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December 9 2005

INTERNET DRAFT  
Expires: June 8, 2006

The AES-CMAC Algorithm  
draft-songlee-aes-cmac-03.txt

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## Abstract

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has newly specified the Cipher-based Message Authentication Code (CMAC) which is equivalent to the One-Key CBC MAC1 (OMAC1) submitted by Iwata and Kurosawa. This memo specifies the authentication algorithm based on CMAC with 128-bit Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). This new authentication algorithm is named AES-CMAC. The purpose of this document is to make the AES-CMAC algorithm conveniently available to the Internet Community.

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[1.](#) Introduction

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has newly specified the Cipher-based Message Authentication Code (CMAC). CMAC [NIST-CMAC] is a keyed hash function that is based on a symmetric key block cipher such as the Advanced Encryption Standard [NIST-AES]. CMAC is equivalent to the One-Key CBC MAC1 (OMAC1) submitted by Iwata and Kurosawa [OMAC1a, OMAC1b]. OMAC1 is an improvement of the eXtended Cipher Block Chaining mode (XCBC) submitted by Black and Rogaway [XCBCa, XCBCb], which itself is an improvement of the basic CBC-MAC. XCBC efficiently addresses the security deficiencies of CBC-MAC, and OMAC1 efficiently reduces the key size of XCBC.

AES-CMAC provides stronger assurance of data integrity than a checksum or an error detecting code. The verification of a checksum or an error detecting code detects only accidental modifications of the data, while CMAC is designed to detect intentional, unauthorized modifications of the data, as well as accidental modifications.

AES-CMAC achieves the similar security goal of HMAC [RFC-HMAC].

Since AES-CMAC is based on a symmetric key block cipher, AES, while HMAC is based on a hash function, such as SHA-1, AES-CMAC is appropriate for information systems in which AES is more readily available than a hash function.

This memo specifies the authentication algorithm based on CMAC with AES-128. This new authentication algorithm is named AES-CMAC.

## [2. Specification of AES-CMAC](#)

### [2.1 Basic definitions](#)

The following table describes the basic definitions necessary to explain the specification of AES-CMAC.

$x    y$	Concatenation. $x    y$ is the string $x$ concatenated with string $y$ . $0000    1111$ is $00001111$ .
$x \text{ XOR } y$	Exclusive-OR operation. For two equal length strings $x$ and $y$ , $x \text{ XOR } y$ is their bit-wise exclusive-OR.
$\text{ceil}(x)$	Ceiling function. The smallest integer no smaller than $x$ . $\text{ceil}(3.5)$ is 4. $\text{ceil}(5)$ is 5.
$x \ll 1$	Left-shift of the string $x$ by 1 bit. The most significant bit disappears and a zero comes into the least significant bit. $10010001 \ll 1$ is $00100010$ .
$0^n$	The string that consists of $n$ zero-bits. $0^3$ means that $000$ in binary format. $0^4$ means that $10000$ in binary format. $0^i$ means that 1 followed by $i$ -times repeated zero's.
$\text{MSB}(x)$	The most-significant bit of the string $x$ . $\text{MSB}(10010000)$ means 1.
$\text{padding}(x)$	$0^i$ padded output of input $x$ .

It is described in detail in [section 2.4](#).

Key                    128 bits (16 bytes) long key for AES-128.  
Denoted by K.

First subkey        128 bits (16 bytes) long first subkey,  
derived through the subkey  
generation algorithm from the key K.  
Denoted by K1.

Second subkey      128 bits (16 bytes) long second subkey,  
derived through the subkey  
generation algorithm from the key K.  
Denoted by K2.

Message            A message to be authenticated.  
Denoted by M.  
The message can be null, which means that the length  
of M is 0.

Message length    The length of the message M in bytes.  
Denoted by len.  
Minimum value of the length can be 0. The maximum  
value of the length is not specified in this document.

AES-128(K,M)      AES-128(K,M) is the 128-bit ciphertext of AES-128  
for a 128-bit key K and a 128-bit message M.


MAC                A 128-bit string which is the output of AES-CMAC.  
Denoted by T.  
Validating the MAC provides assurance of the  
integrity and authenticity over the message from  
the source.

MAC length        By default, the length of the output of AES-CMAC is  
128 bits. It is possible to truncate the MAC.  
Result of truncation should be taken in most  
significant bits first order. MAC length must be  
specified before the communication starts, and  
it must not be changed during the life time of the key.

