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Using GOST algorithms in IKEv2 draft-smyslov-ike2-gost-02

Abstract

This document defines a set of cryptographic transforms for use in the Internet Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2) protocol. The transforms are based on Russian cryptographic standard algorithms (GOST).

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Table of Contents

1.	Introduction	2
2.	Terminology and Notation	2
3.	Overview	2
4.	IKE SA Protection	3
5.	Pseudo Random Function	3
6.	Shared Key Calculation	3
6.1.	Recipient Tests	4
7.	Authentication	4
7.1.	Hash Functions	4
7.2.	ASN.1 Objects	5
7.2.1.	id-tc26-signwithdigest-gost3410-12-256	5
7.2.2.	id-tc26-signwithdigest-gost3410-12-512	5
8.	Security Considerations	5
9.	IANA Considerations	6
10.	References	6
10.1.	Normative References	6
10.2.	Informative References	7
	Author's Address	8

[1.](#) Introduction

This document defines a number of transforms for the Internet Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2) [[RFC7296](#)]. These transforms are based on Russian cryptographic standard algorithms (often called "GOST" algorithms) for hash function, digital signature and key exchange method. Along with transforms defined in [[I-D.smyslov-esp-gost](#)], the transforms defined in this specification allow using GOST cryptographic algorithms in IPsec protocols.

[2.](#) Terminology and Notation

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [BCP 14](#) [[RFC2119](#)] [[RFC8174](#)] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

[3.](#) Overview

Russian cryptographic standard (GOST) algorithms are a set of cryptographic algorithms of different types - ciphers, hash functions, digital signatures etc. In particular, Russian cryptographic standard [[GOST3412-2015](#)] defines block ciphers "Kuznyechik" (also defined in [[RFC7801](#)]) and "Magma" (also defined in [[I-D.dolmatov-magma](#)]). Cryptographic standard [[GOST3410-2012](#)] defines elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (also defined in

Smyslov

Expires August 29, 2020

[Page 2]

[RFC7091]), while [GOST3411-2012] defines two cryptographic hash functions "Stribog", with different output length (also defined in [RFC6986]). The parameters for the elliptic curves used in GOST signature and key exchange algorithms are defined in [RFC7836].

4. IKE SA Protection

Specification [I-D.smyslov-esp-gost] defines two transforms of type 1 (Encryption Algorithm Transform IDs) based on GOST block ciphers that may be used for IKE SA protection: ENCR_KUZYNECHIK_MGM_KTREE (32) based on "Kuznyechik" block cipher and ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE (33) based on "Magma" block cipher. Since they are AEAD transforms and provide both encryption and authentication, there is no need for new transform type 3 (Integrity Algorithm Transform IDs), because it must not be used with these transforms (or must have a value NONE).

5. Pseudo Random Function

This specification defines a new transform of type 2 (Pseudorandom Function Transform IDs) - PRF_HMAC_STRIBOG_512 (<TBA by IANA>). This transform uses PRF HMAC_GOSTR3411_2012_512 defined in [Section 4.1.2 of \[RFC7836\]](#). The PRF uses GOST R 34.11-2012 ("Stribog") hash-function with 512-bit output defined in [RFC6986][GOST3411-2012] with HMAC [RFC2104] construction. The PRF has a 512-bit block size and a 512-bit output length.

6. Shared Key Calculation

This specification defines two new transforms of type 4 (Diffie-Hellman Group Transform IDs): GOST3410_2012_256 (<TBA by IANA>) and GOST3410_2012_512 (<TBA by IANA>). These transforms use Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key exchange algorithm over Twisted Edwards curves. The parameters for these curves are defined in Section A.2 of [RFC7836]. In particular, transform GOST3410_2012_256 uses id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-paramSetA parameter set and GOST3410_2012_512 uses id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetC parameter set (both defined in [RFC7836]).

Shared secret is computed as follows. The initiator randomly selects its private key d_i from $\{1, \dots, q - 1\}$, where q is the group order and is a parameter of the selected curve. Then a public key Q_i is computed as a point on the curve: $Q_i = d_i * G$, where G is the generator for the selected curve, and then is sent to the responder. The responder makes the same calculations to get d_r and Q_r and sends Q_r to the initiator. After peers exchange Q_i and Q_r both sides can compute a point on the curve $S = ((m / q) * d_i) * Q_r = ((m / q) * d_r) * Q_i$, where m is the subgroup order and is a parameter of the selected curve. The shared secret K is an x

Smyslov

Expires August 29, 2020

[Page 3]

coordinate of S in a little-endian representation. The size of K is determined by the size of used curve and is either 256 or 512 bit.

