

**Trusted Path Routing**  
**draft-voit-rats-trustworthy-path-routing-02**

Abstract

There are end-users who believe encryption technologies like IPSec alone are insufficient to protect the confidentiality of their highly sensitive traffic flows. These end-users want their flows to traverse devices which have been freshly appraised and verified. This specification describes Trusted Path Routing. Trusted Path Routing protects sensitive flows as they transit a network by forwarding traffic to/from sensitive subnets across network devices recently appraised as trustworthy.

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## Table of Contents

<a href="#">1.</a>	<a href="#">Introduction . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">2</a>
<a href="#">2.</a>	<a href="#">Terminology . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">3</a>
<a href="#">2.1.</a>	<a href="#">Terms . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">3</a>
<a href="#">2.2.</a>	<a href="#">Requirements Notation . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">4</a>
<a href="#">3.</a>	<a href="#">Protocol Independent Definitions . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">4</a>
<a href="#">3.1.</a>	<a href="#">Trusted Path Routing Service . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">4</a>
<a href="#">3.2.</a>	<a href="#">Network Topology Assembly . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">5</a>
<a href="#">3.3.</a>	<a href="#">Link Appraisal . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">5</a>
<a href="#">3.4.</a>	<a href="#">Trustworthiness Vector . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">6</a>
<a href="#">3.5.</a>	<a href="#">Attestation Results . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">8</a>
<a href="#">3.6.</a>	<a href="#">Stamped Passport . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">9</a>
<a href="#">3.7.</a>	<a href="#">Appraising the Stamped Passport . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">11</a>
<a href="#">4.</a>	<a href="#">Implementable Solution . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">13</a>
<a href="#">4.1.</a>	<a href="#">Prerequisites . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">13</a>
<a href="#">4.2.</a>	<a href="#">Protocol Bindings . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">14</a>
<a href="#">5.</a>	<a href="#">YANG Module . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">16</a>
<a href="#">6.</a>	<a href="#">Security Considerations . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">19</a>
<a href="#">7.</a>	<a href="#">References . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">20</a>
<a href="#">7.1.</a>	<a href="#">Normative References . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">20</a>
<a href="#">7.2.</a>	<a href="#">Informative References . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">21</a>
<a href="#">Appendix A.</a>	<a href="#">Acknowledgements . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">21</a>
<a href="#">Appendix B.</a>	<a href="#">Change Log . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">22</a>
<a href="#">Appendix C.</a>	<a href="#">Open Questions . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">23</a>
	<a href="#">Author's Address . . . . .</a>	<a href="#">23</a>

## **[1.](#) Introduction**

There are end-users who believe encryption technologies like IPSec alone are insufficient to protect the confidentiality of their highly sensitive traffic flows. These customers want their highly sensitive flows to be transported over only network devices recently verified as trustworthy.

With the inclusion of TPM based cryptoprocessors into network devices, it is now possible for network providers to identify potentially compromised devices as well as potentially exploitable (or even exploited) vulnerabilities. Using this knowledge, it then becomes possible to redirect sensitive flows around these devices.

Trusted Path Routing provides a method of establishing Trusted Topologies which only include trust-verified network devices. Membership in a Trusted Topology is established and maintained via an

Voit

Expires October 4, 2021

[Page 2]

exchange of Stamped Passports at the link layer between peering network devices. As links to Attesting Devices are appraised as meeting at least a minimum set of formally defined Trustworthiness Claims, the links are then included as members of this Trusted Topology. Routing protocols like [[I-D.ietf-lsr-flex-algo](#)] can then be used to propagate topology state throughout a network. IP Packets to and from end-user designated Sensitive Subnets are then forwarded into this Trusted Topology at each network boundary.

The specification works under the following assumptions:

- o A set of network devices supporting the TPM remote attestation profile as laid out in [[RATS-Device](#)] are connected within a network domain.
- o A routing protocol capable of maintaining multiple forwarding topologies connects these network devices.
- o One or more Verifiers continuously appraise each of network devices, and these Verifiers can return the Attestation Results back to the attesting network device.

