Last Call Review of draft-ietf-geopriv-deref-protocol-
review-ietf-geopriv-deref-protocol-secdir-lc-kaufman-2011-11-08-00
| Request | Review of | draft-ietf-geopriv-deref-protocol |
|---|---|---|
| Requested revision | No specific revision (document currently at 07) | |
| Type | Last Call Review | |
| Team | Security Area Directorate (secdir) | |
| Deadline | 2011-11-22 | |
| Requested | 2011-10-14 | |
| Authors | James Winterbottom , Hannes Tschofenig , Henning Schulzrinne , Martin Thomson | |
| Draft last updated | 2011-11-08 | |
| Completed reviews |
Genart Telechat review of -??
by
Elwyn B. Davies
Genart Telechat review of -?? by Elwyn B. Davies Secdir Last Call review of -?? by Charlie Kaufman |
|
| Assignment | Reviewer | Charlie Kaufman |
| State | Completed | |
| Review |
review-ietf-geopriv-deref-protocol-secdir-lc-kaufman-2011-11-08
|
|
| Completed | 2011-11-08 |
review-ietf-geopriv-deref-protocol-secdir-lc-kaufman-2011-11-08-00
I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's ongoing
effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. These
comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area
directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just
like any other last call comments.
This document specifies a protocol over http (and optionally over TLS) for
dereferencing a Presence Information Data Format Location Object. This data is
sensitive and there is likely to be an authorization policy saying who can get
it. This spec is careful to enumerate the various ways that authorization
decision might be made without specifying how one would specify any particular
policy. I believe it therefore manages to evade any security scrutiny. (Use of
TLS is recommended and is an appropriate way to secure the protocol itself).
I found one typo: page 11: specfies -> specifies
--Charlie