Last Call Review of draft-ietf-httpapi-api-catalog-05
review-ietf-httpapi-api-catalog-05-secdir-lc-salazar-2024-11-09-00
Request | Review of | draft-ietf-httpapi-api-catalog |
---|---|---|
Requested revision | No specific revision (document currently at 06) | |
Type | Last Call Review | |
Team | Security Area Directorate (secdir) | |
Deadline | 2024-11-11 | |
Requested | 2024-10-21 | |
Authors | Kevin Smith | |
I-D last updated | 2024-11-09 | |
Completed reviews |
Artart Last Call review of -05
by Tim Bray
(diff)
Genart Last Call review of -05 by Mallory Knodel (diff) Secdir Last Call review of -05 by Joey Salazar (diff) Opsdir Last Call review of -05 by Tina Tsou (Ting ZOU) (diff) |
|
Assignment | Reviewer | Joey Salazar |
State | Completed | |
Request | Last Call review on draft-ietf-httpapi-api-catalog by Security Area Directorate Assigned | |
Posted at | https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/secdir/hLb_MFF7yBcW-NilB8fmoEtPxkM | |
Reviewed revision | 05 (document currently at 06) | |
Result | Has issues | |
Completed | 2024-11-09 |
review-ietf-httpapi-api-catalog-05-secdir-lc-salazar-2024-11-09-00
I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other last call comments. Review of draft-ietf-httpapi-api-catalog-05 Reviewer: Joey Salazar Review Type: SecDir Last Call Review Document State: In Last Call (ends 2024-11-11) Reviewed Version: -05 The summary of the review is: Ready with issues Main Concern: The Security Considerations section needs more input 9. Security Considerations Overall, I agree with the OpsDir review which suggested expanding on Access Controls and Data Sensitivity, and want to add: To help mitigate abuse and prevent denial-of-service (DoS) attacks on the API catalog endpoint, rate-limiting measures could be recommended. CORS policies could be suggested for use on the server to restrict which origins are allowed to access the API catalog(s). For the internal/private APIs scenario, the text could additionally mention that metadata exposure should be minimized; a catalog hosted on developer.example.com should not expose unnecessary metadata about other domains like internal.example.net. Considerations on how to verify that catalog content has not been tampered with should be explored. Lastly, given that RFC8615 expands on some of these concerns and recommendations, perhaps a note specifically pointing to that section would help provide valuable insight. Nits: Echoing what other reviewers have shared during this LC, I find some parts of it somewhat harder to digest that could benefit from clearer definition; as a person not deeply familiar with RFC8615, even after careful reading of section 7 it still remains unclear to me if, in order to prevent "squatting" by using precise names for a specific application, the examples included in the document should be `example.com/.well-known/example-api-catalog` or if `example.com/.well-known/api-catalog` remains applicable. Also, the definition of 'owner' as opposed to 'publisher' in section 8.2. could benefit from added context. Across the document there seems to be a persistence of double spacing between the end of a sentence and the beginning of the next sentence in the same paragraph, i.e "choose. Hence" Minor corrections: 1.2 Notational Conventions In "The term "content negotiation" and "status code" are from [HTTP]." s/term/terms/ In "The term well-known URI is from [RFC8615]." s/well-known URI/"well-known URI"/ 6. The API Catalog s/definitions for each API, etc. ./definitions for each API, etc./ s/utiise/utilise/ s/exmple/example/ Other than these, I find good value in the document and look forward to reading an updated version. Thank you for your work.