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Completely Automated Public Turing Test to Tell Computers and Humans Apart (CAPTCHA) based Robot Challenges for SIP draft-tschofenig-sipping-captcha-01.txt

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Abstract

A common approach to deal with unwanted communication attempts is to rely on some form of authorization policies, typically whitelists. In order to populate the entries in such an access control list it is helpful to have a way to challenge the entity willing to engage in a conversation (unless they are already pre-authorized). One reason why

this is desired is to deal with robots that are aggressively distributing messages.

This document describes how "Completely Automated Public Turing Test to Tell Computers and Humans Apart" (CAPTCHA) tests, which require human interaction, are applied to SIP.

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1. Introduction TOC

The problem of unwanted communication is an imminent challenge and only the combination of several techniques can provide some degree of protection. [RFC5039] (Rosenberg, J. and C. Jennings, "The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Spam," January 2008.) provides four recommendations that should to be considered for an overall solution, namely,

*Strong Identity

*White Lists

*Solve the Introduction Problem

*Don't Wait Until its Too Late.

The human interaction required challenges are mainly used for solving the introduction problem targeting to handle requests from user agents with whom the recipient do not have former relations. For example, the challenge is initiated towards user agents that are not yet white or black-listed, or based on some other criteria.

The [I-D.tschofenig-sipping-framework-spit-reduction] (Tschofenig, H., Schulzrinne, H., Wing, D., Rosenberg, J., and D. Schwartz, "A Framework to tackle Spam and Unwanted Communication for Internet Telephony," July 2008.) provides a framework for dealing with unwanted communication. The policy contains rules that are applied to requests if the conditions of a given rule matche. The actions of the matching rules are executed and one of the actions could be to provide a challenge that must be soved by a human before the request is forwarded to the called party triggering the corresponding user interface notifications to the user.

There are different techniques already developed for challenging user agents. "Completely Automated Public Turing Test to Tell Computes and Humans Apart" (CAPTCHA) [captcha] (von Ahn, L., Blum, M., and J. Langford, "Telling Humans and Computers Apart Automatically,"

February 2004.) typically provides a human a task either to recognize something or a question to be answered using different media types.

[Inaccessibility-of-CAPTCHA] (May, M., "Inaccessibility of CAPTCHA; Alternatives to Visual Turing Tests on the Web," November 2005.)

provides alternatives to visual test for allowing systems to test for

human users while preserving access by users with disabilities. Hashcash challenge [hashcash] (Back, A., "Hashcash - A Denial of Service Counter-Measure," August 2002.) requires user agents to perform CPU-intensive computational puzzles making it difficult to send large amounts of requests. The hashcash concept has been proposed for usage with SIP in [I-D.jennings-sip-hashcash] (Jennings, C., "Computational Puzzles for SPAM Reduction in SIP," July 2007.).

Using CAPTCHA techniques for SIP communication requires a mechanism for enabling user interaction to be associated with SIP requests. When a proxy or user agent server (UAS) server receives a SIP request that needs to be challenged, the proxy or UAS sends a challenge to the originator of the SIP request before continue handling of the request. After getting the answer to the challenge from the user, the user agent client (UAC) needs to provide the answer back towards the UAS in order to get the initial request passed to the recipient.

The challenge should offer multiple choices for the UACs to select depending on the capabilities of the device where the UAC is running. Also, the UAC should be able to authenticate and authorize the source of challenge. The UAC may receive the challenge via a URL or as direct media component(s).

The main goal is to support SIP dialog creating request such as SIP INVITE, but ideally the solution should also cover non-dialog creating requests, e.g., SIP MESSAGE.

Note that this document presents several different solution approaches, see Section 11 (Alternative Solution Approaches). The solution presented in the main part of the document is aligned with the work done with [XEP-0158] (Paterson, I., "XEP-0158: Robot Challenges," October 2006.) on CAPTCHAS for XMPP.

2. Terminology

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In this document, the key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119] (Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels," March 1997.) and indicate requirement levels for compliant implementations.

This document makes also use of the vocabulary defined in RFC 3261 [RFC3261] (Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol," June 2002.).

