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M. Tuexen  
Univ. of Applied Sciences Muenster  
R. Stewart  
P. Lei  
Cisco Systems, Inc.  
E. Rescorla  
RTFM, Inc.  
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**Authenticated Chunks for Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP)**  
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Abstract

This document describes a new chunk type, several parameters and procedures for SCTP. This new chunk type can be used to authenticate

SCTP chunks by using a shared key between the sender and receiver.  
The new parameters are used to establish the shared key.

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## 1. Introduction

SCTP uses 32 bit verification tags to protect itself against blind attackers. These values are not changed during the lifetime of an SCTP association.

Looking at new SCTP extensions there is the need to have a method of proving that an SCTP chunk(s) was really sent by the original peer that started the association and not by a malicious attacker.

Using TLS as defined in [RFC3436](#) [8] does not help here because it only secures SCTP user data.

Therefore an SCTP extension is presented in this document which allows an SCTP sender to sign chunks using a shared key between the sender and receiver. The receiver can then verify, that the chunks are sent from the sender and not from a malicious attacker.

This extension also provides a mechanism for deriving a shared key for each association. This association shared key is derived from a endpoint pair shared key, which is preconfigured and might be empty.

## 2. Conventions

The keywords MUST, MUST NOT, REQUIRED, SHALL, SHALL NOT, SHOULD, SHOULD NOT, RECOMMENDED, NOT RECOMMENDED, MAY, and OPTIONAL, when they appear in this document, are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119](#) [4].

## 3. New Parameter Types

This section defines the new parameter types that will be used to negotiate the authentication during association setup. Figure 1 illustrates the new parameter types.

Parameter Type	Parameter Name
-----	
0x8002	Random Parameter (RANDOM)
0x8003	Chunk List Parameter (CHUNKS)

Figure 1

It should be noted that the parameter format requires the receiver to ignore the parameter and continue processing if it is not understood. This is accomplished as described in [RFC2960](#) [7] [section 3.2.1](#). by the use of the upper bit of the parameter type.



### 3.1 Random Parameter (RANDOM)

This parameter is used to carry an arbitrary length random number.




Figure 2

Parameter Type: 2 bytes (unsigned integer) This value MUST be set to 0x8002.

Parameter Length: 2 bytes (unsigned integer) This value is the length of the Random Number plus 4.

Random Number: n bytes (unsigned integer) This value represents an arbitrary Random Number in network byte order.

The `RANDOM` parameter **MUST** be included once in the `INIT` or `INIT-ACK` chunk if the sender wants to send or receive authenticated chunks.

### 3.2 Chunk List Parameter (CHUNKS)

This parameter is used to specify which chunk types are required to be sent authenticated by the peer.






Figure 3

Parameter Type: 2 bytes (unsigned integer) This value MUST be set to 0x8003.

Parameter Length: 2 bytes (unsigned integer) This value is the number of listed Chunk Types plus 4.

Chunk Type n: 1 byte (unsigned integer) Each Chunk Type listed is required to be authenticated when sent by the peer.

The CHUNKS parameter MUST be included once in the INIT or INIT-ACK chunk if the sender wants to receive authenticated chunks. Its maximum length is 260 bytes.

The chunk types for INIT, INIT-ACK, COOKIE-ECHO, COOKIE-ACK, SHUTDOWN-COMPLETE and AUTH chunks MUST not be listed in the CHUNKS parameter. However, if a CHUNKS parameter is received then the types for INIT, INIT-ACK, COOKIE-ECHO, COOKIE-ACK, SHUTDOWN-COMPLETE and AUTH chunks MUST be ignored.

#### 4. New Chunk Type

This section defines the new chunk type that will be used to authenticate chunks. Figure 4 illustrates the new chunk type.

Chunk Type	Chunk Name
0x10	Authentication Chunk (AUTH)

Figure 4

It should be noted that the AUTH-chunk format requires the receiver to ignore the chunk if it is not understood and silently discard all chunks that follow. This is accomplished as described in [RFC2960](#) [7] [section 3.2](#). by the use of the upper bit of the chunk type.

##### 4.1 Authentication Chunk (AUTH)

This chunk is used to hold the result of the HMAC calculation.








Figure 5

Type: 1 byte (unsigned integer) This value MUST be set to 0x83 for all AUTH-chunks.

Flags: 1 byte (unsigned integer) Set to zero on transmit and ignored on receipt.

Length: 2 bytes (unsigned integer) This value holds the length of the HMAC plus 8.

HMAC Identifier: 4 bytes (unsigned integer) This value describes which message digest is being used. The following Figure 6 shows the currently defined values.

HMAC Identifier	Message Digest Algorithm
0	MD-5 defined in [ <a href="#">1</a> ]
1	SHA-1 defined in [ <a href="#">10</a> ]

Figure 6

HMAC: n bytes (unsigned integer) This hold the result of the HMAC calculation.

The control chunk AUTH can appear at most once in an SCTP packet. All control and data chunks which are placed after the AUTH chunk in the packet are sent in an authenticated way. Those chunks placed in a packet before the AUTH chunk are not authenticated.

## 5. Procedures

### 5.1 Establishment of an association shared key

An SCTP endpoint willing to receive or send authenticated chunks has to send one RANDOM parameter in its INIT or INIT-ACK chunk. The



RANDOM parameter MUST contain a 32 byte random number. This random number is handled like the verification tag in case of INIT collisions. Therefore each endpoint knows its own random number and the peers random number after the association has been established.