## 2.2 Overview

AES-CMAC uses the Advanced Encryption Standard [[NIST-AES](#)] as a building block. To generate a MAC, AES-CMAC takes a secret key, a message of variable length and the length of the message in bytes as inputs, and returns a fixed bit string called a MAC.

The core of AES-CMAC is the basic CBC-MAC. For a message  $M$  to be authenticated, the CBC-MAC is applied to  $M$ . There are two cases of operation in CMAC. Figure 2.1 illustrated the operation of CBC-MAC with two cases. If the size of input message block is equal to multiple of block size namely 128 bits, the last block processing shall be exclusive-OR'ed with  $K_1$ . Otherwise, the last block shall be padded with  $10^i$  (notation is described in [section 2.1](#)) and exclusive-OR'ed with  $K_2$ . The result of the previous process will be the input of the last CBC operation. The output of AES-CMAC provides data integrity over whole input message.



(a) positive multiple block length

(b) otherwise

Figure 2.1 Illustration of two cases of AES-CMAC.

AES\_K is AES-128 with key K.  
The message M is divided into blocks  $M_1, \dots, M_n$ ,  
where  $M_i$  is the  $i$ -th message block.  
The length of  $M_i$  is 128 bits for  $i = 1, \dots, n-1$ , and  
the length of the last block  $M_n$  is less than or equal to 128 bits.  
K1 is the subkey for the case (a), and  
K2 is the subkey for the case (b).  
K1 and K2 are generated by the subkey generation algorithm  
described in [section 2.3](#).

### [2.3](#) Subkey Generation Algorithm

The subkey generation algorithm, `Generate_Subkey()`, takes a secret key, K, which is just the key for AES-128.

The output of the subkey generation algorithm is two subkeys, K1 and K2. We write  $(K1, K2) := \text{Generate\_Subkey}(K)$ .

Subkeys K1 and K2 are used in both MAC generation and MAC verification algorithms. K1 is used for the case where the length of the last block is equal to the block length. K2 is used for the case where the length of the last block is less than the block length.

```

+++++
+                               Algorithm Generate_Subkey                               +
+++++
+                                                                           +
+   Input      : K (128-bit key)                                           +
+   Output     : K1 (128-bit first subkey)                                 +
+               K2 (128-bit second subkey)                                +
+-----+
+                                                                           +
+   Constants: const_Zero is 0x00000000000000000000000000000000          +
+               const_Rb   is 0x000000000000000000000000000000087        +
+   Variables: L           for output of AES-128 applied to 0^128        +
+                                                                           +
+   Step 1.  L := AES-128(K, const_Zero);                                +
+   Step 2.  if MSB(L) is equal to 0                                       +
+             then      K1 := L << 1;                                     +

```

```

+           else      K1 := (L << 1) XOR const_Rb;           +
+ Step 3.   if MSB(K1) is equal to 0                         +
+           then      K2 := K1 << 1;                         +
+           else      K2 := (K1 << 1) XOR const_Rb;           +
+ Step 4.   return K1, K2;                                    +
+                                                         +
+*****+

```

Figure 2.2 Algorithm Generate\_Subkey

Figure 2.2 specifies the subkey generation algorithm. In step 1, AES-128 is applied to all zero bits with the input key K.

In step 2, K1 is derived through the following operation: If the most significant bit of L is equal to 0, K1 is the left-shift of L by 1-bit. Otherwise, K1 is the exclusive-OR of const\_Rb and the left-shift of L by 1-bit.

In step 3, K2 is derived through the following operation: If the most significant bit of K1 is equal to 0, K2 is the left-shift of K1 by 1-bit. Otherwise, K2 is the exclusive-OR of const\_Rb and the left-shift of K1 by 1-bit.

In step 4, (K1,K2) := Generate\_Subkey(K) is returned.

The mathematical meaning of procedure in step 2 and step 3 including const\_Rb can be found in [[OMAC1a](#)].

## [2.4](#) MAC Generation Algorithm

The MAC generation algorithm, AES-CMAC(), takes three inputs, a secret key, a message, and the length of the message in bytes. The secret key, denoted by K, is just the key for AES-128. The message and its length in bytes are denoted by M and len, respectively. The message M is denoted by the sequence of M<sub>i</sub> where M<sub>i</sub> is the i-th message block. That is, if M consists of n blocks, then M is written as

-  $M = M_1 || M_2 || \dots || M_{\{n-1\}} || M_n$

The length of  $M_i$  is 128 bits for  $i = 1, \dots, n-1$ , and the length of the last block  $M_n$  is less than or equal to 128 bits.

