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**Route Information Options in IPv6 Neighbor Discovery**  
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Abstract

The IPv6 Neighbor Discovery (ND) protocol allows nodes to discover neighbors on the same link. Router Advertisement (RA) messages can also convey routing information by including a non-zero (default) Router Lifetime, and/or Route Information Options (RIOs). This document specifies backward-compatible extensions that permit nodes to include RIOs in other IPv6 ND messages to support the discovery of more-specific routes among neighbors on the link.

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## [1.](#) Introduction

"Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)" [[RFC4861](#)] (IPv6 ND) provides a Router Solicitation (RS) function allowing nodes to solicit a Router Advertisement (RA) response from an on-link router, a Neighbor Solicitation (NS) function allowing nodes to solicit a Neighbor Advertisement (NA) response from an on-link neighbor, and a Redirect function allowing routers to inform nodes of a better next hop neighbor on the link toward the destination. Further guidance for processing Redirect messages is given in "First-Hop Router Selection by Hosts in a Multi-Prefix Network" [[RFC8028](#)].

"Default Router Preferences and More-Specific Routes" [[RFC4191](#)] specifies a Route Information Option (RIO) that routers can include



in RA messages to inform recipients of more-specific routes ([section 1](#) of that document provides rationale for the use of RA messages instead of an adjunct routing protocol). This document specifies a backward-compatible and incrementally-deployable extension to allow nodes to include RIOs in other IPv6 ND messages to support the dynamic discovery of more-specific routes. This allows nodes to discover a better neighbor for more-specific routes to both increase performance and reduce the workload on default routers.

This approach applies to any link type on which there may be many nodes that provision delegated prefixes on their downstream interfaces and do not provide transit services between upstream networks. These nodes can either be routers that forward packets on behalf of their downstream networks, or hosts that use a delegated prefix for their own multi-addressing purposes [[I-D.templin-v6ops-pdhost](#)][RFC7934].

This work benefits from the experience of [[RFC6706](#)] - an experimental protocol that uses UDP-based "pseudo-ND" messages instead of actual ICMPv6 message codes. That experience has shown that using synthesized UDP messages in addition to the IPv6 ND messaging already present on the link is inefficient. Furthermore, the UDP approach is neither backward-compatible nor incrementally-deployable, since sending UDP messages blindly to a node that does not have the port open could be mis-interpreted as a port scan attack. This specification avoids these issues by using the already-present and natural IPv6 ND messaging available on the link, as specified in this document.

## **2. Terminology**

The terminology in the normative references applies.

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [[RFC2119](#)]. Lower case uses of these words are not to be interpreted as carrying [RFC2119](#) significance.

## **3. Motivation**

An example of a good application for RIO is the local-area subnets served by the routers described in "Basic Requirements for IPv6 Customer Edge Routers" [[RFC7084](#)]. While many customer edge routers are capable of operating in a mode with a dynamic routing protocol operating in the local-area network, the default mode of operation is typically designed for unmanaged operation without any dynamic routing protocol. On these networks, the only means for any node to



learn about routers on the link is by using the Router Discovery protocol described in [[RFC4861](#)].

Nevertheless, hosts on unmanaged home subnets may use "IPv6 Prefix Options for DHCPv6" [[RFC3633](#)] (DHCPv6 PD) to receive IPv6 routing prefixes for additional subnets allocated from the space provided by the service provider, and operate as routers for other links where hosts in delegated subnets are attached. Hosts may even learn about more specific routes than the default route by processing RIOs in RA messages as described in [[RFC4191](#)].

However, due to perceptions of the security considerations for hosts in processing RIOs on unmanaged networks, the default configuration for common host IPv6 implementations is to ignore RIOs. Accordingly, on typical home networks the forwarding path from hosts on one subnet to destinations on every off-link local subnet always passes through the customer edge router, even when a shorter path would otherwise be available through an on-link router. This adds costs for retransmission on shared LAN media, often adding latency and jitter with queuing delay and delay variability. This is not materially different under the scenarios described in "IPv6 Home Networking Architecture Principles" [[RFC7368](#)] except that routers may use an interior dynamic routing protocol to coordinate sending of RIOs in RA messages, which as explained above, are not processed by typical hosts.

