Last Call Review of draft-ietf-detnet-architecture-08

Request Review of draft-ietf-detnet-architecture
Requested rev. no specific revision (document currently at 13)
Type Last Call Review
Team Security Area Directorate (secdir)
Deadline 2018-10-03
Requested 2018-09-19
Authors Norman Finn, Pascal Thubert, Balazs Varga, János Farkas
Draft last updated 2018-09-27
Completed reviews Rtgdir Last Call review of -08 by Henning Rogge (diff)
Secdir Last Call review of -08 by Dan Harkins (diff)
Genart Last Call review of -08 by Joel Halpern (diff)
Tsvart Last Call review of -08 by Michael Scharf (diff)
Tsvart Telechat review of -11 by Michael Scharf (diff)
Genart Telechat review of -11 by Joel Halpern (diff)
Assignment Reviewer Dan Harkins
State Completed
Review review-ietf-detnet-architecture-08-secdir-lc-harkins-2018-09-27
Reviewed rev. 08 (document currently at 13)
Review result Has Issues
Review completed: 2018-09-27



   I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's
ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the
IESG.  These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the
security area directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat
these comments just like any other last call comments.

   The summary of the review is ready with issues.

   This draft describes an architecture for deterministic networking
that provides for delivery of packet flows with low packet loss and
with a maximum amount of latency.

   A nit first. The terminology seems a bit overblown. We have DetNet
Intermediate nodes that could be relay nodes or transit nodes; and a
DetNet system that is a DetNet aware system or transit node or
relay node; and DetNet edge nodes that are relay nodes; and DetNet
relay nodes that can be bridges, firewalls, or anything else that
participates in DetNet. Finally, to translate between 802.1 TSN and
DetNet we have a "relay system" that is an 802.1 term for a DetNet
intermediate node which, as we have seen, is a DetNet relay node. This
can be simplified considerably.

   The Security Considerations is thin, especially for an architecture
draft that is going to be referred to by subsequent drafts which will
just say something along the lines of, "as an instance of the DetNet
FooBar, these Security Considerations are those from [ARCH]", where
ARCH is the RFC that comes out of this I-D. I think there needs to be
a description of the various points in the architecture that an attacker
could exploit, and if a point is not exploitable it should say so. For

   - is it possible for an attacker to launch a DoS attack by manipulating
     member flows of a DetNet flow in order to force DetNet nodes to
     consume buffers they allocated to deal with the DetNet flow?

   - If an end system is not DetNet aware there needs to be a DetNet edge
     node to handle the encaps of the flow into the DetNet system. Can an
     attacker in that case introduce packets that shouldn't be part of the
     DetNet flow into the flow by getting the edge node to encaps them as

If there are any assumptions being made-- e.g. "insider attacks are not
being considered"-- they should be mentioned.