## **[2. Terminology](#)**

### **[2.1. Terms](#)**

The following terms are imported from [[RATS-Arch](#)]: Attester, Evidence, Passport, Relying Party, and Verifier.

Newly defined terms for this document:

Attested Device - a device where a Verifier's most recent appraisal of Evidence has returned a Trustworthiness Vector.

Stamped Passport - a bundle of Evidence which includes at least signed Attestation Results from a Verifier, and two independent TPM quotes from an Attester.

Sensitive Subnet - an IP address range where IP packets to or from that range desire confidentially guarantees beyond those of non-identified subnets. In practice, flows to or from a Sensitive Subnet must only have their IP headers and encapsulated payloads accessible/visible only by Attested Devices supporting one or more Trustworthiness Vectors.

Transparently-Transited Device - a network device within an network domain where any packets originally passed into that network

Voit

Expires October 4, 2021

[Page 3]

domain are completely opaque on that network device at Layer 3 and above.

Trusted Topology - a topology which includes only Attested Devices and Transparently-Transited Devices.

Trustworthiness Claim - a specific quanta of trustworthiness which can be assigned by a Verifier.

Trustworthiness Vector - a set of Trustworthiness Claims assigned during a single assessment cycle by a Verifier using Evidence and Claims related to an Attested Device. The vector is included within Attestation Results.

## **2.2. Requirements Notation**

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [BCP 14](#) [[RFC2119](#)] [[RFC8174](#)] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

## **3. Protocol Independent Definitions**

### **3.1. Trusted Path Routing Service**

An end user identifies sensitive IP subnets where flows with applications using these IP subnets need enhanced privacy guarantees. Trusted Path Routing passes flows to/from these Sensitive Subnets over a Trusted Topology able to meet these guarantees. The Trusted Topology itself consists of the interconnection of network devices where each potentially transited device has passed a recent trustworthiness appraisal.

Different guarantees of end-to-end trustworthiness appraisal may be offered to network users. These guarantees are network operator specific, but might include options such as:

- o all transited devices are currently boot integrity verified
- o all transited devices are from a specific set of vendors and are running known software containing the latest patches
- o no guarantees provided

Voit

Expires October 4, 2021

[Page 4]

### 3.2. Network Topology Assembly

To be included in a Trusted Topology, Evidence of trustworthiness is shared between network device peers (such as routers). Upon receiving and appraising this Evidence as part of link layer authentication, the network device peer decides if this link should be added as an active adjacency for the Trusted Topology.

When enough links have been successfully added, a Trusted Topology will come into existence as routing protocols flood the adjacency information across the network domain.




Figure 1: Trusted Path Topology Assembly

Traffic exchanged with Sensitive Subnets can then be forwarded into that Trusted Topology from all edges of the network domain.

### 3.3. Link Appraisal

Critical to the establishment and maintenance of a Trusted Topology is the Stamped Passport. A Stamped Passport is comprised of Evidence from both an Attester and a Verifier. Stamped Passports are exchanged between adjacent network devices over a link layer protocols like 802.1x or MACSEC. As both sides of a link may need to appraise the other, independent Stamped Passports will often be transmitted from either side of the link. Additionally, as link layer protocols will continuously re-authenticate the link, this allows for fresh Stamped Passports to be constantly appraised by either side of the connection.

Each Stamped Passport will include the most recent Verifier provided Attestation Results, as well as the most recent TPM Quote for that Attester. Upon receiving this information as part of link layer authentication, the Relying Party Router appraises the results and decides if this link should be added to a Trusted Topology.



Voit

Expires October 4, 2021

[Page 5]

Figure 2 describes this flow of information using the time definitions described in [RATS-Arch], and the information flows defined in Section 7 of [RATS-Interactions].