In increasingly common practice, a node that receives a prefix delegation can use the prefix for its own multi-addressing purposes or can connect an entourage of "Internet of Things (IoT)" back end devices (an approach sometimes known as "tethering" [[RFC7934](#)]). On many link types, the number of such nodes may be quite large which would make running a dynamic routing protocol between the nodes impractical. Example use cases include:

- o IETF conference, airport, and hotel WiFi networks, where large numbers of nodes on the link could receive IPv6 prefix delegations. Using the extensions described in this document, the nodes could dynamically discover more-specific routes to enable direct neighbor-to-neighbor communications.
- o Mobile enterprise devices that connect into a corporate network via VPN links. Using the extensions described in this document, mobile devices could dynamically establish pair-wise VPN links between themselves without having to use the enterprise network as transit.
- o Civil aviation networks where an aircraft holds an IPv6 prefix derived from the identification value assigned to it by the



International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Using the extensions described in this document, direct paths between the aircraft and Air Traffic Control (ATC) can be established to provide a more direct route for communications.

- o Unmanned Air System (UAS) networks where each UAS receives an IPv6 prefix delegation for operation with in the Unmanned Air Traffic Management (UTM) service under development within NASA and the FAA. Using the extensions described in this document, very large numbers of UAS can be accommodated by the UTM service for both vehicle-to-infrastructure and vehicle-to-vehicle communications.

By using RIOs in IPv6 ND messages, the forwarding path between subnets can be shortened while accepting a much narrower opening of attack surfaces on general purpose hosts related to the Router Discovery protocol. The basic idea is simple: hosts normally send packets for off-link destinations to their default router unless they receive ND Redirect messages designating another on-link node as the target. This document allows ND Redirects additionally to suggest another on-link node as the target for one or more routing prefixes, including one with the destination. Hosts that receive RIOs in ND Redirect messages then send NS messages to the target containing those RIOs, and process the NA messages the target sends in reply. If hosts only process RIOs in NA messages when they have previously sent them in NS messages to the targets of received ND Redirect messages, then hosts only process the RIOs at the initiative of routers they already accept as authoritative.

#### **4. Route Information Options (RIOs) in IPv6 Neighbor Discovery Messages**

The RIO is specified for inclusion in RA messages in [Section 2.3 of \[RFC4191\]](#), while the neighbor discovery functions are specified in [\[RFC4861\]](#). This specification permits routers to include RIOs in other IPv6 ND messages so that recipients can discover a better next hop for a destination \*prefix\* instead of just a specific destination address. This specification therefore updates [\[RFC4191\]](#) as discussed in the following sections.

##### **4.1. RIO Update**

The RIO format given in [Section 2.3 of \[RFC4191\]](#) is updated by this specification as shown in Figure 1:








Figure 1: Updated RIO Format

This format introduces a new S flag and variable-length Attributes. The fields of the main body of the RIO are set as follows:

- o Type, Prefix Length, Prf, Route Lifetime and Prefix are set exactly as specified in [Section 2.3 of \[RFC4191\]](#).
- o For RA messages, Length is set exactly as specified in [Section 2.3 of \[RFC4191\]](#) and no Attributes are included. For all other IPv6 ND messages, Length MUST be initialized to exactly 1 when Prefix Length is 0, to exactly 2 when Prefix Length is between 1 and 64, and to exactly 3 when Prefix Length is greater than 64. Length is then incremented by the length of all included Attributes in units of 8-octets (see below).
- o S is set to '1' to "Solicit" route information or to '0' (i.e., the default value) to "Assert" route information.
- o Res and Resvd are reserved and MUST be set to '0'.

