IETF Last Call Review of draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-jpegxs-3ed-02
review-ietf-avtcore-rtp-jpegxs-3ed-02-secdir-lc-orman-2026-06-18-00

Do not be alarmed.  I generated this review of this document as part
of the security directorate's ongoing effort to review all IETF
documents being processed by the IESG.  These comments were written
with the intent of improving security requirements and considerations
in IETF drafts.  Comments not addressed in last call may be included
in AD reviews during the IESG review.  Document editors and WG chairs
should treat these comments just like any other last call comments.

The document covers new payload formats for the RTP protocol.  The
changes are necessary to support new features introduced in
third edition of JPEG XS which itself supports the TDC coding mode.
TDC can use a wavelet-domain prediction method that can be very fast
and very efficient.

Because RTP security and privacy are generally considered to be
achieved by protecting the session stream, and because RTP
deliberately does not mandate or recommend any mechanisms
for cryptography or key management, the security issues are punted
to transport layer security mechanisms like TLS.  

The authors considered methods for subverting the parsing of payload
formats through malicious construction, but they feel that the
semantics are simple enough to make such attacks impossible.

I am mildly curious about selective protection of payloads.  At
one time there was interest in doing that in order to reduce the
cryptographic burden to some minimally acceptable level.  Perhaps
that fell by the wayside as hardware got better and compression
algorithms got better.

At any rate (compressed or not), the security considerations section
seems adequately presented.

Hilarie