Last Call Review of draft-ietf-6man-snac-router-ra-flag-02
review-ietf-6man-snac-router-ra-flag-02-secdir-lc-sahib-2024-11-09-00
Request | Review of | draft-ietf-6man-snac-router-ra-flag |
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Requested revision | No specific revision (document currently at 03) | |
Type | IETF Last Call Review | |
Team | Security Area Directorate (secdir) | |
Deadline | 2024-11-11 | |
Requested | 2024-10-21 | |
Authors | Jonathan Hui | |
I-D last updated | 2025-01-07 (Latest revision 2024-12-04) | |
Completed reviews |
Genart IETF Last Call review of -02
by Gyan Mishra
(diff)
Secdir IETF Last Call review of -02 by Shivan Kaul Sahib (diff) Opsdir IETF Last Call review of -02 by Adrian Farrel (diff) Iotdir Telechat review of -02 by Thomas Fossati (diff) Intdir Telechat review of -02 by Juan-Carlos Zúñiga (diff) |
|
Assignment | Reviewer | Shivan Kaul Sahib |
State | Completed | |
Request | IETF Last Call review on draft-ietf-6man-snac-router-ra-flag by Security Area Directorate Assigned | |
Posted at | https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/secdir/-bbOj-RVGjDn-nSkfezmMSbGQAI | |
Reviewed revision | 02 (document currently at 03) | |
Result | Has issues | |
Completed | 2024-11-09 |
review-ietf-6man-snac-router-ra-flag-02-secdir-lc-sahib-2024-11-09-00
The document generally looks straight-forward. However, it's surprising to me that the Security Considerations section completely defers to RFC 4861. For example, surely a device lying about being a SNAC router would have some added implications for DoS capabilities like mentioned in Security Considerations section of RFC 4861 and RFC 3756? I think it would be worth spelling out what happens in that scenario. Nit: In the introduction, "Stub Network Auto-Configuring Router (SNAC) router" says router twice, can just remove the first "Router".