Last Call Review of draft-ietf-decade-problem-statement-
review-ietf-decade-problem-statement-secdir-lc-johansson-2012-03-16-00

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I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's
ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the
IESG.  These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the
security area directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat
these comments just like any other last call comments.

My main problem with the draft is that the Security Considerations
Section is weak. I would have liked a more in-depth analysis of the
enumerated threats in the context of decade. For instance the privacy
aspects of using in-network storage for P2P networks is only covered
briefly as part of a discussion on traffic analysis.

Also in section 3.2 it is noted that E2E encryption may render P2P
caches ineffective. This speaks to a fundamental flaw (imo) in the
architecture: the standard way to protect against many of the stated
attacks also leads to inefficiency of decade. At the very least the
document needs to call this issue out clearly.

	Cheers Leif
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