The output of the MAC generation algorithm is a 128-bit string, called a MAC, which can be used to validate the input message. The MAC is denoted by  $T$  and we write  $T := \text{AES-CMAC}(K, M, \text{len})$ . Validating the MAC provides assurance of the integrity and authenticity over the message from the source.

It is possible to truncate the MAC. According to [NIST-CMAC] at least 64-bit MAC should be used for against guessing attack. Result of truncation should be taken in most significant bits first order.

The block length of AES-128 is 128 bits (16 bytes). There is a special treatment in case that the length of the message is not a positive multiple of the block length. The special treatment is to pad  $10^i$  bit-string for adjusting the length of the last block up to the block length.

For the input string  $x$  of  $r$ -bytes, where  $r < 16$ , the padding function,  $\text{padding}(x)$ , is defined as follows.

-  $\text{padding}(x) = x || 10^i$       where  $i$  is  $128 - 8 \times r - 1$

That is,  $\text{padding}(x)$  is the concatenation of  $x$  and a single '1' followed by the minimum number of '0's so that the total length is equal to 128 bits.

```
+++++
+                               Algorithm AES-CMAC                               +
+++++
+
+   Input      : K      ( 128-bit key )                                         +
+
```

```

+           : M      ( message to be authenticated )           +
+           : len    ( length of the message in bytes )       +
+   Output  : T      ( message authenticated code )           +
+                                                                 +
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
+   Constants: const_Zero is 0x00000000000000000000000000000000 +
+               const_Rb   is 0x00000000000000000000000000000087 +
+               const_Bsize is 16                                +
+                                                                 +
+   Variables: K1, K2 for 128-bit subkeys                       +
+               M_i is the i-th block (i=1..ceil(len/const_Bsize)) +
+               M_last is the last block xor-ed with K1 or K2    +
+               n      for number of blocks to be processed      +
+               r      for number of bytes of last block         +
+               flag   for denoting if last block is complete or not +
+                                                                 +
+   Step 1.  (K1,K2) := Generate_Subkey(K);                     +
+   Step 2.  n := ceil(len/const_Bsize);                         +
+   Step 3.  if n = 0                                           +
+           then                                              +
+               n := 1;                                       +
+               flag := false;                               +
+           else                                              +
+               if len mod const_Bsize is 0                  +
+               then flag := true;                            +
+               else flag := false;                          +
+           +
+   Step 4.  if flag is true                                   +
+           then M_last := M_n XOR K1;                       +
+           else M_last := padding(M_n) XOR K2;              +
+   Step 5.  X := const_Zero;                                  +
+   Step 6.  for i := 1 to n-1 do                               +
+           begin                                              +
+               Y := X XOR M_i;                               +
+               X := AES-128(K,Y);                           +
+           end                                              +
+               Y := M_last XOR X;                            +
+               T := AES-128(K,Y);                            +
+   Step 7.  return T;                                         +
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+

```

Figure 2.3 Algorithm AES-CMAC

Figure 2.3 describes the MAC generation algorithm.

In step 1, subkeys K1 and K2 are derived from K through the subkey generation algorithm.

In step 2, the number of blocks, n, is calculated. The number of blocks is the smallest integer value greater than or equal to quotient by dividing length parameter by the block length, 16 bytes.

In step 3, the length of the input message is checked. If the input length is less than 128 bits (including null), the number of blocks to be processed shall be 1 and mark the flag as not-complete-block (false). Otherwise, if the last block length is 128 bits, mark the flag as complete-block (true), else mark the flag as not-complete-block (false).

In step 4, M\_last is calculated by exclusive-OR'ing M\_n and previously calculated subkeys. If the last block is a complete block (true), then M\_last is the exclusive-OR of M\_n and K1. Otherwise, M\_last is the exclusive-OR of padding(M\_n) and K2.

In step 5, the variable X is initialized.

In step 6, the basic CBC-MAC is applied to M\_1,...,M\_{n-1},M\_last.

In step 7, the 128-bit MAC, T := AES-CMAC(K,M,len), is returned.

If necessary, truncation of the MAC is done before returning the MAC.

