Last Call Review of draft-ietf-avtcore-aria-srtp-09
review-ietf-avtcore-aria-srtp-09-secdir-lc-laurie-2017-06-29-00
Request | Review of | draft-ietf-avtcore-aria-srtp |
---|---|---|
Requested revision | No specific revision (document currently at 11) | |
Type | Last Call Review | |
Team | Security Area Directorate (secdir) | |
Deadline | 2017-06-29 | |
Requested | 2017-06-15 | |
Authors | Woo-Hwan Kim , Jungkeun Lee , Je Hong Park , Daesung Kwon , Dong-Chan Kim | |
I-D last updated | 2017-06-29 | |
Completed reviews |
Genart Last Call review of -07
by Alexey Melnikov
(diff)
Secdir Last Call review of -06 by Ben Laurie (diff) Opsdir Last Call review of -06 by Jouni Korhonen (diff) Genart Last Call review of -09 by Meral Shirazipour (diff) Secdir Last Call review of -09 by Ben Laurie (diff) |
|
Assignment | Reviewer | Ben Laurie |
State | Completed | |
Request | Last Call review on draft-ietf-avtcore-aria-srtp by Security Area Directorate Assigned | |
Reviewed revision | 09 (document currently at 11) | |
Result | Has nits | |
Completed | 2017-06-29 |
review-ietf-avtcore-aria-srtp-09-secdir-lc-laurie-2017-06-29-00
I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other last call comments. The summary of the review is ready with nits. This is essentially a drop-in replacement of AES for SRTP with ARIA, a cipher I've never heard of. Because it is a drop-in replacement, it uses SHA-1. Probably it would be better practice to update the hash function to something more modern. The I-D also somewhat eccentrically says that no security problems have been found with ARIA whilst referencing a paper on a meet-in-the-middle attack on reduced round ARIA. I am not sure what to make of this, though clearly it is not a fatal flaw.