Figure 2: Trusted Path Timing

Specifics for each one of these information flows, including details on what happens at the items numbered (1) through (5) are described in [Section 3.6](#).

### 3.4. Trustworthiness Vector

For Trusted Path Routing to operate, fresh Attestation Results need to be communicated by a Verifier back to the Attester. These Attestation Results must be encoded in a way which is known and actionable.

A Verifier must be able to assert different aspects of Attester trustworthiness. Therefore specific claims of Verifier appraised trustworthiness have been defined. These are known as Trustworthiness Claims. These Trustworthiness Claims may be either affirming (positive) or detracting (negative). It is these Trustworthiness Claims which are asserted within the Attestation Results produced by a Verifier. It is out of the scope of this document for the Verifier to provide proof or logic on how the assertion was derived.

Voit

Expires October 4, 2021

[Page 6]

Following are the set of Trustworthiness Claims defined within this document. Additional Trustworthiness Claims may be defined in subsequent documents:

Trustworthiness Claim	Definition	+/-
hw-authentic	A Verifier has appraised an Attester as having authentic hardware and firmware	affirming
hw-verification-fail	A Verifier has appraised an Attester has failed its hardware or firmware verification	detracting
tee-identity-verified	A Verifier has appraised and verified an Attester's unique identity based on some hardware based private key signing	affirming
tee-identity-fail	A Verifier has been unable to assess or verify an Attester's unique identity	detracting
executables-verified	A Verifier has appraised an Attester has installed into runtime memory only a genuine set of approved files during and after boot	affirming
executables-fail	A Verifier has appraised an Attester has installed into runtime memory files other than approved files	detracting
file-system-anomaly	A Verifier has found a file on an Attester which should not be present	detracting

A quick look at the list above shows that multiple Trustworthiness Claims will often be applicable at single point in time. To support this, the Attestation Results will include a single Trustworthiness Vector consisting of a set of Trustworthiness Claims. The establishment of this Trustworthiness Vector follows the following logic on the Verifier:

Voit

Expires October 4, 2021

[Page 7]

Start: TPM Quote Received, log received, or appraisal timer expired

Step 0: set Trustworthiness Vector = Null

Step 1: Is there sufficient fresh signed evidence to appraise?

(yes) - No Action

(no) - Goto Step 6

Step 2: Appraise Hardware Integrity

(if hw-verification-fail) - push onto vector, go to Step 6

else (if hw-authentic) - push onto vector

(if not evaluated, or insufficient data to conclude: take no action)

Step 3: Appraise attester identity

(if tee-identity-verified) - push onto vector

else (if tee-identity-fail) - push onto vector

(if not evaluated, or insufficient data to conclude: take no action)

Step 4: Appraise executable loaded and filesystem integrity

(if executables-verified) - push onto vector

else (if executables-fail) - push onto vector

(if file-system-anomaly) - push onto vector

(if not evaluated, or insufficient data to conclude: take no action)

Step 5: Assemble Attestation Results, and push to Attester

End

### **[3.5.](#) Attestation Results**

As Evidence changes, a new Trustworthiness Vector needs to be returned to the Attester as Attestation Results. But this Trustworthiness Vector is not all that needs to be returned. Following is a YANG tree for all the returned objects. Each of these objects will later be used as Evidence by another Verifier which is co-resident with the Relying Party.



```

module: ietf-attestation-results-vector
  +--rw attestation-results!
    +--rw trustworthiness-vector*          identityref
    +--rw (tpm-specification-version)?
      | +--:(TPM2.0) {taa:TPM20}?
      | | +--rw TPM2B_DIGEST                binary
      | | +--rw tpm20-pcr-bank* [TPM-hash-algo]
      | | | +--rw TPM-hash-algo            identityref
      | | | +--rw pcr-index*               tpm:pcr
      | | +--rw clock                      uint64
      | | +--rw reset-counter              uint32
      | | +--rw restart-counter            uint32
      | | +--rw safe                       boolean
      | +--:(TPM1.2) {taa:TPM12}?
      | | +--rw pcr-index*                 pcr
      | | +--rw tpm12-pcr-value*           binary
      | | +--rw timestamp                  yang:date-and-time
    +--rw public-key-format                identityref
    +--rw public-key                      binary
    +--rw public-key-algorithm-type        identityref
    +--rw verifier-signature-key-name?    string
    +--rw verifier-key-algorithm-type      identityref
    +--rw verifier-signature              binary

