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Last Call Review of draft-ietf-bess-orf-covering-prefixes-03
review-ietf-bess-orf-covering-prefixes-03-secdir-lc-weis-2015-03-02-00

Request Review of draft-ietf-bess-orf-covering-prefixes
Requested revision No specific revision (document currently at 06)
Type Last Call Review
Team Security Area Directorate (secdir)
Deadline 2015-02-18
Requested 2015-02-05
Authors Huajin Jeng , Luay Jalil , Ron Bonica , Keyur Patel , Lucy Yong
I-D last updated 2015-03-02
Completed reviews Genart Last Call review of -03 by David L. Black (diff)
Genart Telechat review of -04 by David L. Black (diff)
Secdir Last Call review of -03 by Brian Weis (diff)
Opsdir Last Call review of -03 by Carlos Pignataro (diff)
Assignment Reviewer Brian Weis
State Completed
Request Last Call review on draft-ietf-bess-orf-covering-prefixes by Security Area Directorate Assigned
Reviewed revision 03 (document currently at 06)
Result Ready
Completed 2015-03-02
review-ietf-bess-orf-covering-prefixes-03-secdir-lc-weis-2015-03-02-00
I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's
ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the
IESG.  These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the
security area directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should
treat these comments just like any other last call comments.

This document defines a new type of Outbound Route Filter (ORF),
which is a directive sent to a BGP speaker requesting it to drop
packets matching the filter. This can be used to avoid propogating
traffic that will be filtered after delivery. The new ORF type is
a Covering Prefixes ORF (CP-ORF), which has additional flexibility
in specififying which addresses are to be filtered.

The CP-ORF is stated as being useful within Virutal Hub-and-Spoke
VPNs and EVPNs, both of which include a set of cooperating BGP
speakers implementing a private network. Given that there is a
general trust between the BGP speakers, the security considerations
of the CP-ORF are few. The Security Considerations section describes
how a BGP speaker can limit resource usage, and there is a pointer
to the Security Considerations section of RFC 4271, which describes
more generally how a BGP speaker can reject ORFs due to an 
unwillingness to use additional resources.

I consider this document Ready To Publish.

Brian