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Certificate Policy (CP)
for the Resource PKI (RPKI)
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Status of this Memo

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Abstract

This document describes the certificate policy for a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) used to support attestations about Internet Number Resource (INR) holdings. Each organization that distributes IP addresses or Autonomous System (AS) numbers to an organization will, in parallel, issue a (public key) certificate reflecting this distribution. These certificates will enable verification that the resources indicated in the certificate have been distributed to the

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holder of the associated private key and that this organization is the current, unique holder of these resources.

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[1.](#) Introduction

This document describes the certificate policy for a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) used to attest to Internet Number Resource holdings (INRs) (IP addresses or Autonomous System (AS) numbers). An organization that distributes INRs to another organization MAY, in parallel, issue a (public key) certificate reflecting this distribution. These certificates will enable verification that the resources indicated in the certificate have been distributed to the holder of the associated private key and that this organization is the current holder of these resources.

The most important and distinguishing aspect of the PKI for which this policy was created is that it does not purport to identify an

INR holder via the subject name contained in the certificate issued to that entity. Rather, each certificate issued under this policy is intended to enable an entity to assert, in a verifiable fashion, that it is the current holder of an INR based on the current records of the entity responsible for the resources in question. Verification of the assertion is based on two criteria: the ability of the entity to digitally sign data that is verifiable using the public key contained in the corresponding certificate, and validation of that certificate in the context of this PKI.

This PKI is designed exclusively for use in support of validation of claims related to current INR holdings. This includes any certificates issued in support of operation of this infrastructure, e.g., for integrity or access control of the repository system described in [section 2.4](#). Such transitive uses of certificates also are permitted under this policy. Use of the certificates and certificate revocation lists (CRLs) managed under this PKI for any other purpose is a violation of this CP, and relying parties (RPs) SHOULD reject certificates presented for such uses.

Note: This document is based on the template specified in the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) standards document [RFC 3647](#) [[RFC3647](#)]. In the interest of keeping the document as short as reasonable, a number of sections contained in the template have been omitted from this policy because they do not apply to this PKI. However, we have retained the section numbering scheme employed in [RFC 3647](#) to facilitate comparison with the outline in [Section 6 of RFC 3647](#). Each of these omitted sections should be read as "No stipulation" in CP/CPS parlance.

Conventions used in this document

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC-2119](#) [[RFC2119](#)].

[1.1](#). Overview

This PKI is designed to support validation of claims by current holders of INRs, in accordance with the records of the organizations that act as Certification Authorities (CAs) in this PKI. The ability

to verify such claims is essential to ensuring the unambiguous distribution of these resources [[ARCH](#)].

The structure of the RPKI is congruent with the number resource allocation framework of the Internet. The IANA allocates number resources for special purposes [[RFC5736](#)], to Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), and to others. The RIRs, in turn, manage the allocation of number resources to end users, Internet Service Providers, and others.

This PKI encompasses several types of certificates (see [[CERTPROF](#)] for more details):

- . CA certificates for each organization distributing INRs, and for INR holders
- . End-entity (EE) certificates for organizations to validate digital signatures on RPKI-signed objects

[1.2.](#) Document name and identification

The name of this document is "Certificate Policy (CP) for the Resource PKI (RPKI)".

This policy has been assigned the following OID:

```
id-cp-ipAddr-asNumber OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
    identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
    security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) cp(14) 2 }
```

[1.3.](#) PKI participants

Note: In a PKI, the term "subscriber" refers to an individual or organization that is a Subject of a certificate issued by a CA. The term is used in this fashion throughout this document, without qualification, and should not be confused with the networking use of the term to refer to an individual or organization that receives

service from an ISP. In such cases the term "network subscriber" will be used. Also note that, for brevity, this document always

refers to PKI participants as organizations or entities, even though some of them are individuals.

[1.3.1.](#) Certification authorities

The organizations that distribute IP addresses and AS numbers (IANA, RIRs, NIRs, ISPs) act as CAs in this PKI.

Organizations that do not distribute INRs, but hold such resources also act as CAs when they create EE certificates.

[1.3.2.](#) Registration authorities

This PKI does not require establishment or use of a registration authority (RA) function separate from the one provided inherently in conjunction with the CA function. The RA function MUST be provided by the same entity operating as a CA, e.g., entities listed in [Section 1.3.1](#). An entity acting as a CA in this PKI already has a formal relationship with each organization to which it distributes INRs. These organizations already perform the RA function implicitly since they already assume responsibility for distributing INRs.

[1.3.3.](#) Subscribers

These are the organizations receiving distributions of INRs – RIRs, NIRs, ISPs, and other organizations.

Note that any of these organizations may have received distributions from more than one source, over time. This is true even for RIRs, which participate in inter-registry exchanges of address space. This PKI accommodates such relationships.

[1.3.4.](#) Relying parties

Entities or individuals that act in reliance on certificates or RPKI-signed objects issued under this PKI are relying parties. Relying parties may or may not be subscribers within this PKI. (See [section 1.6](#) for the definition of an RPKI-signed object.)

