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Telechat Review of draft-ietf-dtn-tcpclv4-18
review-ietf-dtn-tcpclv4-18-secdir-telechat-wood-2020-02-13-00

Request Review of draft-ietf-dtn-tcpclv4
Requested revision No specific revision (document currently at 28)
Type Telechat Review
Team Security Area Directorate (secdir)
Deadline 2020-02-18
Requested 2020-02-12
Authors Brian Sipos , Michael Demmer , Joerg Ott , Simon Perreault
I-D last updated 2020-02-13
Completed reviews Secdir Last Call review of -15 by Christopher A. Wood (diff)
Opsdir Last Call review of -15 by Mehmet Ersue (diff)
Secdir Telechat review of -18 by Christopher A. Wood (diff)
Assignment Reviewer Christopher A. Wood
State Completed
Request Telechat review on draft-ietf-dtn-tcpclv4 by Security Area Directorate Assigned
Posted at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/secdir/QdD1gb92Z2nm38QvjQjDmKaIaB8
Reviewed revision 18 (document currently at 28)
Result Has nits
Completed 2020-02-13
review-ietf-dtn-tcpclv4-18-secdir-telechat-wood-2020-02-13-00
Thanks for updating this document! All of my comments from the previous review
have been addressed. It reads much better now. I only have some minor nits to
note below:

- Section 8.5: This section title references ciphersuite downgrade, yet the
text refers to configured use of less-good ciphersuites. Perhaps the title
should be, "Threat: Weak TLS Configurations"? - Section 8.6: I don't quite
follow this section. Certainly, describing how one validates certificates is
out of scope. However, the title suggests this is part of how one "uses"
certificates? I might just scratch this section altogether, and instead
reference RFC5280 where certificate-based authentication is first presented. -
Section 8.7: I might rename this title to, "Threat: Symmetric Key Limits." -
Section 8.10.1: I would reference opportunistic security here, as an
unauthenticated key exchange yields similar properties.