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Last Call Review of draft-ietf-dhc-relay-id-suboption-11
review-ietf-dhc-relay-id-suboption-11-genart-lc-campbell-2012-12-19-00

Request Review of draft-ietf-dhc-relay-id-suboption
Requested revision No specific revision (document currently at 13)
Type Last Call Review
Team General Area Review Team (Gen-ART) (genart)
Deadline 2013-01-07
Requested 2012-12-14
Authors Bharat Joshi , D.T.V. Ramakrishna Rao , Mark Stapp
I-D last updated 2012-12-19
Completed reviews Genart Last Call review of -11 by Ben Campbell (diff)
Genart Last Call review of -11 by Ben Campbell (diff)
Secdir Last Call review of -?? by Dan Harkins
Assignment Reviewer Ben Campbell
State Completed
Request Last Call review on draft-ietf-dhc-relay-id-suboption by General Area Review Team (Gen-ART) Assigned
Reviewed revision 11 (document currently at 13)
Result Ready w/nits
Completed 2012-12-19
review-ietf-dhc-relay-id-suboption-11-genart-lc-campbell-2012-12-19-00
I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on
Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at

<

http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.

Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments
you may receive.

Document: draft-ietf-dhc-relay-id-suboption-11
Reviewer: Ben Campbell
Review Date: 2012-12-19
IETF LC End Date: 2013-01-07

Summary: This draft is basically ready for publication as a proposed standard.
However, there is one comment from a prior review that I am not sure whether is
resolved.

Major issues:

None

Minor issues:

-- In Sean Turner's 2009 review of version 07 of the document [

http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/gen-art/current/msg04614.html

 ], he made the following comment:

> In the security considerations it says look to RFC 3046 and
> RFC 4030 for security considerations and then says SHOULD use the relay
> agent authentication option from RFC 4030.  RFC 3046 is targeted at
> network infrastructures that are "trusted and secure" and RFC 4030
> allows the relay agent to be part of this trusted and secure network.
> If an implementation doesn't use the relay agent authentication option,
> then the relay agent can't be part of the "trusted and secure" network.
>  This makes me think that the relay agent authentication option from
> RFC 4030 ought to be a MUST not a SHOULD?

I can't tell from the resulting conversation if that comment is addressed in
the current text. Additional text has been added, but the SHOULD remains. I'm
willing to accept it has been addressed if the author's say so--I only mention
it to make sure it didn't fall through a crack.

Nits/editorial comments:

-- section 5, last paragraph:

I suggest removing the scare quotes around "stability". If there are concerns
about whether such stability is real, it would be better to say that directly.

-- informative references:

draft-ietf-dhc-dhcpv4-bulk-leasequery-06 is now 07