Last Call Review of draft-ietf-dhc-dhcpv6-reconfigure-rebind-
review-ietf-dhc-dhcpv6-reconfigure-rebind-secdir-lc-gondrom-2012-04-11-00
| Request | Review of | draft-ietf-dhc-dhcpv6-reconfigure-rebind |
|---|---|---|
| Requested revision | No specific revision (document currently at 10) | |
| Type | Last Call Review | |
| Team | Security Area Directorate (secdir) | |
| Deadline | 2012-04-10 | |
| Requested | 2012-04-03 | |
| Authors | D. R. Evans , Ralph Droms , Sheng Jiang | |
| Draft last updated | 2012-04-11 | |
| Completed reviews |
Genart Last Call review of -?? by
Francis Dupont
Genart Last Call review of -?? by Francis Dupont Secdir Last Call review of -?? by Tobias Gondrom |
|
| Assignment | Reviewer | Tobias Gondrom |
| State | Completed | |
| Review |
review-ietf-dhc-dhcpv6-reconfigure-rebind-secdir-lc-gondrom-2012-04-11
|
|
| Completed | 2012-04-11 |
review-ietf-dhc-dhcpv6-reconfigure-rebind-secdir-lc-gondrom-2012-04-11-00
I have reviewed this document as part of the
security directorate's ongoing effort to review all IETF documents
being processed by the IESG. These comments were written
primarily for the benefit of the security area directors.
Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just
like any other last call comments.
The I-D updates RFC 3315 to allow the Rebind message type to
appear in the Reconfigure Message option of a Reconfigure message;
and clarifies how a DHCPv6 client responds to a received
Reconfigure message.
The existing Security Considerations section is a bit soft/vague.
It speaks correctly of the possible risk of an attacker induced
disconnect and relink. And it states these attacks may be
prevented by using the AUTH option or Secure DHCPv6.
However it is vague in the overall system risks / preconditions
under which the risks arise and should also be more clear about
when these mitigation strategies should/SHOULD be used (instead of
"may").
Best regards, Tobias