[1.3.5.](#) Other participants

Every organization that undertakes a role as a CA in this PKI is responsible for populating the RPKI distributed repository system with the certificates, CRLs, and RPKI-signed objects that it issues. The organization MAY operate its own publication point or it MAY outsource this function (See sections [2.1](#) and [2.2](#).)

[1.4.](#) Certificate usage

[1.4.1.](#) Appropriate certificate uses

The certificates issued under this hierarchy are for authorization in support of validation of claims of current holdings of INRs.

Additional uses of the certificates, consistent with the basic goal cited above, also are permitted under this policy. For example, certificates may be issued in support of integrity and access control for the repository system described in 2.4. Such transitive uses are permitted under this policy.

[1.4.2.](#) Prohibited certificate uses

Any uses other than those described in [Section 1.4.1](#) are prohibited under this policy.

[1.5.](#) Policy administration

[1.5.1.](#) Organization administering the document

This CP is administered by

Internet Engineering Steering Group
c/o Internet Society
1775 Wiehle Avenue, Suite 201
Reston, VA 20190-5108
U.S.A.

[1.5.2.](#) Contact person

The contact information is

iesg@ietf.org

+1-703-439-2120 (Internet Society)

[1.5.4.](#) CP approval procedures

If a replacement BCP is needed that updates or obsoletes the current BCP, then the replacement BCP MUST be approved by the IESG following the procedures of the IETF Standards Process as defined in [RFC 2026](#) [[RFC2026](#)].

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[1.6.](#) Definitions and acronyms

CPS - Certification Practice Statement. A CPS is a document that specifies the practices that a Certification Authority employs in issuing certificates in this PKI.

Distribution of INRs - A process of distribution of the INRs along the respective number hierarchy. IANA distributes blocks of IP addresses and AS Numbers to the five Regional Internet Registries (RIRs). RIRs distribute smaller address blocks and AS Numbers to organizations within their service regions, who in turn distribute IP addresses to their customers.

IANA - Internet Assigned Numbers Authority. IANA is responsible for global coordination of the IP addressing systems and AS numbers used for routing internet traffic. IANA distributes INRs to Regional Internet Registries (RIRs).

INRs - Internet Number Resources. INRs are number values for three protocol parameter sets, namely:

- . IP Version 4 addresses,
- . IP version 6 addresses, and
- . Identifiers used in Internet inter-domain routing, currently Border Gateway Protocol-4 AS numbers.

ISP - Internet Service Provider. This is an organization managing and providing Internet services to other organizations.

LIR - In some regions, the term Local Internet Registry (LIR) is used to refer to what is called an ISP in other regions.

NIR - National Internet Registry. This is an organization that manages the distribution of INRs for a portion of the geopolitical area covered by a Regional Registry. NIRs form an optional second tier in the tree scheme used to manage INRs.

RIR - Regional Internet Registry. This is an organization that

manages the distribution of INRs for a geopolitical area.

RPKI-signed object - An RPKI-signed object is a digitally signed data object (other than a certificate or CRL) that is declared to be such by a standards track RFC, and that can be validated using certificates issued under this PKI. The content and format of these data constructs depend on the context in which validation

of claims of current holdings of INRs takes place. Examples of these objects are repository manifests and ROAs.

[2.](#) Publication And Repository Responsibilities

[2.1.](#) Repositories

Certificates, CRLs, and RPKI-signed objects (intended for public consumption) MUST be made available for downloading by all relying parties, to enable them to validate this data. This motivates use of a robust, distributed repository system. Each CA MUST maintain a publicly accessible online repository and publish all RPKI-signed objects (intended for public consumption) via this repository in a manner that conforms with "A Profile for Resource Certificate Repository Structure" [[REPOS](#)]. (This function MAY be outsourced, as noted in [Section 2.2](#) below.) The collection of repositories forms the RPKI distributed repository system.

[2.2.](#) Publication of certification information

Each CA MUST publish the certificates (intended for public consumption) that it issues via the repository system.

Each CA MUST publish the CRLs (intended for public consumption) that it issues via the repository system.

Each CA MUST publish its RPKI-signed objects (intended for public consumption) via the repository system.

Each CA that issues certificates to entities outside of its administrative domain SHOULD create and publish a CPS that meets the requirements set forth in this CP. Publication means that the entities to which the CA issues certificates MUST be able to acquire a copy of the CPS, and MUST be able to ascertain when the CPS changes. (An organization that does not allocate or assign INRs does not need to create or publish a CPS.)

An organization MAY choose to outsource publication of RPKI data - certificates, CRLs, and other RPKI-signed objects.

The CP will be published as an IETF RFC and will be available from the IETF RFC repository.

[2.3.](#) Time or frequency of publication

The CPS for each CA MUST specify the following information:

The period of time within which a certificate will be published after the CA issues the certificate.

The period of time within which a CA will publish a CRL with an entry for a revoked certificate after it revokes that certificate.

Expired and revoked certificates SHOULD be removed from the RPKI repository system, upon expiration or revocation, respectively. Also, please note that each CA MUST publish its CRL prior to the nextUpdate value in the scheduled CRL previously issued by the CA.

