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IETF Last Call Review of draft-ietf-cose-dilithium-08
review-ietf-cose-dilithium-08-genart-lc-housley-2025-07-09-00

Request Review of draft-ietf-cose-dilithium
Requested revision No specific revision (document currently at 11)
Type IETF Last Call Review
Team General Area Review Team (Gen-ART) (genart)
Deadline 2025-07-28
Requested 2025-07-07
Authors Michael Prorock , Orie Steele
I-D last updated 2026-05-19 (Latest revision 2025-11-15)
Completed reviews Genart IETF Last Call review of -08 by Russ Housley (diff)
Secdir IETF Last Call review of -08 by Peter E. Yee (diff)
Opsdir IETF Last Call review of -09 by Daniele Ceccarelli (diff)
Genart Telechat review of -09 by Russ Housley (diff)
Secdir Telechat review of -09 by Peter E. Yee (diff)
Assignment Reviewer Russ Housley
State Completed
Request IETF Last Call review on draft-ietf-cose-dilithium by General Area Review Team (Gen-ART) Assigned
Posted at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/gen-art/SD4jo5Zhv_Kv5it2mL33lesoCR4
Reviewed revision 08 (document currently at 11)
Result Not ready
Completed 2025-07-09
review-ietf-cose-dilithium-08-genart-lc-housley-2025-07-09-00
I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. The General Area
Review Team (Gen-ART) reviews all IETF documents being processed
by the IESG for the IETF Chair. Please treat these comments just
like any other last call comments.

For more information, please see the FAQ at
<https://wiki.ietf.org/en/group/gen/GenArtFAQ>.

Document: draft-ietf-tcpm-prr-rfc6937bis-14
Reviewer: Russ Housley
Review Date: 2025-07-09
IETF LC End Date: 2025-07-28
IESG Telechat date: Not scheduled for a telechat


Summary: Not Ready


Major Concerns:

Section 3 says:

   The AKP key type and thumbprint computations are generic, and
   suitable for use with algorithms other than ML-DSA.

I do not understand this sentence.   The "AKP key type" is a new term.
Perhaps you mean the "Algorithm Key Pair Type", but I do not see any
computations associated with the type.  The types are just registered
string values (JOSE) and integers (COSE).  Also, thumbprints have not
been introduced yet; they are not discussed until Section 6.

Section 4 says:

   See Security Considerations of this document for details.

The Security Considerations contains very little additional information.
It just saus that the seed needs the same protection as the private key.
It would be more helpful to say that the see and the private key that is
expanded from the seed require the same level of protection in Section 4.

Minor Concerns:


Section 3 says:

   When AKP keys are expressed in JWK, key parameters are base64url
   encoded.

This begs for a parallel sentence about COSE that indicates no encoding
is needed.

Section 5 says:

   When producing JSON Web Signatures, the signature bytestrings are
   base64url encoded, and the encoded signature size is larger than
   described in the table above.

Once again, this begs for a parallel sentence about COSE that indicates
no encoding is needed.


Nits:

Section 7.4: s/key compromise/private key compromise/


Note:

I did not make any attempt to verify the examples in Appendix A.