Telechat Review of draft-ietf-httpbis-authscheme-registrations-08
review-ietf-httpbis-authscheme-registrations-08-opsdir-telechat-hares-2013-12-18-00

Request Review of draft-ietf-httpbis-authscheme-registrations
Requested rev. no specific revision (document currently at 10)
Type Telechat Review
Team Ops Directorate (opsdir)
Deadline 2013-12-17
Requested 2013-11-11
Draft last updated 2013-12-18
Completed reviews Genart Last Call review of -08 by Kathleen Moriarty (diff)
Genart Telechat review of -09 by Kathleen Moriarty (diff)
Secdir Last Call review of -08 by Catherine Meadows (diff)
Opsdir Telechat review of -08 by Susan Hares (diff)
Assignment Reviewer Susan Hares
State Completed
Review review-ietf-httpbis-authscheme-registrations-08-opsdir-telechat-hares-2013-12-18
Reviewed rev. 08 (document currently at 10)
Review result Not Ready
Review completed: 2013-12-18

Review
review-ietf-httpbis-authscheme-registrations-08-opsdir-telechat-hares-2013-12-18

Ops-dir folks: 

 

I am reviewing the following document: 

 

Susan Hares T 2013-12-17 draft-ietf-httpbis-authscheme-registrations-09

 

But the IESG write-up states the following should reviewed together: 

* draft-ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging

* draft-ietf-httpbis-p2-semantics

* draft-ietf-httpbis-p4-conditional

* draft-ietf-httpbis-p5-range

* draft-ietf-httpbis-p6-cache

* draft-ietf-httpbis-p7-auth (

Peter Schoenmaker Ops-Dir reviewer) 

* draft-ietf-httpbis-method-registrations (

Michael Sneed, Ops-dir

* draft-ietf-httpbis-authscheme-registrations (Sue Hares Reviewer) 

 

I am concerned about the breaking of the review of httpbis-authscheme-registrations away From the draft-ietf-httpbis-p7-auth and the draft-ietf-httpbis-method-registrations.  I have read all three drafts.  

 

 

So this is addressed to the reviewers of the httpbis documents for this week 

Niclas Comstedt        T 2013-12-17 draft-ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging-25

Menachem Dodge         T 2013-12-17 draft-ietf-httpbis-p5-range-25

Lionel Morand          T 2013-12-17 draft-ietf-httpbis-p6-cache-25

Sarah Banks            T 2013-12-17 draft-ietf-httpbis-p2-semantics-25

Peter Schoenmaker      T 2013-12-17 draft-ietf-httpbis-p7-auth-25

Michael Sneed          T 2013-12-17 draft-ietf-httpbis-method-registrations-14

Susan Hares            T 2013-12-17 draft-ietf-httpbis-authscheme-registrations-09

 

Do you want me to: a) keep my comments to myself, b) send you comments that you can review, or c) just send it to the ops-dir list?  I’m glad to collaborate with the person reviewing these piece. Just let me know by email. 

 

 

Review of the 

draft-ietf-httpbis-authscheme-registrations

 

This document: Not ready. 

Why not ready:  It is just really unclear exactly what IANA is putting in <http://www.iana.org/assignments/http-authschemes> 

 

Here’s my guess:  I think that  IANA is simply giving the following as potential WWW-Authenticate RFC values 

 

WWW-Authenticate: [Basic]|[Bearer] |  

                  [Digest] |[Negotiate]| [OAuth]

 

What’s the problem with reviewing just this document: Reviewing just this document is like 

tracing the validity of a string path that enters a wad of strings and exits it.  Without looking at the whole scheme, you cannot tell if this is reason. 

 

 

I have

 reviewed the specification reference in 

draft-ietf-httpbis-authscheme-registrations.  

 

1)

       

Basic: RFC 2617: section 2 (nothing)  

 

2)

       

Bearer: RFC 6750: bearers 

 

Bearer authentication have 3 different bearer authentication schemes but no logging of which is used.  The errors (due to HTTP errors reporting) seem to merge several errors into the same error codes). Since this is an approved RFC,  why does IANA have error codes for the different Bearer schemes? 

 

What level of this work is “just encode” and what level is updated to the latest in security handshaking schemes?  Should this be compared against the OASIS work to secure portions of the information? That is – authenticate who can have this piece of data using my HTTTP. 

 

3)

       

Digest: RFC 2617:  Digest – 

Even for routing protocols (sometimes called security light) the digests have been considered weak.  What exactly the author is trying to suggest needs to be included in the registry is not clear. 

 

4)

       

Negotiate: RFC 54559: Section 3: 

The author indicates that this breaks syntax by mixing Kerberos (connection-oriented) and expanding the syntax (Authenticate/Authorization) by not including the Kerberos gssapi-data in the initial WWW-Authenticate header.

 

It is entirely unclearly why this kludge in limited use is any more a kludge than the rest of the system.   The comment on non-context specific ignores the password/user digest issues of deployment 

 

It is not clear why this needs to be noted in the IANA registration. 

 

5)

       

OAuth: RFC5849: Section 3.5.1 

                    

Authorization: OAuth realm="Example",

        oauth_consumer_key="0685bd9184jfhq22",

        oauth_token="ad180jjd733klru7",

        oauth_signature_method="HMAC-SHA1",

        oauth_signature="wOJIO9A2W5mFwDgiDvZbTSMK%2FPY%3D",

        oauth_timestamp="137131200",

        oauth_nonce="4572616e48616d6d65724c61686176",

        oauth_version="1.0"

 

I have confirmed that referenced documents in  do reference these documents and have comments. However, unless I look at the wider context of these documents, I do not know if the IANA work is complete. 

 

What bothers me in the macro-view: 

 

However, I would like to comment on the protected space concept (Realm) and proxy-authenticate in the draft-ietf-httpbis-p4-auth. The practical implementation is impacted by the new world of VMs and shared information.  

 

Respectfully, but

Sue Hares