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COAP Redirects  
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## Abstract

This document allows a Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) server to redirect a client to a new URI. The primary use case is to allow a client using multicast CoAP discovery to learn a COAPS endpoint of the server, without the server revealing privacy-sensitive information. This improves security and privacy in environments with untrusted clients.

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## [1.](#) Introduction

The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [[RFC7252](#)] is a specialized web transfer protocol for use with constrained nodes and constrained networks. When COAP nodes can appear on a network that allows untrusted clients, security and privacy issues can arise, as discussed in [Section 11 of \[RFC7252\]](#).

This document focuses on a solution for a specific use case: preventing privacy-sensitive information from being passed to untrusted clients, especially as part of resource discovery. The resource discovery phase is important because DTLS is not used with multicast COAP.

The specific relevant threats are:

- o Correlation across location: If a COAP server can move between multiple networks in which an attacker has a presence, the attacker can potentially correlate responses from the COAP server across the two locations and determine that the same entity is

moving between those two locations. This can even be used to identify individuals, such as when the COAP server is in a wearable device.

- o Correlation across time: If a COAP server is available periodically in the same location over a long time, an attacker in that location can potentially correlate responses over time and determine that it is the same entity, even though the IP address and layer-2 address may be different. This can even be used to identify individuals, such as when the COAP server is in a wearable device.
- o Fingerprinting: Device-specific vulnerability exploitation can be most easily accomplished if an attacker can easily narrow down what software the server runs. Information returned via multicast service discovery can facilitate such fingerprinting.

For more discussion of these threats, see [Section 5.2 of \[RFC6973\]](#), [Section 3 of \[RFC7721\]](#), and [\[I-D.winfaa-intarea-broadcast-consider\]](#).

To mitigate these threats, this document defines the ability for a server to redirect a client to another URI. Specifically, the expected use is that in response to an unsecured COAP request, a privacy-sensitive server could be configured to simply respond by redirecting the client to a COAPS endpoint, thus allowing the client to discover a unicast endpoint, but not to discover any privacy-sensitive information without establishing a secured unicast connection.

By comparison, HTTP ([Section 6.4.2 of \[RFC7231\]](#)) redirects with 301 (Moved Permanently) and a Location header containing the new URI. COAP, on the other hand, defines Location-Path and Location-Query COAP options [\[RFC7252\]](#) for those components of the URI, but did not define options for the other URI components. [\[ListDiscussion\]](#) explains:

While early drafts of CoAP did have some forms of redirection, we found that the use cases most people had in mind did not call for redirects. The main reason is that in a CoRE world, URIs are usually found through a discovery process, and these URIs can be

made to point to the right place right away.

The use case motivating this document, however, is specifically for redirects as part of the discovery process itself.

### [1.1.](#) Example

Existing clients conforming to the OIC 1.1 Core spec [[OIC1.1Core](#)] sections [10](#) and [11.3.5](#) do discovery by sending a multicast CoAP GET for "/oic/res". Existing servers will respond with links to a set of resources, but that information might be privacy-sensitive in some cases. For example, it might contain sufficient a unique identifier

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of the server, or information sufficient for an attacker to determine what version of what software it runs. (A sample response can be found in section 10.2 of [[OIC1.1Core](#)].) Hence a privacy-sensitive server needs a way to be discovered by trusted clients without revealing privacy-sensitive information to untrusted observers. A redirect allows a client to send the same request, thus not increasing the amount of multicast traffic on the network.

For example, consider a network with a privacy-sensitive server, and a legacy server. A client wants to efficiently discover both servers. The client can send a single multicast GET for "/oic/res", and the legacy server would send a unicast response with the requested data, whereas the privacy-sensitive server would respond with a unicast redirect to "coaps://<ipaddr>:<port>/oic/res". The client can then generate a unicast GET over coaps to get the actual data, if permitted, from the privacy-sensitive server. This mechanism keeps the latency and number of messages to a minimum.

## [2.](#) Alternatives Considered

This section discusses why existing alternatives are not sufficient.

### [2.1.](#) Just use normal multicast discovery

Normal multicast discovery is susceptible to the threats discussed earlier. Another approach would be for multicast discovery to return only generic information that is the same for every device, and hence does not reveal any privacy related information or allow fingerprinting. This is undesirable since the resource handler would

have to return different information based on whether the client is authenticated vs. unauthenticated, and thus is complex and error prone to implement and maintain.