## [2.5](#) MAC Verification Algorithm

The verification of the MAC is simply done by a MAC recomputation. We use the MAC generation algorithm which is described in [section 2.4](#).

The MAC verification algorithm, Verify\_MAC(), takes four inputs, a secret key, a message, the length of the message in bytes, and the received MAC.

They are denoted by K, M, len, and T' respectively.

The output of the MAC verification algorithm is either INVALID or VALID.

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```

+++++
+                               Algorithm Verify_MAC                               +
+++++
+
+   Input      : K      ( 128-bit Key )                                         +
+               : M      ( message to be verified )                             +
+               : len    ( length of the message in bytes )                     +
+               : T'     ( the received MAC to be verified )                     +
+   Output     : INVALID or VALID                                              +
+
+-----+
+
+   Step 1.    T* := AES-CMAC(K,M,len);                                         +
+   Step 2.    if T* = T'                                                         +
+               then                                                             +
+                   return VALID;                                                +
+               else                                                             +
+                   return INVALID;                                              +
+
+++++
+                               Figure 2.4 Algorithm Verify_MAC                               +
+++++

```

Figure 2.4 describes the MAC verification algorithm.

In step 1,  $T^*$  is derived from  $K$ ,  $M$  and  $len$  through the MAC generation algorithm.

In step 2,  $T^*$  and  $T'$  are compared. If  $T^*=T'$ , then return VALID, otherwise return INVALID.

If the output is INVALID, then the message is definitely not authentic, i.e., it did not originate from a source that executed the generation process on the message to produce the purported MAC.

If the output is VALID, then the design of the AES-CMAC provides assurance that the message is authentic and, hence, was not corrupted in transit; however, this assurance, as for any MAC algorithm, is not absolute.

### 3. Security Considerations

The security provided by AES-CMAC are built on strong cryptographic algorithm AES. However as is true with any cryptographic algorithm, part of its strength lies in the secret key, 'K' and the correctness

of the implementation in all of the participating systems.  
If the secret key 'K' is compromised or inappropriately shared, it no longer guarantee either authentication or integrity of message. The secret key shall be generated in a way that meet the pseudo randomness requirement of [RFC 4086](#) [[RFC4086](#)] and should be kept in safe. If and only if AES-CMAC used properly it can provide the Authentication and Integrity that meet the best current practice of message authentication.

#### [4.](#) Test Vectors

Following test vectors are the same as those of [NIST-CMAC]. The following vectors are also output of the test program in [appendix A](#).

-----  
Subkey Generation

K	2b7e1516	28aed2a6	abf71588	09cf4f3c
AES-128(key,0)	7df76b0c	1ab899b3	3e42f047	b91b546f
K1	fbeed618	35713366	7c85e08f	7236a8de
K2	f7ddac30	6ae266cc	f90bc11e	e46d513b

-----

-----  
Example 1: len = 0

M	<empty string>			
AES-CMAC	bb1d6929	e9593728	7fa37d12	9b756746

-----

Example 2: len = 16

M	6bc1bee2	2e409f96	e93d7e11	7393172a
AES-CMAC	070a16b4	6b4d4144	f79bdd9d	d04a287c

-----

Example 3: len = 40

M	6bc1bee2	2e409f96	e93d7e11	7393172a
	ae2d8a57	1e03ac9c	9eb76fac	45af8e51
	30c81c46	a35ce411		
AES-CMAC	dfa66747	de9ae630	30ca3261	1497c827

-----

Example 4: len = 64

M	6bc1bee2	2e409f96	e93d7e11	7393172a
	ae2d8a57	1e03ac9c	9eb76fac	45af8e51
	30c81c46	a35ce411	e5fbc119	1a0a52ef

f69f2445 df4f9b17 ad2b417b e66c3710  
AES-CMAC 51f0bebf 7e3b9d92 fc497417 79363cfe  
-----

## [5. Acknowledgement](#)

Portions of this text here in is borrowed from [NIST-CMAC].  
We appreciate OMAC1 authors and SP 800-38B author, and Russ Housley  
for his useful comments and guidance that have been incorporated  
herein. We also appreciate David Johnston for providing code of  
the AES block cipher.

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## [Appendix A](#). Test Code