When GOST public key is transmitted in the KE payload, it MUST be represented as x coordinate immediately followed by y coordinate, each in a little-endian representation. The size of each coordinate is determined by the size of the used curve and is either 256 or 512 bits, so that the size of the Key Exchange Data field in the KE payload is either 64 or 128 octets.

6.1. Recipient Tests

Upon receiving peer's public key implementations MUST check that the key is actually a point on the curve, otherwise the exchange fails. Implementations MUST check that the calculated public value S is not an identity element of the curve, in which case the exchange fails.

7. Authentication

GOST digital signatures algorithm GOST R 34.10-2012 is defined in [\[RFC7091\]](#)[\[GOST3410-2012\]](#). There are two variants of GOST signature algorithm - one over 256-bit elliptic curve and the other over 512-bit key elliptic curve.

When GOST digital signature is used in IKEv2 for authentication purposes, an Authentication Method "Digital Signature" (14) MUST be specified in the AUTH payload. The AlgorithmIdentifier ASN.1 objects for GOST digital signature algorithm are defined in [Section 7.2](#).

The signature value, as defined in [\[RFC7091\]](#)[\[GOST3410-2012\]](#), consists of two integers r and s. The size of each integer is either 256 bit or 512 bit depending on the used elliptic curve. The content of the Signature Value field in the AUTH payload MUST consist of s immediately followed by r, each in a big-endian representation, so that the size of the field is either 64 or 128 octets.

7.1. Hash Functions

GOST digital signatures algorithm uses GOST hash functions GOST R 34.11-2012 ("Stribog") defined in [\[RFC6986\]](#)[\[GOST3411-2012\]](#). There are two "Stribog" hash functions - one with 256-bit output length and the other with 512-bit output length.

This specification defines two new values for IKEv2 Hash Algorithms registry: STRIBOG_256 (<TBA by IANA>) for GOST hash function with 256-bit output length and STRIBOG_512 (<TBA by IANA>) for the 512-bit length output. These values MUST be included in the

Smyslov

Expires August 29, 2020

[Page 4]

SIGNATURE_HASH_ALGORITHMS notify if a corresponding GOST digital signature algorithm is supported by the sender.

7.2. ASN.1 Objects

This section lists GOST signature algorithm ASN.1 objects in binary form.

7.2.1. id-tc26-signwithdigest-gost3410-12-256

```
id-tc26-signwithdigest-gost3410-12-256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) ru(643) rosstandart(7) tc26(1) algorithms(1)
signwithdigest(3) gost3410-12-256(2) }
```

Parameters are absent.

```
Name = id-tc26-signwithdigest-gost3410-12-256
OID = 1.2.643.7.1.1.3.2
Length = 12
0000: 300a 0608 2a85 0307 0101 0302
```

7.2.2. id-tc26-signwithdigest-gost3410-12-512

```
id-tc26-signwithdigest-gost3410-12-512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) ru(643) rosstandart(7) tc26(1) algorithms(1)
signwithdigest(3) gost3410-12-512(3) }
```

Parameters are absent.

```
Name = id-tc26-signwithdigest-gost3410-12-256
OID = 1.2.643.7.1.1.3.3
Length = 12
0000: 300a 0608 2a85 0307 0101 0303
```

8. Security Considerations

The security considerations of [\[RFC7296\]](#) apply accordingly.

The security of GOST elliptic curves is discussed in [\[GOST-EC-SECURITY\]](#). The security of "Stribog" hash function is discussed in [\[STRIBOG-SECURITY\]](#). A second preimage attack on "Stribog" is described in [\[STRIBOG-PREIMAGE\]](#) if message size exceeds 2^{259} blocks. This attack is not relevant to how "Stribog" is used in IKEv2.

9. IANA Considerations

IANA is requested to assign one Transform ID in the "Transform Type 2 - Pseudorandom Function Transform IDs" registry (where RFCXXXX is this document):

Number	Name	Reference

TBA	PRF_HMAC_STRIBOG_512	[RFCXXXX]

IANA is requested to assign two Transform IDs in the "Transform Type 4 - Diffie-Hellman Group Transform IDs" registry (where RFCXXXX is this document):

Number	Name	Recipient Tests	Reference

TBA	GOST3410_2012_256	[RFCXXXX] Sec. 6.1	[RFCXXXX]
TBA	GOST3410_2012_512	[RFCXXXX] Sec. 6.1	[RFCXXXX]

IANA is requested to assign two values in the "IKEv2 Hash Algorithms" registry (where RFCXXXX is this document):

Number	Hash Algorithm	Reference

TBA	STRIBOG_256	[RFCXXXX]
TBA	STRIBOG_512	[RFCXXXX]

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Smyslov

Expires August 29, 2020

[Page 6]

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