anima Working Group Internet-Draft Intended status: Standards Track Expires: April 2, 2019 M. Richardson Sandelman Software Works P. van der Stok vanderstok consultancy P. Kampanakis Cisco Systems September 29, 2018

# Constrained Join Proxy for Bootstrapping Protocols draft-vanderstok-constrained-anima-dtls-join-proxy-00

# Abstract

This document defines a protocol to securely assign a pledge to an owner, using an intermediary node between pledge and owner. This intermediary node is known as a "constrained-join-proxy".

#### This document extends the work of

[<u>I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra</u>] by replacing the Circuitproxy by a stateless constrained join-proxy, that uses IP encapsulation.

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#### **1**. Introduction

Enrolment of new nodes into constrained networks with constrained nodes present is described in [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] and makes use of Enrolment over Secure Transport (EST) [RFC7030]. The specified solutions use https and may be too large in terms of code space or bandwidth required. Constrained devices in constrained networks [RFC7228] typically implement the IPv6 over Low-Power Wireless personal Area Networks (6LoWPAN) [RFC4944] and Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252].

CoAP has chosen Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) [<u>RFC6347</u>] as the preferred security protocol for authenticity and confidentiality of the messages. A constrained version of EST, using Coap and DTLS, is described in [<u>I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est</u>].

DTLS is a client-server protocol relying on the underlying IP layer to perform the routing between the DTLS Client and the DTLS Server. However, the new "joining" device will not be IP routable until it is authenticated to the network. A new "joining" device can only initially use a link-local IPv6 address to communicate with a neighbour node using neighbour discovery [RFC6775] until it receives the necessary network configuration parameters. However, before the device can receive these configuration parameters, it needs to

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authenticate itself to the network to which it connects. In [<u>I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra</u>] Enrolment over Secure Transport (EST) [<u>RFC7030</u>] is used to authenticate the joining device. However, IPv6 routing is necessary to establish a connection between joining device and the EST server.

This document specifies a Join-proxy and protocol to act as intermediary between joining device and EST server to establish a connection between joining device and EST server.

This document is very much inspired by text published earlier in [<u>I-D.kumar-dice-dtls-relay</u>].

# 2. Terminology


The following terms are defined in [<u>RFC8366</u>], and are used identically as in that document: artifact, imprint, domain, Join Registrar/Coordinator (JRC), Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority (MASA), pledge, Trust of First Use (TOFU), and Voucher.


# 3. Requirements Language

In this document, the key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to be interpreted as described in <u>BCP 14</u>, <u>RFC 2119</u> [<u>RFC2119</u>] and indicate requirement levels for compliant STuPiD implementations.

## **<u>4</u>**. Join Proxy functionality

As depicted in the Figure 1, the joining Device, or pledge (P), is more than one hop away from the EST server (E) and not yet authenticated into the network. At this stage, it can only communicate one-hop to its nearest neighbour, the Join proxy (J) using their link-local IPv6 addresses. However, the Device needs to communicate with end-to-end security with a Registrar hosting the EST server (E) to authenticate and get the relevant system/network parameters. If the Pledge (P) initiates a DTLS connection to the EST server whose IP address has been pre-configured, then the packets are dropped at the Join Proxy (J) since the Pledge (P) is not yet admitted to the network or there is no IP routability to Pledge (P) for any returned messages.





Furthermore, the Pledge (P) may wish to establish a secure connection to the EST server (E) in the network assuming appropriate credentials are exchanged out-of-band, e.g. a hash of the Pledge (P)'s raw public key could be provided to the EST server (E). However, the Pledge (P) is unaware of the IP address of the EST-server (E) to initiate a DTLS connection and perform authentication with.

An DTLS connection is required between Pledge and EST server. To overcome the problems with non-routability of DTLS packets and/ or discovery of the destination address of the EST Server to contact, the Join Proxy is introduced. This Join-Proxy functionality is configured into all authenticated devices in the network which may act as the Join Proxy (J) for newly joining nodes. The Join Proxy allows for routing of the packets from the Pledge (P) using IP routing to the intended EST Server.

