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# BFD for VXLAN draft-spallagatti-bfd-vxlan-04

### Abstract

This document describes use of Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD) protocol in Virtual eXtensible Local Area Network (VXLAN) overlay network.

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# **1**. Introduction

"Virtual eXtensible Local Area Network (VXLAN)" has been described in [<u>RFC7348</u>]. VXLAN provides an encapsulation scheme that allows virtual machines (VMs) to communicate in a data center network.

VXLAN is typically deployed in data centers interconnecting virtualized hosts, which may be spread across multiple racks. The individual racks may be part of a different Layer 3 network or they could be in a single Layer 2 network. The VXLAN segments/overlay networks are overlaid on top of these Layer 2 or Layer 3 networks.

A VM can communicate with another VM only if they are on the same VXLAN. VMs are unaware of VXLAN tunnels as VXLAN tunnel is terminated on VXLAN Tunnel End Point (VTEP) (hypervisor/TOR). VTEPs (hypervisor/TOR) are responsible for encapsulating and decapsulating frames exchanged among VMs.

Since underlay is a L3 network, ability to monitor path continuity, i.e. perform proactive continuity check (CC) for these tunnels is important. Asynchronous mode of BFD, as defined in [<u>RFC5880</u>], can be used to monitor a VXLAN tunnel. Use of [<u>I-D.ietf-bfd-multipoint</u>] is for future study.

This draft addresses requirements outlined in [<u>I-D.ashwood-nvo3-operational-requirement</u>]. Specifically with reference to the OAM model to Figure 3 of [<u>I-D.ashwood-nvo3-operational-requirement</u>], this draft outlines proposal to implement the OAM mechanism between the Network Virtualization Edges (NVEs) using BFD.

## 2. Conventions used in this document

### 2.1. Terminology

BFD - Bidirectional Forwarding Detection

- CC Continuity Check
- NVE Network Virtualization Edge
- TOR Top of Rack
- VM Virtual Machine
- VTEP VXLAN Tunnel End Point
- VXLAN Virtual eXtensible Local Area Network

#### <u>2.2</u>. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in <u>RFC 2119</u> [<u>RFC2119</u>].

# 3. Use cases

Main use case of BFD for VXLAN is for continuity check of a tunnel. By exchanging BFD control packets between VTEPs an operator exercises the VXLAN path in both in underlay and overlay thus ensuring the VXLAN path availability and VTEPs reachability. BFD failure detection can be used for maintenance. There are other use cases such as

Layer 2 VMs:

Most deployments will have VMs with only L2 capabilities that may not support L3. BFD being a L3 protocol can be used as tunnel CC mechanism, where BFD will start and terminate at the NVEs, e.g. VTEPs. It is possible to aggregate the CC sessions for multiple tenants by running a BFD session between the VTEPs over VxLAN tunnel. In rest of this document terms NVE and VTEP are used interchangeably.


Fault localization:

It is also possible that VMs are L3 aware and can possibly host a BFD session. In these cases BFD sessions can be established among VMs for CC. In addition, BFD sessions can be established among VTEPs for tunnel CC. Having a hierarchical OAM model helps localize faults though requires additional consideration.

Service node reachability:

Service node is responsible for sending BUM traffic. In case of service node tunnel terminates at VTEP and it might not even host VM. BFD session between TOR/hypervisor and service node can be used to monitor service node reachability.

**<u>4</u>**. Deployment



### Figure 1

Figure 1 illustrates the scenario with two servers, each of them hosting two VMs. These servers host VTEPs that terminate two VXLAN tunnels with VNI number 100 and 200. Separate BFD sessions can be established between the VTEPs (IP1 and IP2) for monitoring each of the VXLAN tunnels (VNI 100 and 200). No BFD packets, intended to Hypervisor VTEP, should be forwarded to a VM as VM may drop BFD packets leading to false negative. This method is applicable whether VTEP is a virtual or physical device.