3.1. Operation of a SIP Proxy or SIP UAS

TOC

When a SIP proxy or a SIP UAS receives a SIP request from a UAC, its authorization engine may apply the policy to the SIP request, as, for example, defined in [RFC5025] (Rosenberg, J., "Presence Authorization Rules," December 2007.). This authorization policy execution may result in the need for the proxy (or the UAS) to generate a challenge to the UAC, the proxy (or the UAS) can send the challenge directly, can send a URI of the challenge, or can redirect the request to a special CAPTCHA UA.

3.2. Operation of UAC

TOC

The UAC either receives a CAPTCHA challenge or a URI of the challenge. The UAC is expected to solve the CAPTCHA puzzle and send the answer back to the SIP proxy server or to send a token to indicate that it has successfully solved the puzzle.

4. Description of the CAPTCHA XML Doument

TOC

This section describes the content of the CAPTCHA XML document. The XML schema for it can be found in <u>Section 7 (XML Schema)</u>.

4.1. Structure of XML-Encoded CAPTCHA Challenge

TOC

A CAPTCHA challenge is an XML document [XML] (Bray, T., "Exensible Markup Language (XML) 1.0 (Second Edition)," October 2000.) that MUST be well-formed and MUST be valid according to the schema defined in this document, including extension schemas available to the validater and applicable to the XML document. The XML documents MUST be based on XML 1.0 and MUST be encoded using UTF-8.

The namespace identifier for elements defined by this specification is a URN [RFC2141] (Moats, R., "URN Syntax," May 1997.), using the namespace identifier 'ietf' defined by [RFC2648] (Moats, R., "A URN Namespace for IETF Documents," August 1999.) and extended by [RFC3688] (Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry," January 2004.). This URN is: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:captcha.

4.2. MIME Type for CAPTCHA Challenge Document

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The MIME type for the XML document is 'application/capcha-challenge+xml'.

4.3. The <challenge> Root Element

TOC

The root element of the XML document is <challenge>.

The <challenge> element contains the namespace definition mentioned in Section 4.1 (Structure of XML-Encoded CAPTCHA Challenge). It also contains a mandatory 'id' attribute for correlating the challenge and the answer, and the 'min-tests' attribute with the default value set to 1. With the 'min-tests' attribute, it is possible to define the minimum amount of tests that need to be solved.

The <challenge> element MUST have at least one child element. This document defines the <media> element as a child element. The <challenge> element may contain one or more <media> elements. The <challenge> element may also be extended by XML elements or attributes defined with other namespaces.

4.4. The <media> Element

TOC

The <media> element contains one child element. This document defines the <uri> and <data> elements as child elements for allowing the CAPTCHA challenge be provided directly as content or as a reference to an external content.

The <media> element contains a mandatory 'var' attribute indicating the type of the challenge (see values from the 'var' column of Figure 1 (Information of CAPTCHA challenges)). It may also contain optional 'width' and 'height' attributes for providing the size of the content. In addition, the element may contain an 'instr' attribute which purpose is to provide instructions related to the challenge (see the 'example generic instruction' column from Figure 1 (Information of CAPTCHA challenges)). The required tests can be indicated by setting the value of the 'required' attribute to 'true'.

The <media> element may also be extended by XML elements or attributes defined with other namespaces.

4.5. The <uri> element

The <uri> element contains a mandatory 'type' attribute indicating the MIME type of the challenge. See values from the 'MIME type' column of Figure 1 (Information of CAPTCHA challenges). The value of the <uri> element is a URL where the challenge can be fetched.

The <uri> element may also be extended by XML attributes defined with other namespaces.

4.6. The <data> element

TOC

The <data> element contains a mandatory 'type' attribute indicating the MIME type of the challenge. See typical values from the 'MIME type' column of Figure 1 (Information of CAPTCHA challenges).

The value of the <data> element is the content of the challenge.

The <data> element may also be extended by XML attributes defined with other namespaces.

4.7. Values TOC

The following table copied from [XEP-0158] (Paterson, I., "XEP-0158: Robot Challenges," October 2006.) presents typical values for the CAPTCHA challenge. The 'var' column lists values for the 'var' attribute of the <media> element. The 'MIME type' column contains values of the corresponding 'type' attribute of the <ur>
 elements.