Attributes MAY be included as ancillary route information. Each Attribute is formatted in the same manner as specified for IPv6 ND options in [Section 4.6 of \[RFC4861\]](#) and as shown in Figure 2:




Figure 2: RIO Attribute Format



This document defines the NULL Attribute with Type '0'. Other Attribute Types are assigned through IANA action.

When Type is '0', Length MUST be set to the total number of 8-octet blocks in the Attribute, and the Attribute body MUST include a corresponding number of '0' octets. For example, for Lengths of 1, 2, 3, etc., the Attribute body includes 6, 14, 22, etc. '0' octets, respectively.

Receivers ignore any NULL, unknown or malformed Attributes and continue to process any other Attributes in the RIO that follow.

#### **4.2. RIO Requirements**

This specification updates [[RFC4191](#)] by allowing RIOs to appear in any IPV6 ND messages with the following requirements:

- o Redirect, NA and RA messages MUST NOT include RIOs with the S flag set to '1'; any RIOs received in Redirect, NA and RA messages with S set to '1' MUST be silently ignored.
- o NS and RS messages MAY include some RIOs with S set to '1' and others with S set to '0'.
- o NA/RA responses to RIOs in NS/RS messages with S set to '1' MUST include RIOs with the solicited route information and with S set to '0'. (If the route information solicited by the NS/RS message is incorrect or unrecognized, however, the RIO MUST be silently ignored.)
- o Asserted route information in any RIOs received with S set to '0' SHOULD be considered as "unconfirmed" until the assertion can be verified. Assertion verification can be through a trust anchor such as a trusted on-link router, through a static routing table, or through some other means outside the scope of this document. Any route information that cannot be verified SHOULD be ignored.

The following sections present the classic redirection scenario illustrating an exchange where a trusted on-link router is used to verify RIO assertions. Other IPV6 ND messaging scenarios that can employ some other means of verifying RIO assertions are also acceptable.

#### **4.3. Classic Redirection Scenario**

In the classical redirection scenario there are three actors, namely the Source, Router and Target as shown in Figure 3:






Figure 3: Classical Redirection Scenario

In addition, the Target may be a node that connects an arbitrarily-complex set of IPv6 networks (e.g., as depicted by 2001:db8::/N in the figure) with hosts H(i).

In this scenario, the Source initially has no route for 2001:db8::/N and must send initial packets destined to correspondents H(i) via a first-hop Router. Upon receiving the packets, the Router forwards the packets to the Target and may also send a Redirect message back to the Source with the Destination Address field set to the destination of the packet that triggered the Redirect, the Target Address field set to the target link-local address and with a Target Link Layer Address Option (TLLAO) that includes the target link-layer address. After receiving the message, the Source may begin sending packets destined to H(i) directly to the Target, which will then forward them to addresses within its internal and/or external IPv6 network prefixes.

This specification augments the classical Redirection scenario by allowing the Router to include entire prefixes (e.g., 2001:db8::/N) in RIOs in the Redirect message, and thereafter allowing the Source to include RIOs in an NS message and the Target to include RIOs in



its NA response. The following sections present this "augmented" RIO redirection scenario.

#### **4.4. RIO Redirection Scenario**

In the RIO redirection scenario, the Source sends initial packets via the Router the same as in the classical scenario. When the Router receives the packets, it searches its routing tables for a route that is assigned to the Target and that covers the destination address of the packet. The Router then includes the route in an RIO in a Redirect message to send back to the Source. The Router sets the S flag in the RIO to '0' to indicate that a prefix is being asserted.

When the Source receives the Redirect message, it prepares an NS message that includes the route information received in the RIO from the Redirect message and with S set to '1' to indicate that route information is being solicited. At the same time, if the Source needs to assert any route information to the Target, it includes the information in RIOs with S set to '0'. The Source then sends the NS message to the Target.

When the Target receives the NS message, it records any route information in RIOs with S set to '0' as unconfirmed route information for the Source pending verification. At the same time, it determines whether the route information included in any RIOs with S set to '1' matches one of its own routes. If so, the Target includes the route information in an RIO with S set to '0' to return in an NA message reply to the Source.

