Last Call Review of draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-circuit-breakers-13
review-ietf-avtcore-rtp-circuit-breakers-13-secdir-lc-nystrom-2016-03-10-00
Request | Review of | draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-circuit-breakers |
---|---|---|
Requested revision | No specific revision (document currently at 18) | |
Type | Last Call Review | |
Team | Security Area Directorate (secdir) | |
Deadline | 2016-03-09 | |
Requested | 2016-02-25 | |
Authors | Colin Perkins , Varun Singh | |
I-D last updated | 2016-03-10 | |
Completed reviews |
Genart Early review of -11
by Meral Shirazipour
(diff)
Genart Last Call review of -13 by Meral Shirazipour (diff) Genart Last Call review of -14 by Meral Shirazipour (diff) Secdir Last Call review of -13 by Magnus Nyström (diff) Opsdir Last Call review of -13 by Scott O. Bradner (diff) |
|
Assignment | Reviewer | Magnus Nyström |
State | Completed | |
Request | Last Call review on draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-circuit-breakers by Security Area Directorate Assigned | |
Reviewed revision | 13 (document currently at 18) | |
Result | Ready | |
Completed | 2016-03-10 |
review-ietf-avtcore-rtp-circuit-breakers-13-secdir-lc-nystrom-2016-03-10-00
I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other last call comments. This memo describes a set of RTP "circuit-breakers." In this context, circuit-breakers are conditions under which an RTP sender "needs to stop transmitting media data in order to protect the network from excessive congestion." As such, the possibility for DOS and similar disruptions are possible in this context. However, the security considerations sections seems adequate and refers to the core RTP, RTCP documents for threat models and mitigations. -- Magnus