+	++		+	++
'var' +	Name		MIME type	Example generic instructions
ocr* 	Optical Char Recognition	_	image/ jpeg	Enter the code you see
picture_recog	Picture Recognition	· ·		
video_recog 	Video Recognition			'
speech_recog	Speech Recognition		•	Enter the words you hear
audio_recog 	Audio Recognition		•	Describe the sound you hear
picture_q 	Picture Question	· ·		Answer the question you see
video_q 	Video Question	video		Answer the question in video
speech_q 	Speech Question			Answer the question you hear
qa t	Text Q & A 	text	text/	Answer the question
,	, 		 -	,

^{*} The image portrays random characters that humans can read but OCR software cannot. To pass the challenge, the user must simply type the characters. The correct answer SHOULD NOT depend on the language specified by the 'xml:lang' attribute of the challenge.

Figure 1: Information of CAPTCHA challenges

5. Syntax

The Captcha header field carries the solution information. It has parameters called 'id' and 'answer'. The 'id' parameter value is set to the same as the 'id' attribute of the CAPTCHA challenge sent to the UAC. The 'answer' parameter value is set to the answer of the CAPTCHA challenge.

Example:

Captcha: id="rjffe32"; answer="2"; The ABNF for the header is:

Captcha = "Captcha" HCOLON captcha-parm *(COMMA captcha-param)
captcha-param = captcha-id SEMI captcha-answer *(SEMI generic-param)
captcha-id = "id" EQUAL quoted-string
captcha-answer = "answer" EQUAL quoted-string

This document updates the Table 2 of [RFC3261] (Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol,"

June 2002.) by adding the following:

Header field	where	proxy	ACK	BYE	CAN	INV	0PT	REG
Captcha	R	dr	0	0	-	0	0	0
			SUB	NOT	REF	INF	UPD	PRA
			0	0	0	0	0	0

6. Example TOC

The following XML document shows the content that is provided of a CAPTCHA the challenge message sent towards the sending party as shown in message (2) of Figure 3 (Proxy returns URL to the CAPTCHA).

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<challenge xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:captcha"</pre>
    xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
    id="73DE28A2">
    <media var="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:captcha:ocr"</pre>
                width="290" height="80">
        <uri type="image/jpeg">
                http://www.example.com/challenges/ocr.jpeg?F3A6292C
        </uri>
    </media>
    <media var="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:captcha:audio_recog">
        <uri type="audio/x-wav">
                http://www.example.com/challenges/audio.wav?F3A6292C
        </uri>
    </media>
    <media var="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:captcha:qa">
        <data type="text/plain">Type the color of a stop light</data>
    </media>
</challenge>
```

7. XML Schema TOC

This document defines the XML Schema based on the schema defined in Section 12 of [XEP-0158] (Paterson, I., "XEP-0158: Robot Challenges," October 2006.).

```
<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<xs:schema xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"</pre>
    targetNamespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:captcha"
    xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:captcha"
    elementFormDefault="qualified">
    <xs:element name="challenge" type="challengeType"/>
    <xs:complexType name="challengeType">
        <xs:complexContent>
            <xs:restriction base="xs:anyType">
                 <xs:sequence>
                     <xs:element ref="media"</pre>
                         minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
                     <xs:any namespace="##other"</pre>
                         minOccurs="0" processContents="lax"/>
                 </xs:sequence>
                 <xs:attribute name="id"</pre>
                     use="required" type="xs:string"/>
                 <xs:attribute name="min_tests" type="xs:unsignedInt"</pre>
                     default="1" use="optional" />
             </xs:restriction>
        </xs:complexContent>
    </xs:complexType>
    <xs:element name="media" type="mediaType"/>
    <xs:complexType name="mediaType">
        <xs:complexContent>
             <xs:restriction base="xs:anyType">
                 <xs:choice min0ccurs="1" max0ccurs="1">
                     <xs:element ref="uri"</pre>
                         minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
                     <xs:element ref="data"</pre>
                         minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
                     <xs:any namespace="##other" min0ccurs="0"</pre>
                         processContents="lax"/>
                 </xs:choice>
                 <xs:attribute name="var"</pre>
                     use="required" type="xs:anyURI"/>
                 <xs:attribute name="required" type="xs:boolean"</pre>
                     default="false" use="optional"/>
                 <xs:attribute name="height"</pre>
                     type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
                 <xs:attribute name="width"</pre>
                     type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
```