[2.4.](#) Access controls on repositories

Each CA or repository operator MUST implement access controls to prevent unauthorized persons from adding, modifying or deleting repository entries. A CA or repository operator MUST NOT intentionally use technical means of limiting read access to its CPS, certificates, CRLs or RPKI-signed objects. This data is intended to be accessible to the public.

[3. Identification and Authentication](#)

[3.1. Naming](#)

[3.1.1. Types of names](#)

The distinguished name for every CA and end-entity consists of a single Common Name (CN) attribute with a value generated by the issuer of the certificate. Optionally, the serialNumber attribute MAY be included along with the common name (to form a terminal relative distinguished name set), to distinguish among successive instances of certificates associated with the same entity.

[3.1.2.](#) Need for names to be meaningful

The Subject name in each certificate SHOULD NOT be "meaningful", i.e., the name is not intended to convey the identity of the Subject to relying parties. The rationale here is that certificates issued under this PKI are used for authorization in support of applications that make use of attestations of INR holdings. They are not used to identify Subjects.

[3.1.3.](#) Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers

Although Subject (and Issuer) names need not be meaningful, and may appear "random," anonymity is not a function of this PKI, and thus no explicit support for this feature is provided.

[3.1.4.](#) Rules for interpreting various name forms

None

[3.1.5.](#) Uniqueness of names

There is no guarantee that subject names are globally unique in this PKI. Each CA certifies subject names that MUST be unique among the certificates that it issues. Although it is desirable that these subject names be unique throughout the PKI, name uniqueness within the RPKI cannot be guaranteed.

However, subject names in certificates SHOULD be constructed in a way that minimizes the chances that two entities in the RPKI will be assigned the same name. The RPKI certificate profile [[CERTPROF](#)] provides an example of how to generate (meaningless) subject names in a way that minimizes the likelihood of collisions.

[3.2.](#) Initial identity validation

[3.2.1.](#) Method to prove possession of private key

Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST require each Subject to demonstrate proof-of-possession (PoP) of the private key

corresponding to the public key in the certificate, prior to issuing the certificate. The means by which PoP is achieved is determined by each CA and MUST be declared in the CPS of that CA.

3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity

Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST employ procedures to ensure that each certificate it issues accurately reflects its records with regard to the organization to which the CA has distributed the INRs identified in the certificate. The specific procedures employed for this purpose MUST be described by the CPS for each CA. Relying parties can expect each CA to employ procedures commensurate with those it already employs as a registry or ISP, in the management of the INRs. This authentication is solely for use by each CA in dealing with the organizations to which it distributes INRs, and thus should not be relied upon outside of this CA-subscriber relationship.

3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity

Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST employ procedures to identify at least one individual as a representative of each organization that is an INR holder. The specific means by which each CA authenticates individuals as representatives for an organization MUST be described by the CPS for each CA. Relying parties can expect each CA to employ procedures commensurate with those it already employs as a registry or ISP, in authenticating individuals as representatives for INR holders.

3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information

A CA MUST NOT include any non-verified subscriber data in certificates issued under this certificate policy except for Subject Information Access (SIA) extensions.

3.2.5. Validation of authority

Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST employ procedures to verify that an individual claiming to represent an organization to which a certificate is issued, is authorized to represent that organization in this context. The procedures MUST be described by the CPS for the CA. Relying parties can expect each CA

to employ procedures commensurate with those it already employs as a registry or ISP, in authenticating individuals as representatives for INR holders.

[3.2.6.](#) Criteria for interoperation

This PKI is neither intended nor designed to interoperate with any other PKI.

[3.3.](#) Identification and authentication for re-key requests

[3.3.1.](#) Identification and authentication for routine re-key

Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST employ procedures to ensure that an organization requesting a re-key is the legitimate holder of the certificate to be re-keyed and associated INRs and MUST require PoP of the private key corresponding to the new public key. The procedures employed for these purposes MUST be described in the CPS for the CA. With respect to authentication of the holder of the INRs, relying parties can expect each CA to employ procedures commensurate with those it already employs as a registry or ISP, in the management of INRs.

Note: An issuer MAY choose to require periodic re-keying consistent with contractual agreements with the recipient. If so, this MUST be described by the CPS for the CA.

[3.3.2.](#) Identification and authentication for re-key after revocation

Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST employ procedures to ensure that an organization requesting a re-key after revocation is the same entity to which the revoked certificate was issued and is the legitimate holder of the associated INR. The CA MUST require PoP of the private key corresponding to the new public key. The specific procedures employed for these purposes MUST be described by the CPS for the CA. With respect to authentication of the holder of the INRs, relying parties can expect each CA to employ procedures commensurate with those it already employs as a registry or ISP, in the management of INRs. Note that there MAY be different procedures for the case where the legitimate subject still possesses the original private key as opposed to the case when it no longer has access to that key.

[3.4.](#) Identification and authentication for revocation request

Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST employ procedures to ensure that:

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- . an organization requesting revocation is the legitimate holder of the certificate to be revoked.
- . each certificate it revokes accurately reflects its records with regard to the organization to which the CA has distributed the INRs identified in the certificate.
- . an individual claiming to represent an organization for which a certificate is to be revoked, is authorized to represent that organization in this context.

The specific procedures employed for these purposes MUST be described by the CPS for the CA. Relying parties can expect each CA to employ procedures commensurate with those it already employs as a registry or ISP, in the management of INRs.