An SCTP endpoint has a list of chunks it only accepts if they are received in an authenticated way. This list is included in the INIT and INIT-ACK and MAY be omitted if it is empty. Since this list is for an endpoint there is no problem in case of INIT collision.

Both endpoints of an association have an endpoint pair shared key which is a byte vector and preconfigured or established by another mechanism. If it is not preconfigured or established by another mechanism it is set to the empty byte vector.

From this endpoint pair shared key the association shared key is computed by concatenating the endpoint pair shared key with the random numbers exchanged in the INIT and INIT-ACK. This is performed by selecting the smaller random number and concatenating it to the endpoint pair shared key. Then concatenating the larger of the random numbers to that. If both random numbers are equal they may be concatenated to the endpoint pair key in any order. The concatenation is performed on byte vectors representing all numbers in network byte order. The result is the association shared key.

## **5.2 Sending authenticated chunks**

Chunks can only be authenticated when the SCTP association is in the ESTABLISHED state. Both endpoints MUST send all those chunks authenticated where this has been requested by the peer. The other chunks MAY be sent authenticated.

To send chunks in an authenticated way, the sender has to include these chunks after an AUTH chunk. This means that a sender MUST bundle chunks in order to authenticate them.

The sender MUST calculate the MAC using the hash function H as described by the MAC Identifier and the shared association key K. The 'data' used for the computation is the AUTH-chunk as given by Figure 7 and all chunks that are placed after the AUTH chunk in the SCTP packet. [RFC2104](#) [3] can be used as a guideline for generating the MAC.



```

+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
| Type = 0x10 | Flags=0 | Chunk Length |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
| HMAC Identifier |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
|
\                                0                                /
/                                                                    \
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+

```

Figure 7

Please note that all fields are in network byte order.

The sender fills the HMAC then into the HMAC field and sends the packet.

### 5.3 Receiving authenticated chunks

The receiver has a list of chunk types which it expects to be received only after an AUTH-chunk. This list has been sent to the peer during the association setup. It MUST silently discard these chunks if they are not placed after an AUTH chunk in the packet.

The receiver MUST use the HMAC algorithm indicated in the HMAC Identifier field. If this algorithm is not known the AUTH chunk and all chunks after it MUST silently be discarded.

The receiver now performs the same calculation as described for the sender based on Figure 7. If the result of the calculation is the same as given in the HMAC field, all chunks following the AUTH chunk are processed. If the field does not match the result of the calculation all these chunks MUST be silently discarded.

## 6. Examples

This section gives examples of message exchanges for association setup.

The simplest way of using the extension described in this document is given by the following message exchange.

```

----- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS] ----->
<----- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS] -----
----- COOKIE-ECHO ----->
<----- COOKIE-ACK -----

```

Please note that the CHUNKS parameter is optional in the INIT and



INIT-ACK.

If the server wants to receive DATA chunks in an authenticated way, the following message exchange is possible:

```
-----> INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS] ----->
<----- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS] -----
-----> COOKIE-ECHO; AUTH; DATA ----->
<----- COOKIE-ACK; SACK ----->
```

Please note that if the endpoint pair shared key depends on the client and the server and that it is only known by the upper layer this message exchange requires an upper layer intervention between the processing of the COOKIE-ECHO chunk (COMMUNICATION-UP notification followed by the presentation of the endpoint pair shared key by the upper layer to the SCTP stack) and the processing of the AUTH and DATA chunk. If this intervention is not possible due to limitations of the API the server might discard the AUTH and DATA chunk making a retransmission of the DATA chunk necessary. If the same endpoint pair shared key is used for multiple endpoints and does not depend on the client this intervention might not be necessary.

## **7. IANA Considerations**

A chunk type for the AUTH chunk has to be assigned by IANA. It is suggested to use the value given above.

Parameter types have to be assigned for the RANDOM and CHUNKS parameter by IANA. It is suggested to use the values given above.

## **8. Security Considerations**

This section is still incomplete.

If no endpoint pair shared key is used an attacker which captures the association setup message exchange can later insert arbitrary packets in an authenticated way. However, if the attacker did not capture this initial message exchange he can not successfully inject chunks which are required to be authenticated.

If an endpoint pair shared key is used even a true man in the middle can not inject chunks which are required to be authenticated even if he intercepts the initial message exchange.

Because SCTP has already a mechanism built-in that handles the reception of duplicated chunks the presented solution makes use of this functionality and does not provide a method to avoid replay attacks by itself. Of course, this only works within each SCTP





association. Therefore a separate shared key is used for each SCTP association to handle replay attacks covering multiple SCTP associations.

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### **9.2 Informative References**

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Authors' Addresses

Michael Tuexen  
Univ. of Applied Sciences Muenster  
Stegerwaldstr. 39  
48565 Steinfurt  
Germany

Email: [tuexen@fh-muenster.de](mailto:tuexen@fh-muenster.de)

Randall R. Stewart  
Cisco Systems, Inc.  
4875 Forest Drive  
Suite 200  
Columbia, SC 29206  
USA

Email: [rrs@cisco.com](mailto:rrs@cisco.com)

Peter Lei  
Cisco Systems, Inc.  
8735 West Higgins Road  
Suite 300  
Chicago, IL 60631  
USA

Phone:  
Email: [peterlei@cisco.com](mailto:peterlei@cisco.com)

Eric Rescorla  
RTFM, Inc.  
2064 Edgewood Drive  
Palo Alto, CA 94303  
USA

Phone: +1 650-320-8549  
Email: [ekr@rtfm.com](mailto:ekr@rtfm.com)



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