Last Call Review of draft-ietf-bess-evpn-oam-req-frmwk-04

Request Review of draft-ietf-bess-evpn-oam-req-frmwk
Requested rev. no specific revision (document currently at 10)
Type Last Call Review
Team Security Area Directorate (secdir)
Deadline 2021-02-16
Requested 2021-02-02
Authors Samer Salam, Ali Sajassi, Sam Aldrin, John Drake, Donald Eastlake
Draft last updated 2021-02-15
Completed reviews Rtgdir Last Call review of -04 by Stig Venaas (diff)
Secdir Last Call review of -04 by Melinda Shore (diff)
Genart Last Call review of -04 by David Schinazi (diff)
Tsvart Last Call review of -04 by David Black (diff)
Secdir Telechat review of -07 by Melinda Shore (diff)
Assignment Reviewer Melinda Shore 
State Completed
Review review-ietf-bess-evpn-oam-req-frmwk-04-secdir-lc-shore-2021-02-15
Posted at
Reviewed rev. 04 (document currently at 10)
Review result Has Nits
Review completed: 2021-02-15


This is a very nicely-structured, efficient, well-written document - among the most clearly-written that I've read in a few years.  

Nits:  As a minor point, I am really not a fan of using RFC 2119 language for informational documents, and in this case it's being used somewhat inconsistently (for example, the lowercase "must" in section 4).  I'm also a bit unclear on what's intended by "must optionally authenticate" and suggest that that should be clarified as to whether what's meant is "mandatory to implement but optional to use," or "optional to implement" and should probably be a "SHOULD" (or a "should").  Additionally, it may be helpful to provide an example or two of how the EVPN OAM channel could be exploited as a DOS vector, and to explain what problem is solved by authenticating EVPN endpoints.