## [2.2.](#) Just use a resource directory

A resource directory could be used and only provide data to authenticated clients. However, the same problem still remains as to how to discover the resource directory itself. One could potentially use an alternate discovery protocol such as DNS-SD, but this introduces additional complexity when clients otherwise just use COAP for both discovery and communication. In addition, requiring a resource directory to be implemented, deployed, and maintained in a constrained environment presents an extra deployment burden that is desirable to avoid.

## [2.3.](#) Use Alternative-Address

Section 4.5 of [[I-D.ietf-core-coap-tcp-tls](#)] provides an Alternative-Address option, which can be used to redirect the client to another transport address. However, it states:

The Alternative-Address elective option requests the peer to instead open a connection of the same kind as the present connection to the alternative transport address given. Its value is in the form "authority" as defined in [Section 3.2 of \[RFC3986\]](#).

Thus, Alternative-Address can indicate another authority component, but it explicitly requires the same URI scheme to be used, so it cannot be used to redirect from coap to coaps.

## [3.](#) Redirects

### [3.1.](#) Option Definitions

The following additional options are defined.

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Number	Name	Format	Length	Base Value
TBD	Location-Scheme	string	0-255	(none)
TBD	Location-Authority	string	0-255	(none)

### [3.1.1.](#) Location-Scheme and Location-Authority

[Section 5.10.7 of \[RFC7252\]](#) states:

The options that are used to compute the relative URI-reference are collectively called Location-\* options. Beyond Location-Path and Location-Query, more Location-\* options may be defined in the future and have been reserved option numbers 128, 132, 136, and 140.

The Location-Scheme and Location-Authority options are subject to all rules for Location-\* options discussed in [\[RFC7252\]](#).

Together with Location-Path and Location-Query, the Location-Scheme and Location-Authority Options indicate a relative URI that contains either of an absolute path, a query string, or both. A combination of these options is included in a 3.01 (Moved Permanently) response to indicate the new location of the requested resource relative to the request URI.

If a response with Location-Scheme and/or Location-Authority Options passes through a cache that interprets these options and the implied URI identifies one or more currently stored responses, those entries MUST be marked as not fresh.

The Location-Scheme and Location-Authority Option can contain any character sequence conforming to the scheme and authority components defined in [\[RFC3986\]](#).

## [3.2.](#) Response Codes

This specification adds the following response code.

### [3.2.1.](#) 3.01 Moved Permanently

This Response Code indicates that the target resource has been assigned a new permanent URI and any future references to this resource ought to use the indicated effective URI.

The server MUST include in the response any of the following options whose values differ between the requested URI and the new effective URI: Location-Scheme, Location-Authority, Location-Path, and Location-Query. The client SHOULD use the Location field value for automatic redirection.

A 3.01 response is cacheable. Caches can use the Max-Age Option to determine freshness. A 3.01 response cannot be validated.

#### [4.](#) IANA Considerations

This document adds the following option numbers to the "CoAP Option Numbers" registry defined by [\[RFC7252\]](#):

Number	Name	Reference
TBD	Location-Scheme	I-D.thaler-core-redirect
TBD	Location-Authority	I-D.thaler-core-redirect

NOTE: [Section 5.10.7 of \[RFC7252\]](#) reserves option numbers 128, 132, 136, and 140 for new Location-\* options. Thus, the option numbers should be assigned from that set.

This document adds the following response codes to the "CoAP Response Codes" registry defined by [\[RFC7252\]](#):

Code	Description	Reference
3.01	Moved Permanently	I-D.thaler-core-redirect

#### [5.](#) Security Considerations

The use case for this document is specifically to mitigate privacy concerns by allowing a request to an unsecured URI to be redirected to a secured URI.

Preventing identifying information from being observed by untrusted clients doing multicast discovery is necessary but not sufficient to mitigate the privacy issues discussed in [Section 1](#). That is, one must also use an authentication scheme for subsequent unicast messages that does not reveal a stable identifier to clients before authentication is complete. Mutual authentication schemes exist (e.g., [[Balfanz](#)]) that only reveal the identity of both endpoints if authentication succeeds, but they may not yet be available in current standards and popular code bases.

## [6.](#) References

### [6.1.](#) Normative References

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