[4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements](#)

[4.1. Certificate Application](#)

[4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application](#)

Any entity that distributes INRs SHOULD acquire a certificate. This includes Internet Registries and ISPs. Additionally, entities that hold INRs from an Internet Registry, or that are multi-homed, MAY acquire a certificate under this PKI. The (CA) certificates issued to these entities MUST include one or both of the extensions defined by [RFC 3779](#) [[RFC3779](#)], X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers, as appropriate.

The application procedure MUST be described in the CPS for each CA.

[4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities](#)

The enrollment process and procedures MUST be described by the CPS for each CA. An entity that desires one or more certificates should contact the organization from which it receives its INRs.

[4.2. Certificate application processing](#)

CAs SHOULD make use of existing standards for certificate application processing. [Section 6](#) of the resource certificate profile [[CERTPROF](#)] defines the standard certificate request formats that MUST be supported

Each CA MUST define the certificate request/response standards that it employs, via its CPS.

[4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication functions](#)

Existing practices employed by registries and ISPs to identify and authenticate organizations that receive INRs form the basis for

issuance of certificates to these subscribers. It is important to note that the Resource PKI SHOULD NOT be used to authenticate the identity of an organization, but rather to bind subscribers to the INRs they hold. Because identity is not being vouched for by this PKI, certificate application procedures need not verify legal organization names, etc.

[4.2.2.](#) Approval or rejection of certificate applications

Certificate applications MUST be approved based on the normal business practices of the entity operating the CA, based on the CA's records of INR holders. Each CA MUST follow the procedures specified

in 3.2.1 to verify that the requester holds the private key corresponding to the public key that will be bound to the certificate the CA issues to the requestor. The details of how certificate applications are approved MUST be described in the CPS for the CA in question.

[4.2.3.](#) Time to process certificate applications

No stipulation. Each CA MUST declare its expected time frame to process (approve, issue and publish) a certificate application as part of its CPS.

[4.3.](#) Certificate issuance

[4.3.1.](#) CA actions during certificate issuance

If a CA determines that the request is acceptable, it MUST issue the corresponding certificate and publish it in the RPKI distributed repository system via publication of the certificate at the CA's repository publication point.

[4.3.2.](#) Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of certificate

The CA MUST notify the subscriber when the certificate is published. The means by which a subscriber is notified MUST be defined by each CA in its CPS.

[4.4.](#) Certificate acceptance

[4.4.1.](#) Conduct constituting certificate acceptance

Within the timeframe specified in its CPS, the CA MUST place the certificate in the repository and notify the subscriber. This MAY be done without subscriber review and acceptance. Each CA MUST state in its CPS the procedures it follows for publishing of the certificate and notification to the subscriber.

[4.4.2.](#) Publication of the certificate by the CA

Certificates MUST be published in the RPKI distributed repository system via publication of the certificate at the CA's repository publication point as per the conduct described in 4.4.1. The procedures for publication MUST be defined by each CA in its CPS.

[4.4.3.](#) Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities

The CPS of each CA MUST indicate whether any other entities will be notified when a certificate is issued.

[4.5.](#) Key pair and certificate usage

A summary of the use model for the RPKI is provided below.

[4.5.1.](#) Subscriber private key and certificate usage

Each holder of an INR is eligible to request an X.509 CA certificate containing appropriate [RFC 3779](#) extensions. Holders of CA resource certificates also MAY issue EE certificates to themselves to enable verification of RPKI-signed objects that they generate.

[4.5.2.](#) Relying party public key and certificate usage

Reliance on a certificate must be reasonable under the circumstances. If the circumstances indicate a need for additional assurances, the relying party must obtain such assurances in order for such reliance to be deemed reasonable.

Before any act of reliance, relying parties MUST independently (1) verify that the certificate will be used for an appropriate purpose that is not prohibited or otherwise restricted by this CP (see [section 1.4](#)), and (2) assess the status of the certificate and all

the certificates in the chain (terminating at a Trust Anchor (TA) accepted by the RP) that issued the certificates relevant to the certificate in question. If any of the certificates in the certificate chain have been revoked or have expired, the relying party is solely responsible to determine whether reliance on a digital signature to be verified by the certificate in question is acceptable. Any such reliance is made solely at the risk of the relying party.

If a relying party determines that use of the certificate is appropriate, the relying party must utilize appropriate software and/or hardware to perform digital signature verification as a condition of relying on the certificate. Moreover the relying party MUST validate the certificate in a manner consistent with the RPKI certificate profile [[CERTPROF](#)], which specifies the extended validation algorithm for RPKI certificates.

[4.6.](#) Certificate renewal

This section describes the procedures for certificate renewal. Certificate renewal is the issuance of a new certificate to replace an old one prior to its expiration. Only the validity dates and the serial number (the field in the certificate not the DN attribute) are changed. The public key and all other information remain the same.