```
<xs:attribute name="instr"</pre>
                     type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
                 <xs:anyAttribute namespace="##any"</pre>
                     processContents="lax"/>
            </xs:restriction>
        </xs:complexContent>
    </xs:complexType>
    <xs:element name="uri">
        <xs:complexType>
            <xs:simpleContent>
                 <xs:extension base="xs:string">
                     <xs:attribute name="type" use="required"/>
                     <xs:anyAttribute namespace="##any"</pre>
                         processContents="lax"/>
                 </xs:extension>
            </xs:simpleContent>
        </xs:complexType>
    </xs:element>
    <xs:element name="data">
        <xs:complexType>
            <xs:simpleContent>
                 <xs:extension base="xs:string">
                     <xs:attribute name="type" use="required"/>
                     <xs:anyAttribute namespace="##any"</pre>
                         processContents="lax"/>
                 </xs:extension>
            </xs:simpleContent>
        </xs:complexType>
    </xs:element>
</xs:schema>
```

8. Security Considerations

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[Editor's Note: A future version of this document will describe security considerations.]

9. IANA Considerations

TOC

This specification registers a new header and a new response code. IANA is requested to make the following updates in the registry at: http://

www.iana.org/assignments/sip-parameters. It also registers a new namespace and a content type.

9.1. Captcha Header

TOC

Add the following entry to the header sub-registry.

Header Name	compact	Reference
Captcha		[RFC-XXXX]

9.2. 4xx Response

TOC

Add the following entry to the response code sub-registry under the "Request Failure 4xx" heading.

4xx CAPTCHA required [RFC-XXXX]

9.3. Namespace

TOC

This section registers a new XML namespace per the procedures in [RFC3688] (Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry," January 2004.).

