Last Call Review of draft-ietf-6man-snac-router-ra-flag-02
review-ietf-6man-snac-router-ra-flag-02-secdir-lc-sahib-2024-11-09-00

Request Review of draft-ietf-6man-snac-router-ra-flag
Requested revision No specific revision (document currently at 08)
Type IETF Last Call Review
Team Security Area Directorate (secdir)
Deadline 2024-11-11
Requested 2024-10-21
Authors Jonathan Hui
I-D last updated 2026-06-10 (Latest revision 2026-06-05)
Completed reviews Genart IETF Last Call review of -02 by Gyan Mishra (diff)
Secdir IETF Last Call review of -02 by Shivan Kaul Sahib (diff)
Opsdir IETF Last Call review of -02 by Adrian Farrel (diff)
Iotdir Telechat review of -02 by Thomas Fossati (diff)
Intdir Telechat review of -02 by Juan-Carlos Zúñiga (diff)
Genart IETF Last Call review of -06 by Gyan Mishra (diff)
Secdir IETF Last Call review of -06 by Prachi Jain (diff)
Assignment Reviewer Shivan Kaul Sahib
State Completed
Request IETF Last Call review on draft-ietf-6man-snac-router-ra-flag by Security Area Directorate Assigned
Posted at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/secdir/-bbOj-RVGjDn-nSkfezmMSbGQAI
Reviewed revision 02 (document currently at 08)
Result Has issues
Completed 2024-11-09
review-ietf-6man-snac-router-ra-flag-02-secdir-lc-sahib-2024-11-09-00
The document generally looks straight-forward. However, it's surprising to me
that the Security Considerations section completely defers to RFC 4861. For
example, surely a device lying about being a SNAC router would have some added
implications for DoS capabilities like mentioned in Security Considerations
section of RFC 4861 and RFC 3756? I think it would be worth spelling out what
happens in that scenario.

Nit: In the introduction, "Stub Network Auto-Configuring Router (SNAC) router"
says router twice, can just remove the first "Router".