                  Client Authentication over New TLS Connection
                        draft-thomson-httpbis-cant-00

Abstract

   This document defines an HTTP authentication scheme that can be added
   to an error response to indicate to a client that a successful
   response will only be provided over a new TLS connection, and only if
   the client has provided a certificate on that connection.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on November 9, 2014.

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1. Introduction

   Client authentication in HTTP sometimes relies on certificate-based
   authentication of clients in Transport Layer Security (TLS)
   [RFC5246]. Some uses of client authentication rely on TLS
   renegotiation, triggering renegotiation in response to a request for
   a particular resource.

   HTTP/2 [I-D.ietf-httpbis-http2] forbids the use of renegotiation,
   except for at the very beginning of a connection. This makes
   addressing some client authentication use cases difficult.

   This document defines a new authentication scheme,
   "ClientCertificate", for use in HTTP authentication challenges
   [I-D.ietf-httpbis-p7-auth]. In combination with the 401
   (Unauthorized) status code, this indicates that the resource requires
   client authentication at the TLS layer in order to access it.

1.1. Conventions and Terminology

   At times, this document falls back on shorthands for establishing
   interoperability requirements on implementations: the capitalized
   words "MUST", "SHOULD" and "MAY". These terms are defined in
   [RFC2119].

2. Client Certificate Challenge

   A new authentication scheme ([I-D.ietf-httpbis-p7-auth]) for the
   "WWW-Authenticate" and "Proxy-Authenticate" header fields is defined
   with the name "ClientCertificate".

   A challenge with this authentication scheme does not define any
   parameters except "realm". The "realm" can be used to select an
   appropriate certificate, or if a certificate is already in use, to
   indicate the need for a different certificate. Other challenge

parameters MAY be used to provide a client with information it can
use to select an appropriate certificate. Unknown parameters MUST be
ignored.

This challenge cannot be satisfied by constructing an Authorization
header field [I-D.ietf-httpbis-p7-auth], it can only be satisfied by
making the request on a TLS connection where an appropriate
certificate has been provided by the client.

To effectively use this authentication scheme, a new connection is
needed for every protection space used by a given origin server. A
client can use the "ClientCertificate" challenge as a trigger to open
a new connection and to use client authentication on that connection.
The client can use the mechanism in [I-D.thomson-tls-care] to prompt
the server to request a client certificate, to avoid the problem
where the server doesn't know to make this request.

3. Security Considerations

Clients that support this authentication scheme will create a new
connection each time that they see a challenge. This could be
exploited in order to generate additional load in terms of
connections on both server and client.

Using new connections for client authentication has additional
processing costs to the client in proving access to the private keys
associated with the client certificate; and to the server in proving
access to the private keys associated with their certificate twice in
the case that the client opts for confidentiality protection on the
client certificate.

HTTP/2 [I-D.ietf-httpbis-http2] allows clients to use the same
connection for multiple canonical root URIs. Certificate-based
client authentication as defined by this specification is bound to a
single origin. This could create issues whereby the security
properties of a connection could become confused. Clients MUST
ensure that a client-authenticated connection is only used for the
origin for which it was created.

4. IANA Considerations

IANA is requested to create an entry in the HTTP Authentication
Scheme Registry with the following information:

   ClientCertificate

   This document

This scheme does not rely on the Authorization header field.

5. Acknowledgements

Eric Rescorla helped identify the problem and formulate this
mechanism. Julian Reschke and Michael Koeller provided excellent
feedback.

6. References

6.1. Normative References

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[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
          (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.

[RFC6454] Barth, A., "The Web Origin Concept", RFC 6454, December
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6.2. Informational References

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[I-D.thomson-tls-care]
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