When the Source receives the NA message it can install any RIO information that matches the Redirect RIOs in its routing table. The following sections present more detailed specifications for the Router, Source and Target.

##### **4.4.1. Router Specification**

When the Router receives a packet from the Source it searches its routing table for a prefix that covers the destination address (e.g., 2001:db8::/N as depicted in Figure 1), where prefix could be populated in the routing table during DHCPv6 Prefix Delegation [[RFC3633](#)], via manual configuration, etc. If the next hop for the prefix is on-link (i.e., a "Target" in the terms of [[RFC4861](#)]), the Router then prepares a Redirect message with the Destination Address field set to the packet's IPv6 destination address, with the Target Address field set to the link-local address of the Target, with a TLLAO set to the link-layer address of the Target, and with an RIO that includes route information for the prefix with Route Lifetime,





Prf, and S set to 0. The Router then sends the Redirect message to the Source (subject to rate limiting).

#### **4.4.2. Source Specification**

According to [[RFC4861](#)], a Source that receives a valid Redirect message updates its destination cache per the Destination Address and its neighbor cache per the Target Address. According to [[RFC4191](#)], Sources can be classified as Type "A", "B" or "C" based on how they process RIOs, where a Type "C" Source updates its routing table per any RIO elements included in an RA message. Finally, according to [[RFC8028](#)], a Type "C" Source operating on a Multi-Prefix Network with multiple default routes can make source address selection decisions based on information in its routing table decorated with information derived from the source of the RIO element.

In light of these considerations, this document introduces a new Type "D" behavior for Sources with the same behavior as a Type "C" Source, but which also process RIO elements in other IPv6 ND messages. Type "D" Sources process Redirect messages with RIO elements by first verifying that the Prefix in the first RIO matches the Destination Address. If the Destination Address does not match the Prefix, the Source discards the Redirect message. Otherwise, the Source updates its neighbor cache per the Target Address and its destination cache per the Destination Address the same as for classical redirection. Next, the Source MAY send an NS message to the Target containing an RIO with the Prefix and Prefix Length and with S set to '1' to elicit an NA response (at the same time, the Source MAY include RIOs with S set to '0' if it needs to assert any route information to the Target).

When the Type 'D' Source receives the solicited NA message from the Target, if the NA includes an RIO with S set to '0' and with a Prefix corresponding to the one received in the Redirect message, the Source installs the route information in its routing table with the Target's address as the next hop. (Note that the Prefix Length received in the NA message MAY be different than the Prefix Length received in the Redirect message. If the Prefix Length in the NA is the same or longer, the Source accepts the Prefix as verified by the Router; if the Prefix Length is shorter, the Source considers the Prefix as unconfirmed.)

After the Source installs the route information in its routing table, it MAY begin sending packets with destination addresses that match the Prefix directly to the Target Instead of sending them to the Router. The Source SHOULD decrement the Route Lifetime and MAY send new NS messages to receive a fresh Route Lifetime (if the Route Lifetime decrements to 0, the Source instead deletes the route



information from its routing table). The Source MAY furthermore delete the route information at any time and again allow subsequent packets to flow through the Router which may send a fresh Redirect. The Source SHOULD then again test the route by performing an NS/NA exchange with the Target the same as described above.

After updating its routing table, the Source may receive an unsolicited NA message from the Target with an RIO with new route information. If the RIO Prefix is in its routing table, and if the RIO Route Lifetime value is 0, the Source deletes the corresponding route.

After updating its routing table, the Source may subsequently receive a Destination Unreachable message from the Target with Code '0' ("No route to destination"). If so, the Source SHOULD delete the corresponding route information from its routing table and again allow subsequent packets to flow through the Router.

