with (see [Section 4.1](#)), and the fourth is a counter, representing the message number for this key.




Figure 1: IV Format

where:

- o i1 (1 octet), i2 (2 octets), i3 (2 octets) - parameters, determining the particular key used to protect this message; 2-octets parameters are integers in network byte order
- o pnun (3 octets) - message counter in network byte order for the leaf key protecting this message; up to 2^{24} messages may be protected using a single leaf key

For any given SA the IV MUST NOT repeat, but there is no requirement that IV is unpredictable.

4.3. Nonce Format for MGM

MGM requires a per-message nonce (called Initial Counter Nonce, ICN, in the [RFC9058]) that MUST be unique in the context of any leaf key. The size of the ICN is $n-1$ bits, where n is the block size of the underlying cipher. The two ciphers used in the transforms defined in this document have different block sizes, so two different formats for the ICN are defined.

MGM specification requires that the nonce be $n-1$ bits in size, where n is the block size of the underlying cipher. This document defines MGM nonces having n bits (the block size of the underlying cipher) in size. Since the n is always a multiple of 8 bits, this makes MGM nonces having a whole number of octets. When used inside MGM the most significant bit of the first octet of the nonce (represented as an octet string) is dropped, making an effective size of the nonce equal to $n-1$ bits. Note, that the dropped bit is a part of zero field (see Figure 2 and Figure 3) which is always set to 0, so no information is lost when it is dropped.

4.3.1. MGM Nonce Format for "Kuznyechik" based Transforms

For transforms based on "Kuznyechik" cipher (ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE and ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_MAC_KTREE) the ICN consists of a zero octet, a 24-bit message counter and a 96-bit secret salt, that is fixed for SA and is not transmitted.




Figure 2: Nonce format for "Kuznyechik" based transforms

where:

- o zero (1 octet) - set to 0
- o pnum (3 octets) - the counter for the messages protected by the given leaf key; this field MUST be equal to the pnum field in the IV
- o salt (12 octets) - secret salt

[4.3.2.](#) MGM Nonce Format for "Magma" based Transforms

For transforms based on "Magma" cipher (ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE and ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_MAC_KTREE) the ICN consists of a zero octet, a 24-bit message counter and a 32-bit secret salt, that is fixed for SA and is not transmitted.




Figure 3: Nonce format for "Magma" based transforms

where:

- o zero (1 octet) - set to 0
- o pnum (3 octets) - the counter for the messages protected by the given leaf key; this field MUST be equal to the pnum field in the IV
- o salt (4 octets) - secret salt

4.4. Keying Material

The key for ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE and ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_MAC_KTREE transforms consists of 352 bits, of which the first 256 bits is a root key for the tree (denoted as K in [Section 4.1](#)) and the remaining 96 bits is a secret salt (see [Section 4.3.1](#)).

The key for ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE and ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_MAC_KTREE transforms consists of 288 bits, of which the first 256 bits is a root key for the tree (denoted as K in [Section 4.1](#)) and the remaining 32 bits is a secret salt (see [Section 4.3.2](#)).

In case of ESP the transform keys are extracted from the KEYMAT as defined in [Section 2.17 of \[RFC7296\]](#). In case of IKEv2 the transform keys are either SK_{ei} or SK_{er}, which are generated as defined in [Section 2.14 of \[RFC7296\]](#). Note, that since these transforms provide authenticated encryption, no additional keys are needed for authentication. It means that in case of IKEv2 the keys SK_{ai}/SK_{ar} are not used and MUST be treated as having zero length.

4.5. Integrity Check Value

The MGM computes authentication tag equal to the block size of the underlying cipher. For "Kuznyechik" based transforms (ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE and ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_MAC_KTREE) the resulting Integrity Check Value (ICV) is truncated to 96 bits by dropping the last 4 octets of the produced authentication tag. For "Magma" based transforms (ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE and ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_MAC_KTREE) the full 64-bit authentication tag is used as ICV.

4.6. Plaintext Padding

Transforms defined in this document don't require any plaintext padding, as specified in [\[RFC9058\]](#). It means, that only those padding requirements that are imposed by the protocol are applied (4 bytes for ESP, no padding for IKEv2).