[4.6.1.](#) Circumstance for certificate renewal

A certificate MUST be processed for renewal based on its expiration date or a renewal request from the subscriber. Prior to the expiration of an existing subscriber's certificate, it is the responsibility of the subscriber to renew the certificate to maintain continuity of certificate usage. If the issuing CA initiates the renewal process based on the certificate expiration date, then that CA MUST notify the holder in advance of the renewal process. The validity interval of the new (renewed) certificate SHOULD overlap that of the previous certificate, to ensure continuity of certificate usage. It is RECOMMENDED that the renewed certificate be issued and published at least 1 week prior to the expiration of the certificate it replaces.

Certificate renewal SHOULD incorporate the same public key as the previous certificate, unless the private key has been reported as compromised. If a new key pair is being used, the stipulations of [Section 4.7](#) apply.

[4.6.2.](#) Who may request renewal

Only the certificate holder or the issuing CA may initiate the renewal process. The certificate holder MAY request an early renewal, for example, if it wishes to change the public key, or if it expects to be unavailable to support the renewal process during the normal expiration period. An issuing CA MAY initiate the renewal process based on the certificate expiration date.

[4.6.3.](#) Processing certificate renewal requests

Renewal procedures MUST ensure that the person or organization seeking to renew a certificate is in fact the subscriber (or authorized by the subscriber) of the certificate and the legitimate holder of the INR associated with the renewed certificate. Renewal processing MUST verify that the certificate in question has not been revoked.

[4.6.4.](#) Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber

No additional stipulations beyond those of [section 4.3.2](#).

[4.6.5.](#) Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate

No additional stipulations beyond those of [section 4.4.1](#).

[4.6.6.](#) Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA

No additional stipulations beyond those of [section 4.4.2](#).

[4.6.7.](#) Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities

No additional stipulations beyond those of [section 4.4.3](#).

[4.7.](#) Certificate re-key

This section describes the procedures for certificate re-key. Certificate re-key is the issuance of a new certificate to replace an old one because the key needs to be replaced. Unlike with certificate renewal, the public key is changed.

[4.7.1.](#) Circumstance for certificate re-key

Re-key of a certificate SHOULD be performed only when required, based on:

1. knowledge or suspicion of compromise or loss of the associated private key, or
2. the expiration of the cryptographic lifetime of the associated key pair

A CA re-key operation has dramatic consequences, requiring the re-issuance of all certificates issued by the re-keyed entity. So it should be performed only when necessary and in a way that preserves the ability of relying parties to validate certificates whose validation path includes the re-keyed entity. CA key rollover MUST follow the procedures defined in "CA Key Rollover in the RPKI" [[KEYROLL](#)].

Note that if a certificate is revoked to replace the [RFC 3779](#) extensions, the replacement certificate MUST incorporate the same public key rather than a new key. This applies to when one is adding INRs (revocation not required) and to when one is removing INRs (revocation required (see [Section 4.8.1](#))).

If the re-key is based on a suspected compromise, then the previous certificate MUST be revoked.

[4.7.2.](#) Who may request certification of a new public key

The holder of the certificate may request a re-key. In addition, the CA that issued the certificate MAY chose to initiate a rekey based on a verified compromise report.

[4.7.3.](#) Processing certificate re-keying requests

The re-key process follows the general procedures of certificate generation as defined in [section 4.3](#).

[4.7.4](#). Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber

No additional stipulations beyond those of [section 4.3.2](#).

[4.7.5](#). Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate

No additional stipulations beyond those of [section 4.4.1](#).

[4.7.6](#). Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA

No additional stipulations beyond those of [section 4.4.2](#).

[4.7.7](#). Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities

No additional stipulations beyond those of [section 4.4.3](#).

[4.8](#). Certificate modification

[4.8.1](#). Circumstance for certificate modification

Modification of a certificate occurs to implement changes to selected attribute values in a certificate. In the context of the RPKI, the only changes that are accommodated by certificate modification are changes to the INR holdings described by the [RFC 3779](#) extension and changes to the SIA extension.

When a certificate modification is approved, a new certificate is issued. If no INR holdings are removed from the certificate, the new certificate **MUST** contain the same public key and the same expiration date as the original certificate, (but with the SIA extension and/or the INR set expanded). In this case, revocation of the previous certificate is not required.

When previously distributed INRs are removed from a certificate, then the old certificate **MUST** be revoked and a new certificate **MUST** be issued, reflecting the changed INR holdings. (The SIA extension in the new certificate will be unchanged, unless the affected INR holder supplies a new SIA value.)

[4.8.2](#). Who may request certificate modification

Either the certificate holder or the issuer may initiate the certificate modification process.

[4.8.3.](#) Processing certificate modification requests

The CA MUST determine that the requested modification is appropriate and that the procedures for the issuance of a new certificate are followed (see [Section 4.3](#)).

[4.8.4.](#) Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber

No additional stipulations beyond those of [section 4.3.2](#).

[4.8.5.](#) Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate

No additional stipulations beyond those of [section 4.4.1](#).

[4.8.6.](#) Publication of the modified certificate by the CA

No additional stipulations beyond those of [section 4.4.2](#).

[4.8.7.](#) Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities

No additional stipulations beyond those of [section 4.4.3](#).