```

Figure 3: Attestation Results Tree

Looking at the objects above, if the Attester has a TPM2, then the values of the TPM PCRs are included (i.e., <TPM2B\_DIGEST>, <TPM2\_Algo>, and <pcr-index>), as are the timing counters from the TPM (i.e., <clock>, <reset-counter>, <restart-counter>, and <safe>).

Likewise if the Attester has a TPM1.2, the TPM PCR values of the <pcr-index> and <pcr-value> are included. Timing information comes from the Verifier itself via the <timestamp> object.

For both the TPM1.2 and the TPM2, there are other Attestation Results which are sent. These are the Attester's TPM key (i.e., <public-key>, <public-key-format>, and <public-key-algorithm-type>). This key later will allow the Relying Party router to appraise a subsequent TPM Quote. It is this signature which allows the Trustworthiness Vector to be later provably associated with a recent TPM Quote.

### 3.6. Stamped Passport

The Attestation Results are not the only item which a Relying Party needs to consider during its appraisal. A provably recent TPM Quote from the Attester must also be included. With these two items, the



Voit

Expires October 4, 2021

[Page 9]

resulting Stamped Passports formats described below must be converted to CDDL and passed over EAP. If an Attester includes a TPM2, the objects are:

YANG structure for a TPM2 Stamped Passport

```

+--ro latest-tpm-quote
| +--ro quote          binary
| +--ro quote-signature binary
+--ro latest-attestation-results
  +--ro trustworthiness-vector*  identityref
  +--ro TPM2B_DIGEST             binary
  +--ro tpm20-pcr-bank* [TPM-hash-algo]
    | +--ro TPM-hash-algo  identityref
    | +--ro pcr-index*    tpm:pcr
  +--ro clock              uint64
  +--ro reset-counter      uint32
  +--ro restart-counter    uint32
  +--ro safe               boolean
  +--ro public-key-format  identityref
  +--ro public-key         binary
  +--ro public-key-algorithm-type identityref
  +--ro verifier-signature-key-name? string
  +--ro verifier-signature binary

```

And if the Attester is a TPM1.2, the object are:

YANG structure for a TPM1.2 Stamped Passport

```

+--ro latest-tpm-quote
| +--ro version* []
| | +--ro major?    uint8
| | +--ro minor?    uint8
| | +--ro revMajor? uint8
| | +--ro revMinor? uint8
| +--ro digest-value? binary
+--ro latest-tpm12-attestation-results
  +--ro trustworthiness-vector*  identityref
  +--ro pcr-index*               pcr
  +--ro tpm12-pcr-value*         binary
  +--ro timestamp                yang:date-and-time
  +--ro public-key-format        identityref
  +--ro public-key               binary
  +--ro public-key-algorithm-type identityref
  +--ro verifier-signature-key-name? string
  +--ro verifier-signature       binary

```

With either of these passport formats, if the <latest-tpm-quote> is verifiably fresh, then the state of the Attester can be appraised by a network peer.

Voit

Expires October 4, 2021

[Page 10]

### 3.7. Appraising the Stamped Passport

When it receives a Stamped Passport, a Verifier co-resident with the Relying Party on a network peer can make nuanced decisions about how to handle traffic coming from that link. For example, when the Attester's TPM hardware identity credentials can be verified, it might choose to accept link layer connections and forward generic Internet traffic.

Additionally, if the Attester's Trustworthiness Vector is acceptable to the Relying Party, and it hasn't been too long since the Verifier has provided a Stamped Passport, the Relying Party can include that link in a Trusted Topology.

