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Extended DNS Errors  
draft-wkumari-dnsop-extended-error-02

## Abstract

This document defines an extensible method to return additional information about the cause of DNS errors. The primary use case is to extend SERVFAIL to provide additional information about the cause of DNS and DNSSEC failures.

[ Open question: The document currently defines a registry for errors. It has also been suggested that the option also carry human readable (text) messages, to allow the server admin to provide additional debugging information (e.g: "example.com pointed their NS at us. No idea why...", "We don't provide recursive DNS to 192.0.2.0. Please stop asking...", "Have you tried Acme Anvil and DNS? We do DNS right..." (!). Please let us know if you think text is needed, or if a 16bit FCFS registry is expressive enough. ]

[ Open question: This document discusses extended \*errors\*, but it has been suggested that this could be used to also annotate \*non-error\* messages. The authors do not think that this is a good idea, but could be persuaded otherwise. ]

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## 1. Introduction and background

There are many reasons that a DNS query may fail, some of them transient, some permanent; some can be resolved by querying another server, some are likely best handled by stopping resolution. Unfortunately, the error signals that a DNS server can return are very limited, and are not very expressive. This means that applications and resolvers often have to "guess" at what the issue is - e.g the answer was marked REFUSED because of a lame delegation, or because there is a lame delegation or because the nameserver is still starting up and loading zones? Is a SERVFAIL a DNSSEC validation issue, or is the nameserver experiencing a bad hair day?

A good example of issues that would benefit by additional error information is an error caused by a DNSSEC validation issue. When a stub resolver queries a DNSSEC bogus name (using a validating resolver), the stub resolver receives only a SERVFAIL in response. Unfortunately, SERVFAIL is used to signal many sorts of DNS errors, and so the stub resolver simply asks the next configured DNS resolver. The result of trying the next resolver is one of two outcomes: either the next resolver also validates, a SERVFAIL is returned again, and the user gets an (largely) incomprehensible error message; or the next resolver is not a validating resolver, and the user is returned a potentially harmful result.

This document specifies a mechanism to extend (or annotate) DNS errors to provide additional information about the cause of the error. This information can be used by the resolver to make a decision regarding whether or not to retry, or by technical users attempting to debug issues.


Here is a reference to an "external" (non-RFC / draft) thing: ([[IANA.AS Numbers](#)]). And this is a link to an ID: [[I-D.ietf-sidr-iana-objects](#)].

### 1.1. Requirements notation

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [[RFC2119](#)].

## 2. Extended Error EDNS0 option format

This draft uses an EDNS0 ([RFC2671](#)) option to include extended error (ExtError) information in DNS messages. The option is structured as follows:



- o OPTION-CODE, 2 octets (defined in [[RFC6891](#)]), for ExtError is TBD.
- o OPTION-LENGTH, 2 octets ((defined in [[RFC6891](#)]) contains the length of the payload (everything after OPTION-LENGTH) in octets and should be 4.
- o FLAGS, 2 octets.
- o CODE, 2 octets.

Currently the only defined flag is the R flag.

R - Retry The R (or Retry) flag provides a hint to the receiver if it should retry the query, possibly by querying another server. If the R bit is set (1), the sender believes that retrying the query may provide a successful answer next time; if the R bit is clear (0), the sender believes that it should not ask another

server.

The remaining bits in the flags field MUST be set to 0 by the sender and SHOULD be ignored by the receiver.

Code: A code point into the IANA "Extended DNS Errors" registry.

### 3. Use of the Extended DNS Error option

The Extended DNS Error (EDE) is an EDNS option. It can be included in any error response (SERVFAIL, NXDOMAIN, REFUSED, etc) to a query that includes an EDNS option. This document includes a set of initial codepoints (and requests to the IANA to add them to the registry), but is extensible via the IANA registry to allow additional error codes to be defined in the future.

The R (Retry) flag provides a hint (or suggestion) as to what the receiver may want to do with this annotated error. The mechanism is specifically designed to be extensible, and so implementations may

receive EDE codes that it does not understand. The R flag allows implementations to make a decision as to what to do if it receives a response with an unknown code - retry or drop the query. Note that this flag is only a suggestion or hint. Receivers can choose to ignore this hint.

### 4. Defined Extended DNS Errors

This document defines some initial EDE codes. The mechanism is intended to be extensible, and additional codepoints will be registered in the "Extended DNS Errors" registry. This document provides suggestions for the R flag, but the originating server may ignore these recommendations if it knows better.

#### 4.1. Extended DNS Error Code 1 - DNSSEC Bogus

The resolver attempted to perform DNSSEC validation, but validation ended in the Bogus state. The R flag should be set.