[4.9.](#) Certificate revocation and suspension

[4.9.1.](#) Circumstances for revocation

A certificate MUST be revoked (and published on a CRL) if there is reason to believe that there has been a compromise of a subscriber's private key. A certificate also MAY be revoked to invalidate a data object signed by the private key associated with that certificate. Other circumstances that justify revocation of a certificate MAY be specified in a CA's CPS.

Note: If new INRs are being added to an organization's existing distribution, the old certificate need not be revoked. Instead, a new certificate MAY be issued with both the old and the new resources and the old key. If INRs are being removed or if there has been a key compromise, then the old certificate MUST be revoked (and a re-key MUST be performed in the event of key compromise).

[4.9.2.](#) Who can request revocation

This MUST be defined in the CPS of the relevant organization.

[4.9.3.](#) Procedure for revocation request

A subscriber MAY submit a request to the certificate issuer for a revocation. This request MUST identify the certificate to be revoked

and MUST be authenticated. The procedures for making the request MUST be described in the CPS for each CA. The RPKI provisioning document [[PROV](#)] describes a protocol that MAY be used to make revocation requests.

A certificate issuer MUST notify the subscriber when revoking a certificate. The notification requirement is satisfied by CRL publication. The CPS for a CA MUST indicate the means by which the CA will inform a subscriber of certificate revocation.

[4.9.4.](#) Revocation request grace period

A subscriber SHOULD request revocation as soon as possible after the need for revocation has been identified. There is no specified grace period for the subscriber in this process.

[4.9.5.](#) Time within which CA must process the revocation request

No stipulation. Each CA SHOULD specify its expected revocation processing time in its CPS.

[4.9.6.](#) Revocation checking requirement for relying parties

A relying party MUST acquire and check the most recent, scheduled CRL from the issuer of the certificate, whenever the relying party validates a certificate.

[4.9.7.](#) CRL issuance frequency

The CRL issuance frequency MUST be determined by each CA and stated in its CPS. Each CRL carries a nextScheduledUpdate value and a new CRL MUST be published at or before that time. A CA MUST set the nextUpdate value when it issues a CRL, to signal when the next scheduled CRL will be issued.

[4.9.8.](#) Maximum latency for CRLs

The CPS for each CA MUST specify the maximum latency associated with posting its CRL to the repository system.

[4.10](#). Certificate status services

This PKI does not make provision for use of the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) [[RFC2560](#)] or Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol (SCVP) [[RFC5055](#)]. This is because it is anticipated that the primary RPs (ISPs) will acquire and validate certificates for all participating resource holders. These protocols are not designed for such large-scale, bulk certificate status

checking. RPs MUST check for new CRLs at least daily. It is RECOMMENDED that RPs perform this check several times per day, but no more than 8-12 times per day (to avoid excessive repository accesses).

[5. Facility, Management, And Operational Controls](#)

[5.1. Physical controls](#)

Each CA MUST maintain physical security controls for its operation that are commensurate with those employed by the organization in the management of INR distribution. The physical controls employed for CA operation MUST be specified in its CPS. Possible topics to be covered in the CPS are shown below. (These sections are taken from [\[RFC3647\]](#).)

[5.1.1. Site location and construction](#)

[5.1.2. Physical access](#)

[5.1.3. Power and air conditioning](#)

[5.1.4. Water exposures](#)

[5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection](#)

[5.1.6. Media storage](#)

[5.1.7. Waste disposal](#)

[5.1.8.](#) Off-site backup

[5.2.](#) Procedural controls

Each CA MUST maintain procedural security controls that are commensurate with those employed by the organization in the management of INR distribution. The procedural security controls employed for CA operation MUST be specified in its CPS. Possible topics to be covered in the CPS are shown below. (These sections are taken from [[RFC3647](#)].)

[5.2.1.](#) Trusted roles

[5.2.2.](#) Number of persons required per task

[5.2.3.](#) Identification and authentication for each role

[5.2.4.](#) Roles requiring separation of duties

[5.3.](#) Personnel controls

Each CA MUST maintain personnel security controls that are commensurate with those employed by the organization in the management of INR distribution. The details for each CA MUST be specified in its CPS.

[5.4.](#) Audit logging procedures

Details of how a CA implements the audit logging described in this

section (5.4.1 to 5.4.8) MUST be addressed in its CPS.

[5.4.1. Types of events recorded](#)

Audit records MUST be generated for the basic operations of the certification authority computing equipment. Audit records MUST include the date, time, responsible user or process, and summary content data relating to the event. Auditable events include:

- . Access to CA computing equipment (e.g., logon, logout)
- . Messages received requesting CA actions (e.g., certificate requests, certificate revocation requests, compromise notifications)
- . Certificate creation, modification, revocation, or renewal actions
- . Posting of any material to a repository
- . Any attempts to change or delete audit data
- . Key generation
- . Software and/or configuration updates to the CA
- . Clock adjustments

[5.4.2. Frequency of processing log](#)

Each CA MUST establish its own procedures for review of audit logs.

[5.4.3. Retention period for audit log](#)

Each CA MUST establish its own policies for retention of audit logs.

[5.4.4. Protection of audit log](#)

The audit log SHOULD be protected based on current industry standards.

[5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures](#)

The audit log SHOULD be backed up based on current industry standards.