#### **4.4.3. Target Specification**

When the Target receives an NS message from the Source containing an RIO with S set to '1', it examines the Prefix and Prefix Length to see if it matches one of the prefixes in its routing table. If so, the Target prepares an NA message with an RIO including a Prefix and Prefix Length, any necessary route information, and with S set to '0'. The Target then sends the NA message back to the Source.

If the NS included any RIO options with S set to '0', the Target SHOULD employ a suitable means to verify the asserted route information, and SHOULD reject any route information that cannot be verified.

At some later time, the Target may either alter or deprecate one of its routes. If the Target has asserted route information in RIOs to one or more Sources, the Target SHOULD send unsolicited NA messages with RIOs that assert new route information to alter the route, where a new Route Lifetime value of '0' deprecates the route. If the Target receives a packet with a destination addresses for which there is no matching route for one of its downstream networks, the Target sends a Destination Unreachable message to the Source with Code '0' ("No route to destination"), subject to rate limiting.

#### **4.5. Operation Without Redirects**

If the Source has some way to determine the Target's link-local address without receiving a Redirect message from the Router, the Source MAY send an NS message with an RIO directly to the Target with



S set to 1, Prefix set to the destination address of an IPv6 packet, Prefix Length set to 128 and all other route information is set to 0.

When the Target receives the NS message, it prepares an NA response with an RIO that includes route information for the shortest one of its prefixes that covers the destination address. The Target then sends the NA message to the Source.

When the Source receives the NA message, it SHOULD consider the route information asserted in the RIO as unconfirmed until it can verify the Target's claim (i.e., as described in [Section 4.2](#)).

Any node may also assert route information at any time by sending IPv6 ND messages with RIOs with S set to 0. Recipients of such messages SHOULD consider the route information as unconfirmed until the information can be verified.

#### [4.6.](#) Multiple RIOs

If a Redirect includes multiple RIOs, the Source only checks the destination address for a match against the Prefix in the first RIO.

If an NS/RS message includes multiple RIOs with S set to '1', the neighbor responds to those RIOs which match entries in its routing table.

If an NS/NA/RS/RA message includes multiple RIOs with S set to '0', the neighbor considers all of the route information as unconfirmed until the information can be verified.

#### [4.7.](#) Multicast

Nodes MAY send IPv6 ND messages with RIOs to link-scoped multicast destination addresses including All Nodes, All Routers, and Solicited-Node multicast (see: [\[RFC4291\]](#)). As an example, a node could send unsolicited NA messages to the All Nodes multicast address to alter or deprecate a route it had previously asserted to one or more neighbors.

Nodes MUST be conservative in their use of multicast IPv6 ND messaging to avoid unnecessarily disturbing other nodes on the link.

#### [4.8.](#) Why NS/NA?

Since [\[RFC4191\]](#) already specifies the inclusion of RIOs in RA messages, a natural question is why use NS/NA instead of RS/RA?



First, RA messages are only sent over advertising interfaces [[RFC4861](#)]. Source and Target nodes typically connect only downstream networks; hence, they configure their upstream interfaces as non-advertising interfaces.

Second, NS/NA exchanges used by the IPv6 Neighbor Unreachability Detection (NUD) procedure are unicast-based whereas RA responses to RS messages are typically sent as multicast. Since this mechanism must support unicast operation, the use of unicast NS/NA exchanges is preferred.

Third, the IPv6 ND specification places restrictions on minimum delays between RA messages. Since this mechanism expects an immediate advertisement from the Target in response to the Source's solicitation, only the NS/NA exchange can satisfy this property.

Fourth, the RA message is the "swiss army knife" of the IPv6 ND protocol. RA messages carry numerous configuration parameters for the link, including Cur Hop Limit, M/O flags, Router Lifetime, Reachable Time, Retrans Time, Prefix Information Options, MTU options, etc. The Target must not advertise any of this information to the soliciting Source.

Fifth, RIOs in legacy RA messages cannot encode attributes and therefore may be limited in the route information they can carry.

Finally, operators are deeply concerned about the security of RA messages - so much so that they deploy link-layer security mechanisms that drop RA messages originating from nodes claiming to be an authoritative router for the link [[RFC6105](#)].