4.7. AAD Construction

4.7.1. ESP AAD

Additional Authenticated Data (AAD) in ESP is constructed differently depending on the transform being used and whether Extended Sequence Number (ESN) is in use or not. The ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE and ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE provide confidentiality, so the content of the

ESP body is encrypted and AAD consists of the ESP SPI and (E)SN. The AAD is constructed similarly to the one in [\[RFC4106\]](#).

On the other hand the ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_MAC_KTREE and ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_MAC_KTREE don't provide confidentiality, they provide only message authentication. For this purpose the IV and the part of ESP packet that is normally encrypted are included in the AAD. For these transforms encryption capability provided by MGM is not used. The AAD is constructed similarly to the one in [\[RFC4543\]](#).




Figure 4: AAD for AEAD transforms with 32-bit SN




Figure 5: AAD for AEAD transforms with 64-bit ESN




Figure 6: AAD for authentication only transforms with 32-bit SN




Figure 7: AAD for authentication only transforms with 64-bit ESN

4.7.2. IKEv2 AAD

For IKEv2 the AAD consists of the IKEv2 Header, any unencrypted payloads following it (if they are present) and the Encrypted (or the

Smyslov

Expires June 9, 2022

[Page 10]

Encrypted Fragment) payload header. The AAD is constructed similar to one in [\[RFC5282\]](#).




Figure 8: AAD for IKEv2

4.8. Using Transforms

When SA is established the *i1*, *i2* and *i3* parameters are set to 0 by the sender and a leaf key is calculated. The *pnum* parameter starts from 0 and is incremented with each message protected by the same leaf key. When sender decides that the leaf should be changed, it increments *i3* parameter and generates a new leaf key. The *pnum* parameter for the new leaf key is reset to 0 and the process continues. If the sender decides, that 3rd level key corresponding to *i3* is used enough times, it increments *i2*, resets *i3* to 0 and calculates a new leaf key. The *pnum* is reset to 0 (as with every new leaf key) and the process continues. Similar procedure is used when 2nd level key needs to be changed.

Note, that a combination of *i1*, *i2*, *i3* and *pnum* MUST NOT repeat for any particular SA. This means that wrapping around of these counters is not allowed: when *i2*, *i3* or *pnum* reach their maximum values, a procedure of changing a leaf key described above is executed, and if all four parameters reach their maximum values, the IPsec SA becomes unusable.

There may be other reasons to recalculate leaf keys beside reaching maximum values for the counters. For example, the sender may count a number of octets protected by a particular leaf key and generate a new key when some threshold is reached.

The receiver always uses *i1*, *i2* and *i3* from the received message. If they differ from the values in previously received packets, a new leaf key is calculated. The *pnum* parameter is always used from the received packet. To improve performance implementations may cache recently used leaf key. When new leaf key is calculated (based on the values from received message) the old key may be kept for some time to improve performance in case of possible packet reordering

Smyslov

Expires June 9, 2022

[Page 11]

(when packets protected by the old leaf key are delayed and arrive later).

5. Security Considerations

The most important security consideration for MGM is that the nonce MUST NOT repeat for a given key. For this reason the transforms defined in this document MUST NOT be used with manual keying.

This specification defines transforms based on two different ciphers: "Kuznyechik" and "Magma". These ciphers have different block size: "Kuznyechik" has a block size of 128 bits, while "Magma" has a 64-bit block. Generally, 64-bit block ciphers are currently considered insecure after protecting relatively small amount of data. For example, Section 3.4 of [SP800-67] limits the number of blocks that are allowed to be encrypted with Triple DES cipher by 2^{20} (8 Mbytes of data). Since Triple DES and "Magma" both have 64-bit block size, it is believed that NIST's recommendation are also applicable to "Magma".

This document defines a rekeying mechanism that allows to mitigate a weak security of a 64-bit block cipher by frequent changing of encryption key. When this specification is used with "Magma" it is RECOMMENDED to limit the amount of data protected with a single leaf key by a value of 8 Mbytes or less depending on the security requirements.