## 5. Join Proxy specification

In this section, the constrained Join Proxy functionality is specified using DTLS and coaps. When a joining device as a client attempts a DTLS connection to the EST server, it uses its link- local IP address as its IP source address. This message is transmitted one-hop to a neighbour node. Under normal circumstances, this message would be dropped at the neighbour node since the joining device is not yet IP routable or it is not yet authenticated to send messages through the network. However, if the neighbour device has the Join Proxy functionality enabled, it routes the DTLS message to a specific EST Server. Additional security mechanisms need to exist to prevent this routing functionality being used by rogue nodes to bypass any network authentication procedures.

The Join-proxy is stateless to minimize the requirements on the constrained Join-proxy device.

If an untrusted DTLS Client that can only use link-local addressing wants to contact a trusted end-point EST Server, it sends the DTLS message to the Join Proxy. The Join Proxy encapsulates this message

into a new type of message called Join ProxY (JPY) message. The JPY message consists of two parts:

- o Header (H) field: consisting of the source link-local address and port of the DTLS Client device, and
- o Contents (C) field: containing the original DTLS message.

On receiving the JPY message, the EST Server decapsulates it to retrieve the two parts. It uses the Header field information to transiently store the DTLS Client's address and port. The EST Server then performs the normal DTLS operations on the DTLS message from the Contents field. However, when the EST Server replies, it also encapsulates its DTLS message in a JPY message back to the Join Proxy. The Header contains the original source link-local address and port of the DTLS Client from the transient state stored earlier (which can now be discarded) and the Contents field contains the DTLS message.

On receiving the JPY message, the Join Proxy decapsulates it to retrieve the two parts. It uses the Header field to route the DTLS message retrieved from the Contents field to the joining node.

The Figure 2 depicts the message flow diagram when the EST Server end-point address is known only to the Join Proxy:

++++	++		
EST Client   Join Proxy   EST server			
(P)   (J)   (E)	Src_IP:port Dst_IP:port		
+++++++			
<pre>ClientHello&gt;</pre>	IP_C:p_C  IP_Ra:5684		
JPY[H(IP_C:p_C),>	IP_Rb:p_Rb IP_S:5684		
C(ClientHello)]			
<jpy[h(ip_c:p_c),< td=""><td>  IP_S:5684  IP_Rb:p_Rb  </td></jpy[h(ip_c:p_c),<>	IP_S:5684  IP_Rb:p_Rb		
[ C(ServerHello)]			
<pre><serverhello< pre=""></serverhello<></pre>	IP_Ra:5684 IP_C:p_C		
:			
:	:   :		
	:   :		
Finished>	IP_C:p_C  IP_Ra:5684		
<pre>JPY[H(IP_C:p_C),&gt;</pre>	IP_Rb:p_Rb IP_S:5684		
[ C(Finished)]			
<jpy[h(ip_c:p_c),< td=""><td>  IP_S:5684  IP_Rb:p_Rb  </td></jpy[h(ip_c:p_c),<>	IP_S:5684  IP_Rb:p_Rb		
[ C(Finished)]			
<finished< td=""><td>  IP_Ra:5684 IP_C:p_C  </td></finished<>	IP_Ra:5684 IP_C:p_C		
:	:   :		
+	++		

IP\_C:p\_C = Link-local IP address and port of DTLS Client
IP\_S:5684 = IP address and coaps port of DTLS Server
IP\_Ra:5684 = Link-local IP address and coaps port of DTLS Relay
IP\_Rb:p\_Rb = IP address(can be same as IP\_Ra) and port of DTLS Relay

JPY[H(),C()] = Join Proxy message with header H and content C

Figure 2: constrained joining message flow.

# <u>6</u>. Protocol

The JPY message is constructed as a single untagged [<u>RFC7049</u>] CBOR map. The contents of the map include:

- 1: the pledge IPv6 Link Local address as a 16-byte binary value.
- 2: the pledge's UDP port number, if different from 5684, as a CBOR integer.
- 3: the proxy's ifindex or other identifier for the physical port on which the pledge is connected.
- 4: the contents of the UDP (DTLS) message received from the pledge.

(INSERT CDDL notation)

#### 7. Security Considerations

It should be noted here that the contents of the CBOR map are not protected, but that the communication is between the Proxy and a known registrar (a connected UDP socket), and that messages from other origins are ignored.

#### 8. IANA Considerations

This document needs to create a registry for key indexes in the CBOR map. It should be given a name, and the amending formula should be IETF Specification.

## 9. Acknowledgements

Much of this text is inspired by [<u>I-D.kumar-dice-dtls-relay</u>].

## 10. Changelog

empty

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