## 5. Implementation Status

The IPv6 ND functions and RIOs are widely deployed in IPv6 implementations, however these implementations do not currently include RIOs in IPv6 ND messages other than RAs.

An experimental implementation of [[RFC6706](#)] exists, and demonstrates how the Redirect function can be used to carry route information.

## 6. IANA Considerations

IANA is instructed to create a registry for "RIO Attributes" as discussed in [Section 4.1](#). The registry includes the following initial entry:

0 - the NULL Attribute [[draft-templin-6man-rio-redirect](#)]





Other Attribute types are defined through standards action or expert review.

## 7. Security Considerations

The Redirect message validation rules in [Section 8.1 of \[RFC4861\]](#) require recipients to verify that the IP source address of the Redirect is the same as the current first-hop router for the specified ICMP Destination Address. Recipients therefore naturally reject any Redirect message with an incorrect source address.

Other security considerations for IPv6 ND messages that include RIOs are the same as specified in [Section 11 of \[RFC4861\]](#). Namely, the protocol must take measures to secure IPv6 ND messages on links where spoofing attacks are possible.

A spoofed Redirect message containing no RIOs could cause corruption in the recipient's destination cache, while a spoofed Redirect message containing RIOs could corrupt the host's routing tables. While the latter would seem to be a more onerous result, the possibility for corruption is unacceptable in either case.

"IPv6 ND Trust Models and Threats" [\[RFC3756\]](#) discusses spoofing attacks, and states that: "This attack is not a concern if access to the link is restricted to trusted nodes". "Secure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)" [\[RFC3971\]](#) provides one possible mitigation for other cases. In some scenarios, it may be sufficient to include only the Timestamp and Nonce options defined for SEND without implementing other aspects of the protocol.

"IPv6 Router Advertisement Guard" [\[RFC6105\]](#) ("RA Guard") describes a layer-2 filtering technique intended for network operators to use in protecting hosts from receiving RA messages sent by nodes that are not among the set of routers regarded as legitimate by the network operator.

Nodes must have some form of trust basis for knowing that the sender of an ND message is authoritative for the prefixes it asserts in RIOs. For example, when an NS/NA exchange is triggered by the receipt of a Redirect, the soliciting node can verify that the RIOs in the NA message match the ones it received in the Redirect message (which originally came from a trusted router).

Nodes that do not wish to provide transit services for upstream networks may also receive IPv6 packets via an upstream interface that do not match any of the their delegated prefixes. In that case, the node drops the packets and observes the "Destination Unreachable - No route to destination" procedures discussed in [\[RFC4443\]](#). Dropping



the packets is necessary to avoid a reflection attack that would cause the node to forward packets received from an upstream interface via the same or a different upstream interface.

## 8. Acknowledgements

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This work is aligned with the Boeing Information Technology (BIT) MobileNet program and the Boeing Research & Technology (BR&T) enterprise autonomy program.

## 9. References

### 9.1. Normative References

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#### [Appendix A](#). Link-layer Address Changes

Type "D" hosts send unsolicited NAs to announce link-layer address changes per standard neighbor discovery [[RFC4861](#)]. Link-layer address changes may be due to localized factors such as hot-swap of an interface card, but could also occur during movement to a new point of attachment on the same link.

#### [Appendix B](#). Interfaces with Multiple Link-Layer Addresses

Type "D" host interfaces may have multiple connections to the link; each with its own link-layer address. Type "D" nodes can therefore include multiple link-layer address options in IPv6 ND messages. Neighbors that receive these messages can cache and select link-layer addresses in a manner outside the scope of this specification.

#### [Appendix C](#). Change Log

-04 to -05:

- o Removed "Ver" field and version numbers.
- o Included reference to '[draft-templin-v6ops-pdhost](#)'
- o Changed "MAY" to "may" in two places
- o Added text on advertising interfaces





- o Added UAS use case

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