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Telechat Review of draft-harkins-salted-eap-pwd-06

Request Review of draft-harkins-salted-eap-pwd
Requested revision No specific revision (document currently at 08)
Type Telechat Review
Team General Area Review Team (Gen-ART) (genart)
Deadline 2016-10-25
Requested 2016-09-22
Authors Dan Harkins
I-D last updated 2016-10-15
Completed reviews Genart Last Call review of -06 by Dale R. Worley (diff)
Genart Telechat review of -06 by Dale R. Worley (diff)
Genart Telechat review of -07 by Dale R. Worley (diff)
Secdir Last Call review of -06 by Simon Josefsson (diff)
Opsdir Last Call review of -06 by Mahesh Jethanandani (diff)
Assignment Reviewer Dale R. Worley
State Completed
Request Telechat review on draft-harkins-salted-eap-pwd by General Area Review Team (Gen-ART) Assigned
Reviewed revision 06 (document currently at 08)
Result Ready w/nits
Completed 2016-10-15
Document: draft-harkins-salted-eap-pwd-06
Reviewer: Dale R. Worley
Review Date: 2016-09-05
IESG Telechat date: 2016-10-27

I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft.  The General Area
Review Team (Gen-ART) reviews all IETF documents being processed by
the IESG for the IETF Chair.  Please wait for direction from your
document shepherd or AD before posting a new version of the draft.

For more information, please see the FAQ at

Summary:  This draft is basically ready for publication, but has
possible nits that should be considered for fixing before publication.

Minor issues:

2.5.  Payload Modifications

The construction of the EAP-pwd-Commit/Request message limits the salt
to 255 octets, or 2040 bits.  This probably ought to be mentioned in
section 2.1 where the length of the salt is discussed.

Is there any reason to be concerned that 2040 bits will be inadequate
in the near-to-medium future?

Nits/editorial comments:


   It included support for raw keys and RFC2751-style double
   hashing of a password but did not include support for salted

I believe that the reference to RFC 2751 is incorrect.  Probably what
is meant is RFC 2759 (see the reference thereto in RFC 5931).  In any
case, the referenced RFC should be listed as a reference.

1.1.  Background

   Databases of stored passwords present an attractive target for
   attack-- get access to the database, learn the passwords.

Normally, the spacing before and after "--" is the same.  There are
also examples of this in sections 2.1 and 5.  Perhaps discuss this
with the RFC Editor concerning the meaning the authors want to
associate with this punctuation.

2.1.  Password Pre-Processing

   o  TBD8: OpaqueString and a UNIX crypt() ([CRY])

Probably change "a UNIX crypt" to "UNIX crypt".

   o  TBD5: OpaqueString and a random salt with SHA-1 ([SHS])

For TBD5-TBD8, it might be clearer to say "OpaqueString and then ...",
as all of them have a two-phase structure.

5.  Security Considerations

   there is no dictionary attack needed to recover the plaintext

This is correct but doesn't emphasize the important point.  Perhaps

   since the plaintext password need not be recovered, no dictionary
   attack is needed


   While the immediate effect of such a compromise would be the
   compromised server,

I think changing "would be the compromised server" to "would be the
compromise of the server" would make this clearer.