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Last Call Review of draft-ietf-detnet-bounded-latency-08

Request Review of draft-ietf-detnet-bounded-latency
Requested revision No specific revision (document currently at 10)
Type Last Call Review
Team Security Area Directorate (secdir)
Deadline 2022-02-08
Requested 2022-01-25
Authors Norman Finn , Jean-Yves Le Boudec , Ehsan Mohammadpour , Jiayi Zhang , Balazs Varga
I-D last updated 2022-01-30
Completed reviews Rtgdir Last Call review of -06 by Tony Przygienda (diff)
Genart Last Call review of -08 by Gyan Mishra (diff)
Intdir Last Call review of -08 by Ralf Weber (diff)
Secdir Last Call review of -08 by Watson Ladd (diff)
Artart Last Call review of -08 by Robert Sparks (diff)
Tsvart Last Call review of -08 by Yoshifumi Nishida (diff)
Secdir Telechat review of -10 by Watson Ladd
Assignment Reviewer Watson Ladd
State Completed
Review review-ietf-detnet-bounded-latency-08-secdir-lc-ladd-2022-01-30
Posted at
Reviewed revision 08 (document currently at 10)
Result Has issues
Completed 2022-01-30
Dear fellow IETFers,

Alas I'm forced to put down draft-ietf-detnet-bounded-latency as having issues.
The vast majority of the draft is a detailed and readable description of how to
compute the resources required for a particular QoS. But unfortunately the
security concerns section has a paragraph about securing the reservations which
doesn't really seem relevant: it would seem to be relevant to the control plane
that does the reserving. At the same time a discussion of how an attacker might
be able to abuse the models presented in the document is lacking.

This is particularly important given that there can be very unintuitive global
effects from changes made to capacity on one node or link in a network.
Sincerely, Watson