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Client ID in Forwarded DNS Queries
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Abstract

This draft defines a DNS EDNS option to carry a client-specific identifier in DNS queries, with guidance for privacy protection of such information.

Ed note

Text inside square brackets ([]) is additional background information, answers to frequently asked questions, general musings, etc. They will be removed before publication. This document is being collaborated on in GitHub at <<https://github.com/vttale/edns0-clientid>>. The most recent version of the document, open issues, etc should all be available here. The authors gratefully accept pull requests.

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[1.](#) Introduction

Some DNS operators generate, or wish to generate, customized DNS responses based on the originator of a DNS query. For example, [[RFC7871](#)], "Client Subnet in DNS Queries", defines a method to convey partial IP network address information about the device that originated a DNS request, so that a response could be targeted to be topographically near the source.

Some specialized services, however, need more precise client identity information to function adequately. For example, a parental control service that restricts access to particular domains from particular devices needs to have a device-specific identifier.

This document defines an EDNS [[RFC6891](#)] option to convey client identification information that is relevant to the DNS query. It is added by software on the client's local area network, for transmission to the upstream DNS provider.

A similar EDNS option is already being used on the public Internet in two different implementations. One is between the [[dnsmasq](#)] resolver on the client side and Nominum's [[Vantio CacheServe](#)] upstream. It uses EDNS option code 65073 from the "Reserved for Local/Experimental Use" range to pass the client's Media Access Control (MAC) address. The other implementation is for Cisco's [[Umbrella](#)], aka OpenDNS, which encodes the client's MAC address and complete IP address. It uses option codes 26946 and 20292, respectively, from the middle of the "Unassigned" range.

This document codifies a more flexible format that can accommodate the needs of both implementations, as well as other more opaque identifiers. It is intended to supersede those non-standard options.

This option is intended only for constrained environments where its use can be carefully controlled. It is completely optional and should be ignored by most DNS software.

[2.](#) Privacy Considerations

The IETF is actively working on enhancing DNS privacy [[DPRIVE Working Group](#)], and the re-injection of personally identifiable information has been identified as a problematic design pattern [[I-D.hardie-privsec-metadata-insertion](#)].

Because this option transmits information that is meant to identify specific clients, to be considered compliant with this draft implementations MUST NOT add the option without explicit opt-in by an administrator on the local area network. For example, agreeing to the terms of service for a device-specific DNS filtering product would allow the option to be enabled, and only for communication to the product's DNS server(s).

Implementers need to be aware of the various laws and regulations governing handling personal data, but they are out of scope of this document.

No explicit provision is made in the protocol to opt-out. For more discussion on this, see [Section 9](#), "Security Considerations".

3. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [[RFC2119](#)]

For a comprehensive treatment of DNS terms, please see [[RFC7719](#)]. This document uses the following additional terms:

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ECID EDNS Client Identification.

Client The user or device that originates a DNS lookup.


Nameserver A DNS server capable of resolving a DNS query and formulating a response.

Forwarding Resolver A nameserver that does not do iterative resolution itself, but instead passes that responsibility to another resolver, called a "Forwarder" in [[RFC2308](#)] [section 1](#).

Tailored Response A response from a nameserver that is customized based on a policy defined for the client requesting the query.

4. Option Format

This protocol uses an EDNS [[RFC6891](#)] option to include client identification information in DNS messages. The option is structured as follows:



```

/                               CLIENT-IDENTIFIER                               /
/                                                                           /
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+

```

OPTION-CODE: 2 octets per [[RFC6891](#)]. For ECID the code is TBD by IANA.

OPTION-LENGTH: 2 octets per [[RFC6891](#)]. Contains the length of the payload following OPTION-LENGTH, in octets.

IDENTIFIER-TYPE: 2 octets per [[Address Family Numbers](#)], describing the format of CLIENT-IDENTIFIER as elaborated below. [Is it better to call this ADDRESS-FAMILY?]

CLIENT-IDENTIFIER: A variable number of octets, depending on IDENTIFIER-TYPE.

All fields are in network byte order ("big-endian", per [[RFC1700](#)], Data Notation).

This draft only specifies behaviour for the following IDENTIFIER-TYPE values and the corresponding CLIENT-IDENTIFIER lengths:

- o 16389 (0x4005, 48-bit MAC): 6 octets, fixed.
- o 1 (0x0001, IP version 4): 4 octets, fixed.
- o 2 (0x0002, IP version 6): 16 octets, fixed.
- o 16 (0x0010, Domain Name System): Variable-length domain name in uncompressed wire format followed by a variable-length custom token.

For DNS servers that implement ECID, it is RECOMMENDED that they recognize at least the 48-bit MAC CLIENT-IDENTIFIER.

The use of Domain Name System as an address family is to facilitate custom tokens that are not well-conceptualized as addresses, as described in [Section 6](#).

Other types of identifying addresses, such as a 64-bit MAC [[RFC7042](#)] or a DHCP Unique Identifier [[RFC3315](#)] and [[RFC6355](#)] could be

accommodated as devices and needs change, without needing to define new EDNS option codes to cover them. [Why not just bless those obvious candidates now?]