[5.4.8.](#) Vulnerability assessments

The RPKI subsystems of a registry or ISP SHOULD participate in any vulnerability assessments that these organizations run as part of their normal business practice.

[5.6.](#) Key changeover

When a CA wishes to change keys, it MUST acquire a new certificate containing its new public key. See [[KEYROLL](#)] for a description of how key changeover is effected in the RPKI.

[5.8.](#) CA or RA termination

In the RPKI, each subscriber acts as a CA authoritative for the specified INRs that were distributed to that entity. Procedures associated with the termination of a CA MUST be described in the CPS for that CA. These procedures MUST include a provision to notify each entity that issued a certificate to the organization that is operating the CA that is terminating.

Since the RA function MUST be provided by the same entity operating as the CA (see [Section 1.3.2](#)), there are no separate stipulations for RAs.

[6.](#) Technical Security Controls

The organizations that distribute INRs to network subscribers are authoritative for these distributions. This PKI is designed to

enable ISPs and network subscribers to demonstrate that they are the holders of the INRs that have been distributed to them. Accordingly, the security controls used by CAs and subscribers for this PKI need only to be as secure as those that apply to the procedures for administering the distribution of INR data by the extant organizations. Details of each CA's security controls MUST be described in the CPS issued by the CA.

[6.1.](#) Key pair generation and installation

[6.1.1.](#) Key pair generation

In most instances, public-key pairs will be generated by the subject, i.e., the organization receiving the distribution of INRs. However, some CAs MAY offer to generate key pairs on behalf of their subjects at the request of the subjects, e.g., to accommodate subscribers who do not have the ability to perform key generation in a secure fashion. (The CA has to check the quality of the keys only if it generates them (see [Section 6.1.6](#))). Since the keys used in this PKI are not for non-repudiation purposes, generation of key pairs by CAs does not inherently undermine the security of the PKI. Each CA MUST describe its key pair generation procedures in its CPS.

[6.1.2.](#) Private key delivery to subscriber

If a CA provides key pair generation services for subscribers, its CPS MUST describe the means by which private keys are delivered to subscribers in a secure fashion.

[6.1.3.](#) Public key delivery to certificate issuer

When a public key is transferred to the issuing CA to be certified, it MUST be delivered through a mechanism ensuring that the public key has not been altered during transit and that the subscriber possesses the private key corresponding to the transferred public key.

[6.1.4.](#) CA public key delivery to relying parties

CA public keys for all entities (other than trust anchors) are contained in certificates issued by other CAs. These certificates MUST be published in the RPKI distributed repository system. Relying parties download these certificates from the repositories. Public key values and associated data for (putative) trust anchors are

distributed out of band and accepted by relying parties on the basis of locally-defined criteria.

[6.1.5.](#) Key sizes

The algorithms and key sizes used in the RPKI are specified in "A Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure [[ALGKEY](#)].

[6.1.6.](#) Public key parameters generation and quality checking

The public key parameters used in the RPKI are specified in [[ALGKEY](#)]. Each subscriber is responsible for performing checks on the quality of its key pair. A CA is not responsible for performing such checks for subscribers except in the case where the CA generates the key pair on behalf of the subscriber.

[6.1.7.](#) Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)

The Key usage extension bit values used in the RPKI are specified in RPKI certificate profile [[CERTPROF](#)].

[6.2.](#) Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls

[6.2.1.](#) Cryptographic module standards and controls

The cryptographic module standards and controls employed by each CA MUST be described in the CPS issued by that CA.

[6.2.2.](#) Private key (n out of m) multi-person control

CAs MAY employ multi-person controls to constrain access to their private keys, but this is not a requirement for all CAs in the PKI. The CPS for each CA MUST describe which, if any, multi-person controls it employs.

[6.2.3.](#) Private key escrow

No private key escrow procedures are required for the RPKI.

[6.2.4.](#) Private key backup

Because of the adverse operational implications associated with the loss of use of a CA private key in the PKI, each CA MUST employ a secure means to backup its private keys. The details of the procedures for backing up a CA's private key MUST be described in

the CPS issued by the CA.

[6.2.5.](#) Private key archival

The details of the process and procedures used to archive the CA's private key MUST be described in the CPS issued by the CA.

[6.2.6.](#) Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module

The details of the process and procedures used to transfer the CA's private key into or from a cryptographic module MUST be described in the CPS issued by the CA.

[6.2.7.](#) Private key storage on cryptographic module

The details of the process and procedures used to store the CA's private key on a cryptographic module and protect it from unauthorized use MUST be described in the CPS issued by the CA.

[6.2.8.](#) Method of activating private key

The details of the process and procedures used to activate the CA's private key MUST be described in the CPS issued by the CA.

[6.2.9.](#) Method of deactivating private key

The details of the process and procedures used to deactivate the CA's private key MUST be described in the CPS issued by the CA.

[6.2.10.](#) Method of destroying private key

The details of the process and procedures used to destroy the CA's private key MUST be described in the CPS issued by the CA.

[6.2.11.](#) Cryptographic Module Rating

The security rating of the cryptographic module MUST be described in the CPS issued by the CA.

[6.3.](#) Other aspects of key pair management

[6.3.1.](#) Public key archival

Because this PKI does not support non-repudiation, there is no need to archive public keys.

