Telechat Review of draft-ietf-avtcore-srtp-encrypted-header-ext-04
review-ietf-avtcore-srtp-encrypted-header-ext-04-genart-telechat-thomson-2013-02-05-00
| Request | Review of | draft-ietf-avtcore-srtp-encrypted-header-ext |
|---|---|---|
| Requested revision | No specific revision (document currently at 05) | |
| Type | Telechat Review | |
| Team | General Area Review Team (Gen-ART) (genart) | |
| Deadline | 2013-02-05 | |
| Requested | 2013-01-24 | |
| Authors | Jonathan Lennox | |
| I-D last updated | 2018-12-20 (Latest revision 2013-02-08) | |
| Completed reviews |
Genart IETF Last Call review of -04
by Martin Thomson
(diff)
Genart Telechat review of -04 by Martin Thomson (diff) Secdir IETF Last Call review of -04 by Scott G. Kelly (diff) |
|
| Assignment | Reviewer | Martin Thomson |
| State | Completed | |
| Request | Telechat review on draft-ietf-avtcore-srtp-encrypted-header-ext by General Area Review Team (Gen-ART) Assigned | |
| Reviewed revision | 04 (document currently at 05) | |
| Result | Ready | |
| Completed | 2013-02-05 |
review-ietf-avtcore-srtp-encrypted-header-ext-04-genart-telechat-thomson-2013-02-05-00
FYI, I can't believe that I did this again. Sorry Russ. ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson at gmail.com> Date: 17 January 2013 13:49 Subject: Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-avtcore-srtp-encrypted-header-ext-04 To: draft-ietf-avtcore-srtp-encrypted-header-ext.all at tools.ietf.org I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at < http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>. Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments you may receive. Document: draft-ietf-avtcore-srtp-encrypted-header-ext-04 Reviewer: Martin Thomson Review Date: 2013-01-17 IETF LC End Date: 2013-01-17 IESG Telechat date: (if known) Summary: This document is clear, well-written and ready for publication as proposed standard. Minor issues: I wonder if it is necessary to establish a registry for the labels used in SRTP key derivation (k_e, k_s, k_he, k_hs, etc...). As unlikely as it seems, a collision in this space would be bad. Nits/editorial comments: S5: s/alternate/alternative/