```
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:captcha
   Registrant Contact: IETF SIPPING Working Group, Hannes Tschofenig
      (hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com).
   XML:
   BEGIN
   <?xml version="1.0"?>
   <!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML Basic 1.0//EN"</pre>
     "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml-basic/xhtml-basic10.dtd">
   <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
   <head>
     <meta http-equiv="content-type"</pre>
           content="text/html;charset=iso-8859-1"/>
     <title>Namespace for CAPTCHA Challenge</title>
   </head>
   <body>
     <h1>Namespace for providing CAPTCHA challenge</h1>
     <h2>urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:captcha</h2>
   See <a href="[URL of published RFC]">RFCXXXX
       [NOTE TO IANA/RFC-EDITOR:
        Please replace XXXX with the RFC number of this
       specification.]</a>.
   </body>
   </html>
   END
```

9.4. Content-Type registration for 'application/captchachallenge+xml'

TOC

This specification requests the registration of a new MIME type according to the procedures of RFC 2048 [RFC2048] (Freed, N., Klensin, J., and J. Postel, "Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) Part Four: Registration Procedures," November 1996.) and guidelines in RFC 3023 [RFC3023] (Murata, M., St. Laurent, S., and D. Kohn, "XML Media Types," January 2001.).

MIME media type name: application

MIME subtype name: captcha-challenge+xml

Mandatory parameters: none Optional parameters: charset

Indicates the character encoding of enclosed XML. Default is UTF-8. Encoding considerations:

Uses XML, which can employ 8-bit characters, depending on the character encoding used. See RFC 3023 <xref target="RFC3023"/>, Section 3.2.

Security considerations:

This content type is designed to carry challenges for the user agent clients to solve in order to give a proof of being a human behind the generated request. This action is a part of a spam preventing mechanism.

Appropriate precautions should be adopted to limit disclosure of this information. Please refer to RFCXXXX [NOTE TO IANA/RFC-EDITOR: Please replace XXXX with the RFC number of this specification.]

Security Considerations section for more information.

Interoperability considerations: none

Published specification: RFCXXXX [NOTE TO IANA/RFC-EDITOR: Please replace XXXX with the RFC number of this specification.] this document

Applications which use this media type: SIP applications

Additional information:

Magic Number: None File Extension: .xml

Macintosh file type code: 'TEXT'

Personal and email address for further information: Hannes

Tschofenig, Hannes.Tschofenig@nsn.com

Intended usage: LIMITED USE

Author/Change controller:

This specification is a work item of the IETF SIPPING working group, with mailing list address <xxxxx @ietf.org>.

9.5. CAPTCHA Schema Registration

</xs:schema>

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10. Acknowledgments

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Years ago CAPTCHAs have been introduced for XMPP, see 'XEP-0158: Robot Challenges' [XEP-0158] (Paterson, I., "XEP-0158: Robot Challenges," October 2006.). The authors of this document believe that there is value in re-using it for SIP for Spam prevention. Hence, the authors would like to thank the XMPP community for their work on this subject. In particular, all credits go to Ian Paterson (ian.paterson@clientside.co.uk), the author of [XEP-0158] (Paterson, I., "XEP-0158: Robot Challenges," October 2006.).

We would like to thank Jonathan Rosenberg for his feedback to this draft.

11. Alternative Solution Approaches

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This section shows alternative solution approaches that can be used by a proxy to perform CAPTCHA tests.

11.1. Challenge by Proxy

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11.1.1. Overview TOC

Figure 2 (Proxy returns the CAPTCHA directly with the response) and Figure 3 (Proxy returns URL to the CAPTCHA) present high level messages flows for conveying a challenge (e.g., CAPTCHA) to the SIP UAC that initiated a dialog forming SIP request. In Figure 2 (Proxy returns the CAPTCHA directly with the response) the challenge is included in the body of the SIP 4xx response while Figure 3 (Proxy returns URL to the CAPTCHA) describes a case when the challenge is fetched via an URL that was provided with the response. After the user has managed to solve the challenge the UAC re-issues the request with the solution. The proxy removes the solution before forwarding the request to the SIP UAS.




Figure 2: Proxy returns the CAPTCHA directly with the response




Figure 3: Proxy returns URL to the CAPTCHA

11.1.2. Operation of Proxy when it issues a challenge directly

The proxy sends a 4xx response with an XML document containing the challenge in the body. The Content-Type used for the XML document is 'application/captcha-challenge+xml'.

When the proxy receives a re-issued SIP request from the UAC, it validates the answer provided by the UAC in the CAPTCHA header field. In case the answer and other possible policies allow the request to get proxied further to the UAS, the proxy removes the CAPTCHA header. Depending on the policies and functionality of the proxy, the proxy may update the authorization policy according to the decision, e.g., insert the AoR of the user of the UAC to a white or black list. In case the answer was not satisfactory, the UAS acts according to a defined policy, e.g., rejects the request.