[6.3.2.](#) Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods

The INRs held by a CA may periodically change when it receives new distributions. To minimize disruption, the CA key pair **MUST NOT** change when INRs are added to its certificate.

If ISP and network subscriber certificates are tied to the duration of service agreements, these certificates should have validity periods commensurate with the duration of these agreements. In any case, the validity period for certificates **MUST** be chosen by the issuing CA and described in its CPS.

[6.4.](#) Activation data

Each CA **MUST** document in its CPS how it will generate, install and protect its activation data.

[6.5.](#) Computer security controls

Each CA **MUST** document the technical security requirements it employs for CA computer operation in its CPS.

[6.6.](#) Life cycle technical controls

[6.6.1.](#) System development controls

The CPS for each CA **MUST** document any system development controls required by that CA, if applicable.

[6.6.2.](#) Security management controls

The CPS for each CA **MUST** document the security controls applied to the software and equipment used for this PKI. These controls **MUST** be

commensurate with those used for the systems used by the CAs for managing the INRs.

[6.6.3.](#) Life cycle security controls

The CPS for each CA MUST document how the equipment (hardware and software) used for this PKI will be procured, installed, maintained, and updated. This MUST be done in a fashion commensurate with the way in which equipment for the management and distribution of INRs is handled.

[6.7.](#) Network security controls

The CPS for each CA MUST document the network security controls employed for CA operation. These MUST be commensurate with the

protection it employs for the computers used for managing distribution of INRs.

[6.8.](#) Time-stamping

The RPKI does not make use of time stamping.

[7](#). Certificate and CRL Profiles

Please refer to the RPKI Certificate and CRL Profile [[CERTPROF](#)].

[8.](#) Compliance Audit And Other Assessments

The Certificate Policy for a typical PKI defines the criteria against which prospective CAs are evaluated and establishes requirements that they must meet. In this PKI, the CAs are already authoritative for the management of INRs, and the PKI simply supports verification of the distribution of these resources to network subscribers. Accordingly, whatever audit and other assessments are already used to ensure the security of the management of INRs is sufficient for this PKI. The CPS for each CA MUST describe what audits and other assessments are used.

[9.](#) Other Business And Legal Matters

As noted throughout this certificate policy, the organizations managing the distribution of INRs are authoritative in their roles as managers of this data. They MUST operate this PKI to allow the

holders of INRs to generate digitally signed data that attest to these distributions. Therefore, the manner in which the organizations in question manage their business and legal matters for this PKI MUST be commensurate with the way in which they already manage business and legal matters in their existing roles. Since there is no single set of responses to this section that would apply to all organizations, the topics listed in sections [4.9.1](#) to [4.9.11](#) and 4.9.13 to 4.9.17 of [RFC 3647](#) SHOULD be covered in the CPS issued by each CA, although not every CA may choose to address all of these topics.

[9.12](#). Amendments

[9.12.1](#). Procedure for amendment

The procedure for amending this CP is via written notice from the IESG in the form of a new (BCP) RFC that updates or obsoletes this document.

[9.12.2](#). Notification mechanism and period

Successive versions of the CP will be published with the statement "This CP takes effect on MM/DD/YYYY." MM/DD/YYYY MUST be a minimum of 6 months from the date of publication.

[9.12.3](#). Circumstances under which OID must be changed

If the IESG judges that changes to the CP do not materially reduce the acceptability of certificates issued for RPKI purposes, there will be no change to the CP OID. If the IESG judges that changes to the CP do materially change the acceptability of certificates for RPKI purposes, then there MUST be a new CP OID.

10. Security Considerations

According to X.509, a certificate policy (CP) is "a named set of rules that indicates the applicability of a certificate to a particular community and/or class of applications with common security requirements." A CP may be used by a relying party to help in deciding whether a certificate, and the binding therein, are sufficiently trustworthy and otherwise appropriate for a particular application. This document describes the CP for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). There are separate documents (Certification Practice Statements (CPS's)) that cover the factors that determine the degree to which a relying party can trust the binding embodied in a certificate. The degree to which such a binding can be trusted depends on several factors, e.g., the practices followed by the certification authority (CA) in authenticating the subject; the CA's operating policy, procedures, and technical security controls, including the scope of the subscriber's responsibilities (for example, in protecting the private key), and the stated responsibilities and liability terms and conditions of the CA (for example, warranties, disclaimers of warranties, and limitations of liability).

Since name uniqueness within the RPKI cannot be guaranteed, there is a risk that two or more CAs in the RPKI will issue certificates and CRLs under the same Issuer name. Path validation implementations that conform to the resource certification path validation algorithm (see [[CERTPROF](#)]) verify that the same key was used to sign both the target (the resource certificate) and the corresponding CRL. So a name collision will not change the result. Use of the basic X.509 path validation algorithm, which assumes name uniqueness, could result in a revoked certificate being accepted as valid or a valid certificate being rejected as revoked. Relying parties must ensure that the software they use to validate certificates issued under this policy verifies that the same key was used to sign both the certificate and the corresponding CRL, as specified in [[CERTPROF](#)].

11. IANA Considerations

None.

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