As the process described above repeats across the set of links within a network domain, Trusted Topologies can be extended and maintained. Traffic to and from Sensitive Subnets is then identified at the edges of the network domain and passed into this Trusted Topology.




Figure 4: Stamped Passport Generation and Appraisal

In Figure 4 above, Evidence from a TPM is generated and signed by that TPM. This Evidence is appraised by Verifier A, and the Attester is given a Trustworthiness Vector which is signed and returned as Attestation Results to the Attester. Later, when a request comes in from a Relying Party, the Attester assembles and returns a Stamped Passport. The Stamped Passport contains all the information necessary for Verifier B to appraise the current Trustworthiness Vector of the Attester. Based on this appraisal, the link will be included or not in a Trusted Topology.

Voit

Expires October 4, 2021

[Page 11]

More details on the mechanisms used in the construction and verification of the Stamped Passport are listed below. These numbers match to the numbered steps of Figure 4:

1. An Attester sends a signed TPM Quote which includes PCR measurements to Verifier A at time(EG).
2. Verifier A appraises (1), then sends the following items back to that Attester as Attestation Results:
  1. the Trustworthiness Vector of an Attester,
  2. the PCR state information from the TPM Quote of (1),
  3. time information associated with the TPM Quote of (1),
  4. the Public Attestation Key which it used to validate the TPM Quote of (1), and
  5. a Verifier signature across (2.1) through (2.4).
3. At time(EG') a nonce known to the Relying Party is sent to the Attester .
4. The Attester generates and sends a Stamped Passport. This Stamped Passport includes:
  1. The Attestation Results from (2)
  2. New signed, verifiably fresh PCR measurements from time(EG'), which incorporates the nonce from (3).
5. On receipt of (4), the Relying Party makes its determination of how the Stamped Passport will impact adjacencies within a Trusted Topology. The decision process is:
  1. Verify that (4.2) includes the nonce from (3).
  2. Use a local certificate to validate the signature (4.1).
  3. Use the Attestation Results provided public key info of (2.4) to validate the signatures of (4.2).
  4. Failure of (5.1) through (5.3) means the link does not meet minimum validation criteria, therefore appraise the link as having a null Trustworthiness Vector. Jump to step (6).



5. If all PCR values from (2.2) equal those (4.2), then Relying Party can accept (2.1) as the link's Trustworthiness Vector. Jump to step (6).
  6. If the PCR state information of (2.2) doesn't equal (4.2), and not much time has passed between time(EG) and time(EG'), the Relying Party accepts any previous Trustworthiness Vector. (Note: rather than accepting, it is also viable to attempt to acquire a new Stamped Passport. Where [\[stream-subscription\]](#) is used, it should only be a few seconds before a new Attestation Results are delivered to an Attester via (2).)
  7. When the PCR state information is different, and there is a large or uncertain time gap between time(EG) and time(EG'), the link should be assigned a null Trustworthiness Vector.
6. Take action based on Verifier B's appraised Trustworthiness Vector:
    1. Include the link within any Trusted Topology for which that Trustworthiness Vector is qualified.
    2. Remove the link from any Trusted Topology for which that Trustworthiness Vector is not qualified.

## **4. Implementable Solution**

This section defines one set of protocols which can be used for Trusted Path Routing. The protocols include [\[MACSEC\]](#) or [\[IEEE-802.1X\]](#), ISIS [\[I-D.ietf-lsr-flex-algo\]](#), YANG subscriptions [\[RFC8639\]](#), and [\[RFC3748\]](#) methods. Other alternatives are also viable.