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11.1.3. Operation of UAC on receiving a CAPTCHA challenge from the SIP

When the UAC receives a 4xx response with a MIME type 'application/ captcha-challenge+xml' in the body to be solved, the UAC first authenticates and authorizes the sender of the challenge. The UAC selects the challenges marked as mandatory and possibly some additional ones for UAC's execution or to be rendered to the user based on, e.g., the device capabilities. The UAC may also need to fetch the challenges from which URL links were provided. When the challenge gets solved, the UAC provides an answer in the CAPTCHA header field by reissuing the SIP request, e.g., by sending a SIP re-INVITE.

11.2. SIP request redirected by the SIP Proxy

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11.2.1. Overview

In this case, the SIP proxy redirects the INVITE from a SIP UAC to a CAPTCHA UAS. The CAPTCHA UA acknowledges the request for service and then, contacts the SIP UAC directly to issue the challenge. On performing the CAPTCHA tests, it initimates the SIP server of the result.

The redirect of the INVITE by the SIP server to a CAPTCHA UA is a simple call redirect, negotiation of the parameters for the CAPTCHA is done using the standard SDP negotiation. From the caller point of view this is just a call setup, the caller will be presented the CAPTCHA test depending on the media it supports (audio, video, text). In this way there is no need for additional signaling that would reveal the caller that a CAPTCHA needs to be solved.

Figure 4 (A case where the Proxy redirects the INVITE to a CAPTCHA UA and gets a SUCCCESS repsonse) presents a high level message flow showing a successful CAPTCHA test and Figure 5 (A case where the Proxy redirects the INVITE to a CAPTCHA UA and gets a NOT SUCCCESS repsonse) presents a high level message flow conveying a unsuccessful CAPTCHA challenge by a UA.

SIP	SIP Proxy	CAPTCHA	S
JAC	or UA	UA	U
 	l I	 	
 INVITE(Callee)	i	İ	
+	1		
 	INVITE(Re-Dire CAPTCHA UA)	ected to 	
	+		
<u> </u>	<u> </u>		
		 200 OK	
İ	<	+	
	<u> </u>		
200 <) OK		
/	1	\	
//		\\	
/ \	VIDEO Test Perform	\ hed \ /	
\\		·//	
\	1	/	
 	 <if td="" test="" was<=""><td>Successful> </td><td></td></if>	Successful>	
	REFER TO Cal	·	
I	Crypto cook		
 	<	+ 	
REFER TO Callee	· +		
Crypto cookie	1		
<	+ I		
 INVITE(Callee) +	 	 	
Crypto cookie	<u> </u>		
+ 	1	ee) + Crypto cookie	
i İ	+	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	
	I		200 OK
	<		
Ì	İ		
200) OK		
/	İ	i	\
//			\\
/			

\\			//
\	I	I	/
I	1	1	

Figure 4: A case where the Proxy redirects the INVITE to a CAPTCHA UA and gets a SUCCCESS repsonse




Figure 5: A case where the Proxy redirects the INVITE to a CAPTCHA UA and gets a NOT SUCCCESS repsonse

11.2.2. Operation of Proxy when it redirects the INVITE to a CAPTCHA UA

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The SIP server redirects the INVITE to a CAPTCHA UA. The CAPTCHA UA, acknowledges the request for service by sending a "200 OK" message. The CAPTCHA UA, then proceeds to issue the CAPTCHA challenge to the user. If the user is successful in solving the CAPTCHA challenge, the CAPTCHA UA issues a reference to the Callee along with crypto cookie to ensure that a replay attack isn't possible. The SIP server passes this information to the SIP UAC. The SIP UAC issues a new INVITE along with the obtained crypto cookie. Figure 4 (A case where the Proxy redirects the INVITE to a CAPTCHA UA and gets a SUCCCESS repsonse) presents the message flow.

If the user is not successful in solving the CAPTCHA challenge, the CAPTCHA UA issues a Bye message or a 4xx RESPONSE with an appropriate error message. Figure 5 (A case where the Proxy redirects the INVITE to a CAPTCHA UA and gets a NOT SUCCCESS repsonse) presents the message flow.

11.2.3. Operation of UAC when it recieves a challenge from a CAPTCHA UA

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When the UAC receives a challenge from a CAPTCHA UA, the UAC selects the challenges marked as mandatory and possibly some additional ones for UAC's execution or to be rendered to the user based on e.g. the device capabilities. When the challenge gets solved, the UAC provides an answer to the CAPTCHA UA.

11.3. SIP Application Interaction Framework

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[I-D.ietf-sipping-app-interaction-framework] (Rosenberg, J., "A Framework for Application Interaction in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)," July 2005.) defines a framework for interaction between users and SIP based applications. The framework covers both the "presentation capable" and "presentation free" user interfaces (UI) having different solutions to both. The user interaction with the

presentation capable UI is handled by using SIP REFER and HTTP while the presentation free UI case utilize SIP events [RFC3265] (Roach, A., "SIP-Specific Event Notification," June 2002.) (SIP SUBSCRIBE and NOTIFY). Since there are different solutions for different cases, the UAC needs to indicate the supported application user interaction mechamisms when issuing a SIP request.

12. References

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12.1. Normative references

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