Security properties of MGM are discussed in [MGM-SECURITY].

6. IANA Considerations

IANA maintains a registry of "Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2) Parameters" with a sub-registry of "Transform Type Values". IANA has assigned four Transform IDs in the "Transform Type 1 - Encryption Algorithm Transform IDs" registry and is requested to update their references to this document (where RFCXXXX is this document):

Number	Name	ESP Reference	IKEv2 Reference
32	ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE	[RFCXXXX]	[RFCXXXX]
33	ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE	[RFCXXXX]	[RFCXXXX]
34	ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_MAC_KTREE	[RFCXXXX]	Not allowed
35	ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_MAC_KTREE	[RFCXXXX]	Not allowed

Smyslov

Expires June 9, 2022

[Page 12]

7. Acknowledgments

Author wants to thank Adrian Farrel, Russ Housley and Yaron Sheffer for valuable input in the process of publication this document.

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Smyslov

Expires June 9, 2022

[Page 14]

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Appendix A. Test Vectors

In the following test vectors binary data is represented in hexadecimal format. The numbers in square bracket indicate the size of the corresponding data in decimal format.

1. ENCR_KUZYNECHIK_MGM_KTREE, example 1:


```
transform key [44]:
    b6 18 0c 14 5c 51 2d bd 69 d9 ce a9 2c ac 1b 5c
    e1 bc fa 73 79 2d 61 af 0b 44 0d 84 b5 22 cc 38
    7b 67 e6 f2 44 f9 7f 06 78 95 2e 45
K [32]:
    b6 18 0c 14 5c 51 2d bd 69 d9 ce a9 2c ac 1b 5c
    e1 bc fa 73 79 2d 61 af 0b 44 0d 84 b5 22 cc 38
salt [12]:
    7b 67 e6 f2 44 f9 7f 06 78 95 2e 45
i1 = 00, i2 = 0000, i3 = 0000, pnum = 000000
K_msg [32]:
    2f f1 c9 0e de 78 6e 06 1e 17 b3 74 d7 82 af 7b
    d8 80 bd 52 7c 66 a2 ba dc 3e 56 9a ab 27 1d a4
nonce [16]:
    00 00 00 00 7b 67 e6 f2 44 f9 7f 06 78 95 2e 45
IV [8]:
    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
AAD [8]:
    51 46 53 6b 00 00 00 01
plaintext [64]:
    45 00 00 3c 23 35 00 00 7f 01 ee cc 0a 6f 0a c5
    0a 6f 0a 1d 08 00 f3 5b 02 00 58 00 61 62 63 64
    65 66 67 68 69 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f 70 71 72 73 74
    75 76 77 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 01 02 02 04
ciphertext [64]:
    18 9d 12 88 b7 18 f9 ea be 55 4b 23 9b ee 65 96
    c6 d4 ea fd 31 64 96 ef 90 1c ac 31 60 05 aa 07
    62 97 b2 24 bf 6d 2b e3 5f d6 f6 7e 7b 9d eb 31
    85 ff e9 17 9c a9 bf 0b db af c2 3e ae 4d a5 6f
ESP ICV [12]:
    50 b0 70 a1 5a 2b d9 73 86 89 f8 ed
ESP packet [112]:
    45 00 00 70 00 4d 00 00 ff 32 91 4f 0a 6f 0a c5
    0a 6f 0a 1d 51 46 53 6b 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00
    00 00 00 00 18 9d 12 88 b7 18 f9 ea be 55 4b 23
    9b ee 65 96 c6 d4 ea fd 31 64 96 ef 90 1c ac 31
    60 05 aa 07 62 97 b2 24 bf 6d 2b e3 5f d6 f6 7e
    7b 9d eb 31 85 ff e9 17 9c a9 bf 0b db af c2 3e
    ae 4d a5 6f 50 b0 70 a1 5a 2b d9 73 86 89 f8 ed
```

2. ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE, example 2:


```
transform key [44]:
  b6 18 0c 14 5c 51 2d bd 69 d9 ce a9 2c ac 1b 5c
  e1 bc fa 73 79 2d 61 af 0b 44 0d 84 b5 22 cc 38
  7b 67 e6 f2 44 f9 7f 06 78 95 2e 45
K [32]:
  b6 18 0c 14 5c 51 2d bd 69 d9 ce a9 2c ac 1b 5c
  e1 bc fa 73 79 2d 61 af 0b 44 0d 84 b5 22 cc 38
salt [12]:
  7b 67 e6 f2 44 f9 7f 06 78 95 2e 45
i1 = 00, i2 = 0001, i3 = 0001, pnum = 000000
K_msg [32]:
  9a ba c6 57 78 18 0e 6f 2a f6 1f b8 d5 71 62 36
  66 c2 f5 13 0d 54 e2 11 6c 7d 53 0e 6e 7d 48 bc
nonce [16]:
  00 00 00 00 7b 67 e6 f2 44 f9 7f 06 78 95 2e 45
IV [8]:
  00 00 01 00 01 00 00 00
AAD [8]:
  51 46 53 6b 00 00 00 10
plaintext [64]:
  45 00 00 3c 23 48 00 00 7f 01 ee b9 0a 6f 0a c5
  0a 6f 0a 1d 08 00 e4 5b 02 00 67 00 61 62 63 64
  65 66 67 68 69 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f 70 71 72 73 74
  75 76 77 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 01 02 02 04
ciphertext [64]:
  78 0a 2c 62 62 32 15 7b fe 01 76 32 f3 2d b4 d0
  a4 fa 61 2f 66 c2 bf 79 d5 e2 14 9b ac 1d fc 4b
  15 4b 69 03 4d c2 1d ef 20 90 6d 59 62 81 12 7c
  ff 72 56 ab f0 0b a1 22 bb 5e 6c 71 a4 d4 9a 4d
ESP ICV [12]:
  c2 2f 87 40 83 8e 3d fa ce 91 cc b8
ESP packet [112]:
  45 00 00 70 00 5c 00 00 ff 32 91 40 0a 6f 0a c5
  0a 6f 0a 1d 51 46 53 6b 00 00 00 10 00 00 01 00
  01 00 00 00 78 0a 2c 62 62 32 15 7b fe 01 76 32
  f3 2d b4 d0 a4 fa 61 2f 66 c2 bf 79 d5 e2 14 9b
  ac 1d fc 4b 15 4b 69 03 4d c2 1d ef 20 90 6d 59
  62 81 12 7c ff 72 56 ab f0 0b a1 22 bb 5e 6c 71
  a4 d4 9a 4d c2 2f 87 40 83 8e 3d fa ce 91 cc b8
```

3. ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE, example 1:


```

transform key [36]:
    5b 50 bf 33 78 87 02 38 f3 ca 74 0f d1 24 ba 6c
    22 83 ef 58 9b e6 f4 6a 89 4a a3 5d 5f 06 b2 03
    cf 36 63 12
K [32]:
    5b 50 bf 33 78 87 02 38 f3 ca 74 0f d1 24 ba 6c
    22 83 ef 58 9b e6 f4 6a 89 4a a3 5d 5f 06 b2 03
salt [4]:
    cf 36 63 12
i1 = 00, i2 = 0000, i3 = 0000, pnum = 000000
K_msg [32]:
    25 65 21 e2 70 b7 4a 16 4d fc 26 e6 bf 0c ca 76
    5e 9d 41 02 7d 4b 7b 19 76 2b 1c c9 01 dc de 7f
nonce [8]:
    00 00 00 00 cf 36 63 12
IV [8]:
    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
AAD [8]:
    c8 c2 b2 8d 00 00 00 01
plaintext [64]:
    45 00 00 3c 24 2d 00 00 7f 01 ed d4 0a 6f 0a c5
    0a 6f 0a 1d 08 00 de 5b 02 00 6d 00 61 62 63 64
    65 66 67 68 69 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f 70 71 72 73 74
    75 76 77 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 01 02 02 04
ciphertext [64]:
    fa 08 40 33 2c 4f 3f c9 64 4d 8c 2c 4a 91 7e 0c
    d8 6f 8e 61 04 03 87 64 6b b9 df bd 91 50 3f 4a
    f5 d2 42 69 49 d3 5a 22 9e 1e 0e fc 99 ac ee 9e
    32 43 e2 3b a4 d1 1e 84 5c 91 a7 19 15 52 cc e8
ESP ICV [8]:
    5f 4a fa 8b 02 94 0f 5c
ESP packet [108]:
    45 00 00 6c 00 62 00 00 ff 32 91 3e 0a 6f 0a c5
    0a 6f 0a 1d c8 c2 b2 8d 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00
    00 00 00 00 fa 08 40 33 2c 4f 3f c9 64 4d 8c 2c
    4a 91 7e 0c d8 6f 8e 61 04 03 87 64 6b b9 df bd
    91 50 3f 4a f5 d2 42 69 49 d3 5a 22 9e 1e 0e fc
    99 ac ee 9e 32 43 e2 3b a4 d1 1e 84 5c 91 a7 19
    15 52 cc e8 5f 4a fa 8b 02 94 0f 5c