### **4.1. Prerequisites**

- o A Trusted Topology such as one established by ISIS exists in an IGP domain for the forwarding of Sensitive Subnet traffic. This Topology will carry traffic across a set of devices which currently meet at a defined set of Trustworthiness Vectors.
- o Customer designated Sensitive Subnets and their requested Trustworthiness Vectors have been identified and associated with external interfaces to/from the edge of a network. Traffic to a Sensitive Subnet can be passed into the Trusted Topology.
- o Verifiers A and B are able to verify [\[TPM1.2\]](#) or [\[TPM2.0\]](#) signatures of an Attester.



Voit

Expires October 4, 2021

[Page 13]

- o Verifier B trusts information signed by Verifier A. Verifier B has also been pre-provisioned with certificates or public keys necessary to confirm that Stamped Passports came from Verifier A
- o Within a network, a Relying Party is able to use affinity to include/exclude links as part of the Trusted Topology based on this appraisal.

#### **4.2. Protocol Bindings**

The numbering in below matches to the steps in Figure 4.

##### **Step (1)**

There are two alternatives for Verifier A to acquire Evidence including a TPM Quote from the Attester:

- o Subscription to the <attestation> stream defined in [[stream-subscription](#)]. Note: this method is recommended as it will minimize the interval between when a PCR change is made in a TPM, and when the PCR change appraisal is incorporated within a subsequent Stamped Passport.
- o The RPCs <tpm20-challenge-response-attestation> or <tpm12-challenge-response-attestation> defined in device [[RATS-YANG](#)]

##### **Step (2)**

The delivery of these Attestation Results back to the Attester MAY be done via an operational datastore write to the YANG module <ietf-attestation-results-vector>.

##### **Step (3)**

At time(NS') a Relying Party makes a Link Layer authentication request to an Attester via either [[MACSEC](#)] or [[IEEE-802.1X](#)]. This connection request must include [[RFC3748](#)] credentials. Specifics of the EAP mapping to the Stamped Passport is tbd.

##### **Step (4)**

Upon receipt of (3), a Stamped Passport is generated as per [Section 3.6](#), and sent to the Relying Party. Note that with [[MACSEC](#)] or [[IEEE-802.1X](#)], steps (3) & (4) will repeat periodically independently of any subsequent iteration (1) and (2). This allows for periodic reauthentication of the link layer in a way not bound to the updating of Verifier A's Attestation Results.

Voit

Expires October 4, 2021

[Page 14]

## Step (5)

Upon receipt of (4), the Relying Party appraises the Stamped Passport as per [Section 3.6](#). Following are relevant mappings which replace generic steps from [Section 3.6](#) with specific objects available with a TPM1.2 or TPM2.0.

+-----+		+-----+
	TPM2.0 - Bindings/details	
+-----+		+-----+
	(5.5): If the <TPM2B_DIGEST>, <TPML_PCR_SELECTION>, <reset-counter>, <restart-counter> and <safe> are equal between the	
	Attestation Results and the TPM Quote at time(EG') then Relying	
	Party can accept (2.1) as the link's Trustworthiness Vector. Jump	
	to step (6).	
	(5.6): If the <reset-counter>, <restart-counter> and <safe> are	
	equal between the Attestation Results and the TPM Quote at	
	time(EG'), and the <clock> object from time(EG') has not	
	incremented by an unacceptable number of seconds since the	
	Attestation Result, then Relying Party can accept (2.1) as the	
	link's Trustworthiness Vector. Jump to step (6).	
	(5.7): Assign the link a null Trustworthiness Vector.	
+-----+		+-----+
+-----+		+-----+
	TPM1.2 - Bindings/details	
+-----+		+-----+
	(5.5): If the <pcr-index>'s and <tpm12-pcr-value>'s are equal	
	between the Attestation Results and the TPM Quote at time(EG'),	
	then Relying Party can accept (2.1) as the link's Trustworthiness	
	Vector. Jump to step (6).	
	(5.6): If the time hasn't incremented an unacceptable number of	
	seconds from the Attestation Results <timestamp> and the system	
	clock of the Relying Party, then Relying Party can accept (2.1)	
	as the link's Trustworthiness Vector. Jump to step (6).	
	(5.7): Assign the link a null Trustworthiness Vector.	
+-----+		+-----+

## Step (6)

After the Trustworthiness Vector has been validated or reset, based on the link's Trustworthiness Vector, the Relying Party may adjust the link affinity of the corresponding ISIS [[I-D.ietf-lsr-flex-algo](#)] topology. ISIS will then replicate the link state across the IGP

Voit

Expires October 4, 2021

[Page 15]

domain. Traffic will then avoid links which do not have a qualifying Trustworthiness Vector.

