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Last Call Review of draft-ietf-acme-star-06
review-ietf-acme-star-06-opsdir-lc-ersue-2019-07-21-00

Request Review of draft-ietf-acme-star
Requested revision No specific revision (document currently at 11)
Type Last Call Review
Team Ops Directorate (opsdir)
Deadline 2019-08-01
Requested 2019-07-11
Authors Yaron Sheffer , Diego Lopez , Oscar Gonzalez de Dios , Antonio Pastor , Thomas Fossati
I-D last updated 2019-07-21
Completed reviews Genart Last Call review of -06 by Meral Shirazipour (diff)
Opsdir Last Call review of -06 by Mehmet Ersue (diff)
Assignment Reviewer Mehmet Ersue
State Completed
Request Last Call review on draft-ietf-acme-star by Ops Directorate Assigned
Posted at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ops-dir/qLfRZ1cvylhRqaWEDbHtD_KMGKA
Reviewed revision 06 (document currently at 11)
Result Has nits
Completed 2019-07-21
review-ietf-acme-star-06-opsdir-lc-ersue-2019-07-21-00
I reviewed the document "Support for Short-Term, Automatically-Renewed (STAR)
Certificates in        Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME)
(draft-ietf-acme-star-06) as part of the Operational directorate's ongoing
effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. These comments
were written primarily for the benefit of the operational area directors. 
Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other
last call comments.

Intended status: Standards Track
Current IESG state: In Last Call (ends 2019-08-01)
IANA State: IANA - Review Needed

Summary:

The document proposes an ACME extension to enable the issuance of short-term
and automatically renewed (STAR) X.509 certificates. There are no nits in the
document.

As far as I can see the document does not cause any issues related to
operations and management. Though I have two suggestions:

1)
> 4.2.  Impact on Certificate Transparency (CT) Logs
...
>      The input received from most members of the CT community when the
>      issue was raised was that this should not represent a problem for the
>      CT architecture.

This statement is pretty vague for a standard track document. I assume the
reader will be asking what "most members" mean and why it shouldn't represent a
problem for the CT architecture.

2)
> 7.1.  No revocation
...
>      More discussion of the security of STAR certificates is available in
>      [Topalovic].

AFAIU the external paper referred to does not adress security considerations
directly. If you think there are concrete security considerations related to
"No revocations" I would like to suggest to list them here.

Thanks,
Mehmet