```

4. ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE, example 2:


```
transform key [36]:
  5b 50 bf 33 78 87 02 38 f3 ca 74 0f d1 24 ba 6c
  22 83 ef 58 9b e6 f4 6a 89 4a a3 5d 5f 06 b2 03
  cf 36 63 12
K [32]:
  5b 50 bf 33 78 87 02 38 f3 ca 74 0f d1 24 ba 6c
  22 83 ef 58 9b e6 f4 6a 89 4a a3 5d 5f 06 b2 03
salt [4]:
  cf 36 63 12
i1 = 00, i2 = 0001, i3 = 0001, pnum = 000000
K_msg [32]:
  20 e0 46 d4 09 83 9b 23 f0 66 a5 0a 7a 06 5b 4a
  39 24 4f 0e 29 ef 1e 6f 2e 5d 2e 13 55 f5 da 08
nonce [8]:
  00 00 00 00 cf 36 63 12
IV [8]:
  00 00 01 00 01 00 00 00
AAD [8]:
  c8 c2 b2 8d 00 00 00 10
plaintext [64]:
  45 00 00 3c 24 40 00 00 7f 01 ed c1 0a 6f 0a c5
  0a 6f 0a 1d 08 00 cf 5b 02 00 7c 00 61 62 63 64
  65 66 67 68 69 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f 70 71 72 73 74
  75 76 77 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 01 02 02 04
ciphertext [64]:
  7a 71 48 41 a5 34 b7 58 93 6a 8e ab 26 91 40 a8
  25 a7 f3 5d b9 e4 37 1f e7 6c 99 9c 9b 88 db 72
  1d c7 59 f6 56 b5 b3 ea b6 b1 4d 6b d7 7a 07 1d
  4b 93 78 bd 08 97 6c 33 ed 9a 01 91 bf fe a1 dd
ESP ICV [8]:
  dd 5d 50 9a fd b8 09 98
ESP packet [108]:
  45 00 00 6c 00 71 00 00 ff 32 91 2f 0a 6f 0a c5
  0a 6f 0a 1d c8 c2 b2 8d 00 00 00 10 00 00 01 00
  01 00 00 00 7a 71 48 41 a5 34 b7 58 93 6a 8e ab
  26 91 40 a8 25 a7 f3 5d b9 e4 37 1f e7 6c 99 9c
  9b 88 db 72 1d c7 59 f6 56 b5 b3 ea b6 b1 4d 6b
  d7 7a 07 1d 4b 93 78 bd 08 97 6c 33 ed 9a 01 91
  bf fe a1 dd dd 5d 50 9a fd b8 09 98
```

5. ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_MAC_KTREE, example 1:


```

transform key [44]:
  98 bd 34 ce 3b e1 9a 34 65 e4 87 c0 06 48 83 f4
  88 cc 23 92 63 dc 32 04 91 9b 64 3f e7 57 b2 be
  6c 51 cb ac 93 c4 5b ea 99 62 79 1d
K [32]:
  98 bd 34 ce 3b e1 9a 34 65 e4 87 c0 06 48 83 f4
  88 cc 23 92 63 dc 32 04 91 9b 64 3f e7 57 b2 be
salt [12]:
  6c 51 cb ac 93 c4 5b ea 99 62 79 1d
i1 = 00, i2 = 0000, i3 = 0000, pnum = 000000
K_msg [32]:
  98 f1 03 01 81 0a 04 1c da dd e1 bd 85 a0 8f 21
  8b ac b5 7e 00 35 e2 22 c8 31 e3 e4 f0 a2 0c 8f
nonce [16]:
  00 00 00 00 6c 51 cb ac 93 c4 5b ea 99 62 79 1d
IV [8]:
  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
AAD [80]:
  3d ac 92 6a 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  45 00 00 3c 0c f1 00 00 7f 01 05 11 0a 6f 0a c5
  0a 6f 0a 1d 08 00 48 5c 02 00 03 00 61 62 63 64
  65 66 67 68 69 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f 70 71 72 73 74
  75 76 77 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 01 02 02 04
plaintext [0]:
ciphertext [0]:
ESP ICV [12]:
  ca c5 8c e5 e8 8b 4b f3 2d 6c f0 4d
ESP packet [112]:
  45 00 00 70 00 01 00 00 ff 32 91 9b 0a 6f 0a c5
  0a 6f 0a 1d 3d ac 92 6a 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00
  00 00 00 00 45 00 00 3c 0c f1 00 00 7f 01 05 11
  0a 6f 0a c5 0a 6f 0a 1d 08 00 48 5c 02 00 03 00
  61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f 70
  71 72 73 74 75 76 77 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69
  01 02 02 04 ca c5 8c e5 e8 8b 4b f3 2d 6c f0 4d

```

6. ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_MAC_KTREE, example 2:


```
transform key [44]:
  98 bd 34 ce 3b e1 9a 34 65 e4 87 c0 06 48 83 f4
  88 cc 23 92 63 dc 32 04 91 9b 64 3f e7 57 b2 be
  6c 51 cb ac 93 c4 5b ea 99 62 79 1d
K [32]:
  98 bd 34 ce 3b e1 9a 34 65 e4 87 c0 06 48 83 f4
  88 cc 23 92 63 dc 32 04 91 9b 64 3f e7 57 b2 be
salt [12]:
  6c 51 cb ac 93 c4 5b ea 99 62 79 1d
i1 = 00, i2 = 0000, i3 = 0001, pnum = 000000
K_msg [32]:
  02 c5 41 87 7c c6 23 f3 f1 35 91 9a 75 13 b6 f8
  a8 a1 8c b2 63 99 86 2f 50 81 4f 52 91 01 67 84
nonce [16]:
  00 00 00 00 6c 51 cb ac 93 c4 5b ea 99 62 79 1d
IV [8]:
  00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00
AAD [80]:
  3d ac 92 6a 00 00 00 06 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00
  45 00 00 3c 0c fb 00 00 7f 01 05 07 0a 6f 0a c5
  0a 6f 0a 1d 08 00 43 5c 02 00 08 00 61 62 63 64
  65 66 67 68 69 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f 70 71 72 73 74
  75 76 77 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 01 02 02 04
plaintext [0]:
ciphertext [0]:
ESP ICV [12]:
  ba bc 67 ec 72 a8 c3 1a 89 b4 0e 91
ESP packet [112]:
  45 00 00 70 00 06 00 00 ff 32 91 96 0a 6f 0a c5
  0a 6f 0a 1d 3d ac 92 6a 00 00 00 06 00 00 00 00
  01 00 00 00 45 00 00 3c 0c fb 00 00 7f 01 05 07
  0a 6f 0a c5 0a 6f 0a 1d 08 00 43 5c 02 00 08 00
  61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f 70
  71 72 73 74 75 76 77 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69
  01 02 02 04 ba bc 67 ec 72 a8 c3 1a 89 b4 0e 91
```

7. ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_MAC_KTREE, example 1:


```
transform key [36]:
  d0 65 b5 30 fa 20 b8 24 c7 57 0c 1d 86 2a e3 39
  2c 1c 07 6d fa da 69 75 74 4a 07 a8 85 7d bd 30
  88 79 8f 29
K [32]:
  d0 65 b5 30 fa 20 b8 24 c7 57 0c 1d 86 2a e3 39
  2c 1c 07 6d fa da 69 75 74 4a 07 a8 85 7d bd 30
salt [4]:
  88 79 8f 29
i1 = 00, i2 = 0000, i3 = 0000, pnum = 000000
K_msg [32]:
  4c 61 45 99 a0 a0 67 f1 94 87 24 0a e1 00 e1 b7
  ea f2 3e da f8 7e 38 73 50 86 1c 68 3b a4 04 46
nonce [8]:
  00 00 00 00 88 79 8f 29
IV [8]:
  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
AAD [80]:
  3e 40 69 9c 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  45 00 00 3c 0e 08 00 00 7f 01 03 fa 0a 6f 0a c5
  0a 6f 0a 1d 08 00 36 5c 02 00 15 00 61 62 63 64
  65 66 67 68 69 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f 70 71 72 73 74
  75 76 77 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 01 02 02 04
plaintext [0]:
ciphertext [0]:
ESP ICV [8]:
  4d d4 25 8a 25 35 95 df
ESP packet [108]:
  45 00 00 6c 00 13 00 00 ff 32 91 8d 0a 6f 0a c5
  0a 6f 0a 1d 3e 40 69 9c 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00
  00 00 00 00 45 00 00 3c 0e 08 00 00 7f 01 03 fa
  0a 6f 0a c5 0a 6f 0a 1d 08 00 36 5c 02 00 15 00
  61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f 70
  71 72 73 74 75 76 77 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69
  01 02 02 04 4d d4 25 8a 25 35 95 df
```

8. ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_MAC_KTREE, example 2:


```
transform key [36]:
  d0 65 b5 30 fa 20 b8 24 c7 57 0c 1d 86 2a e3 39
  2c 1c 07 6d fa da 69 75 74 4a 07 a8 85 7d bd 30
  88 79 8f 29
K [32]:
  d0 65 b5 30 fa 20 b8 24 c7 57 0c 1d 86 2a e3 39
  2c 1c 07 6d fa da 69 75 74 4a 07 a8 85 7d bd 30
salt [4]:
  88 79 8f 29
i1 = 00, i2 = 0000, i3 = 0001, pnum = 000000
K_msg [32]:
  b4 f3 f9 0d c4 87 fa b8 c4 af d0 eb 45 49 f2 f0
  e4 36 32 b6 79 19 37 2e 1e 96 09 ea f0 b8 e2 28
nonce [8]:
  00 00 00 00 88 79 8f 29
IV [8]:
  00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00
AAD [80]:
  3e 40 69 9c 00 00 00 06 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00
  45 00 00 3c 0e 13 00 00 7f 01 03 ef 0a 6f 0a c5
  0a 6f 0a 1d 08 00 31 5c 02 00 1a 00 61 62 63 64
  65 66 67 68 69 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f 70 71 72 73 74
  75 76 77 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 01 02 02 04
plaintext [0]:
ciphertext [0]:
ESP ICV [8]:
  84 84 a9 23 30 a0 b1 96
ESP packet [108]:
  45 00 00 6c 00 18 00 00 ff 32 91 88 0a 6f 0a c5
  0a 6f 0a 1d 3e 40 69 9c 00 00 00 06 00 00 00 00
  01 00 00 00 45 00 00 3c 0e 13 00 00 7f 01 03 ef
  0a 6f 0a c5 0a 6f 0a 1d 08 00 31 5c 02 00 1a 00
  61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f 70
  71 72 73 74 75 76 77 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69
  01 02 02 04 84 84 a9 23 30 a0 b1 96
```

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Expires June 9, 2022

[Page 23]