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**simple VPN solution using Multi-point Security Association  
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**Abstract**

This document describes the over-layer network solution by utilizing dynamically established IPsec multi-point Security Association (SA) without individual connection.

Multi-point SA technology provides the simplified mechanism of the Auto Discovery and Configuration function.

This is applicable for any IPsec tunnels such as IPv4 over IPv4, IPv4 over IPv6, IPv6 over IPv4 and IPv6 over IPv6.

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## [1. Introduction](#)

As described in the problem statement document[ad-vpn-problem], dynamic, secure and scalable system for establishing SAs is needed.

With multi-point SA, an endpoint automatically discovers other endpoint. In this draft, an endpoint means an inexpensive CPE, which can hardly establish large number of IPsec sessions simultaneously. The CPEs also share a multi-point SA within the same group, and there is no individual connection between them.

Scalability issue becomes serious in the service, such as triple play which requires large number of sessions at the same time. MPSA enables large scale simultaneous sessions even with inexpensive CPEs, and can avoid scalability issue.

The latency between CPEs can be minimized because of stateless shared multipoint SA, MPSA is suitable for video and voice services which is very sensitive to latency.

It can avoid the exhaustive configuration for CPEs/ gateways. No reconfiguration is needed when a new CPE is added, removed, or changed. It can avoid high load on the gateways.

## 1.1. Terminology

Multi-point SA - This is similar to Dynamic Full Mesh topology described in [\[ad-vpn-problem\]](#); direct connections exist in a hub and spoke manner, but only one SA for data transfer is shared with all CPEs.

## 2. Motivation

**There are two major topologies - Star topology and full-mesh topology -** to communicate securely on over-lay network by using IPsec.

Figure.1 shows star topology. The number of IPsec connection is the same as the number of CPEs (CPE). Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA) of each CPE can be achieved on the gateway.

The problem of the star topology is all the traffic go through the gateway, then it causes high load and latency.




Figure 1

Figure.2 shows Full-mesh topology. There is no gateways. Each CPE establishes IPsec connection independently. The latency on this topology is relatively low compared to star topology.

In large system, there are huge number  $((N^2-N)/2)$  of IPsec connections. AAA of each CPE is hard to manage in this topology. Moreover, when a CPE is added, removed or changed, reconfiguration

is needed for all rest of the CPEs.




Figure 2

The solution in this document eliminates the problems listed above.

Figure 3 shows topology of multi-point SA.

Traffic between CPEs does not go through the gateway, low latency,

AAA of each CPE can be achieved, the number of

IPsec connection is almost same as star topology, and no reconfiguration

is needed for all the rest of CPEs even when a CPE is added,

removed or changed.




Figure 3

### **3. Procedure**

### 3.1 Sequence

The multi-point SA capability of the remote host is determined by an exchange of Vendor ID payloads. In the IKE\_SA\_INIT exchange, the Vendor ID payload for this specification is sent if the multi-point SA is used.

```

CPE                                Gateway
-----
HDR, SAI1, KEi, Ni, V(MPSA) -->

<-- HDR, SAR1, KEr, Nr, V(MPSA), [CERTREQ]

MPSA : multi-point SA

```

The initial exchange (including IKE\_AUTH) is same as [IKEV2], other than Vendor ID payload included in IKE\_SA\_INIT.

After the initial exchange has finished successfully, a new INFORMATIONAL exchange is used to distribute multi-point SA to the CPE, with the Notify payload of MPSA\_PUT that includes cryptographic algorithm, nonce, keying material, SPI and so on. Keys for multi-point SA is generated according to the contents of the Notify payload by the CPE. The response of the Notify payload has empty Encrypted payload.

```

CPE                                Gateway
-----
                                <-- HDR, SK {N(MPSA_PUT)}

HDR, SK {} -->

```

## 3.2 Extended format

### 3.2.1 Vendor ID

This document defines a new Vendor ID. The content of the payload is described below.

"multi-point SA"

### 3.2.2 MPSA\_PUT

This document defines a new Notify Message Type MPSA\_PUT. The Notify Message Type of MPSA\_PUT is 40960. Notification Data of MPSA\_PUT has a Proposal-substructure-like format. It consists of Transform-substructure-like structures that have following data.

Description	Trans. Reference Type
-------------	-----------------------

-----		
Encryption Algorithm (ENCR)	1	<a href="#">RFC5996</a>
Pseudorandom Function (PRF)	2	<a href="#">RFC5996</a>
Integrity Algorithm (INTEG)	3	<a href="#">RFC5996</a>
Nonce (NONCE)	241	
SK_d (SKD)	242	
Lifetime (LIFE)	243	
Rollover time 1 (ROLL1)	244	
Rollover time 2 (ROLL2)	245	

#### - Nonce

For Nonce, the Transform ID is 1.

The attribute contains actual nonce value with attribute type 16384.

The size of the Nonce Data is between 16 and 256 octets.

Name	Number
-----	
NONCE_NONCE	1

Attribute Type	Value	Attribute Format
-----		
Nonce Value	16384	TLV

#### - SK\_d

For SK\_d, the Transform ID is 1.