```
/******  
/* AES-CMAC with AES-128 bit */  
/* AES-128 from David Johnston (802.16) */  
/* CMAC Algorithm described in SP800-38B draft */  
/* Author: Junhyuk Song (junhyuk.song@samsung.com) */  
/* Jicheol Lee (jicheol.lee@samsung.com) */  
/******  
  
#include <stdio.h>  
  
/****** SBOX Table *****/  
unsigned char sbox_table[256] = {  
    0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5,  
    0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76,  
    0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0,
```

```

0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0,
0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc,
0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15,
0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a,
0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75,
0x09, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0,
0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84,
0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b,
0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf,
0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85,
0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8,
0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5,
0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2,
0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17,
0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x73,
0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88,
0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14, 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb,
0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c,
0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79,
0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9,
0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08,
0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6,
0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a,
0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e,
0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e,
0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94,
0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf,
0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68,
0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16
};

```

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```

/* For CMAC Calculation */
unsigned char const_Rb[16] = {
    0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
    0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x87
};

unsigned char const_Zero[16] = {
    0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
    0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00
};

/*****
**** Function Prototypes ****
*/

```

```

/*****/

void xor_128(unsigned char *a, unsigned char *b, unsigned char *out);
void xor_32(unsigned char *a, unsigned char *b, unsigned char *out);
unsigned char sbox(unsigned char a);
void next_key(unsigned char *key, int round);
void byte_sub(unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out);
void shift_row(unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out);
void mix_column(unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out);
void add_round_key( unsigned char *shiftrow_in,
                    unsigned char *mcol_in,
                    unsigned char *block_in,
                    int round,
                    unsigned char *out);

void AES_128(unsigned char *key, unsigned char *data, unsigned char
             *ciphertext);
void leftshift_onebit(unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output);

/*****/
/* AES_128() */
/* Performs a 128 bit AES encrypt with */
/* 128 bit data. */
/*****/

void xor_128(unsigned char *a, unsigned char *b, unsigned char *out)
{
    int i;
    for (i=0; i<16; i++)
    {
        out[i] = a[i] ^ b[i];
    }
}

```

```

void xor_32(unsigned char *a, unsigned char *b, unsigned char *out)
{
    int i;
    for (i=0; i<4; i++)
    {

```

```

        out[i] = a[i] ^ b[i];
    }
}

unsigned char sbbox(unsigned char a)
{
    return sbbox_table[(int)a];
}

void next_key(unsigned char *key, int round)
{
    unsigned char rcon;
    unsigned char sbbox_key[4];
    unsigned char rcon_table[12] = {
        0x01, 0x02, 0x04, 0x08, 0x10, 0x20, 0x40, 0x80,
        0x1b, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36
    };

    sbbox_key[0] = sbbox(key[13]);
    sbbox_key[1] = sbbox(key[14]);
    sbbox_key[2] = sbbox(key[15]);
    sbbox_key[3] = sbbox(key[12]);
    rcon = rcon_table[round];

    xor_32(&key[0], sbbox_key, &key[0]);
    key[0] = key[0] ^ rcon;

    xor_32(&key[4], &key[0], &key[4]);
    xor_32(&key[8], &key[4], &key[8]);
    xor_32(&key[12], &key[8], &key[12]);
}

void byte_sub(unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out)
{
    int i;
    for (i=0; i< 16; i++)
    {
        out[i] = sbbox(in[i]);
    }
}

```

```

void shift_row(unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out)
{
    out[0] = in[0];
    out[1] = in[5];
    out[2] = in[10];
    out[3] = in[15];
    out[4] = in[4];
    out[5] = in[9];
    out[6] = in[14];
    out[7] = in[3];
    out[8] = in[8];
    out[9] = in[13];
    out[10] = in[2];
    out[11] = in[7];
    out[12] = in[12];
    out[13] = in[1];
    out[14] = in[6];
    out[15] = in[11];
}

```

```

void mix_column(unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out)
{
    int i;
    unsigned char add1b[4];
    unsigned char add1bf7[4];
    unsigned char rotl[4];
    unsigned char swap_halfs[4];
    unsigned char andf7[4];
    unsigned char rotr[4];
    unsigned char temp[4];
    unsigned char tempb[4];

    for (i=0 ; i<4; i++)
    {
        if ((in[i] & 0x80)== 0x80)
            add1b[i] = 0x1b;
        else
            add1b[i] = 0x00;
    }

    swap_halfs[0] = in[2];    /* Swap halves */
    swap_halfs[1] = in[3];
    swap_halfs[2] = in[0];
    swap_halfs[3] = in[1];

    rotl[0] = in[3];         /* Rotate left 8 bits */
    rotl[1] = in[0];
    rotl[2] = in[1];
    rotl[3] = in[2];
}

