Expanding Aggressively Those HTTP Cookies
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Abstract

HTTP Cookies that are sent over connections without confidentiality and integrity protection are vulnerable to theft. Such cookies should be expired aggressively.

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1. Introduction

HTTP cookies [RFC6265] provide a means of persisting server state between multiple requests. This feature is widely used on both HTTP [RFC7230] and HTTPS [RFC2818] requests.

The authority for "http://" resources (see Section 9.1 of [RFC7230]) derives from insecure sources: notably the network and the DNS (absent DNSSEC). This situation might change over time. As persistent state, cookies create a way for an attacker to link requests. The information that a cookie holds might also be valuable to that attacker in some way.

To limit the effectiveness of attacks on cleartext communications [RFC7258], user agents are encouraged to limit the persistence of cookies that are set over insecure connections.

1.1. Notational Conventions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2. Expire Cookies

Cookies that are set using insecure channels (i.e., HTTP over cleartext TCP), MUST have a short time limit on the time that they are persisted. For instance, such cookies might only persist until the user closes their browser.

If a user agent detects a change in network conditions it SHOULD remove any cookies that were established using insecure channels.

Alternatives:
In the investigation into this change, it was suggested that cookies without the "Secure" flag might be given the same treatment. However, this resulted in a far greater number of cookies being affected and some interoperability problems as a result.

This change might be limited to cookies that are set in third-party contexts. See [I-D.west-first-party-cookies]. Limiting access to third-party cookies in this fashion could have the secondary effect of encouraging providers of third-party content to move to HTTPS. This removes that content as a barrier to the adoption of HTTPS for the sites that include that content.

3. Security Considerations

This document describes an improvement that could be a security improvement. However, this is not without risks. For cookies that are used as a substitute for logins, more regular clearing of a login cookie could expose the primary authentication token (for instance, a password) to more network attackers as a result of being entered more often.

Clearing login tokens could also cause a degree of user annoyance, as login information is lost. Such annoyance manifests in many subtle ways.

Limiting the change to third-party contexts as suggested above might reduce these risks, though with lesser overall impact.

4. IANA Considerations

This document makes no request of IANA.

5. References

5.1. Normative References


5.2. Informative References


Appendix A. Acknowledgements

Henri Sivonen first suggested that non-Secure cookies be made ephemeral. Chris Peterson did much of the initial investigation and work. See <https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1160368> for details.

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