The attribute contains actual SK\_d value with attribute type 16385.

The length of SK\_d Data is the preferred key length of the PRF.

Name	Number
-----	
SKD_SK_D	1

Attribute Type	Value	Attribute Format
-----		
SK_d Value	16385	TLV

#### - Lifetime

For Lifetime, the Transform ID is 1.

The attribute contains actual lifetime value with attribute type 16386.

The length of Lifetime Value is 4 octets.

Lifetime is stored in seconds as effective time of the multi-point SA.

Name	Number
-----	
LIFE_LIFETIME	1



```

+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| Protocol ID | SPI Size | Notify Message Type |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| Security Parameter Index (SPI) |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| 0 (last) or 2 | RESERVED | Proposal Length |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| Proposal Num | Protocol ID | SPI Size | Num Transforms |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| Security Parameter Index (SPI) |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| 0 (last) or 3 | RESERVED | Transform Length |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| Transform Type | RESERVED | Transform ID |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
|
~ Transform Attributes ~
|
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| 0 (last) or 3 | RESERVED | Transform Length |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| Transform Type | RESERVED | Transform ID |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
|
~ Transform Attributes ~
|
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| 0 | RESERVED | Transform Length |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| Transform Type | RESERVED | Transform ID |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
|
~ Transform Attributes ~
|
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+

```

The following example shows a N(MPSA\_PUT) notification message.  
The SPIs in the Proposal-like and Tranform-like substructure are the  
same value. Following values are defined by the example.

```

Protocol: ESP
ENCR:    AES-CBC (256bits)
PRF:     SHA-1
INTEG:   HMAC-SHA-1-96
NONCE:   241
SKD:     242

```



```
LIFE:      243
ROLL1:     244
ROLL2:     245
```

[illegible]

### 3.3 Multi-point SA Management

### 3.3.1 Gateway

Gateway generates a multi-point SA for a group before connecting to any CPEs.

After the initial exchanges have finished, Gateway distributes the same multi-point SA information to CPEs within the group by sending N(MPSA\_PUT).

SPI and Nonce is generated similar way of [IKEv2].  
SK\_d is generated from random numbers similar to Nonce.

The same SPI value is stored to Notify payload and Proposal-like substructure.

The multi-point SA will not be negotiated between gateway and CPE, but will be notified from gateway to CPE one way.

Gateway initiates rekey before Lifetime expiration.  
As the Lifetime, gateway notifies the effective time left of the multi-point SA.

### **3.3.2 CPE**

After the initial exchange has finished, CPE obtains multi-point SA information by receiving N(MPSA\_PUT) from gateway. The keys for the multi-point SA are generated in the same procedure described in [IKEv2], except  $N_i \mid N_r$  is replaced by Nonce.

Therefore, KEYMAT is derived by PRF listed below.

$$\text{KEYMAT} = \text{prf}+(\text{SK}_d, \text{Nonce})$$

The multi-point SA is protected in a cryptographic manner by ENCR and INTEG which uses the generated keys.

The SPI value for the multi-point SA is the same of its in Notify message.

CPE uses the same multi-point SA as both inbound and outbound SAs.

CPE deletes both of inbound and outbound SA when Lifetime is expired.

Rollover time 1, 2 have no meaning when no old multi-point SA exists.

### **3.3.3 Rekeying**

Rekeying should be finished before Lifetime expiration of current multi-point SA. Rekeying of multi-point SA will be performed as follows.

- Gateway generates a new multi-point SA
- Gateway distributes a new multi-point SA to all CPEs within the group
- CPE replaces the current multi-point SA to new one

CPE replaces multi-point SA using rollover method like [[GDOI](#)].

## **3.4 Forwarding**

Each CPE sends and receives encapsulated packets using the multi-point SA.

The destination address of encapsulated packet will be determined with routing information, which can be achieved by static configuration or route exchange mechanism such as BGP on encapsulated environment described in [[MESH](#)].

It is applicable for any IPsec tunnels such as IPv4 over IPv4, IPv4 over IPv6, IPv6 over IPv4 and IPv6 over IPv6.

## **4. Security Considerations**

## **5. IANA Considerations**

There is no new IANA considerations in this document.

## **6. References**

### **6.1 Normative References**

[IKEv2]

Charlie Kaufman, Paul Hoffman, Yoav Nir, Pasi Eronen  
"Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)",  
[RFC5596](#), September 2010

### **6.2 Informative References**

[GDOI] B. Weis, S. Rowles, T. Hardjono  
"The Group Domain of Interpretation"  
[RFC6407](#), October 2011

[MESH] J. Wu, Y. Cui, C. Metz, E. Rosen  
"Softwire Mesh Framework" [RFC5565](#), June 2009

[ad-vpn-problem]  
S. Hanna, V. Manral "Auto Discovery VPN Problem Statement  
and Requirements" [draft-ietf-ipsecme-ad-vpn-problem-03](#),  
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