```

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```
    andf7[0] = in[0] & 0x7f;
    andf7[1] = in[1] & 0x7f;
    andf7[2] = in[2] & 0x7f;
    andf7[3] = in[3] & 0x7f;

    for (i = 3; i>0; i--)    /* logical shift left 1 bit */
    {
        andf7[i] = andf7[i] << 1;
        if ((andf7[i-1] & 0x80) == 0x80)
        {
            andf7[i] = (andf7[i] | 0x01);
        }
    }
    andf7[0] = andf7[0] << 1;
    andf7[0] = andf7[0] & 0xfe;

    xor_32(add1b, andf7, add1bf7);

    xor_32(in, add1bf7, rotr);

    temp[0] = rotr[0];    /* Rotate right 8 bits */
    rotr[0] = rotr[1];
    rotr[1] = rotr[2];
    rotr[2] = rotr[3];
    rotr[3] = temp[0];
    xor_32(add1bf7, rotr, temp);
    xor_32(swap_halfs, rotr, tempb);
    xor_32(temp, tempb, out);
}

void AES_128(unsigned char *key, unsigned char *data, unsigned char
*ciphertext)
{
    int round;
    int i;
    unsigned char intermediatea[16];
    unsigned char intermediateb[16];
    unsigned char round_key[16];

    for(i=0; i<16; i++) round_key[i] = key[i];
    for (round = 0; round < 11; round++)
    {
        if (round == 0)
```

```

{
    xor_128(round_key, data, ciphertext);
    next_key(round_key, round);
}

```

```

    else if (round == 10)
    {
        byte_sub(ciphertext, intermediatea);
        shift_row(intermediatea, intermediateb);
        xor_128(intermediateb, round_key, ciphertext);
    }
    else /* 1 - 9 */
    {
        byte_sub(ciphertext, intermediatea);
        shift_row(intermediatea, intermediateb);
        mix_column(&intermediateb[0], &intermediatea[0]);
        mix_column(&intermediateb[4], &intermediatea[4]);
        mix_column(&intermediateb[8], &intermediatea[8]);
        mix_column(&intermediateb[12], &intermediatea[12]);
        xor_128(intermediatea, round_key, ciphertext);
        next_key(round_key, round);
    }
}
}

```

```

void print_hex(char *str, unsigned char *buf, int len)
{
    int i;

    for ( i=0; i<len; i++ ) {
        if ( (i % 16) == 0 && i != 0 ) printf(str);
        printf("%02x", buf[i]);
        if ( (i % 4) == 3 ) printf(" ");
        if ( (i % 16) == 15 ) printf("\n");
    }
    if ( (i % 16) != 0 ) printf("\n");
}

```

```

void print128(unsigned char *bytes)
{
    int j;
    for (j=0; j<16;j++) {

```

```

        printf("%02x",bytes[j]);
        if ( (j%4) == 3 ) printf(" ");
    }
}

```

```

void print96(unsigned char *bytes)
{
    int j;
    for (j=0; j<12;j++) {
        printf("%02x",bytes[j]);
        if ( (j%4) == 3 ) printf(" ");
    }
}

```

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/\* AES-CMAC Generation Function \*/

```

void leftshift_onebit(unsigned char *input,unsigned char *output)
{
    int i;
    unsigned char overflow = 0;

    for ( i=15; i>=0; i-- ) {
        output[i] = input[i] << 1;
        output[i] |= overflow;
        overflow = (input[i] & 0x80)?1:0;
    }
    return;
}

```

```

void generate_subkey(unsigned char *key, unsigned char *K1, unsigned
                    char *K2)
{
    unsigned char L[16];
    unsigned char Z[16];
    unsigned char tmp[16];
    int i;

    for ( i=0; i<16; i++ ) Z[i] = 0;

    AES_128(key,Z,L);

    if ( (L[0] & 0x80) == 0 ) { /* If MSB(L) = 0, then K1 = L << 1 */
        leftshift_onebit(L,K1);
    } else { /* Else K1 = ( L << 1 ) (+) Rb */
        leftshift_onebit(L,tmp);
    }
}

```