## 5. BFD Packet Transmission over VXLAN Tunnel

BFD packet MUST be encapsulated and sent to a remote VTEP as explained in <u>Section 5.1</u>. Implementations SHOULD ensure that the BFD packets follow the same lookup path of VXLAN packets within the sender system.

#### **5.1**. BFD Packet Encapsulation in VXLAN

VXLAN packet format has been described in <u>Section 5 of [RFC7348]</u>. The Outer IP/UDP and VXLAN headers MUST be encoded by the sender as per [RFC7348].

The BFD packet MUST be carried inside the inner MAC frame of the VXLAN packet. The inner MAC frame carrying the BFD payload has the following format:

Ethernet Header:

Destination MAC: This MUST be a dedicated MAC (TBA) <u>Section 9</u> or the MAC address of the destination VTEP. The details of how the MAC address of the destination VTEP is obtained are outside the scope of this document.

Source MAC: MAC address of the originating VTEP

IP header:

Source IP: IP address of the originating VTEP.

Destination IP: IP address of the terminating VTEP.

TTL: This MUST be set to 1. This is to ensure that the BFD packet is not routed within the L3 underlay network.

[Ed.Note]:Use of inner source and destination IP addresses needs more discussion by the WG.

The fields of the UDP header and the BFD control packet are encoded as specified in [<u>RFC5881</u>] for p2p VXLAN tunnels.

### 6. Reception of BFD packet from VXLAN Tunnel

Once a packet is received, VTEP MUST validate the packet as described in <u>Section 4.1 of [RFC7348]</u>. If the Destination MAC of the inner MAC frame matches the dedicated MAC or the MAC address of the VTEP the packet MUST be processed further. BFD for VXLAN

The UDP destination port and the TTL of the inner Ethernet frame MUST be validated to determine if the received packet can be processed by BFD. BFD packet with inner MAC set to VTEP or dedicated MAC address MUST NOT be forwarded to VMs.

To ensure BFD detects the proper configuration of VXLAN Network Identifier (VNI) in a remote VTEP, a lookup SHOULD be performed with the MAC-DA and VNI as key in the Virtual Forwarding Instance (VFI) table of the originating/ terminating VTEP in order to exercise the VFI associated with the VNI.

### 6.1. Demultiplexing of the BFD packet

Demultiplexing of IP BFD packet has been defined in <u>Section 3 of</u> [RFC5881]. Since multiple BFD sessions may be running between two VTEPs, there needs to be a mechanism for demultiplexing received BFD packets to the proper session. The procedure for demultiplexing packets with Your Discriminator = 0 is different from [RFC5880]. For such packets, the BFD session MUST be identified using the inner headers, i.e. the source IP and the destination IP present in the IP header carried by the payload of the VXLAN encapsulated packet. The VNI of the packet SHOULD be used to derive interface related information for demultiplexing the packet. If BFD packet is received with non-zero your discriminator then BFD session should be demultiplexed only with your discriminator as the key.

### 7. Use of reserved VNI

BFD session MAY be established for the reserved VNI 0. One way to aggregate BFD sessions between VTEP's is to establish a BFD session with VNI 0. A VTEP MAY also use VNI 0 to establish a BFD session with a service node.

# 8. Echo BFD

Support for echo BFD is outside the scope of this document.

### 9. IANA Considerations

IANA is requested to assign a dedicated MAC address to be used as the Destination MAC address of the inner Ethernet which carries BFD control packet in IP/UDP encapsulation.

# **<u>10</u>**. Security Considerations

Document recommends setting of inner IP TTL to 1 which could lead to DDoS attack, implementation MUST have throttling in place. Throttling MAY be relaxed for BFD packets based on port number.

Other than inner IP TTL set to 1 this specification does not raise any additional security issues beyond those of the specifications referred to in the list of normative references.

### **<u>11</u>**. Contributors

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