Multiple ECID options MAY appear in the OPT record. However, the same IDENTIFIER-TYPE SHOULD not appear more than once, and each ECID option MUST only carry one IDENTIFIER-TYPE and CLIENT-IDENTIFIER pair.

[5.](#) Protocol Description

[5.1.](#) DNS Query

Any client that originates a DNS query message MAY include the ECID option in the DNS Query message. It is normally expected that the client itself would not do this, but rather that it will be added by the local forwarding resolver.

When a DNS forwarding resolver, provided as part of a router for example, receives a DNS query message from the originating client it adds any IDENTIFIER-TYPE / CLIENT-IDENTIFIER pairs that it supports but which are not present in the existing client request. It then sends the request to the upstream full-service resolver.

Because the option contains personally identifiable information, it should be protected by either only being used within Autonomous

Systems [[RFC1930](#)] controlled by the same provider, by going over an opaque channel such as DNS over TLS [[RFC7858](#)], or by being securely encoded and varying per request. It MUST NOT be sent in clear-text across the Internet.

[5.2.](#) DNS Response

The logic used by a full-service resolver to customize a response based on ECID is out of scope for this document. The resolver MUST NOT include the ECID option in any queries that it makes to external authoritative DNS servers.

For possible caching purposes, the forwarding resolver needs to know whether filtering affected the response. If the name resolution involved any names for which customization was possible, even if such

filtering resulted in delivering the original data, the response SHOULD include an ECID option which contains the FAMILY-ADDRESS and CLIENT-IDENTIFIER pairs that were considered for filtering.

For example, if a filter is set such that only names in the example.com domain are possibly restricted to some devices, then a request for foo.example.com would have the ECID in the response even when the request came from a device which was not restricted. Requests for any other names would not include ECID in the response.

So that the caching forwarding resolver does not need to have any knowledge about what filters are in place, it is the full-service resolver's responsibility to adjust any TTLs in the response as might be dictated by the filter policy it has configured. That is, if some name is filtered only between the hours of 09:00 and 17:00 and a request is received for that name at 16:59:59, the TTL on a positive response or the SOA ncache field on a negative response should be set to just one second and the ECID option included as described above.

If the request contains a malformed ECID option, such as CLIENT-IDENTIFIER not correctly matching the length of described by OPTION-LENGTH and IDENTIFIER-TYPE, the resolver SHOULD reply with DNS rcode FORMERR.

If the resolver by policy does not respond to requests that are lacking ECID of the appropriate IDENTIFIER-TYPE, it SHOULD reply with DNS rcode REFUSED.

[6.](#) Using the DNS Address Family

When IDENTIFIER-TYPE 16 is used, the uncompressed wire format of the domain name is followed by a token that is otherwise opaque to this specification. The length of that token is defined by OPTION-LENGTH

less the two octets used for IDENTIFIER-TYPE and the length of the domain name.

The name used SHOULD be in a namespace that is controlled by the service provider that is using the option, but need not be resolvable in the DNS. We RECOMMEND that providers use short domain names to minimize DNS packet length.

The domain name provides protection against conflicts with other users of the option without the burden of creating yet another IANA Registry to manage yet another two-octet code. Co-operating forwarder/resolver pairs are the only users of the data who need to be concerned with its format.

7. Implementation Status

[RFC Editor: per [RFC 6982](#) this section should be removed prior to publication.]

The protocol proposed here is not currently used anywhere exactly as described, though the Nominum and Umbrella implementations are substantially similar.

The authors know of at least two providers who wish to have it properly standardized and would implement the standard in preference to either of the existing non-standard methods.

8. NAT Considerations

Devices that perform Network Address Translation (NAT) SHOULD NOT give special consideration for ECID. NAT translates between a layer 3 private IP address assigned to a client device on the Local Area Network and a layer 3 public IP address for use within the Wide Area Network. If ECID is being used to pass an IPv4 or IPv6 address, it SHOULD use the internal address without NAT translation, because transforming it to the public address of the NAT device would coalesce all internal devices to just one address.

Other ECID options identify a client device by a different means, e.g. its layer 2 address. This sort of device's identifier is not impacted by NAT. Therefore, DNS queries may be passed without modification of any ECID information.

9. Security Considerations

The identifier of the client that initiated the request will be visible to all servers that are passed the ECID option, and the

various devices on the path between the local network and the full-

service resolver being used by the forwarding resolver.

DNS filtering products are easily circumvented and should not be considered real security measures. With commonly available tools it is trivial to discover the non-filtered DNS responses and use them in place of the filtered responses.

Along those lines, opting out of this specific protocol is as simple as using a different resolver, such as a full-service resolver on the device itself or one of the well-known public resolvers. Of course, other devices on the local network will still be able to see unencrypted DNS requests from the device, and the only way to really protect against such monitoring is to use an opaque tunnel to a trusted resolver.

10. IANA Considerations

IANA is requested to assign a new value in the DNS EDNS Option Codes registry for the Device ID option.

11. Acknowledgements

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