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Last Call Review of draft-ietf-bfd-unaffiliated-echo-12
review-ietf-bfd-unaffiliated-echo-11-rtgdir-lc-farrel-2024-09-26-01

Request Review of draft-ietf-bfd-unaffiliated-echo
Requested revision No specific revision (document currently at 14)
Type Last Call Review
Team Routing Area Directorate (rtgdir)
Deadline 2024-10-09
Requested 2024-09-25
Requested by Éric Vyncke
Authors Weiqiang Cheng , Ruixue Wang , Xiao Min , Reshad Rahman , Raj Chetan Boddireddy
I-D last updated 2024-10-12
Completed reviews Rtgdir Last Call review of -12 by Adrian Farrel (diff)
Intdir Last Call review of -11 by Tim Wicinski (diff)
Genart Last Call review of -12 by Gyan Mishra (diff)
Secdir Last Call review of -11 by Stephen Farrell (diff)
Opsdir Last Call review of -11 by Dhruv Dhody (diff)
Opsdir Telechat review of -12 by Dhruv Dhody (diff)
Tsvart Telechat review of -12 by Brian Trammell (diff)
Secdir Telechat review of -12 by Stephen Farrell (diff)
Comments
Thank you in advance for a review for this IETF Last Call: it is short and easy to understand (reading the main BFD RFC is required though).
Assignment Reviewer Adrian Farrel
State Completed
Request Last Call review on draft-ietf-bfd-unaffiliated-echo by Routing Area Directorate Assigned
Posted at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rtg-dir/m-aXPACIFXmfykEQYnnvdufvT4M
Reviewed revision 12 (document currently at 14)
Result Ready
Completed 2024-10-12
review-ietf-bfd-unaffiliated-echo-11-rtgdir-lc-farrel-2024-09-26-01
This review of -12 updates my previous review of -11

I find that the ongoing discussion of a "reflection attack" echoes the point
that I raised with the -11 Security Considerations section. On the whole, I
think that calling out the attack vector and noting that 5800 already observes
the risk of spoofed echo requests. It's notable that in "classic" BFD it is the
responder that is attacked, but in this work, it is the "sender" that is
attacked.

Thanks to the authors for resolving my previous review.