Skip to main content

Last Call Review of draft-ietf-core-object-security-13
review-ietf-core-object-security-13-genart-lc-halpern-2018-07-19-00

Request Review of draft-ietf-core-object-security
Requested revision No specific revision (document currently at 16)
Type Last Call Review
Team General Area Review Team (Gen-ART) (genart)
Deadline 2018-07-30
Requested 2018-07-16
Authors Göran Selander , John Preuß Mattsson , Francesca Palombini , Ludwig Seitz
I-D last updated 2018-07-19
Completed reviews Opsdir Telechat review of -08 by Éric Vyncke (diff)
Genart Last Call review of -08 by Joel M. Halpern (diff)
Secdir Last Call review of -14 by Daniel Migault (diff)
Genart Last Call review of -13 by Joel M. Halpern (diff)
Genart Last Call review of -14 by Joel M. Halpern (diff)
Assignment Reviewer Joel M. Halpern
State Completed
Request Last Call review on draft-ietf-core-object-security by General Area Review Team (Gen-ART) Assigned
Reviewed revision 13 (document currently at 16)
Result Ready
Completed 2018-07-19
review-ietf-core-object-security-13-genart-lc-halpern-2018-07-19-00
I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. The General Area
Review Team (Gen-ART) reviews all IETF documents being processed
by the IESG for the IETF Chair.  Please treat these comments just
like any other last call comments.

For more information, please see the FAQ at

<https://trac.ietf.org/trac/gen/wiki/GenArtfaq>.

Document: draft-ietf-core-object-security-13
Reviewer: Joel Halpern
Review Date: 2018-07-19
IETF LC End Date: 2018-07-30
IESG Telechat date: Not scheduled for a telechat

Summary: this document is ready for publication as a Proposed Standard RFC.
    My minor concerns from draft -08 have been addressed.

Major issues: N/A

Minor issues:
    Section 7.2 is about sequence numbers.  The first sentence in 7.2 discusses
    Nonces.  Then the discussion switches to sequence numbers?  My guess is
    that the Nonce is left over from previous text?

Nits/editorial comments:
    In the first paragraph of 3.3, the text reads:
  The requirement that Sender ID SHALL be unique in the set of all security
  contexts using the same Master Secret, Master Salt, and ID Context
  guarantees unique (key, nonce) pairs, which avoids nonce reuse.
    Unfortunately, that is not a grammatical sentence.