## 5. YANG Module

This YANG module imports modules from [[RATS-YANG](#)], [[crypto-types](#)] and [[RFC6021](#)].

```
<CODE BEGINS> ietf-attestation-results-vector@2021-04-01.yang
module ietf-rats-attestation-results-vector {
  yang-version 1.1;
  namespace
    "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-rats-attestation-results-vector";
  prefix arv;

  import ietf-yang-types {
    prefix yang;
  }

  organization "IETF";
  contact
    "WG Web:  <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/rats/>
    WG List:  <mailto:rats@ietf.org>

    Editor:   Eric Voit
              <mailto:evoit@cisco.com>";

  description
    "This module contains conceptual YANG specifications for
    subscribing to attestation streams being generated from TPM chips.

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    authors of the code. All rights reserved.

    Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
    modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to the license
    terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License set forth in
    Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF
    Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).

    This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see the RFC
    itself for full legal notices.";

  revision 2021-04-01 {
    description
      "Initial version.";
    reference
      "draft-voit-rats-trusted-path-routing";
```

Voit

Expires October 4, 2021

[Page 16]

```
}

/*
 * IDENTITIES
 */

identity trustworthiness-claim {
  description
    "Base identity for a Verifier that uses its Appraisal Policy for
    Evidence to establish a trustworthiness level.";
}

identity trustworthiness-pass {
  description
    "A trustworthiness-claim which successfully meets an Appraisal
    Policy for Evidence.";
}

identity trustworthiness-fail {
  description
    "A trustworthiness-claim which hit Appraisal Policy for Evidence
    necessary to fail an evaluation. Note: this failure might or
    might not consider whether sufficient Evidence has been
    provided. In other words having insufficient evidence might
    not drive the setting of this failing trustworthiness-claim.";
}

identity hw-authentic {
  base trustworthiness-pass;
  description
    "A Verifier has appraised an Attester as having authentic
    hardware, as well as authentic firmware where that can be
    verified.";
}

identity hw-verification-fail {
  base trustworthiness-fail;
  description
    "A Verifier has appraised an Attester has failed its hardware or
    firmware verification.";
}

identity tee-identity-verified {
  base trustworthiness-pass;
  description
    "A Verifier has appraised and verified an Attester's unique
    identity stored within the hardware of a Trusted Execution
    Environment.";
}
```



Voit

Expires October 4, 2021

[Page 17]

```
identity tee-identity-fail {
  base trustworthiness-fail;
  description
    "A Verifier has been unable to assess or verify an Attester's
    unique identity";
}

identity executables-verified {
  base trustworthiness-pass;
  description
    "A Verifier has appraised the executables loaded on Attester's,
    and asserts that it recognizes and approves of all relevant
    executable files loaded.";
}

identity executables-fail {
  base trustworthiness-fail;
  description
    "A Verifier has appraised the executables loaded on Attester's,
    and has not been able to recognize or does not approved of all
    the executable files which have been loaded.";
}

identity file-system-anomaly {
  base trustworthiness-fail;
  description
    "A Verifier has found a file on an Attester which should not be
    present.";
}

/*
 * DATA NODES
 */

container attestation-results {
  presence
    "An attestation Verifier has appraised the security posture of
    the device, and returned the results within this container.";
  description
    "Contains the latest Verifier appraisal of an Attester.";
  leaf-list trustworthiness-vector {
    type identityref {
      base trustworthiness-claim;
    }
  }
  ordered-by system;
  description
    "One or more Trustworthiness Levels assigned which expose the
    Verifiers evaluation of the Evidence associated with the
```