```

        xor_128(tmp,const_Rb,K1);
    }

    if ( (K1[0] & 0x80) == 0 ) {
        leftshift_onebit(K1,K2);
    } else {
        leftshift_onebit(K1,tmp);
        xor_128(tmp,const_Rb,K2);
    }
    return;
}

```

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```

void padding ( unsigned char *lastb, unsigned char *pad, int length )
{
    int          j;

    /* original last block */
    for ( j=0; j<16; j++ ) {
        if ( j < length ) {
            pad[j] = lastb[j];
        } else if ( j == length ) {
            pad[j] = 0x80;
        } else {
            pad[j] = 0x00;
        }
    }
}

```

```

void AES_CMAC ( unsigned char *key, unsigned char *input, int length,
                unsigned char *mac )
{
    unsigned char    X[16],Y[16], M_last[16], padded[16];
    unsigned char    K1[16], K2[16];
    int              n, i, flag;
    generate_subkey(key,K1,K2);

    n = (length+15) / 16;          /* n is number of rounds */

```

```

if ( n == 0 ) {
    n = 1;
    flag = 0;
} else {
    if ( (length%16) == 0 ) { /* last block is a complete block */
        flag = 1;
    } else { /* last block is not complete block */
        flag = 0;
    }
}

if ( flag ) { /* last block is complete block */
    xor_128(&input[16*(n-1)],K1,M_last);
} else {
    padding(&input[16*(n-1)],padded,length%16);
    xor_128(padded,K2,M_last);
}

for ( i=0; i<16; i++ ) X[i] = 0;
for ( i=0; i<n-1; i++ ) {
    xor_128(X,&input[16*i],Y); /* Y := Mi (+) X */
    AES_128(key,Y,X);        /* X := AES-128(KEY, Y); */
}

```

```

xor_128(X,M_last,Y);
AES_128(key,Y,X);

for ( i=0; i<16; i++ ) {
    mac[i] = X[i];
}
}

int main()
{
    unsigned char L[16], K1[16], K2[16], T[16], TT[12];
    unsigned char M[64] = {
        0x6b, 0xc1, 0xbe, 0xe2, 0x2e, 0x40, 0x9f, 0x96,
        0xe9, 0x3d, 0x7e, 0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2a,
        0xae, 0x2d, 0x8a, 0x57, 0x1e, 0x03, 0xac, 0x9c,
        0x9e, 0xb7, 0x6f, 0xac, 0x45, 0xaf, 0x8e, 0x51,
        0x30, 0xc8, 0x1c, 0x46, 0xa3, 0x5c, 0xe4, 0x11,
        0xe5, 0xfb, 0xc1, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x0a, 0x52, 0xef,
        0xf6, 0x9f, 0x24, 0x45, 0xdf, 0x4f, 0x9b, 0x17,
        0xad, 0x2b, 0x41, 0x7b, 0xe6, 0x6c, 0x37, 0x10
    }
}

```

```

};
unsigned char key[16] = {
    0x2b, 0x7e, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xae, 0xd2, 0xa6,
    0xab, 0xf7, 0x15, 0x88, 0x09, 0xcf, 0x4f, 0x3c
};

printf("-----\n");
printf("K          "); print128(key); printf("\n");

printf("\nSubkey Generation\n");
AES_128(key,const_Zero,L);
printf("AES_128(key,0) "); print128(L); printf("\n");
generate_subkey(key,K1,K2);
printf("K1          "); print128(K1); printf("\n");
printf("K2          "); print128(K2); printf("\n");

printf("\nExample 1: len = 0\n");
printf("M          "); printf("<empty string>\n");

AES_CMAC(key,M,0,T);
printf("AES_CMAC      "); print128(T); printf("\n");

printf("\nExample 2: len = 16\n");
printf("M          "); print_hex("          ",M,16);
AES_CMAC(key,M,16,T);
printf("AES_CMAC      "); print128(T); printf("\n");
printf("\nExample 3: len = 40\n");
printf("M          "); print_hex("          ",M,40);
AES_CMAC(key,M,40,T);
printf("AES_CMAC      "); print128(T); printf("\n");

```

```

printf("\nExample 4: len = 64\n");
printf("M          "); print_hex("          ",M,64);
AES_CMAC(key,M,64,T);
printf("AES_CMAC      "); print128(T); printf("\n");

printf("-----\n");

return 0;
}

```

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Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the Internet Society.