Last Call Review of draft-ietf-avtcore-multi-party-rtt-mix-16
review-ietf-avtcore-multi-party-rtt-mix-16-secdir-lc-salz-2021-05-06-00

Request Review of draft-ietf-avtcore-multi-party-rtt-mix
Requested revision No specific revision (document currently at 20)
Type Last Call Review
Team Security Area Directorate (secdir)
Deadline 2021-05-03
Requested 2021-04-19
Authors Gunnar Hellstrom
I-D last updated 2021-05-06
Completed reviews Opsdir Last Call review of -14 by Jürgen Schönwälder (diff)
Secdir Last Call review of -16 by Rich Salz (diff)
Genart Last Call review of -14 by Peter E. Yee (diff)
Assignment Reviewer Rich Salz
State Completed
Review review-ietf-avtcore-multi-party-rtt-mix-16-secdir-lc-salz-2021-05-06
Posted at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/secdir/WvgIjmQFMmjP7t1TSwtTV_u9Vko
Reviewed revision 16 (document currently at 20)
Result Ready
Completed 2021-05-06
review-ietf-avtcore-multi-party-rtt-mix-16-secdir-lc-salz-2021-05-06-00
This review is for the benefit of the Security AD's. Nobody else should read
this. Or, if you read it, treat it as any other last call review :)

I know very little about WebRTC, AVT, etc.

I thought Section 1.2, summary of the alternatives, was great. I wish more
documents did this kind of thing. And similar for all of section 2. The details
in Section 3 about how to comply seem very clear. If I were implementing this,
I could use easily use this as a checklist and test suite. Section 3.19 is the
most important one for transport security. Not knowing the operating
environments, it seems reasonable.

The security considerations seems a little scant, given the opportunity for
privacy concerns of participants and for intruders to disrupt calls. Is it
common that the mixer is a trusted entity? A statement on that either way would
be useful.