Voit

Expires October 4, 2021

[Page 18]

```
        'tpmt-signature'.");
    }
    leaf timestamp {
        type yang:date-and-time;
        mandatory true;
        description
            "The timestamp of the Verifier's appraisal.";
    }
    leaf tpmt-signature {
        type binary;
        description
            "Must match a recent tpmt-signature sent in a notification to
            a Verifier. This allows correlation of the Attestation
            Results to a recent PCR change.";
    }
    leaf verifier-signature {
        type binary;
        mandatory true;
        description
            "Signature of the Verifier across all the current objects in
            the attestation-results container.";
    }
    leaf verifier-signature-key-name {
        type binary;
        description
            "Name of the key the Verifier used to sign the results.";
    }
}
}
<CODE ENDS>
```

## 6. Security Considerations

Verifiers are limited to the Evidence available for appraisal from a Router. Although the state of the art is improving, some exploits may not be visible via Evidence.

Only security measurements which are placed into PCRs are capable of being exposed via TPM Quote at time(EG').

Successful attacks on an Verifier have the potential of affecting traffic on the Trusted Topology.

For Trusted Path Routing, links which are part of the FlexAlgo are visible across the entire IGP domain. Therefore a compromised device will know when it is being bypassed.

Voit

Expires October 4, 2021

[Page 19]

Access control for the objects in Figure 3 should be tightly controlled so that it becomes difficult for the Stamped Passport to become a denial of service vector.

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## Appendix A. Acknowledgements

Chennakesava Reddy Gaddam, Peter Psenak, Shwetha Bhandari, Henk Birkholz, Adwaith Gautham, Annu Singh, Sujal Sheth, Nancy Cam Winget, Ned Smith, and Guy Fedorkow.



Voit

Expires October 4, 2021

[Page 21]

## [Appendix B](#). Change Log

[THIS SECTION TO BE REMOVED BY THE RFC EDITOR.]

v01-v02

- o Minor tweaks such as renaming and removal of a few trustworthiness-claims

v00-v01

- o Minor tweaks

v02-v00 of [draft-voit-rats-trustworthy-path-routing-00](#)

- o file rename was due to an IETF tool submission glitch
- o The Attester's AIK is included within the Stamped Passport. This eliminates the need to provision to AIK certificate on the Relying Party.
- o Removed Centralized variant
- o Added timing diagram, and moved content around to match

v01-v02 of [draft-voit-rats-trusted-path-routing](#)

- o Extracted the attestation stream, and placed into [draft-birkholz-rats-network-device-subscription](#)
- o Introduced the Trustworthiness Vector

v00-v01 of [draft-voit-rats-trusted-path-routing](#)

- o Move all FlexAlgo terminology to [Section 4.2](#). This allows [Section 3.6](#) to be more generic.
- o Edited Figure 1 so that (4) points to the egress router.
- o Added text freshness mechanisms, and articulated configured subscription support.
- o Minor YANG model clarifications.
- o Added a few open questions which Frank thinks interesting to work.



## [Appendix C](#). Open Questions

(1) When there is no available Trusted Topology?

Do we need functional requirements on how to handle traffic to/from Sensitive Subnets when no Trusted Topology exists between IGP edges? The network typically can make this unnecessary. For example it is possible to construct a local IPSec tunnel to make untrusted devices appear as Transparently-Transited Devices. This way Secure Subnets could be tunneled between FlexAlgo nodes where an end-to-end path doesn't currently exist. However there still is a corner case where all IGP egress points are not considered sufficiently trustworthy.

(2) Extension of the Stamped Passport?

We might move to 'verifier-certificate' and 'verifier-certificate-name' based on WG desire to include more information in the Stamped Passport. The format used could be extracted from ietf-keystore.yang, grouping keystore-grouping.

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