Early Review of draft-ietf-babel-hmac-00
|Requested revision||No specific revision (document currently at 12)|
|Team||Security Area Directorate (secdir)|
|Requested by||Donald E. Eastlake 3rd|
|Authors||Clara Do , Weronika Kolodziejak , Juliusz Chroboczek|
|Draft last updated||2018-11-01|
Rtgdir Early review of -00
by Mike McBride
Secdir Early review of -00 by Robert Sparks (diff)
Rtgdir Last Call review of -07 by Mike McBride (diff)
Genart Last Call review of -07 by David Schinazi (diff)
Secdir Last Call review of -07 by Robert Sparks (diff)
Opsdir Last Call review of -08 by Dan Romascanu (diff)
It would be nifty if this draft could be reviewed by the BABEL WG meeting Wednesday afternoon in Bangkok. But I realize that only allows an unreasonably short time to review so I have set a more relaxed deadline.
|Reviewed revision||00 (document currently at 12)|
This is an early secdir review of draft-ietf-babel-hmac-00 Summary: There are issues in the draft to address Issues: The pseudo-header is IPv4-centric. The protocol allows for multiple HMAC algorithms, but has no mechanism for signaling which one was used. The MUST NOT at the top of page 8 will need to be adjusted after that's worked out. Discussion of what to do at a verifying peer that doesn't implement a chosen algorithm is also needed. Nits: The claim in 1.1 about not requiring persistent storage is contradicted by the definition of the protocol. At the very least, there is the need to persist the most recent (index,PC) seen. The third bullet at the top of page 4 (among different nodes) has its actors confused. As stated, communication between A and C is irrelevant to the communication between B and C. It would be worth building an example of bootstrapping the protocol between two peers that have no previous knowledge of each other. It's concerning to see a document (even a 00) whose point is to secure a protocol have no discussion at all in the Security Considerations section. It will help refine the document to create and maintain a summary of the important security points in this section going forward.