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Telechat Review of draft-ietf-alto-path-vector-22

Request Review of draft-ietf-alto-path-vector
Requested revision No specific revision (document currently at 25)
Type Telechat Review
Team Security Area Directorate (secdir)
Deadline 2022-03-01
Requested 2022-02-02
Authors Kai Gao , Young Lee , Sabine Randriamasy , Y. Richard Yang , Jingxuan Zhang
I-D last updated 2022-02-25
Completed reviews Secdir Last Call review of -19 by Samuel Weiler (diff)
Genart Last Call review of -17 by Suresh Krishnan (diff)
Opsdir Last Call review of -17 by Tim Chown (diff)
Artart Last Call review of -16 by Paul Kyzivat (diff)
Opsdir Telechat review of -19 by Tim Chown (diff)
Secdir Telechat review of -22 by Samuel Weiler (diff)
Assignment Reviewer Samuel Weiler
State Completed
Request Telechat review on draft-ietf-alto-path-vector by Security Area Directorate Assigned
Posted at
Reviewed revision 22 (document currently at 25)
Result Not ready
Completed 2022-02-25
The security considerations text in this document has changed markedly - and
multiple times - from when I reviewed it at version -19.  I'm flagging this as
"Not Ready" mostly because I think it deserves another set of eyes (e.g. the

An intermediate version (-20) required the use of Digital Right Management
(DRM).  In -22, that's toned down to a recommendation.  What other non-DRM
technical solutions might help?

It feels weird to have the the server being instructed do out-of-band things,

           The ALTO server MUST carefully verify that the deployment
           scenario satisfies the security assumptions of these methods before
           applying them to protect Path Vector services with sensitive network

This sounds like a requirement for the operator of the server, which the server
is in no position to enforce - and we're providing no technical measure for