#### 4.2. Extended DNS Error Code 2 - DNSSEC Indeterminate

The resolver attempted to perform DNSSEC validation, but validation

ended in the Indeterminate state.

Usually attached to SERVFAIL messages. The R flag should be set.

#### [4.3.](#) Extended DNS Error Code 3 - Lame

An authoritative resolver that receives a query (with the RD bit clear) for a domain for which it is not authoritative SHOULD include this EDE code in the REFUSED response.

Implementations should not set the R flag in this case (another nameserver might not be lame).

#### [4.4.](#) Extended DNS Error Code 4 - Prohibited

An authoritative or recursive resolver that receives a query from an "unauthorized" client can annotate its REFUSED message with this code. Examples of "unauthorized" clients are recursive queries from IP addresses outside the network, blacklisted IP addresses, etc.

Implementations SHOULD allow operators to define what to set the R flag to in this case.

#### [4.5.](#) Extended DNS Error Code 5 - TooBusy

[ Ed: This might be a bad idea. It is intended to allow servers under a DoS (for example a random subdomain attack) to signal to recursive clients that they are being abusive and should back off. This may be a bad idea -- it may "complete the attack", it may be spoofable (by anyone who could also do a MITM style attack), etc. ]

A nameserver which is under excessive load (for example, because it is experiencing a DoS) may annotate any answer with this code.

It is RECOMMENDED that implementations set the R flag in this case, but may allow operators to define what to set the R flag to.

[ agreed: bad idea -wjh ]

## 5. IANA Considerations

[This section under construction, beware. ]

This document defines a new EDNS(0) option, entitled "Extended DNS Error", assigned a value of TBD1 from the "DNS EDNS0 Option Codes (OPT)" registry [to be removed upon publication:  
[<http://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-parameters/dns-parameters.xhtml#dns-parameters-11>]

Value	Name	Status	Reference
TBD	Extended DNS Error	TBD	[ This document ]

Data Tag Name Length Meaning ---- ---- ----- ----- TBD1 FooBar N  
FooBar server

The IANA is requested to create and maintain the "Extended DNS Error codes" registry. The codepoint space is broken into 3 ranges:

- o 1 - 16384: Specification required.
- o 16385 - 65000: First Come First Served
- o 65000 - 65534: Experimental / Private use

The codepoints 0, 65535 are reserved.

## 6. Open questions

- 1 Can this be included in \*any\* response or only responses to requests that included an EDNS option? Resolvers are supposed to ignore additional. EDNS capable ones are supposed to simply ignore unknown options. I know the spec says you can only include EDNS0 in a response if in a request -- it is time to reevaluate this?

- 2 Can this be applied to \*any\* response, or only error responses?
- 3 Should textual information be allowed as well? What if the only thing allowed is a domain name, e.g to point at where validation began failing?

## 7. Security Considerations

DNSSEC is being deployed - unfortunately a significant number of clients (~11% according to [[GeoffValidation](#)]), when receiving a SERVFAIL from a validating resolver because of a DNSSEC validation issue simply ask the next (non-validating) resolver in their list, and do don't get any of the protections which DNSSEC should provide. This is very similar to a kid asking his mother if he can have another cookie. When the mother says "No, it will ruin your dinner!", going off and asking his (more permissive) father and getting a "Yes, sure, cookie!".

## 8. Acknowledgements

The authors wish to thank Geoff Huston. They also vaguely remember discussing this with a number of people over the years, but have forgotten who all they were -- if you were one of them, and are not listed, please let us know and we'll acknowledge you.

I also want to thank the band "Infected Mushroom" for providing a good background soundtrack (and to see if I can get away with this!) Another author would like to thank the band "Mushroom Infectors". This was funny at the time we wrote it, but I cannot remember why...

## 9. References

### 9.1. Normative References

[IANA.AS\_Numbers]  
IANA, "Autonomous System (AS) Numbers",  
<<http://www.iana.org/assignments/as-numbers>>.



Requirement Levels", [BCP 14](#), [RFC 2119](#), DOI 10.17487/  
[RFC2119](#), March 1997,  
<<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>>.

## 9.2. Informative References

[GeoffValidation]

IANA, "A quick review of DNSSEC Validation in today's Internet", June 2016, <<http://www.potaroo.net/presentations/2016-06-27-dnssec.pdf>>.

[I-D.ietf-sidr-iana-objects]

Manderson, T., Vegoda, L., and S. Kent, "RPKI Objects issued by IANA", [draft-ietf-sidr-iana-objects-03](#) (work in progress), May 2011.

## Appendix A. Changes / Author Notes.

[RFC Editor: Please remove this section before publication ]

From -02 to -03:

- o Added David Lawrence -- I somehow missed that in last version.

From -00 to -01;

- o Fixed up some of the text, minor clarifications.

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